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Abstract 
To what extent can ethics and foreign policy be conceived as possible? Instead of 
answering within the implied dichotomy of possibility and impossibility, this thesis 
argues for a reconceptualisation of the dichotomy. Ethics and foreign policy are better 
understood on the basis of undecidability: neither simply possible nor impossible, but 
both at the same time. A deconstructive reading of British (1997-2006) and EU (1999- 
2004) foreign policy, both of which make claims to ethics, reveals how the issue is beset 
by internal contradictions, paradoxes and aporias. The deconstruction is structured 
around the concepts of subjectivity, responsibility and hospitality, each of which 
constitutes an important point of undecidability within British and EU representations of 
their ethical dimension. The subject of ethics and foreign policy is always haunted and 
inhabited by its object, responsibility is necessarily irresponsible, and hospitality 
contains an irrepressible hostility. Thus, ethics and foreign policy is best conceived as 
undecidably im-possible. However, such undecidability cannot be used to justify 
abandoning the goal of an ethical foreign policy. Rather, a Derridean 'negotiation' is 
proposed. Negotiation seeks to remain loyal to the dual injunction of deconstruction, an 
undecidability which is the condition of ethics and politics, and a decision which 
decides, and closes to certain figures of otherness. It requires a permanent questioning, 
testing and invention of the promise of ethics and foreign policy. This produces a range 
of illustrative suggestions for the possible enactment of an ethico-political foreign 
policy, which would refer to and strive for an ultimately unrealisable ethical foreign 
policy. This research contributes a fundamental critique and questioning of the 
possibility of ethics and foreign policy. It provides a revealing exploration of British and 
EU foreign policy from the period, based around responsibility and hospitality. Finally, 
the thesis introduces the Derridean notion of negotiation to the discipline, seen as a way 
of moving through the potential paralysis brought by the undecidability arising from 
foundational questioning. 
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Introduction 
Questions of ethics and morality' can be conceived as a matter of how we ought to 
conduct our lives in relation to others, and otherness in general. 'Otherness' is that which 
is different, that which exceeds our self, our understanding, the totalisation of our 
knowledge. As such, it does not only mean other people, but anything which resists our 
comprehension. This is not to say that our 'self gives itself over to such total 
2 understanding. As subjects 'we' are always strangers to ourselves, fragmented, 
containing and constituted by difference and otherness which cannot be subsumed into a 
simple, coherent self The self itself does not permit complete knowledge or 
comprehension. To speak of ethics then is to speak of how we should act in relation to 
this otherness. 
In his reading of foreign policy as a politics of identity, David Campbell draws a 
distinction between two understandings of foreign policy: what he calls 'foreign policy' 
and Foreign Policy. 3 The broader practice of 'foreign policy' refers to discursive 
"practices of differentiation or modes of exclusion (possibly figured as relationships of 
otherness) that constitute their object as 'foreign' in the process of dealing with them". 4 
This is foreign policy seen as a general practice of constituting 'sameness' and 
'otherness' through their representation - of differentiating and excluding the 'foreign' 
from the 'domestic', the 'inside' from the 'outside', the 'other' from the 'self. Foreign 
Policy, on the other hand, is how the disciplines of international relations (IR)5 and 
foreign policy analysis (FPA) generally conceive foreign policy: as a state-based practice 
towards that which is beyond the state's borders, that which is 'foreign' and not 
'domestic' or part of the collective 'self. The capitalised Foreign Policy is therefore a 
1 The terms 'ethical' and 'moral' are used as synonyms in this thesis, following Hutchings argument that 
the distinction drawn between the two by scholars such as Jurgen Habermas is untenable. See Kimberley 
Hutchings, Kant, Critique andPolitics (London: Routledge, 1996). 
2 Michael Dillon, "The Sovereign and the Stranger", in Jenny Edkins, Nalini Persram, and Veronique Pin- 
Fat (eds. ), Sovereignty and Subjectivity (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 1999), p. 118. 
3 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity Revised ed. 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), pp. 68-69. 
4 Ibid, pp. 68-69. 
5 From now on 'IR' will be used to refer to the discipline and 'international relations' to the empirical 
matter which the discipline studies. 
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particular and highly circumscribed instance of the 'foreign PoliCY56 which everyone 
takes part in, both individually and collectively, from moment to moment. 
Ethics andlas Foreign Policy 
Campbell's refiguration of foreign policy has considerable implications for the 
importance placed upon questions of ethics and foreign policy. If, as is commonly the 
case, they are seen as two separate areas joined by an 'and' or an 'in, ' issues of ethics 
can be trivialised as one peripheral concern or potentially interesting question regarding 
foreign policy. But they remain marginal; ethics is considered far from central to the 
conduct of foreign policy. Hence, John A. Vasquez can argue that, "U]ust about 
everyone thinks that morality should play some role in foreign policy, just about 
everyone that is except for professional diplomats, and of course, political scientists. " 7 
While Vasquez separates diplomats and political scientists from "just about everyone" to 
demonstrate that the discipline should give attention to morality in foreign policy, he is 
also marking the issue as peripheral: morality should play some role in foreign policy. 
The issue is thus presented as interdisciplinary, and thus not vital to either the study of 
ethics or foreign policy. 
However, the thinking of ethics and foreign policy above illustrates that, in fact, they are 
far from separate. Both are concerned with the same problem: how we constitute and 
relate to otherness. The subject of ethics is foreign policy: it examines how we ought to 
relate to otherness. And if foreign policy is a practice of constructing otherness and 
relating to it, the question of foreign policy must be how we ought to do this: a question 
of ethics. 8 Even if questions of 'ought' are not posed in foreign policy, assumptions are 
made which presuppose a certain production of and relation to otherness, a certain 'self 
and a certain 'other', and the way they ought to relate. Questions of foreign policy are 
6 Campbell, Writing Security, p. 69. 
7 John A. Vasquez, "Ethics, Foreign Policy, and Liberal Wars: The Role of Restraint in Moral Decision 
Making" International Studies Perspectives Vol. 6, No. 3 (2005), p. 307. 
' Peter Singer makes issues of "ought" central to ethics in the "Introduction" to his ethics reader. See, Peter 
Singer (ed. ), Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 1. 
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therefore highly defined instances of questioning ethics, and vice versa. Ethics is not just 
one issue among many for foreign policy. Indeed, its importance is difficult to overstate. 
Foreign policy is the issue of ethics and ethics is the issue of foreign policy. 
To what extent, then, can an ethical foreign policy be conceived as possible? In the terms 
outlined above, this is to ask: can a truly ethical relation to otherness in/as foreign policy 
be a possibility? The temptation set by these questions is to answer in terms of the 
dichotomy it tacitly implies: it is either possible, or impossible. Most answers to this 
question succumb to such a stultifying logic, seeing it as one or the other, sometimes 
depending upon the circumstances. For example, Will Bartlett concludes that an ethical 
foreign policy is "difficult, if not impossible, to define" let alone enact. 9 Mervyn Frost 
argues that what matters in an ethical foreign policy is the "foster[ing] of free 
individuality", but suggests its impossible implementation by observing that "[i]n many 
international situations there are very few means available" to achieve this. 10 Meanwhile, 
Vasquez and Robert W. McElroy both see an ethical foreign policy as a distinct 
possibility. ' 1 
In contrast, the rigorous deconstruction of ethics and foreign policy undertaken by this 
thesis reveals the need to reconceptualise the dichotomy of possibility/impossibility and 
displace it. Inspired by the thought of Jacques Derrida and the non-method of 
deconstruction, this thesis argues that an ethical foreign policy can best be conceived as 
both possible and impossible, but neither simply one nor the other. Any ethical, 
responsible relation to otherness is also always an unethical irresponsible relation. The 
ethicality of foreign policy is undecidable: neither simply possible nor impossible. 
9 Will Bartlett, "'Simply the right thing to do': Labour goes to war", in Richard Little and Mark Wickham- 
Jones (eds. ), New Labour's Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade? (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2000), p. 143. 
'0 Mervyn Frost, "Putting the World to Rights: Britain's Ethical Foreign Policy" Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs Vol - 
12, No. 2 (1999), p-88. 
11 See Robert W. McElroy, Morality andAmerican Foreign Policy: The Role of Ethics in International 
Affairs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992) and Vasquez, "Ethics, Foreign Policy, and 
Liberal Wars". 
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This deconstructive undecidability is, however, far from negative; undecidability is not 
the same as impossibility, and it calls for the opposite of an abandonment of ethics and 
foreign policy. The aim of a deconstruction is to reveal the complexity and the 
contradictions within what one strives to enact and make possible. While there is what 
Derrida calls a "Necessity" compelling a deconstruction, everything that he seems to 
oppose through this deconstruction "is exactly what I'm after in life. I love the voice, I 
love presence. " 12 Equally, the deconstruction of ethics and foreign policy is not merely 
opposed to its possibility, but is inspired by a desirefor an ethical, responsible relation to 
the other. Yet, to be dedicated to such a goal means also to obey the "Necessity" of 
interrupting this desire and showing that its achievement is never possible, if not 
absolutely impossible. 
The attraction and appeal of a deconstructive approach thus also lies in its resistance to 
the apparent paralysis of undecidability. Far from justifying an rejection of any prospect 
of an ethical foreign policy, deconstruction calls for a testing and 'negotiation' of its 
promise. It allows that there continues to be that in the concept of ethics as it arises in 
foreign policy texts - the aspiration of a responsible relation towards the other and 
otherness - which remains valuable and worth struggling for. While exposing the 
fundamental im-possibility of achieving this promise, deconstruction gives no excuse or 
justification for its abandonment. 
This thesis argues that the promise of ethics and foreign policy can best be preserved 
through negotiation of individual ethico-political foreign policies. A negotiation permits 
the possibility of context-bound decisions which retain a reference to an ethical foreign 
policy (ethico-), while always remaining undecidable (political) as to their ethicality. In 
this way, negotiation retains the hope for, and the aspiration towards, more ethics and 
foreign policy rather than less. A truly ethical foreign policy, however, must remain the 
always referred to, forever undecidable, to come. 
12 Jacques Derrida, in Michael Payne and John Schad (eds. ), life. after. theory (London: Continuum, 2003), 
p. 8. 
II 
Structure and Approach 
This rethinking of ethics and foreign policy as interdependent, as well as indicating their 
profound importance as a single issue, also has implications for the way in which the 
issue is studied. A tendency of the minimal extant literature on the subject is to view the 
two as an "intersection" in the same way that R. B. J. Walker characterises the traditional 
treatment of ethics and international relations. ' 3 "'Ethics' comes to be understood as an 
achieved body of principles, norms and rules already codified in texts and traditions. 
And 'international relations' is understood as a realm of recalcitrant practical problems 
in dire need of greater moral scruple. " 14 The two separate areas thus intersect through the 
application of one to the other: "a singular ethical theory that could be devised in the 
abstract and applied in the concrete". 15 Thus, certain scholars look to the application of 
deontological or consequentalist rules, 16 others to the just war tradition, 17 while for some 
a highly specific notion, such as the "good international citizen", is devised to "evaluate 
the ethical dimension of the Blair government's foreign policy". 18 
It is precisely this application of a pre-established ethics to the empirical arena of foreign 
policy that is ruled out by the symbiotic relation between ethics and/as foreign policy. 
'Ethics' is not an arsenal of principles we can simply fire at a problem, but "an ongoing 
historical practice" 19 regarding what our relation to otherness ought to be. Meanwhile, 
like international relations for Walker, 'foreign policy' and its theoretical study are far 
from lacking any ethical assumptions. Rather, they are "already constituted through 
13 R. B. J. Walker, InsidelOutside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), p. 50. 
14jbid. 
15 David Campbell and Michael J. Shapiro, "From Ethical Theory to the Ethical Relation", in David 
Campbell and Michael J. Shapiro (eds. ), Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics 
(Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. viii. 
16 Chris Brown, "Ethics, interests and foreign policy", in Karen E. Smith and Margot Light, Ethics and 
Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200 1), p. 19. 
" Vasquez, "Ethics, Foreign Policy, and Liberal Wars", p. 314. 
18 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Good international citizenship: a third way for British foreign 
policy" International Affairs Vol. 74, No. 4 (1998), p. 848. 
19 Walker, InsidelOutside, p. 5 1. 
12 
accounts of ethical possibility". 20 Chapter I illustrates this latter point by bringing 
together poststructuralist IR theory and FPA literature, the sub-discipline of IR dedicated 
to the theorisation of foreign policy. While this is the literature in which one could 
perhaps expect an extended discussion of the possibility of ethics and foreign policy, the 
subject has in fact been almost entirely ignored. Yet this ignorance is less interesting 
than the way in which certain unstated assumptions made by FPA work to construct 
foreign policy as a realm in which ethics can be marginalised and disregarded. 
Implicitly, FPA constructs ethics and foreign policy as, at best, an irrelevancy and, at 
worst, an impossibility. 
Avoiding an approach that treats ethics and foreign policy as separate areas, this thesis 
investigates how the two are jointly constructed within certain foreign policies. To look 
at the possibility of ethics and foreign policy is to examine how they are represented 
together, how this is considered possible, and whether the logic of this possibility stands 
up to scrutiny. Chapter 11 explains how this can be done through a deconstructive 
reading of foreign policy as text. Contra-FPA, it is argued that there can be no foreign 
policy per se, a thing itseýf of foreign policy outside of its representation. Foreign policy, 
if there is such a thing, can only be examined in the way it is described and mediated 
through language and discourse. As Derrida observes, any 'act', of foreign policy or 
21 otherwise, cannot be "simply dissociated from, or opposed to discourse" . 
Studied in this way, the application of an ethics from outside the particular text is no 
longer justified or necessary. The representation and understanding of ethics and foreign 
policy within the text can be deconstructed to reveal the possibility and impossibility of 
an ethical foreign policy, along with how this dichotomy breaks down. The theoretical 
study of foreign policy, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, and the foreign policy texts 
themselves, illustrated in Chapters 111, IV and V, are built around binary oppositions 
such as inside/outside, national/international, subject/object, responsible/irresponsible, 
20 Ibid. 
21 Jacques Derrida, "Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility: A dialogue with Jacques Derrida", in Richard 
Kearney and Mark Dooley (eds. ), Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy (London: 
Routledge, 1999), pp. 65-66. 
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and so on. Deconstruction is thus a particularly useful approach because it is attuned to 
the way all text is structured around hierarchical binaries, especially those which foreign 
policy often defers back to and assumes: presence/absence, speech/writing, possibility/ 
impossibility. 
Through a close reading of texts we can find points of weakness, points of incision, 
where deconstruction operates, overturning and displacing hierarchical binaries. This 
displacement is the realm of undecidability. An undecidable disturbs the structure of the 
text through being neither one thing (ethical, for example), nor another (unethical), yet 
being both one (ethical) and the other (unethical). To deconstruct discourses of ethics 
and foreign policy then is to examine the foreign policy text for claims to ethics, and 
then reveal how they break down under their own undecidable logic. 
The specific texts examined are British foreign PoliCY22 from 1997-2006 and European 
Union (EU) foreign policy from 1999-2004. Firstly, the research on British foreign 
policy comprised a careful reading and deconstructive analysis of all foreign policy 
speeches, interviews, media appearances and press conferences given by Prime Minister 
Tony Blair (1997-), Foreign Secretaries Robin Cook (1997-2001) and Jack Straw (2001- 
2006), and several Junior Foreign Office Ministers who held office between 1997 and 
2006.23 The research undertaken is crucial to understanding how ethics and foreign 
policy is represented in British foreign policy during the period under study. 
Secondly, the research on EU foreign policy consisted of a similarly close reading and 
analysis of all the foreign policy speeches, interviews, media appearances and press 
conferences of Javier Solana (High Representative (HR) for the EU Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), 1999-), Romano Prodi (President of the EU Commission, 
1999-2004) and Chris Patten (EU Commissioner for External Relations, 1999-2004). 
The six month rotating EU Presidency is excluded because the thesis examines EU, not 
22 By 'British foreign policy' I mean foreign policy conducted by the government of the United Kingdom. 
23 Those Junior Ministers whose speeches are used in this thesis are: Peter Hain, Kim Howells, Denis 
MacShane, Mike O'Brien, Bill Rammell, Ian Pearson and Lord Triesman. 
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European foreign policy, which Brian White suggests includes the Member States as 
24 
well . 
As Chapter 11 outlines, these speeches and public statements are representative of the 
foreign policy text but cannot exhaust it. In Campbell's terms, everyone constitutes and 
re-constitutes the Foreign Policy text through taking part in discursive practices of 
'foreign policy'. In other words, the text of foreign policy is not something that can be 
separated cleanly from any other text; all discursive differentiation between 'selves' and 
'others', and representations of how this otherness is dealt with, contributes to foreign 
policy. However, the ultimately unjustifiable restriction of the research to the figures 
outlined above is due to the offices which they occupied. These offices are in the best 
position to both speak and be spoken by their foreign policy text. 
British and EU foreign policy are chosen primarily because of the prominence both give 
to the ethical. This could not have been clearer in the case of British foreign policy. 
Under two weeks after the new Labour Government had been elected, the new Foreign 
Secretary, Robin Cook, emphasised ethics in his first major address. His Foreign Office 
'Mission Statement' claimed that, "[o]ur foreign policy must have an ethical dimension 
and must support the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we 
,, 25 insist for ourselves. Subsequently Cook distanced himself from specific use of the 
term "ethical dimension", and the term "ethical foreign policy" was denied as it was "too 
easily capable of being misunderstood as grandstanding". 26 
However, far from fading with Cook's disquiet, the rhetoric of ethics and morality came 
to play a greater role in the British foreign policy discourse. John Kampfner, for 
instance, notes that Prime Minister Tony Blair's language in particular increasingly 
24 Brian White, Understanding European Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 39-41. 
25 Robin Cook, "Mission Statement", 12 May 1997, 
http: //www. guardian. co. uk/indonesia/StoLiL/0,2763,190889,00. html (retrieved 11 July 2003). 
26 Robin Cook, "Beyond good intentions - government, business and the environment", Speech to the 
Business and Environment Dinner, 17 November 1998. Unless otherwise stated, all speeches, interviews 
and press conferences by Foreign Office Ministers have been downloaded from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) website: http: //www. fco. gov. u (retrieved between II October 2004 and I 
May 2006). 
15 
invoked morality, drawing instant comparisons with Cook's 'Mission Statement'. Blair, 
he claimed, "had belatedly found an ethical dimension of his own. The detail was 
different in places, but the idea was not. ý527 Chapters III and IV indicate the ways in 
which this ethical dimension was understood, how it was developed and sustained over 
nine years in Blair's, and his Foreign Ministers', public statements. Crucially, these 
chapters also explicate the way this ethical dimension falls apart under the weight of its 
own internal contradictions. 
Academic debate surrounding EU foreign policy rarely focuses on ethics, instead 
concerning itself with whether the EU can be seen as having a foreign policy at al 1.28 
However, by rethinking foreign policy as text, as a representation of the means by which 
otherness is constituted and related to, we can see that questioning whether the EU is 
capable of foreign policy per se is no longer as pertinent. Regardless of its institutional 
and conceptual dissimilarity to a nation-state, its lack of an executive , foreign policy 
bureaucracy and resources, 29 the EU actively works to both construct and interact with a 
'foreign' otherness through representational practices. 
Like the British text, EU foreign policy has also apportioned great significance to the 
ethical; indeed, Hazel Smith even claims that the EU "seems to view itself as an 
intrinsically ethical foreign policy actor". 30 Though Smith offers no evidence for this, 
textual support nonetheless abounds. Prodi, for instance, declares that, as Europeans, 
"our distinguishing feature is our sense of responsibility", 31 while Solana emphasises 
27 John Kampfner, Blair's Wars (London: Free Press, 2003), p. 124. 
28 Such questions have been prominently raised especially by Christopher Hill - see, "The Capability- 
Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role" Journal of Common Market Studies 
Vol. 3 1, No. 3 (1993), pp. 305-328 - and Roy H. Ginsberg - see, "Conceptualizing the EU as and 
International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Cap abi I ity-Expectations Gap" Journal of Common Market 
Studies Vol. 37, No. 3 (1999), pp. 429-454. For a more general introduction to this question, see Karen E. 
Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Cambridge: Polity, 2003). 
29 Hill, "The Capability-Expectations Gap..., " p. 316. 
30 Hazel Smith, European Union Foreign Policy: What it is and What it Does (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 
p. 271. 
3' Romano Prodi, "The European project in the world: between values and politics, " Speech to Fondazione 
Don Tonino Bello Alessano, Lecce, 13 June 2003. All speeches, interviews and press conferences by 
Romano Prodi, President of the EU Commission, have been downloaded from the Commission archives 
website: http: //europa. eu. int/comm/archives/commission 1999 2004/prodi/speeches/index en. htm 
(accessed 16 August 2005). 
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that this responsibility extends to those beyond the EU's borders. 32 It would be "morally 
untenable, sometimes unthinkable, to sit idle, without reacting to... human misery and 
distress. Therefore we are compelled to act. , 33 
The period between 1999 and 2004 in EU foreign policy provides a useful contrast to 
British foreign policy. While the British text gives a long term and comparatively clear 
line in ethics, the EU text provides a concise, yet more ambiguous understanding of the 
possibility of enacting ethics and foreign policy. This period also encapsulates the dates 
of the Prodi Commission, which saw the coming together of three key figures (Prodi, 
Patten and Solana, who took up his position as HR for the CFSP in 1999) joined by a 
belief in what Prodi calls "an ethical dimension to politics". 34 The nature and 
understanding of EU foreign policy's ethical dimension, as well as its deconstruction, is 
examined in detail in Chapters III and V. 
What emerges from the empirical research into British and EU foreign policy is that, in 
both cases, ethics is understood as a matter of responsibility. That is, the possibility of 
ethics and foreign policy is constructed as an issue of a responsible relation to otherness. 
While there is more to the "ongoing historical practice 5,35 of ethics than 'responsibility', 
its centrality to this thesis arises from the texts of the two foreign policies examined. As 
observed above, a deconstruction searches out points of undecidability in apparently 
coherent and cohesive texts. With this in mind, Chapters III, IV and V are structured 
around such undecidable moments in the British and EU texts: their claims to 
subjectivity, or rather, their construction of the subject of ethics and foreign policy as a 
subject of responsibility; the account of a responsibility to protect and save in British 
32 Javier Solana, Speech at the inaugural conference of the course, "Towards a new international morality: 
the humanitarian interventions", University of Alcala de Henares, Madrid, 7 July 2000. Unless otherwise 
stated, all speeches, interviews and press conferences by Javier Solana, High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, have been downloaded from the Council of the EU website: 
http: //ue. eu. int/ems3 app Ii cations/app Ii cation s/sol ana/i ndex. asp? l ang=EN&cm s id=2 56 
(accessed between II July 2005 and 8 August 2005). 
31 Ibid 
34 Romano Prodi, Report to the European Parliament on the Spring European Council, Brussels, 26 March 
2003. See also, Romano Prodi, "Europe and Ethics", Speech to the Conference on Politics and 
Morality, 
Vienna, 7 December 2002. 
35 Walker, InsidelOutside, p. 5 1. 
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foreign policy; and the exercise of responsibility as an offering of hospitality to others in 
EU foreign policy. 
These foreign policy texts rely on the possibility of a collective subject of ethics and 
foreign policy; they require a 'we', an 'our', an 'us' which can act ethically. This 
subjectivity is conceived differently, however, in the British and EU texts. As Chapter 
IV shows, 'Britain' constructs itself as able to enact an ethics globally, while the 'EU' is 
far more circumspect in this regard, preferring to restrict itself to a regional role. 
Nonetheless, Chapter III illustrates the way in which both foreign policies construct 
subjectivity as the capacity of taking responsibility in world politics through foreign 
policy. It is this 'ability to take responsibility' around which British and EU 
representations of their own and others' subjectivity undermines itself A parallel reading 
of Britain's 'failing state' discourse alongside Derrida's portrayal of democracy as 
autoimmune reveals that a 'successful' subject of responsibility is also always already a 
'failing' object. Similarly, a close reading reveals that the 'we' affirmed as subject is 
constantly shifting in the discourse, never allowing a stable representation of that which 
is capable of responsibility (subject) and that which is not (object). The subject of ethics 
and foreign policy is thus undecidably affirmed and denied as both possible and 
impossible, yet neither simply one nor the other. 
As suggested above, British and EU foreign policy differ substantially in their 
representations of how responsibility is enacted. The British text focuses on the 
relatively straightforward responsibility to protect human life from tyrannical regimes in 
other countries, and the responsibility to save human life from poverty and disease by 
also saving failing (mainly African) states. Chapter IV outlines the way in which both 
descriptions of enacting responsibility are also necessarily irresponsible. The 
responsibility to protect works both for and against the ethics of a 'humanitarian 
intervention' to protect life. This can be demonstrated through the centrality of an 
apparently marginal case: the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Equally, the responsibility to save is 
irrevocably tied to both a responsible compassion for the other as other, and an 
irresponsible contempt for the other until it becomes the same. The possibility of ethics 
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and responsibility in foreign policy are irrevocably and undecidably tied to an unethical 
irresponsibility. 
In contrast to the comparatively simple line taken in the British text, EU foreign policy 
enacts responsibility by offering hospitality to the countries and regions surrounding it. 
This hospitality, analysed in Chapter V, is offered through three policies: the policy of 
enlargement, the policy towards the Balkan countries and, latterly, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The different degrees of conditionality and entry into the 
European 'home' attached to these policies, however, helps illustrate what Derrida calls 
the two laws of hospitality. The law of hospitality demands an unconditional openness 
towards otherness, while the laws place conditions upon this hospitality. The fact that the 
latter needs the former (and vice versa) means that the hostility of conditions and 
questions is always installed in hospitality; ethical and responsible hospitality is always 
already an unethical, irresponsible hostility. This undecidability is equally constitutive of 
unconditional hospitality; allowing anyone and anything into one's home means that it is 
no longer one's home, but rather a place of hostility where one is held hostage. 
If this thesis merely argued that ethics and foreign policy is neither possible nor 
impossible, but undecidably both and neither, this is where the analysis could rest. Both 
British and EU texts reveal this constitutive im-possibility and ir-responsibility. 
However, the implications of such undecidability could be taken as an excuse to further 
marginalise discussion of ethics and foreign policy. Undecidability potentially provides a 
new means, a new rationale, for such marginal isation. Such a position is directly 
opposed to the inspiration of this thesis: that the goal of an ethical foreign policy as a 
responsible relation towards otherness is worth preserving in the perfectibility of its 
promise. Thus, the opportunity of a movement through undecidability is proposed in 
Chapter VI, a movement which seeks to maintain the openness of undecidability as the 
condition of politics and ethics, while negotiating the closure of a decision. 
Negotiation is outlined as a potential for individual, context-bound, ethico-political 
foreign policy decisions. It can, perhaps, best be conceived as an oscillating movement 
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between equally imperative injunctions: an undetermined and a fully determined 
subjectivity; a responsibility to all others and one other; an unconditional hospitality and 
its conditional form. The non-foundational foundation of any such negotiation is the dual 
duty of deconstruction: to remain open to otherness, or what Derrida calls the future-to- 
come, and yet to close to certain futures, and certain figures of otherness, through a 
decision which seeks to avoid the 'worst'. Far from granting the assurance of an ethical 
or responsible foreign policy, negotiation indicates the may be of a potential movement 
through its undecidability. This negotiated movement through is, perhaps, the best way 
to preserve the promise of an ethical foreign policy to come. 
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Chapter I 
Foreign Policy Analysis: Marginalising Ethics 
Introduction 
This chapter brings together two literatures in the study of international relations in order 
to situate the thesis: FPA and poststructuralist IR theory. These two less than coherent 
'bodies' of work only significantly cross over in particular works of David Campbel 136 
and Roxanne Lynn Doty. 37 The two literatures are selected for somewhat obvious 
reasons; the thesis analyses 'foreign policy' through poststructuralist, specifically 
Derridean, thought. However, this chapter does more than simply review the extant 
literature. It draws the two together in order to demonstrate not only that FPA ignores 
and marginalises the 'ethical', but also how it does so. . 
FPA is a field suffused with insecurities and identity problems. It is considered by many 
to be a sub-discipline of IR, indeed, Brian White asserts that "at one level at least, 
international relations consists of an interacting network of foreign policies". 38 Margot 
Light makes the stronger claim that FPA and IR should be considered separate 
disciplines, as FPA seeks to open up the 'black box' of state decisions, while traditional 
IR theory takes the state as a given. 39 James Rosenau, who contributed most to putting 
FPA on the academic map, characterises FPA as a "bridging discipline" between the 
study of international relations and domestic politics, thus concerning itself with politics 
36 Particularly in Campbell, Writing Security. 
37 Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Postivist Analysis of US 
Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines" International Studies Quarterly Vol. 37, No. 3 (1993), and 
Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). 
38 Brian White, "Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches", in Michael Clarke and Brian 
White (eds. ), Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach (Aldershot: Edward 
Elgar, 1989), p. 2. 
39 Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Analysis", in AJ. R. Groom and Margot Light (eds. ), Contemporary 
International Relations: A Guide to Theory (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), p. 94. 
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at every level . 
40 However characterised, scholars have plainly announced their unease at 
the future of FPA. Charles Kegley for example thought that, though by 1980 FPA was 
not yet a 'paradigm lost', it advanced "haltingly and non-self-assuredly". 41 Later, Steve 
Smith felt it necessary to question whether FPA was a "discredited pseudo-science" , 
42 
while even Margot Light suggested a "steady erosion" of a separate concept of foreign 
policy and FPA. 43 A 2002 edited volume queried whether FPA had a future at all. 44 
Regardless of the health of FPA as a thriving discipline, of greater interest to this thesis 
is its failure to account for the ethical. After all, if FPA concerns itself with politics at 
every level, with "the full range of individual and collective processes whereby people 
seek to give meaning and hope to their lives", 45 one would perhaps expect it to have 
something to say about ethics. However, even an explanation as to why the issue is 
ignored generally fails to materialise. This chapter does not simply illustrate this 
marginalisation of the ethical in FPA; this could be easily done and would illuminate 
little. Crucially, it also asks how this marginalisation has been made possible. The claim 
is that while not tackling the ethical directly, different versions of FPA make 
assumptions which fold the ethical into their argument as something which can be 
excluded from debate. 
The term 'marginalising ethics' is therefore used to mean two things: firstly, in a fairly 
simple sense, FPA fails to discuss what morally ought to be done in foreign policy; but 
in a second, more important sense, FPA ignores the fact that the way we think about 
foreign policy contains assumptions about ethics which themselves have ethical 
40 James N. Rosenau, "Introduction: New Directions and Recurrent Questions in the Comparative Study of 
Foreign Policy", in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr, and James N. Rosenau (eds. ), New 
Directions in the Study ofForeign Policy (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), p. 1. 
41 Charles W. Kegley, The Comparative Study ofForeign Policy: Paradigm Lost? (Columbia, SC: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1980), p. 1. 
42 Steve Smith, "Theories of foreign policy: a historical overview" Review of International Studies Vol. 12, 
No. 1 (1986), p. 13. 
43 Light, "Foreign Policy Analysis", p. 100. 
44 Ryan K. Beasley and Michael T. Snarr, "Domestic and International Influences on Foreign Policy: A 
Comparative Perspective", in Ryan K. Beasley, Juliet Kaarbo, Jeffrey S. Lantis and Michael T. Snarr 
(eds. ), Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State 
Behaviour (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2002), p. 345. 
45 Rosenau, 'New Directions and Recurrent Questions... ', pp. 1-3. 
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implications. Our construction of 'foreign policy' is not value free, rather it necessitates 
certain concerns, methodologies, judgements and outcomes which may be ethically 
questionable. Insensitivity to this second marginalisation generally leads to, even 
justifies, the continued marginalisation of ethics in the first sense. For example, we shall 
see that the construction of 'foreign policy' as something we can scientifically quantify 
leads to the need to purge FPA of all "moral fervour" in order to achieve such 
46 scientism . Thus, whether or not FPA is a 'paradigm lost', the study of ethics and 
foreign policy becomes a 'paradigm indefinitely deferred'. 
This chapter proceeds by arbitrarily splitting FPA into 'conventional' analyses, from 
what Smith calls the US and British traditions of FPA, 47 and 'unconventional' analyses, 
which are usually of a constructivist orientation. Having outlined the dominant strains of 
conventional FPA, the first section draws out three ways in which their assumptions 
about the nature of international politics work to exclude and ignore the ethical. The 
constructivist turn, producing an unconventional approach to FPA, is examined in 
section two. While more attuned to the assumptions which exclude the ethical, certain 
presuppositions retained by unconventional FPA work to both limit its ethical scope and 
draw it back into the marginal i sations performed by conventional FPA. Thus it is argued 
that the study of ethics and foreign policy requires a more thoroughgoing analysis than 
that offered by the dominant strains of FPA. 
46 James N. Rosenau, "Moral Fervor, Systematic Analysis, and Scientific Consciousness in Foreign Policy 
Research", in James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 
1971), p. 24. 
47 Steve Smith, "Foreign Policy Analysis: British and American Orientations and Methodologies" Political 
Studies Vol. 3 1, No. 4 (1983); Smith, "Theories of foreign policy". 
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Conventional Foreign Policy Analysis 
Conventional FPA arose out of a dissatisfaction with realist approaches to IR and in the 
1950s and 1960s embraced behaviouralist methodology. 48 Its basis, Smith argues, was a 
belief that foreign policy can be treated as a phenomenon common to all states . 
49 Thus 
certain assumptions were made and held to be beyond doubt - that all nations' foreign 
policies were comparable, that patterns in behaviour were determined by identifiable 
factors, and that these determinants could be classed in terms of relative influence . 
50 This 
section reviews the development of conventional FPA from three important works in its 
early years. Three critiques then reveal the constitutive assumptions which allow an 
ignorance of the ethical. 
Conventional FPA and its Development 
Valerie M. Hudson's recent historical survey of FPA singles out three "paradigmatic" 
works .51 
Arguably the most influential of these three, especially over the following two 
decades, was Rosenau's 'Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy'. 
52 Though many 
developments were to be made on this general framework, Rosenau's pre-theory "lies at 
53 the base of them all". The other two were a 1954 essay by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. 
Bruck and Burton Sapin, 54 which refocused the debate on decision making as the unit of 
analysis, and Harold and Margaret Sprout's examination of 'milieu'. 
55 
48 Smith, "Theories of foreign policy", p. 16. 
49 Smith, "Foreign Policy Analysis", p. 558. 
50 Kegley, The Comparative Study ofForeign Policy, p. 1. 
51 Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International 
Relations" Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 1, No. 1 (2005), p. 5. 
52 Originally published in 1966, reprinted as James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign 
Policy", in Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1971). 
53 Smith, "Foreign Policy Analysis", p. 558. 
54 "Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics", later reprinted in Richard 
C. 
Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York: Free Press of 
Glencoe, 1962), pp. 14-185. 
55 "Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics", later expanded into 
Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human 
Affairs: With Special Reference to 
International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965). 
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i) Pre-theories and the science of FPA 
In his 'Pre-theories' essay, Rosenau states that a problem for FPA has been that it is 
"devoid of general theory". 56 While acknowledging that there is much variation and 
complexity of factors leading to foreign policy, "at the same time it is also true that the 
variability is patterned". 57 The reasons for FPA's failure, he suggests, are two basic 
58 shortcomings, one philosophical and the other conceptual. Philosophically, the failure 
concerns the need for empirical materials to be "similarly processed" for theory to 
develop; "[t]here must be, as it were, pre-theory which renders the raw materials 
,, 59 comparable and ready for theorizing. Causation must be located and the elements 
must be ranked. Such "preliminary processing" has occurred in other social sciences 
which have developed theory but not in FPA, such that most researchers are unaware of 
their pre-theory. 60 
But what does a pre-theory look like? Basically, "all pre-theories of foreign policy are 
either five-dimensional or translatable into five dimensions". 61 These dimensions are 
where causation lies and include the individual (i. e. the characteristics unique to the 
decision makers), role (behaviour generated by the role occupied rather than the 
individual occupier), governmental variables (structures limiting or enhancing choices), 
societal factors (such as values, degree of national unity and industrialization etc. ), and 
finally, systemic factors (non-human aspects of the external environment such as 
geography and aggressive ideologies of other states) . 
62 A pre-theory must then rank the 
"relative potencies", 63 or influence, of these factors. Though he observes that this will 
56 Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", p. 99. 
57 Ibid., p. 103. 
5' Ibid., p. 105. 
59 Ibid., p. 106. 
60 Ibid., pp. 106-107. 
61 Ibid, P. 108. 
62 Ibid., pp. 108-109. 
63 Ibid., p. 109. 
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inevitably lead to many pre-theories, "it should be possible to discern patterns and draw 
contrasts" leading to a general theory. 64 
This philosophical failure to recognise pre-theories (the explicit ranking of variables in 
terms of causation) has been perpetuated, claims Rosenau, by conceptual failures. Even 
if materials are processed, they do not simply fall into meaningful patterns, "concepts are 
necessary to give them structure and thereby facilitate the formulation of if-then 
propositions". 65 An 'if-then' proposition is crucial to theory building by stipulating 'if 
this happens then this follows'. Two related conceptual failures are key: firstly, the 
outdated tendency to maintain a firm separation of national and international political 
systems, and secondly, the blindness to indications that political systems operate 
differently from one issue to another. 66 
To tackle the first problem, he offers the concept of a "penetrated political system 1567 
which indicates the "presence of non-members who participate directly in a society's 
politics". 68 Examples include Vietnam, the Congo, Cuba, Japan and Germany after 
World War 11. Penetrated systems are characterized not only by the existence of non- 
member participants but, more significantly, "by a shortage of capabilities on the part of 
the penetrated society". 69The non-members try to compensate for or take advantage of 
this shortage. Some penetration is "thoroughgoing" while others are limited to certain 
70 issue areas (such as British defence) . 
The second conceptual problem is precisely this: issue-areas. There is a tendency to 
privilege the national level of action on all issues, but many are tackled by a range of 
actors at all levels interested in that one issue .71 He splits the 
levels up into local (sub- 
national), national and international, showing that some issues are tackled by all levels, 
64 Ibid., p. 116. 
65 Ibid 
66 Ibid, p. 117. 
67 Ibid., p. 127 - emphasis in original. 68 Ibid., p. 130. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., p. 132. 
71 Ibid., pp. 133-135. 
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others by just one. His point is that there is no reason to concentrate solely on the 
national level. Taking the two trends together (penetrated systems and issue-areas), 
Rosenau suggests "the radical conclusion that the boundaries of Political systems ought 
to be drawn vertically in terms of issue areas as well as horizontally in terms of 
geographic areas". 72 Thus, he tries to adapt his pre-theory to encompass a fourfold 
typology of issue-areas (including territorial, status, human resources and non-human 
resources), leading to a highly confusing table constituting his rough pre-theory. 73 
Rosenau acknowledges that the concepts he introduces "greatly complicate the task of 
theory building", but suggests that this does not prevent the production of a general 
theory. 74 The elaboration of pre-theories did not, however, lead to a breakthrough in 
general theory. Nonetheless, in 1987 Rosenau introduces the co-edited New Direction in 
the Study of Foreign Policy by firstly noting the increasing complexity of the world 75 
and then re-stating the belief that all foreign policy behaviour has a "common structure", 
consisting of "discrete action initiated by one state and directed towards one or more 
targets in the world arena". 76 This volume illustrates an important trend in conventional 
FPA which follows on from pre-theory: the increasing belief in 'scientific' methods. The 
hope was that this would eventually yield the Holy Grail - "a grand unified theory of all 
foreign policy behaviour for all nations for all time". 77 
Despite the fact that no general theory had yet been produced via 'scientific' methods, 
there was no retreat from them. Neither was there a qualification or justification of their 
use. Rather, scientific methods were simply exercised. Indeed, 
It is perhaps a measure of movement into a new, more mature era of inquiry that philosophical 
and methodological argumentation is conspicuously absent from these essays. Where earlier 
12 Ibid., p. 135. 
73 Ibid., P. 149. 
74 Ibid., P. 148. 
75 See Rosenau, "Introduction: New Directions and Recurrent Questions... ", pp. 2-3. 
76, bid., p. 7. 
77 Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis", p. 9. 
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works were pervaded with efforts to clarify epistemological foundations and methodological 
78 
premises on which the analysis rested, here such matters are largely taken for granted . 
Thus, Gregory Raymond tries to derive performance indicators to show the success of 
different foreign policies, 79 while Russell Leng presents a typology of military disputes 
which he graphs using measurements of time and "hostility score" . 
80 This is seen as a 
step in the direction of discerning the causes and consequences of military disputes. 81 
Perhaps the best example of this scientific method taken to the extreme is Dwain 
Mefford's system of drawing parallels between crisis situations and the best analogy 
from history. An artificial intelligence machine can then be used to "piece together a 
path or contingency plan that leads from the description of the current situation to a 
terminal point". 82 The ultimate goal of such a system, one can only suppose, is the 
programming of foreign policies such that decisions need no longer be taken. 
Information is simply fed into the artificial intelligence and the best analogical action is 
spat out. 
ii) Decision-making and the socio-psychological milieu 
Snyder, Bruck and Sapin can be credited with giving FPA its focus on decision-making, 
rather than foreign policy outcomes. 
83 Their aim was to explain the foreign policy 
decision. Snyder argued in 1962 that the enduring value of their framework would be: 
the concentration on the perceptions of decision-makers and their definition of the 
situation, the context and intervening variables; the interrelations of structure and 
process as well as decisional outcomes; and the combination of psychological and 
78 Rosenau, "Introduction: New Directions and Recurrent Questions... ", pp. 5-6. 
79Gregory A. Raymond, "Evaluation: A Neglected Task for the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy", in 
Hermann et al. (eds. ), New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, p. 98. 
80 Russell J. Leng, "Structure and Action in Militarized Disputes", in Hermann et al. (eds. ), New 
Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, p. 183. 
81 Ibid., p. 198. 
82 Dwain Mefford, "Analogical Reasoning and the Definition of the Situation: Back to Snyder for 
Concepts and Forward to Artificial Intelligence for Method", in Hermann et al. 
(eds. ), New Directions in 
the Study of Foreign Policy, p. 24. 
8' Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis", p. 6. 
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84 sociological levels of analysis in terms of individual and group decisions. This work 
was, of necessity, less 'scientific' and calculative than Rosenau's style of conventional 
FPA and rarely sought a truly general theory. It concentrated more on sociological and 
psychological methods and helped generate a key aspect of FPA: its interdisciplinarity. 
An interdisciplinary approach to decisions was also very much a keystone of Sprout and 
Sprout's work . 
85 They, however, concentrated on what they called the "psycho-milieu" 
of the individual or (far more problematically for thern)86 the group making the decision. 
A 'psycho-milieu' is the way that a person perceives his human and non-human 
environment. It is made up "of images or ideas, derived from some sort of interaction 
between what he selectively receives from his milieu (via his sensory apparatus) and his 
scheme of values, conscious memories, and subconsciously stored experience". 87 The 
inherent vagueness of this some sort of interaction has led to a great deal of literature 
trying to find the various ways in which different aspects of the 'psycho' and 'milieu' 
interact in foreign policy decision-making. Especially relevant were works by Martha 
Cottarn and the psychologist Margaret G. Hermann, 88 as well as texts by Robert Jervis 
and Richard Cottam, trying to deduce the role of perception and images in foreign 
PoliCY. 89 Such research was not confined to the US with an edited collection by British 
academics studying the impact of belief systems in foreign policy, 90 and Walter 
Carlsnaes' examination of the role of ideology in a cognitive schema. 91 
The truly classic work of FPA to emerge from this interdisciplinary focus on decisions 
was that of Graham Allison. Originally published in 197 1, Essence of Decision looks at 
84 Richard C. Snyder, "Introduction", in Snyder et al, Foreign Policy Decision Making, pp. 5-7. 
85 Sprout and Sprout, The Ecological Perspective, p. 24. 
86 Ibid., pp. 33 -4 1. 87 Ibid ., p. 
28. 
81 See especially, Martha L. Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision-Making: The Influence of Cognition 
(Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1986). 
89 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976 and Richard Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case 
Study (Pittsburgh PA: Pittsburgh University Press, 1977). 
90 Richard Little and Steve Smith (eds. ), Belief Systems and International Relations (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988). 
91 Walter Carlsnaes, Ideology and Foreign Policy: Problems of Comparative Conceptualization (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
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three ways of explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Three major policy decisions 
are separated out: the Soviet decision to send nuclear missiles to Cuba; the US decision 
to blockade Cuba; and the Soviet decision to withdraw the missiles from Cuba. These are 
then all explained in turn by three models of decision-making. Firstly, the 'Rational 
Actor Model' (RAM) which was dominant in the contemporary thought of 1971, if not 
now, on all (not just foreign) public policy. 92 Here the state in its totality is taken as a 
unitary actor who is assumed to act rationally in terms of their self interest (i. e. the 
4national interest'). While not dismissing the 'Rational Actor Model', 93 its dominance is 
what Allison seeks to subvert by introducing two more nuanced models. 
The second, 'Organisational Behaviour' model, takes issue with the image of 
government as a unitary actor. Instead, government is seen as a complex set of 
organisations each with its own standard operating procedure (SOP), which largely pre- 
determines behaviour beforehand. 94 The unit of analysis in foreign policy is no longer an 
anthropomorphised state, but an "organization". 95 This leads to complications in the 
RAM. An organisation can increase efficiency, create capabilities and constrain 
behaviour, but it can also take on its own logiC. 96 Also, the organisation is able to define 
the problem to be solved, and the way the definition is posed often leads to an inevitable 
solution. Those defining the problem have much more control than the RAM allows. 
Another blow to 'rationality' arises from unprecedented issues, or issues that cut across 
different organisations. In these situations "interactive complexity" means the 'decision' 
which results from various SOPs is very different to what a unitary rational actor may 
have chosen. 97 The point is that the RAM is simply not sufficient to account for the 
complexity of policy. 
92 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence ofDecision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2 nd 
Edition (New York: Longman, 1999), p. 13. 
93 Ibid., pp. 50-52. 
94, bid., P. 144. 
9' Ibid. 
96, bid., P. 148. 
97 Ibid., P. 159. 
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The third model is the "heart and soul" of the book, attracting the most interest, attention 
and criticism. 98 The "Governmental Politics" model defines leaders (Presidents, Prime 
Ministers, Core Executives, Cabinets etc. ) at the top of organisations as merely important 
players in competitive bargaining games. There are many players, each of whom (though 
less important than the leader) work on diverse issues with a range of different interests 
(national, organisational, personal and so on). These actors make government decisions 
through bargaining, "not by a single, rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that 
is politics". 99 Priorities and perceptions of agents are shaped by their positions within the 
government, but unlike the simple routine SOPs, the identity of individual participants 
and the asymmetries of information between them also matters. 100 Predicting decision 
outcomes must take account of the participants, 101 the rules of decision making (vote 
needed, vetoes and so on), 102 who frames the issue or sets the agenda, 103 the influence of 
'group think' (where group cohesion leads to drive for consensus) 104 and the complexity 
of joint action between departments and agencies. ' 05 
This complicates the RAM beyond recognition. Conventional FPA tends to favour 
models which simplify foreign policy, enabling the prediction of 'outputs' from given 
'inputs5.106 The myriad inputs in the 'Governmental Politics' model are impossible to 
handle in this way. One small example can be taken from the model: section 11 
(organising concepts), subsection B) (what factors shape players' perceptions, 
preferences and stands on the issue), sub-subsection 2), includes personal, domestic and 
organisational "Goals and interests". 107 Analysts would have to account for each player, 
98 Jerel A. Rosati, "Ignoring the Essence of Decision Making: Review of Essence of Decision" The 
International Studies Review Vol. 3, No. 1 (200 1), pp. 179-18 1. 
99 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, p. 25 5. 
100 Ibid., p. 274. 
101 Ibid., pp. 275-278. 
102 Ibid., pp. 278-280. 
103 Ibid., pp. 280-283. 
104 Ibid., pp. 283-287. 
105 Ibid., pp. 287-294. 
106 Charles A. Powell, James W. Dyson and Helen E. Purkitt, "Opening the 'Black Box': Cognitive 
Processing and Optimal Choice in Foreign Policy", in Hermann et al. (eds. ), New Directions in the 
Study 
of Foreign Policy, p. 205. See also Michael Clarke, "The Foreign 
Policy System: A Framework for 
Analysis", in Clarke and White (eds. ), Understanding Foreign Policy, pp. 28-29. 
107 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, p. 298. 
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of whom there are thousands, including their personal interests in a policy, which may 
be subconscious. And this is only a tiny section of the model. 
In his conclusion, Allison to some extent pre-empts this criticism by saying that the 
models are performing different tasks. While "at one level" they are competing 
explanations of the same occurrence, "at another" they are explaining different 
phenomena altogether. 108 Thus a microscope and a telescope produce different images 
"of the same fundamental reality", 109 while "[t]he glasses one wears magnify one set of 
factors rather than another in ways that have multifarious consequences. "' 10 Thus, for 
Allison, "[m]ultiple, overlapping, competing concentric models are the best the current 
understanding of foreign policy provides. ""' 
Conventional FPA had by the 1990s largely abandoned Rosenau's search for a general 
theory of foreign policy. With the influence of the likes of Snyder et aL, the Sprouts, 
Allison and those that followed, the emphasis tended towards theoretical pluralism as the 
best way to understand foreign policy, with each approach explicating at a different level 
of analysis. ' 12 Hudson suggests that, while IR was moving towards an "actor-general" 
approach (based on abstraction and contextless generalisations about state behaviour), 
FPA had moved towards "actor-specific theory" (concrete, contextual and complex). 
' 13 
Conventional FPA had also increased its complexity by moving, in line with Allison's 
different models, towards a multifactorial, multilevel, interdisciplinary, and integrative 
approach. ' 14 There has been a vast diffusion of work within FPA studies in the US along 
these lines. 1 15 This is not say that grand theorising has been permanently eschewed in 
favour of complexity. The most ambitious integrative computational analysis project yet, 
the second version of the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON2), 
108 bid., p. 387. 
109 Ibid, p. 380. 
110 Ibid., p. 387. 
111 Ibid, p. 40 1. 
112 Beasley and Snarr, "Domestic and International Influences on Foreign Policy", pp. 321-322. 
113 Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis", p. 14. 
114 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
"' See Ibid., pp. 13-21, for a summary of contemporary FPA scholarship. 
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was attempted in the 1990s. This involved a model of constraining and enabling 
elements in the international system, combined with a context bound analysis (requiring 
the input of country experts), all routed through a theoretical component called the 
"ultimate decision unit". 116 While now defunct, Hudson reflects upon this loss by asking 
"if we will ever see its like again in IR theory". ' 17 
Ignoring the Ethical 
Implicit in the above discussion is the fact that with conventional FPA's focus on 
conceptualising 'foreign policy', it completely ignores questions of ethics. However, as 
outlined in the introduction, what is more important is to demonstrate the way that FPA 
achieves this marginalisation through its constitutive assumptions. This section outlines 
three methods by which conventional FPA has trained itself to ignore questions of ethics 
and foreign policy, making them appear irrelevant, unimportant and not something one 
should question. 
i) 'Why' and 'how' questions 
Roxanne Lynn Doty notes that much of the reason behind the way FPA contrives to 
ignore issues of power and, as this chapter argues, of ethics, is because of the questions it 
asks. Traditional FPA asks 'why' questions (why was this policy pursued? ), the aim of 
its analysis being to show that the action/decision was predictable in the 
circumstances. 118 This claim is substantiated by Snyder et al. 's paradigmatic case for 
decision-making as a framework for viewing foreign policy. 
[I]f one wishes to probe the 'why' questions underlying the events, conditions, and 
interaction 
patterns which rest upon state action, then decision-making analysis 
is certainly necessary. We 
116 Ibid, pp. 20-2 1. 
117 bid, p. 21. 
118 Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction", p. 298. 
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would go so far as to say that the 'why' questions cannot be answered without analysis of 
decision making. " 9 
In asking such 'why' questions, Doty points out, FPA takes the possibility that a 
particular decision could be made as unproblematic. In doing this, conventional FPA 
ccpresuppose[s] a particular subjectivity... a background of social discursive practices 
and meanings which make possible the practices as well as the social actors 
themselves". 120 
In contrast, Doty asks "how-possible" questions - how were, and are, the subjects, 
objects and interpretations in FPA socially constructed? Thus the questions become, 
'how did policy A become the only reasonable course of action? ' and, 'how did policy A 
come to appear necessary and policy B unthinkable? ' 121 'How' questions thus connect 
to an aspect of power ignored by 'why' questions, the productive feature that constitutes 
these subjectivities and relationships. 122 By only asking 'why' questions, FPA ignores 
the way that power operates to construct the world of foreign policy. 
Doty uses the example of a 'family' to show the way that asking 'how' questions can 
reveal hidden power relations, the ethics of which can be marginalised by treating them 
as 6natural' or 'normal'. Thus, in a 'normal' family, the man is placed hierarchically 
above the woman. Meanwhile, the gay family is excluded as deviant and abnormal, 
123 as 
not really a 'family'. But to treat this as a natural given ignores the way power works to 
fix these elements in discourse, and ignoring the work of power is to ignore the potential 
ethical implications of what it produces. By not questioning how the 'family' came to be 
as such, we manage to efface a question of familial ethics and whether the 'family' could 
be constructed differently. 
"' Snyder et al., Foreign Policy Decision Making, p. 33 - emphasis in original. 
120 Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction", p. 298. 
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Doty uses this 'how' questioning to illuminate the peculiarity of American 
counterinsurgency policy in the Philippines during the late 1940s. She reveals a 
representational conceptual system of differences in the policy discourse of the US at the 
time. This consisted of two opposing terms, one of which (the first) always referred to 
the US and Americans, the other always referring to the Philippines and Filipinos. For 
example, she finds reason/passion, political maturity/immaturity, parent/child, 
order/chaos, good child/problem child, good/evil. 124 This constituted a "cultural code 
within which foreign policy was discussed, organised and implemented". 125 The world of 
foreign policy was thereby constructed such that a potentially unethical policy became 
seen as normal and right. The Philippines was variously represented as immature, 
childlike, evil and in chaos, thus there could surely be nothing morally questionable 
about a mature, patriarchal, order-bringing, good country intervening? Was it not their 
duty? But this representation was constructed, it was not a reflection of a 'reality'. By 
ignoring this productive aspect of power, conventional FRA folds into itself unstated 
assumptions about the world, with significant consequences for ethics. 
We can see the operation of 'why' questions covering unstated assumptions in Allison's 
discussion of the Cuban Missile Crisis. He suggests that his aim is to look at an event we 
don't understand and ask why it happened - why did the Soviet Union put missiles in 
Cuba, and why did the US react in the way it did? 126 Thus, he is only interested in the 
'US' and 'Soviet Union'; 'Cuba' is largely treated as a cipher, subject to the whims of 
the two superpowers. 'Cuba's' reasoning is uninteresting and not worth examining. 'It' 
is an object, acted upon by two subjects, an empty space in which power politics was 
played out. In fact, like Rosenau, we could say that Allison treats Cuba as a "penetrated 
system", 127 which itself is based on assumptions which marginalise the ethical. 
The concept was formulated to try and overcome the conceptual shortcomings of the 
rigid national/international distinction. A 'penetrated system' is characterised most 
124 Doty, Imperial Encounters, pp. 88-91. 
125 Ibid., P. 92. 
126 Allison and Zelikow, Essence ofDecision, p. 2. 
127 Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign policy", pp. 129-130. 
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significantly by "a shortage of capabilities", thus non-Members will penetrate this system 
in order to help, or take advantage of, the weak state. 128 Penetrated systems are thereby 
constituted by a lack, a deficiency that somehow makes them not a 'whole' or full 
4national system'. The examples he gives are either nations defeated in war (Japan and 
Germany post-World War II), communist countries (Cuba and Vietnam), hopelessly 
poor states (Congo), or formerly great empires (Britain). 129 While it is acknowledged 
that the US is penetrated, this is very different. The US is penetrated by those seeking aid 
and support, for the opposite reason -a "relative abundance" of capabilities. 130 
What results then is an apparently innocent separation of Penetrated systems and 
national systems which works to impose a hierarchy on the world: at the top is the US 
marked by 'abundance', then come 'normal' national systems, and finally 'deficient' 
penetrated systems, marked by 'lack'. Such separations are treated as existent in the 
material world so they remain unquestioned but, being constructed, this seemingly 
objective hierarchy has major ethical implications. It can justify any type of intervention 
(after all a penetrated system's 'lack' leads to non-member participation anyway) from 
sanctions to blockades, counterinsurgency and regime change. By asking 'why' 
questions then, FPA creates a conceptual system with hidden ethical assumptions that 
justify ignoring questions of ethics and foreign policy. 
ii) Inside/Outside 
One of the assumptions made by asking 'why' questions is that of a firm demarcation 
between the national and the international, the domestic and the foreign. Walker sees this 
as a definitive dichotomy in the structuring of IR thought. 
' 31 As noted, however, FPA 
(and specifically Rosenau's concept of the 'penetrated systern') is introduced to escape 
128 Ibid., P. 130. 
129 Ibid., pp. 128-129. 
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131 Walker, InsidelOutside. 
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the rigid national/international distinction, which is seen as breaking down., 32 In this 
way, FPA may be thought to evade the logic of inside/outside which has significant 
implications for ethics. However, conventional FPA in fact works to perpetuate this 
distinction and with it the deferral of the analysis of ethics and foreign policy. 
In 'Pre-theories', Rosenau confirms the inside/outside division by marking penetrated 
systems, as we have seen, by 'lack, ' weakness, abnormality, illness; as he says, 
penetration lasts as long as the deficiency. 133 Like China from the 1960s, a society can 
cure itself by regaining lost capabilities. But, if penetrated systems are abnormal then the 
norm remains national systems. In this way national and international, inside and 
outside, is maintained, even while it is questioned. Such distinctions only fail to operate 
for those states which are abnormal and weak - for those seen as 'normal' the distinction 
stands. Thus, when discussing 'issue-areas' Rosenau still refers to local, national and 
international, restating and confirming the distinction even while he claims to dispute 
it. 134 
Similarly in New Directions, Rosenau notes the erosion of the intemal/extemal divide, 
claiming that domestic and foreign policy have become "functions of each other as to 
make them virtually indistinguishable". 135 And yet FPA persists in distinguishing 
between the two: Powell et al. continue to see the goal of FPA as opening up the 'black 
box' of the state, looking inside as opposed to IR which looks outside; 136 Kegley 
differentiates internal and external conditions on decisions., 37 Even those stressing the 
role of environment on foreign policy systems, such as Christopher Farrands, claim that 
domestic and international environments are separated because "the nature of politics 
within the state is very different from politics in the international arena". 138 
132 Ibid., P. 117. 133 Ibid., P. 130. 
134 Ibid., P. 143. 
135 Rosenau, "Introduction: New Directions and Recurrent Questions... ", p. 4. 
136 Powell et al., "Opening the 'Black Box"', p. 205. 
137 Charles W. Kegley, Jr, "Decision Regimes and the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy", in Hermann 
et al. (eds. ), New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, pp. 248-249. 
138 Christopher Farrands, "The Context of Foreign Policy Systems: Environment and Structure", in Clarke 
and White (eds. ), Understanding Foreign Policy, pp. 85-86. 
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Waever notes this tendency in FPA to question the domestic/intemational distinction and 
yet, through a failure to replace it with another concept, FPA continues to lean on it . 
139 
The domestic/foreign, national/international, inside/outside distinction remains in place 
as a fundamental element of the way in which conventional FPA's knowledge of the 
world is constructed. Hence the study of foreign policy is always a "bridging discipline" 
between domestic politics and international relations. 140 It is a bridge that joins the two, 
yet by reinstating the difference between them such that they need to be joined, it is a 
bridge that crucially reinforces their separation and difference. 
But how does this relate to the marginalisation of the ethical? The reinstatement of the 
inside/outside distinction works to exclude questions of ethics from FPA via what 
Richard Ashley calls the realist 'double move'. 141 Firstly, a spatial relation of difference 
is invoked: domestically the state's internal autonomy is maintained and thus we have 
the potential for ethical community; outside the state is considered different however, 
discernible by different forces, (dis)orders and anarchy. Thus, Michael Smith's 
separation of influences on foreign policy systems includes, as different points, internal 
political order 142 and international change-. 143 Order is thus an internal characteristic, 
inside, while change and instability is external, outside. This move of difference is 
underlined further by David Allen as he tries to define the international environment: 
If we take the state as our central focus of attention, within which the foreign policy-making 
process is located, then the international environment is limited by the territorial boundaries of the 
state and all that falls outside those boundaries, and hence outside the formal authority of the 
state, makes up the external environment. 144 
139 Ole Waever, "Resisting the Temptation of Post Foreign Policy Analysis", in Walter Carlsnaes and 
Steve Smith (eds. ), European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe (London: 
Sage, 1994), p. 252. 
140 Rosenau, "Introduction: New Directions and Recurrent Questions... ", p. 1. 
14 ' Richard Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Towards a Critical Social Theory of 
International Politics" Alternatives Vol. 12, No. 4 (1987), p. 413. 
142 Michael Smith, "Comparing Foreign Policy Systems: Problems, Processes and Performance", in Clarke 
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144 David Allen, "The Context of Foreign Policy Systems: The Contemporary International Environment", 
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Thus, despite acknowledged difficulties in rigid delimitation, boundaries between 
internal and external continue to exist and have meaning for Allen, 145 via an assertion of 
difference: within the state there is authority, outside there is none. 
This spatial move of difference then justifies the second move: a temporal relation of 
deferring the domestic community's "essential project for a universal and timeless 
national unity". 146 The ethical community always has its historical margins despite its 
universal aspirations; beyond these its project must be deferred. 147 Without the authority 
of the state, the safety and community available on the inside, the outside can only defer 
ethics until authority is established outside the state. As Walker sees it, in a more 
genealogical study of the development of IR theory, the lack of community outside the 
state was "taken to imply the impossibility of history as a progressive teleology" in the 
international. 148 
Thus the marginalisation of the ethical is no longer surprising. The world is constructed 
by conventional FPA such that the ethical is irrelevant to foreign policy and FPA. As 
Walker notes, the only alternative is, 
... an affirmation of 
the hope that someday, somehow, all that is presumed to be possible inside 
maybe extended to the outside -a hope that is constantly deferred, and indeed can only 
be 
specified as a condition of its own impossibility in anything other than the bounded space of the 
sovereign state. 149 
At best FPA through its entrenching of the inside/outside divide produces the hope of an 
indefinite deferral of ethics. But such a hope is far from 'scientific', as we shall see. The 
'given-ness' of spatial relations in conventional FPA works to exclude the ethical, or at 
least marginalize and defer it. It is not acknowledged that, as Lefebvre points out, 
145 Ibid., pp. 60-61. 
146 Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space", pp. 412-413. 
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39 
"[s]pace is political", a product of political processes and filled with ideologies. 150 Far 
from unproblematic backdrops, conceptions of space and time are discursively 
constructed, ethically problematic products of power relations. 
iii) 'Science, ' calculation and 'moral fervour' 
The final way (that this chapter examines) in which the ethical is excluded from debate is 
through the use of 'science'. Michael Dillon claims that orthodox IR has "become the 
epitome of the closure of political thought" by relying on "technologised 
instrumental isation of its representative-calculative thought". 151 Conventional FPA 
exceeds IR in this regard. The aim here is not to suggest that 'scientific methodologies' 
are inappropriate for the study of social phenomena, but rather to show that the attempt 
to make FPA 'scientific' and rigorous has inevitable exclusionary consequences for 
ethics. This happens in two ways: firstly, by the initial urge towards scientific method 
and, secondly, through the 'calculation' of policies and decisions. 
Firstly, to establish the rigorous study of 'foreign policy' Rosenau begins by overtly 
excising all discussion of 'ethics' and 'morality'. Rosenau condemns the "bewildered 
simplicity and moral fervour" which marks much early comment on foreign policy. ' 52 
Whereas domestic issues invite an academic invocation of the complexity of the issue, 
foreign policy "seems to invite the abandonment of scholarly inclinations". 153 Asked 
about Vietnam or the Middle East, scholars will too often given "an unqualified answer - 
one that derives from moral judgement, assumes motivation, and simplifies 
causation". 154 Rosenau's subsequent plea for "scientific" consciousness in the study of 
foreign policy is an expression of how FPA dismisses questions of morality and ethics in 
favour of 'rigour' and 'science'. 
150 Henri Lefebvre, quoted in Walker, InsidelOutside, p. 128. 
151 Michael Dillon, Politics ofSecurity: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought (London: 
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Secondly, this exclusion is continued by the calculative thought which flows from the 
'scientific' attempt to quantify foreign policy. As Rosenau says, from 1987 at least 
conventional FPA had stopped debating philosophical and methodological issues and 
began to just practice them. 155 Some conventional FPA scholars, as we saw above, 
sought "a grand unified theory of all foreign policy behaviour" through such 
quantification. 
Some set of master equations would link all the relevant variables, independent and dependent, 
together, and when applied to massive databases providing values for these variables, would yield 
r2 approaching 1.0. Although the goal was perhaps naYve in its ambition, the sheer enormousness 
of the task called forth immense efforts in theory building, data collection, and methodological 
innovation that have few parallels in IR. 156 
Funding from the US government poured in to set up projects for the collection and 
categorization of data; projects such as the WEIS (World Event/Interaction Survey), 
COPDAB (the Conflict and Peace Data Bank) and CREON (Comparative Research on 
the Events of Nations), some of which live on. 157 These then led to the development of 
similarly acronymic "computerized decision aids and analysis packages", such as 
EWAMS (Early Warning and Monitoring System), CACIS (Computer-Aided Conflict 
Information System) and XAIDS (Crisis Management Executive Decision Aids). 158 
With this evidence, we can use Dillon's critique of the way IR has shunned any kind of 
truly "political" analysis in favour of examining "the technology of calculative order" 159 
to show that conventional FPA has taken such thinking to the extreme. The aim of 
conventional FPA is to study what is calculable. It has to make what could be an ethico- 
political matter of openness and the contestation of limits' 60 into a technology such that 
it can be quantifiably studied. Thus, the moment of the political and ethical is 
155 Rosenau, "Introduction: New Directions and Recurrent Questions... ", pp. 5-6. 
156 Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis", p. 9. 
157 Ibid. 
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160 Jenny Edkins, Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In (Boulder 
Co: Lynne Rienner, 1999), p. 126. 
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marginalised because they are what cannot be calculated and technologised, but must 
rather be kept open to contestation. 161 The importance of keeping the ethical and political 
from becoming such a technology will be discussed further from a specifically Derridean 
perspective in Chapter VI. 
To summarise the argument of this first section, conventional FPA, despite its internal 
dissimilarities, shares similar assumptions which effectively train it to ignore and 
marginalise any discussion of ethics and foreign policy. Firstly, such marginalisation is 
achieved through only asking 'why' questions, not inquiring as to how the subjects, 
objects and the relationships of power between the two are constituted as such in 
discourse. This failure leads to the unquestioned acceptance of, for example, certain 
states being characterised as 'penetrated' through lack and deficiency. Secondly, the first 
failure has led to the re-entrenchment of the national/international, inside/outside 
distinction which FPA aimed to question. The implications of the division, as Ashley and 
Walker put it, are a deferral and ignorance of the ethical project for the 'international' 
(which is achievable for the community of the domestic) until order is achieved. Thirdly, 
the desire to firstly make FPA rigorously scientific (which demanded an excision of all 
cmoral fervour') and secondly, to make decisions the result of calculative, computational 
thought (which closes all ethical and political discussion), leads to a further 
marginalisation of ethics. These critiques interact and are not wholly separable. They 
come together by revealing the implicit, and sometimes explicit, training of FPA to 
ignore questions of ethics and foreign policy. 
16 1 Dillon, Politics ofSecurity, p. 52. 
42 
Unconventional Foreign Policy Analysis 
Ole Waever, as early as 1990, argued that FPA which took into account the ideational 
(such as that influenced by Sprout and Sprout) should extend its theorisation to other 
ideational factors relevant to foreign policy, those "not in the individuals but in between 
them in a specific discourse space - the political sphere". 
162 This focus on discourse and 
socially constructed meaning brings what has been termed here 'unconventional' FPA to 
the asking of 'how' questions, in addition to 'why' questions. 163 As such, we could say 
that 'unconventional' FPA includes both constructivist approaches (such as Waever) and 
the poststructural analyses of Roxanne Lynn Doty and David Campbell. However, it has 
been 'constructivist' FPA which has come to define an acceptable form of 
unconventional FPA, mirroring the way constructivism has been accepted into the IR 
mainstream. 1 64 
This section outlines some key components of broadly constructivist unconventional 
FPA. Unlike conventional FPA, there are no paradigmatic works, or clear research 
projects; indeed, there is not one constructivism, but many. 165 As such, the summary in 
this section self-consciously constructs an artificial coherence. An examination of the 
ways in which this FPA still contrives to ignore and marginalise the ethical ensues. Once 
again, it is evident from the summary that there is little attention given to ethics and 
foreign policy. It is argued through three critiques that the desire of constructivist FPA to 
maintain its middle ground between conventional and poststructural approaches leads it 
to retain certain assumptions which limit its ability to take ethics into account. 
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Constructivist FPA 
The influence of constructivism in its relatively short life in IR can be summed up by the 
opening line of Stefano Guzzini's formative article: "[w]hat a success story ! 51166 Stephen 
Walt has even elevated constructivism to become one of the three 'pillars' (along with 
realism and idealism) on which the study of IR rests. 167 Emmanuel Adler argues that the 
reason for this success is that constructivism occupies the "true middle ground between 
rationalist and relativist interpretive approaches". 168 Constructivism thus gives "added 
value" to IR through its emphasis on "the ontological reality of intersubjective 
knowledge" and the "epistemological and methodological implications of this reality". 169 
However, constructivists crucially reject what Adler calls the poststructuralist "relativist 
stance" in which "only the organisation of discourse really matters". 170 
Constructivism, contrary to conventional FPA which purports to take the world as it 
finds it, "involves seeing the world as inextricably social and material, that is, seeing 
people in their world as makers of their world, and seeing the world as a never-ending 
construction project". 17 1 Thus meaning is created, it does notjust depend on an external 
reality but also an intersubjective social reality made possible by social 
communication. 172 As Nicholas Onuf puts it, "we make the world what it is, from the 
raw materials that nature provides". 173 This meaning is located "in specific discursive 
fields - and not just in bilateral subject-object relationships". 
174 This is one of the 
'middle grounds' constructivism looks to seize: between materialism and idealism. 
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Crucially, constructivists accept the notion of a real world, but see it as "not entirely 
determined by physical reality", it is "socially emergent. " 175 
Rather than foreign policy being based on decisions or events in the world taken as it is, 
constructivists analyse the way the world is created as it is by foreign policy. Thus, in 
Doty's terms, they are not just asking why a certain foreign policy decision was made, 
but how it was possible, how the world was constructed to make it possible. 176 The basis 
for Onuf s conception of a 'policy' is therefore the importance of language. "In 
representing the way things are and how they work in relation to each other, language 
makes things (including ourselves as agents) what they are by making the world (any 
world of social relations) what it is. " Policies "exist only when we put our intentions into 
words and frame courses of action, or plans, to achieve them". 177 Policies literally create 
rules and norms which make the world of agents and intentions "what it has become and 
can ever be". 178 
Foreign policy makers, through the use of language, both make/construct the world, and 
are made/constructed by it. Constructivists of a specifically 'rule-oriented', Onufian 
bent, thus concentrate their analysis on that which connects the two - various categories 
of rules, practices and institutions resulting from the interactions of 'foreign policy 
maker' and 'world' . 
179 Foreign policy is translated into these constructivist categories 
and this enables, for example, Vendulka Kubalkova's assessment of how Soviet 'New 
Thinking' fares alongside other explanations for the end of the Cold War; 180 Gonzalo 
Porcel Quero's analysis of how Franco's regime changed its foreign policy throughout 
its reign; 181 Michel Collier's examination of why Latin American anti-corruption policy 
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failed; 182 and Shiping Zeng's presentation of adjustments in Chinese and Taiwanese 
foreign policy according to changing identities. ' 83 
Kubalkova argues that constructivists do not offer a theory of foreign policy per se 
(certainly in the sense that conventional FPA looks to), but rather help make sense of 
what has been leamt from other theoretical perspectives by examining what lies beneath 
and between such findings. 184 Thus while many analyses such as Henrik Larsen' S185 
make use of discourse analysis, this is not the only perspective that can be used by 
constructivists. For instance, Collier uses rational choice theory as part of a constructivist 
approach examining Latin American anticorruption policy 186 without this making his 
analysis any less constructivist. 
Arguably, due to the focus on language which forms the basis of many unconventional 
analyses of foreign policy, discourse analysis is an especially suitable method. Hence 
Ole Waever's stress upon the importance of national discursive spaces; the way that 
"meaning is generated and structured in a national context". 187 For a policy to be 
meaningful, he argues, it must 'fit' the discourse. Some policies are excluded "since they 
go against the whole national repertoire of political key terms and connotations". 188 
While not causing foreign policies, national discursive structures help shape a state's 
foreign policy; they "explain the directions and forms that foreign policy can take for a 
specific state if it is to remain politically meaningful in its national context". 189 
Larsen extends the idea of national discursive spaces in his examination of British and 
French policies towards Europe in the 1980s. He begins by critiquing the use of 
182 Michael W. Collier, "Failed Policy: Analyzing Inter-American Anticorruption Programs", in 
Kubalkova (ed. ), Foreign Policy in a Constructed World, pp. 173-202. 
183 Shiping Zheng, "Making Sense of the Conflict Between Mainland China and Taiwan", in Kubalkova 
(ed. ), Foreign Policy in a Constructed World, pp. 203-226. 
184 Kubalkova, "A Constructivist Primer", p. 71. 
185 Henrik Larsen, Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe (London: 
Routledge, 1997). 
186 Collier, "Failed Policy: Analyzing Inter-American Anticorruption Programs". 
187 Waever, "Resisting the Temptation of Post Foreign Policy Analysis", pp. 254-255. 
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psychological approaches in conventional FPA. They are, he claims, mainly appropriate 
for analysing crisis decision making, while tending to treat belief systems in a 
positivistic way and see language as a transparent medium for conveying meaning. 190 In 
contrast, Larsen sees meaning as dependent on the discourse in which it is used. There is 
no general system, but specific "systems of values and rules in a given linguistic context 
can broadly be defined as a discourse". 191 This does not mean he is seeking to replace 
FPA with a purely discourse analysis based approach. He makes it very clear that 
discourse is only "one possible source of foreign policy". 192 As such, despite Larsen's 
and Waever's use of the poststructuralist thinker Michel Foucault, both limit his thought 
on the impact of discourse for constructivist ends. 
Following Foucault, Larsen presents discourse as not just a derivation from social power 
but also its expression. By and large individuals must adapt to the societal level of 
meaning, the discursive formations which gather around societal themes. While Foucault 
looks at themes such as madness and sexuality, Larsen looks at the formations around 
concepts of 'Europe', 'nation/state', 'security' and the nature of the international system. 
The changes and developments around these key themes are used to reveal how British 
and French foreign policy towards Europe changed in the 1980s. Discourse is here a 
particular historical instance of a "discursive formation"; while change in discursive 
formation (which could be seen as a complete change of discourse) is rare, change in the 
discourse around these formations and themes is possible. 193 Discourses are socially 
reified through discursive practices, of which foreign policies are a part. In other words, 
foreign policies, as stated earlier, help to construct the world as it is. 
The small but growing literature of unconventional, constructivist FPA, of which a 
flavour has been given above, is an interesting advance upon the 'why' questions of 
conventional FPA. These brief illustrations reveal the way constructivism works to carve 
itself a middle-ground upon which to ask 'how' the world of foreign policy is 
190 Larsen, Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis, pp. 5 -9. 
191 Ibid., p. 14. 
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constructed. As such, one would perhaps expect it to critique conventional FPA in a 
similar way to poststructuralists: for making assumptions which allow a particular 
construction of the world to be reffied with all its consequences for ignoring ethics. As 
demonstrated below, however, certain assumptions prevent constructivists from making 
this step into ethics and foreign policy. Unconventional constructivist FPA, while 
promising much, also trains itself through its assumptions to marginalise questions of 
ethics and foreign policy. 
Marginalising Ethics 
Despite moving away from the background assumptions of conventional FPA (with the 
crucial claim being that the social world is a construction), constructivist FPA continues 
to provide little analysis of the ethical. 194 Kubalkova, for instance, stresses that Soviet 
interests in the late 1980s began to be defined in "moral terms" and that 'New Thinking' 
gave Gorbachev a "moral platform", 195 but there is no questioning, problematization or 
analysis of the 'moral'. It is simply accepted that, perhaps in contrast to realist power 
politics, 'New Thinking' simply was moral. Similarly, Karin Fierke sees New Labour's 
announcement of an ethical dimension to its foreign policy as "an opportunity for its 
critics to hold it accountable for its promises", 196 but does not question what a 'moral' 
basis for such criticism would look like. 
194 There are at least two exceptions to this rule. Firstly, Nizar Messari's analysis of the violent 
construction of US identity in its foreign policy in Kosovo - see, "Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of 
Islam in U. S. Foreign Policy", in Kubalkova (ed. ), Foreign Policy in a Constructed World - deals directly 
with questions of ethics. However, his analysis is inseparable from that of a poststructuralist. He 
acknowledges his debt to the poststructuralist literature of R. B. J. Walker, William Connolly, Michael 
Shapiro and, especially, David Campbell (p. 27). As such, his account of ethics and foreign policy does 
more to demonstrate the poststructuralist, rather than constructivist concern with the issue. Secondly, 
Xavier Guillaume develops a fascinating use of Bakhtinian dialogism as a way of making foreign policy 
an ethical politics of alterity - see, "Foreign Policy and the Politics of Alterity: A Dialogical 
Understanding of International Relations" Millennium Vol. 3 1, No. 1 (2002). However, Guillaume's 
explanation relies on a re-boxing of the 'state' as chief narrator of identity (pp. 13-16), thus reinscribing 
his work in an IR, rather than FPA, tradition - hence the subtitle of his article. 
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48 
This problem is fully recognised by Paul Kowert who acknowledges the need for a 
treatment of the ethical. Social science "is an ethical as well as explanatory process", 197 
but he admits that constructivists "are mostly silent about what kind of values 
constructivism itself might embrace. In this lacuna resides the untested promise of 
constructivism. " 198 Examining the values constructivism embraces is not a particularly 
helpful way of addressing the issue. Kowert's deferral of the problem, however, is 
exacerbated by his subsequent effacement of it; when considering the future, instead of 
suggesting that constructivists test their 'promise' regarding ethics, he simply suggests 
they "push further down the same path". 199 This fails to fill one with 'promise'. 
Three critiques of unconventional, constructivist FPA are now drawn out. These argue 
that the very importance placed on preserving its 'middle-ground' status means that 
constructivism is ill-equipped to examine ethics and foreign policy. The desire to 
continue as a success story means that constructivism continues to make key 
assumptions so as not to alienate conventional IR and FPA. The three critiques 
correspond to three assumptions that limit the scope of constructivism and the questions 
it asks of the constructed world of foreign policy. These assumptions are, firstly, of an 
extra- or non-discursive reality; secondly, the continued reliance on a distinction 
between the inside and outside, the national and the international; and, thirdly, the 
possibility of giving an empirically 'better' account of foreign policy decisions. The 
questions that these three assumptions restrict constructivist FPA from asking include 
those of ethics and foreign policy. 
19' Paul Kowert, "Towards a Constructivist Theory of Foreign Policy", in Kubalkova (ed. ), Foreign Policy 
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i) Extra-discursive realit 
The first limiting constructivist assumption is that of an extra-discursive reality. As 
stated above, constructivists see the world "as inextricably social and materiar ; 200 the 
world is made by us "from the raw material that nature provides" . 
20 1 Because we create 
the world from something outside our own constructions, a reality which is not 
susceptible to our tinkering, there is a natural limit to our agency. Agents' freedom 
"depends on their ability to recognise the material and social limits that apply to 
them". 202 Adler thus describes constructivists as "ontological realists" in their belief that 
there is a material world which offers resistance when we act upon it. 203 
Given the centrality of this assumption for constructivism, it is often difficult to find 
discussion of how material reality affects foreign policy. When it is discussed, little 
certainty is displayed about its role. One example is Larsen's discussion of the limiting 
impact of non-discursive structures. He claims that the value of studying discourse in 
foreign policy is that it can link up "non-discursive factors... other domestic structures, 
at least partly, work[ing] according to other logics than the political discourse". 204 of 
particular note here is the 'at least partly'. What does this mean? Larsen points out that 
others will argue "the importance of any structural factor depends on how it is made 
sense of in the language". 205 This is precisely what is argued in Chapter 11 - there are no 
factors that are not discursively mediated and thus no extra-discursive reality. 
In places Larsen appears to agree, but later on he restricts this agreement, claiming that 
"most 'facts' are, to a certain extent, mediated by the discourses of the social actors". 206 
Thus "certain features constitute a framework for policy in an almost absolute sense 
because they can impose concrete restrictions". 207 Non-discursive facts imposing limits 
200 Kubalkova, "A Constructivist Primer", p. 58 - emphasis added. 
201 Onuf, "Constructivism: A Users Manual", p. 59. 
202 Ibid., p. 65 - emphasis added. 203 Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground", p. 333. 
204 Larsen, Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis, p. 22. 
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206 Ibid., p. 183 - emphasis added. 207 Ibid., p. 23 - emphasis added. 
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are, for example, that a higher proportion of the French population works in farming than 
the British; Britain is more integrated into the global economy than France; Britain is an 
island, France part of the continent. 208 However, such 'facts' are also discursively 
constituted; their implications for foreign policy depend on'how they are formed by the 
discourse and become part of social reality. They are not apolitical givens. At times 
Larsen agrees with this, saying that geographical and geopolitical factors are far from 
'given' and "can be mediated quite differently". 209 Yet, this clearly contradicts his claim 
that Britain being an island produces an almost concrete restriction on its foreign policy. 
I 
This is a fine line to tread; discourse does mediate facts but some facts are almost 
absolute and thus beyond language, while others are not. Why are the phenomena of 
sovereignty and national interest considered discursively constructed 2 10 but integration in 
the global economy is not? 21 1 At times discourses are "crucial filters through which the 
structural pressures are mediated", 212 and at other times not. But no real distinction is 
provided as to when and where this applies. Doty's criticism of Alexander Wendt's 
constructivism seems equally applicable to Larsen: "[h]e seems to suggest that one 
,, 213 
should go with social construction when it is convenient and reify when it is not. 
The significance of this claim to a non-discursive reality is that 'reality' can be used, and 
any such use is, as Maja Zehfuss points out, never value-netural. 
214 Thus, if there appears 
to be a limit to our conceptual i sati ons of foreign policy, such as the limit of an 
impossible ethicality, there is a tendency to blame this on the 'reality' that 
constructivism allows for. For example, ethics and foreign policy may be impossible due 
to the 'realities' of an anarchic international system, or because of resource scarcity. 
Thus, any "assertion of an independently existing reality, which in itself cannot be 
208 bid. 
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proved and seems to demand no proof, works to support particular political positions and 
to exclude others from consideration". 215 
This potential marginalisation of the ethical through a 'reality' imposing "material 
constraints" is illustrated by Kowert: 
This world may be ontologically dependent on knowing and speaking subjects, but it exists 
independently from them. It is possible to conceive of limits on global oil reserves, for example, 
in different ways: as a constraint on economic development or, if one lives in Qatar or Saudi 
Arabia, as an opportunity for development. Yet it is not useful - it is scarcely meaningful - to 
conceive of the planet's oil reserves as unlimited, the material world penetrates the social too 
much for that. 216 
However, if we question the existence of an extra-discursive 'reality' of oil reserves, is 
this tantamount to the claim that oil reserves are unlimited? Do we even need to take a 
position on the 'actual' level of oil reserves? As Zehfuss notes, Onuf (like Kowert) 
believes we cannot leave our constructions, so what does it matter if there is something 
beyond them? "Even if there was, it could never matter to us other than within our 
constructions. Even if material reality imposed a limit, what is significant is how we 
conceptualise this liMit.,, 217 
The problem is essentially one of questions asked. Claiming a 'reality' sets a limit upon 
Doty's 'how' questions, which reveal power relations and their ethical implications. 
When a reality is invoked we return to conventional FPA, answering 'why' questions. 
Why did Britain enact a certain policy? Because it is (pace Larsen) an island or more 
integrated into the global economy than France, 218 or (pace Kowert) because oil reserves 
are limited. But if we ask how such "material constraints" were constructed, what 
becomes important is how limited oil reserves are represented - for example, as an 
opportunity or a constraint. There is no necessary causation as 'reality' can be 
215 Ibid., p. 245. 
216 Kowert, "Towards a Constructivist Theory of Foreign Policy", p. 276. 
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represented differently. Equally, what matters is how Britain's island status is 
represented, but as a 'fact' it cannot 'cause' any policy in the way that may be 
suggested. Thus, retaining a non-discursive reality limits unconventional FPA's ability to 
ask 'how' questions and allows it to slip back into the ethics-margi nal i sing 'why' 
questions of conventional FPA. 
It is important to observe that not all constructivists see material reality as so important. 
Guzzini, for example, while believing in a phenomenal world notes that we cannot have 
access to it independent of discursive practice . 
21 9 He claims that, with the possible 
exception of Wendt, all constructivists are interested only in socially constructed facts - 
they are "agnostic" or "simply uninterested" in the material world out there. 220 Yet Onuf, 
Larsen and Kowert do see non-discursive reality as important. But why so, given that 
such a 'reality' cannot be proven and seems to affect nothing outside of discourse? Quite 
simply, "it is precisely a certain unproblematic acceptance of reality that has made the 
constructivist 'success story' possible", 221 as it is based on constructivism claiming a 
"true middle ground" between rationalists and relativists, 222 materialism and idealism. 223 
Maintaining that there is a reality out there means that constructivist FPA can, as 
Guzzini puts it, resist "succumb[ing] to the sirens of poststructuralism", which is 
"increasingly emptied of intelligible meaning". 224 It is only by resisting such sirens that 
Adler can claim to have shown that constructivism is "compatible with good social 
science". 225 Constructivists need reality to stay legitimate, as Pettman suggests, to ensure 
they do not suffer "the most effective of all criticisms, namely, calculated 
indifference". 226 To avoid this indifference, 'reality' is used as a rhetorical gesture 
signifying the difference between constructivism and poststructuralism. There are few 
2 19 Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations", p. 159. 
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better illustrations of this than Ben Tonra's polemical mischaracterisation of a middle 
ground: 
This constructivist turn does not go as far as post-structuralist approaches: those far countries of 
post-modernism where language is everything and there are no material constructs, only 
discourse. It does, however, offer a challenge to exclusively instrumental rationalistic accounts. 227 
Constructivists need to remain 'on-side' with conventionalist or rationalist accounts so 
that, as Guzzini admits, they are "allowed to become its [the middle-ground's] legitimate 
tenant". 228 Unconventional FPA, in an attempt to retain credibility with the 
conventional, falls back into assumptions which allow conventional FPA to marginalise 
the ethical. There is no better example than the inside/outside distinction. 
ii) Re-instating inside/outside 
This second critique is more an example of the first: the use of extra-discursive reality by 
unconventional FPA to reinstate a key assumption that works to marginalise the ethical 
in conventional FPA. The assumption is that of a divide between national and 
international, inside and outside, with the realist 'double move' described above (of 
difference between the two spheres, and a deferral of ethics until the community and 
order of the inside can be spread to the outside). 
In his discussion of national discursive spaces, Larsen claims that although discourse 
does not have an a priori border on the other side of which it ceases to apply, 
The key hypothesis in this book is, however, that the political discourse on the four concepts 
examined... here are, national, in other words that the state border represents the boundary of the 
political discourse. 229 
227 Ben Tonra, "Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a Cognitivist 
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The implications of this for international politics is that each state has its own discourse, 
but there is no conflict between discourses because "there is no discursive field" for them 
to overlap. 230 National discourses are incommensurable resulting in their talking past one 
another. Larsen uses the Foucauldian image of discursive trees; some of the branches of 
the discourse may overlap (leading to common policies), but "it is only if discourses 
come from the same tree that we can talk about a real dialogue at the level of 
discourse". 231 In consequence, dialogue results "only between policies, i. e. the more 
concrete elements". 232 This incompatibility is a major obstacle to international 
cooperation. A saving grace is that common discourses can develop at the international 
level in terms of the rules and norms of international society, which "can be interpreted 
as an international discourse". 233 But this remains different from the fundamentally 
"incompatible" national discourses. 
To summarise, this division of discourse has three major points. Firstly, there are 
separate incompatible national discourses which may overlap to form common policies. 
Secondly, we have an international discourse, a discourse of international society. 
Thirdly, there is no apparent relationship between the latter two. Larsen illustrates this 
claim to national discourses throughout, but a very clear example is the differing policies 
of the French socialist government of the 1980s and the British Labour party vis-a-vis 
Europe. In this case, he claims, Labour "adhered to the dominant British discourse on 
Europe" despite French socialist enthusiasm. National discourses framed policy 
orientations and "to a large extent, ran across political ideologies . 
234 
Here we see the old national/international division is being reinstated by an 
unconventional, constructivist FPA, this time at the level of discourse. The borders of the 
state are now reified such that the national discourses, those that arise inside the state, 
are simply incommensurable and cannot talk to other national discourses, other insides. 
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Instead, they can only communicate in their own, international, discursive field, outside 
the national. But can we really see things in such rigid terms? While it may be useful to 
think of foreign policies as formed by national discourses or texts, such boundaries are 
not 'real'. State boundaries, after all, are also discursively mediated. Der Derian argues 
that, in world politics, "it is increasingly not what is inside or outside the core [state] that 
really matters: it is the map of the borders - the textualization of reality". 235 Larsen's 
approach ignores this textualization, treating borders as materially existent at the level of 
discourse. 
Larsen thus reiterates the inside/outside distinction which structures conventional FPA. 
The result of this could easily be the positing of a difference between the national and 
international discourses, and a deferring of the ethical until national discourses become 
commensurable, or international discourse takes on the characteristics of the national. As 
above, the constructivist concern is rarely with the ethical but always with keeping itself 
separate from poststructuralism. Thus, Larsen proudly states that, 
... 
in drawing on a methodology which is, to some extent, poststructuralist, one does not 
necessarily reach conclusions which challenge all modernist categories. The findings of this book 
have not challenged one of the key modernist categories - the state -a contrast to many 
postmodernist approaches which go under the label of deconstruction. This indicates that a 
236 poststructuralist approach does not necessarily lead to strongly postmodern conclusions . 
This embarrassment at using the poststructuralist methodology of Foucault (and coming 
to 'postmodern' conclusions - whatever that means) leads to the use of discourse 
analysis for conventional ends. In doing so, Larsen reffies the state through his claim of 
national discourses and a domestic and international realm, and thus partakes of the 
exclusion of the ethical from FPA. 
235 James Der Derian, Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 2. 
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iii) 'Better' accounting 
The final criticism to be made of unconventional FPA applies especially to those 
constructivists who, like Kubalkova and Onuf, wish to split intersubjective socially 
constructed reality into categories, such as rules, practices, institutions, and so on. 237 
Familiar ways of talking are separated into these categories so that they can be more 
238 fruitfully analysed . Yet what does this 'more fruitfully analysed' mean? Why are 
categories necessary for this? The answer appears to be tied up with what Jennifer 
Milliken suggests should be a goal of discourse analysis: "doing rigorous empirical 
research or developing better theories". 239Karin Fierke puts it more succinctly when she 
observes that the goal of constructivism in IR must be "constructing a better account of 
the past. , 240 This 'better accounting' essentially means that, once again, in seeking to 
separate itself from poststructuralism, constructivist FPA returns to conventional 'why' 
questions with all the power relations and ethical implications this marginalises. 
Fierke examines the irony of the end of the Cold War; neither side aimed to achieve it, 
she notes, indeed neither side wanted it, and yet the Western 'we've won' explanation 
nevertheless became dominant . 
24 1 Fierke suggests that all poststructuralists, such as 
Campbell, would have to say by way of explanation is that the "powerful have once 
again succeeded in marginalizing and silencing voices". 242 While this is in itself a 
"powerful argument" she points to two limits. Firstly, "it suggests the game is over", the 
dominant voice won. Secondly, 
There is little critical about this account except to demonstrate that we are all writings of the 
propaganda apparatus of the powerful. It does not tell us how the marginalized would be given 
more space to speak. More importantly, it does not give us any criteria for coming up with a 
better account of what happened. The argument is that multiple stories can always be told, 
237 Onuf, "Constructivism: A Users Manual", pp. 59-77. 
238 Kubalkova, "A Constructivist Primer", p. 66. 
239 Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations", p. 228. 
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although the story of the dominant tends to prevail. By contrast, we want to think about the 
criteria for constructing a better account of the past. 243 
It is crucial to understand the meaning of the end of the Cold War and how this 
"constitutes our understanding of what is possible or necessary in the future". 244 But how 
to judge a 'better' narrative? She suggests that the 'we won' argument is of little use as it 
is an "interpretation imposed after the fact. " In contrast, her constructivist "conflicting 
games" argument is "'better'... [as it] embeds the moves of any one actor in a larger 
intersubjective space and traces, over time, the transition from one game to another" . 
245 
Constructivists seek to categorise social reality because it gives them a better grasp of a 
slippery socially constructed reality and leads to better explanations of this reality. 
Firstly, a parenthetical point is that Fierke has misunderstood Campbell's writings. Far 
from suggesting that the 'game is over', Campbell opens up the Cold War to alternative 
discourses. He argues that those declaring an end to the Cold War (as Fierke does) 
assume that they know what it was. Labelling it as such makes it an unproblematic era, 
easy to understand. 246 Fierke, not Campbell, is implicated in suggesting the game is over. 
Also, her representation of Campbell as simply asserting that the dominant voice has 
prevailed on the Cold War, and not telling us how the marginalized voice can be given 
more space, is only possible if we ignore that part of his work which specifically 
problematizes dominant voiceS247 and seeks to provide space for the marginalized. 248 
Fierke's analysis of Campbell, if nothing else, is very poor. 
Secondly, we can ask what this 'better' account involves. Constructivist FPA does not 
hold up its explanations against an external reality, as does the conventional. Instead 
their explanations can be judged 'better' or 'worse' to the extent that they embed actors' 
243 Ibid., pp. 128-129. 
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moves in "a larger intersubjective space". 249 Yet any account, even that of 'we won', 
could surely embed its explanation thoroughly in an intersubjective space. Then how 
could a judgement be made between which account is better? It seems unlikely that a 
quantification of intersubjective 'embeddedness' is possible, or even desirable. Thus, 
simply because the 'we won' account's current formulation is poorly situated does not 
nullify it as the potentially 'better' account. What this desire for 'better' accounting 
reveals is in fact a desire to be able to still ask 'why' questions. The aim is not to explain 
'how' power relations, subjects and objects where fixed through discourse and reffied 
such that they are ethically unquestionable. Rather, the goal of a 'better' account is to ask 
'why, ' really, the Cold War ended, in order to disprove the 'we won' account. 
Constructivist FPA, therefore, still seems to be primarily asking 'why' questions, even 
though its own ontology should open it up to more than this. The categorisation of social 
reality leads to the desire to give an impossible 'better' account in empirical terms. 
Campbell suggests that we look to interpretation "that acknowledges the improbability of 
cataloguing, calculating, and specifying 'real causes', concerning itself instead with 
considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation 
over another". 250 There are also ethical consequences, if the ethical and political can be 
split. Fierke argues, however, that the danger with this poststructuralist interpretation is 
that it fails to provide criteria to judge which account of the past is 'better'. 25 1 However, 
Campbell (who seems to be something of a blind spot for Fierke) acknowledges there 
must be some mechanism for distinguishing between narratives, otherwise we have no 
5,252 reason to condemn holocaust denial; he suggests "moral grounds . Rather than 
accounts being tested by the extent to which they 'fit' a boundless intersubjectivity 
which works to marginalise ethical questioning, poststructuralism invokes precisely 
ethical criteria. 
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(Boulder Co: Lynne Rienner, 1993), pp. 7-8. 
25 ' Fierke, "Critical Methodology and Constructivism", p. 133. 
252 Campbell, National Deconstruction, p. 43. 
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Narratives, claims Campbell, should be tested from case to case without universal 
criteria "in terms of the relationship with the other they embody". 253 Holocaust denial 
seeks to destroy the identity of the other; it is immoral because "by destroying the 
identity of the other we negate our own". 254 Does this mean poststructuralists can judge 
between a 'better' and 'worse' account of the end of the Cold War? While there can be 
no 4poststructuralist position' on this, it seems likely that an examination of the 
discourses would produce agreement that Fierke's 'conflicting games' argument is 
'better' than the 'we won' thesis. However, this is not because the latter is an 
interpretation imposed after the fact, but because of the relationship to the other it 
embodies. 'We won' implies superiority of the self, it is a way of degrading and 
belittling the other to whom we are responsible. 
The argument of this section is that unconventional, largely constructivist FPA has, 
through maintaining itself in a 'middle-ground' between conventional FPA and the 
poststructuralists, continued to make assumptions which work to marginalise discussion 
of ethics. This argument has been illustrated by three examples. Firstly, by upholding the 
explanatory power of an extra-discursive 'reality, ' constructivism allows the reification 
of socially constructed power relations. This unquestioned 'reality' limits the 'how' 
questions unconventional FPA can ask; limiting its critical awareness constructivism 
works to marginalise ethical questions. Secondly, the above point is illustrated by 
Larsen's reinstatement of the inside/outside distinction (and its deferral of the possibility 
of ethics in foreign policy) through reifying the borders of national discursive spaces. 
Thirdly, it was demonstrated that unconventional FPA's desire to categorise socially 
constructed reality in order to give a 'better' account of foreign policy means it slips 
back into asking 'why' questions instead of asking 'how'. This limits its ability to 
question power relations and ethical assumptions contained within foreign policy 
situations. 
253 ibid. 
254 ibid. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has brought FPA and the poststructuralist IR literature of Ashley, Campbell, 
Dillon, Doty, Walker and Zehfuss together, in order to make two arguments about the 
marginalisation of the ethical in FPA. Firstly, it simply proposes that both 'conventional' 
and 'unconventional' (mainly constructivist) FPA generally fails to talk about ethics and 
foreign policy. In itself, this is a fairly banal observation, even if counter-intuitive, given 
255 
Rosenau's claim that FPA concerns itself with politics at every level . Secondly, the 
chapter argues that this ignorance of the ethical is made possible by a series of 
constitutive assumptions which work to marginalise, defer and make irrelevant questions 
of ethics and foreign policy. 
The first argument, or proposal, was easily demonstrated by introducing and outlining 
the development of what was termed 'conventional' FPA in section one, and 
c unconventional' FPA in section two. Conventional FPA, emerging from the work of 
Rosenau, Snyder et al., and the Sprouts sought to separate itself off from IR and explain 
foreign policy in more or less general and scientific terms. Regarding unconventional 
FPA, the chapter focused on the growth in constructivist studies of foreign policy, 
specifically those using discourse analyses. This is a relatively recent phenomenon and 
thus does not have the extensive literature of the conventional FPA. Neither of these 
versions of FPA systematically analyse ethics and foreign policy, indeed in conventional 
FPA it is only mentioned as something which must be purged. 
The second argument proceeded through three critiques of each (both conventional and 
unconventional) FPA to ascertain the methods by which ethics was marginalised. 
Section one thus demonstrated the way, firstly, the unquestioned assumptions about 
subjects, objects and the power relations that fix them in relationships allows an 
ignorance of ethics. The goal of conventional FPA is to find out 'why' a foreign policy 
happens but, as Doty notes, if 'how' questions are asked (such as, 'how did a certain 
Rosenau, "Introduction: New Directions and Recurrent Questions... ", p. 1. 
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policy become thought of as possible/unthinkable? ý), 256 the sub-structure of ethico- 
political power relations is unearthed and becomes central to foreign policy. Secondly, 
despite trying to overcome the national/interriational, inside/outside distinction, 
conventional FPA ends up reinstating it as a separation of different areas, followed by a 
deferral of the possibility of ethics and foreign policy. Finally, section one argued that 
the use of 'scientific' methods allowed FPA to firstly justify purging itself of ethical 
judgement and, secondly, worked to marginalise it permanently by making FPA a 
'technology' rather than a 'politiq'. 
Section two critiqued the manner in which unconventional FPA, though opening itself up 
to Doty's 'how' questions, ends up entrenching the marginalisation of the ethical by 
seeking to retain its acceptability as the 'middle ground' of IR and FPA. It was argued 
that, firstly, this was made possible by retaining the limiting assumption of a non- 
discursive material reality. This limited the questioning of 'how' the world is constructed 
the way it is. A 'reality' prevents our questioning of power relations and ethics by 
imposing a natural limit to constructions. Secondly, this allows for the reinstatement of 
the inside/outside distinction, even if at the level of discourse, which legitimises the 
exclusion of questioning ethics and foreign policy. Thirdly, the attempt to give a 'better' 
account of foreign policy works to establish the primacy of 'why' questions more 
thoroughly. It thereby de-legitimized the poststructuralist discrimination between 
narratives based on an examination of the ethics it enacts. 
These are the reasons behind the continued inability of FPA to address questions of 
ethics and foreign policy in a serious, systematic way. This thesis proceeds by setting out 
the 'non-method' of deconstruction as a way of examining discourses of ethics and 
foreign policy. Unlike constructivist discourse analysis, it seeks to question all the 
ethically dubious power relations which go unquestioned in foreign policy situations. In 
this way a deconstructive reading, as outlined in Chapter 11, gives itself the opportunity 
to unearth the implications of discursively fixed relations between subjects and objects 
for the possibility of ethics and foreign policy. 
256 Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction", pp. 297-298. 
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Chapter II 
Deconstruction: Reading, Foreign Polic Text 
Introduction 
The previous chapter situated this study in two 'bodies' of literature (neither of which is 
coherent or unitary): FPA and poststructuralist IR theory. As well as reviewing the FPA 
literature, the argument was made that both its conventional and unconventional forms 
remain closed to questions of the possibility and impossibility of ethics and foreign 
policy. This chapter sets out how a poststructuralist exploration, employing a specifically 
deconstructive approach, can be used to excavate the limits of ethics and/as foreign 
policy as a deeply problematic area. 
Deconstruction. is always deconstruction of text. Thus, to deconstruct foreign policy 
means we must learn to read foreign policy as text. Explaining what foreign policy as 
text means is the focus of the first section and requires the introduction of Derridean 
thought. The section argues that the search for 'foreign policy' as such is just one 
example of a wider problem with the way we have constructed the world for centuries, 
what Derrida calls the logocentric, privileging of presence over absence. Instead, we 
should acknowledge that all 'foreign policy' is interpreted, understood and relayed 
through discourse and language. There is no 'foreign policy' as such, a 'thing itself of 
foreign policy, only its representation in discourses. The 'thing' of foreign policy, what it 
Cis% is constantly deferred and marked by absence, much like Derrida's concept of 
writing. Thus, if foreign policy can be said to be absent, written, we can say it is 
textually constituted; foreign policy, to the extent that it is, 'is' text. 257 
25' For a wider and more diverse treatment of the world of international relations as text, see James Der 
Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds. ), InternationallIntertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World 
Politics (New York: Lexington Books, 1989). 
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The second section explicates more precisely how the 'deconstruction' of a text works. 
We must always bear in mind that deconstruction is not simply analysis, critique, or 
method, nor can it be made into these. 258 At other times, Derrida is less restrictive, 
suggesting that while there is no 'method' of deconstruction as a technical procedure, 
there are "some general rules" that can be "transposed by analogy... but these rules are 
taken up in a text which is each time a unique element and which does not let itself be 
turned totally into a method" . 
259Deconstruction is perhaps best characterised as giving 
rise to a style, or way of reading texts. The reading accepts what is said without 
necessarily questioning the conscious intention behind it but shows how the foundations 
of what is said, the discourse's own logic, undermines its own claims. In other words, to 
deconstruct is to read the way a text undercuts itself, removing its own basi s. 260 
Deconstruction does not just happen anywhere. There are points of weakness within any 
text which are more susceptible to deconstructive reading, or rather, there are fault lines 
where a text is already deconstructing. These points are 'undecidables' which resist and 
disrupt the logic of the text. The third section suggests that the concepts of subjectivity, 
responsibility and hospitality (the titles and focus of the next three chapters) are precisely 
such 'undecidable' fault lines in the foreign policy texts of Britain and the EU during the 
period under study. Instead of outlining these concepts here (as they will be covered in 
the chapters themselves), there is an examination of the way in which these concepts 
have been alternatively theorised in poststructuralist IR. This reveals the intertextuality 
of the thesis: how it is reacting to, clashing with and overlapping the discourses of others 
who have written on these three concepts. It also helps to explain the alternative focus of 
the forthcoming chapters and the different questions that are asked. 
258 Jacques Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese Friend", in David Wood and Robert Bernasconi (eds. ), Derrida 
and Diffigrance (Evanston, 11: Northwestern University Press, 198 8), p. 3. 
259 Jacques Derrida, Points ... 
Interviews, 1974-1994, translated by Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995), p. 200. 
260 This is similar to one of Jonathan Culler's "formulations" of deconstruction: "to deconstruct a discourse 
is to show how it undermines the philosophy it asserts, or the hierarchical oppositions on which it relies, 
by identifying in the text the rhetorical operations that produce the supposed ground of the argument, the 
key concept or premise", Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism 
(London: Routledge, 1983), p. 86. 
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Foreign Policy as Text 
Chapter I demonstrated that an initial concern for FPA was how to conceive of 'foreign 
policy' itself. What precisely is foreign policy? Is it a series of decisions, 261 actions, 262 
spoken utterances, 263 events, 264 an activity, 265 or a bureaucratic prodUCt? 266 There is no 
end to the list of exactly what foreign policy could variously be conceived as. All of 
them, however, exhibit the same desire to present foreign policy itself, to make its being 
present. The analysis of foreign policy then has always been a particular instance of what 
Derrida calls 'logocentrism': the tendency in all Western philosophy to understand being 
as presence. 267 This section explains the centrality of logocentric oppositions, especially 
that of speech and writing, which is crucial to the understanding of foreign policy as text. 
Logocentrism, Speech and Writing 
Logocentrism literally means the privileging of the logos - the Greek for speech, logic, 
268 
reason, literally the Word of God A particularly famous usage of logos comes at the 
beginning of John's Gospel: 
In the beginning was the Word [logos], and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He 
was with God in the beginning. Through him all things were made; without him nothing was 
made that has been made. In him was life, and that life was the light of men. The light shines in 
the darkness, and the darkness has not understood [or overcome] it. 269 
261 See Snyder et al., Foreign Policy Decision Making. 
262 See Carlsnaes, Ideology and Foreign Policy. 
263 See Onuf, "Speaking Policy". 
264 See Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis". 
265 See White, "Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches". 
266 See the "Governmental Politics" model in Allison and Zelikow, The Essence of Decision. 
267 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 12. 
26' Barbara Johnson, "Translator's Introduction", in Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, translated by Barbara 
Johnson (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 198 1), p. ix. 
269 John 1: 1-5, The Bible (New International Version). 
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Here we have Christianity as a particular epoch, or aspect, of logocentrism. Logos is the 
capitalised 'Word of God', the pure self-presence of speech and thought such that it is 
indistinguishable ftom God (with God and was God). Logos was there at the beginning, 
it governs the hierarchy as it is temporally prior to all else. Other hierarchical oppositions 
flow from logos, from pure seýf-presence. Not only is logos a 'him' (placing male 
'naturally' above female), through him everything was made - being as presence. He is 
connected to light and life, as opposed to darkness and death, and neither of these terms, 
being hierarchically subordinate, can overcome the first terms. However, though the 
'Word of God' is the centre of this particular metaphysical structure known as 
'Christianity, ' it is part of a "linked chain" of substituted centres in Western philosophy 
(such as man, subject, consciousness etc. ), the "matrix" of which "is the determination of 
Being as presence". 270 
Logocentrism does not just lead to substituted centres, but also to a system of binary 
oppositions on the basis of presence/absence. In the above example, we have light/dark 
as well as male/female. There is an endless chain of these which substitute for each other 
in the structuring of Western thought: sensible/intelligible, reason/passion, identity/ 
difference, nature/culture, moral/immoral, good/evil, and so on ad infinitum. But the 
opposition of terms, Derrida makes clear, is neither a peaceful coexistence, 271 nor equal 
confrontation, 272 but rather a violent hierarchy where the second term is subordinated to 
the first. Thus, the first term is primary, the second merely derivative. As Culler 
observes, the second is a complication, negation or disruption of the first term. 273 But 
this is not by accident. Rather it is the natural consequence of logocentrism - where all 
philosophy becomes a privileging of being as presence. 274 
The key opposition to the explanation of text is the relationship between speech and 
writing. Writing, from Plato to Rousseau and beyond, is seen as detrimental to 
270 Jacques Derrida, Writing andDifference, translated by Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 353. 
271 Jacques Derrida, Positions, translated by Alan Bass (Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, 1982), 
p. 41. 
272 Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event Context", in Limited Inc, translated by Samuel Weber (Evanston, 11: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988), p. 21. 
273 Culler, On Deconstruction, p. 93. 
274 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 12. 
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knowledge, memory and wisdom, 275 as a "dangerous supplement"276 to speech and 
thought. All the reasons for this favouring of speech over writing are connected to the 
longing for presence. In a deconstructive reading of Condillac, Derrida reveals several 
ways in which writing has been connected to absence. Firstly, writing functions in the 
absence of either the one who communicates or the one to receive the communication. 277 
The addressor and the addressee do not have to be present at the same time. A second 
absence, produced by the fact that the two are not co-present, is that if the meaning of the 
communication is misunderstood it cannot be corrected. 278 There is thus an absence of 
the communicator's intention and meaning in writing which is not possible under the co- 
presence of speech, where any misunderstanding can be corrected instantaneously. 
Finally, these first two absences represent a more originary absence which is 
characteristic of writing. Whereas speech is immediately present to thought, thus present 
to the intention and meaning of thought, writing is a non-natural representation of this 
thought. It is one step removed from presence and is treated as an "artificial and artful 
ruse to make speech present when it is actually absent". 279 Writing is the sign, not the 
thing itself. Rather than presenting them, writing merely re-presents thought, speech, 
meaning, intention in their absence. 
A rigorous determination of the terms of the logocentric opposition, here between speech 
and writing (as presence and absence), is what Derrida calls a "respectful doubling 
commentary" . 
280 This process, which must "have its place" in every "critical reading", 
draws out the logic of the text, makes it clear what its basis is. Such a doubling is 
essential because it means we remain within the logic of the text; it provides an 
"indispensable guardrail" such that we cannot allow ourselves to freely interpret any way 
275 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, translated by Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1981), pp. 101-103. 
276 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 142. 
277 Derrida, "Signature Event Context", p. 5. 
278 Jacques Derrida, "Dialogue with Jacques Derrida", in Richard Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary 
Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 
p. 116. 
279 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 144. 
280 Ibid., P. 15 8. 
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we please. 281 This is also important as a rebuttal of critics who claim that, by his notion 
of 'text', Derrida licenses complete freedom of interpretation, such that each 
interpretation is as valid as any other. 282 However, while indispensable, this doubling 
commentary does nothing to open the reading, and this is Derrida's goal. This opening is 
performed by reversing the hierarchy of speech/writing through two functions of writing: 
its representative nature and its iterability. 
Representation, Iterability, Diffirance 
Firstly, as we have seen, writing is always presented as representative of speech, while 
speech is immediately present to the thought itself Thus, writing as mere representation 
of thought denotes an absence; when we cannot present the thing itself we "go through 
the detour of the sign". 283 In Saussure's linguistic theory, the sign is separated into the 
signifier (the word) and the signified (the thing itself). The relationship between the two 
is arbitrary, but signifiers must signify a signified. Thus, the signifier is marked by 
absence through being the representation of the signified. Derrida disrupts this simple 
logic by revealing that the signifier always signifies another signifier, which itself 
signifies another signifier, and so on - all of which demonstrates the very absence of the 
thing itself, the absence of presence. "The signifier is originally and essentially... trace, 
that is always already in the position of the signifier. ýý284 This "trace" is the chain of 
signifiers and denotes the "disappearance of origin" as the absence of the signified. 285 
This representative structure can be illustrated using the example of foreign policy. 
When a foreign policy analyst writes the words 'foreign policy', it is to signify a certain 
thing - 'foreign policy' itseýf But when the analyst comes to explain what 
foreign policy 
is, in itseýf, they can only refer to other signifiers, such as decisions, actions, activity, 
281 ibid. 
282 For such a (mis)reading see Mary Warnock, An Intelligent Person's Guide to Ethics (London: 
Duckbacks, 2001). 
283 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, translated by Alan Bass (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982), p. 
9. 
284 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 73 - emphasis in original. 285 Ibid., p. 6 1. 
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bureaucratic product, spoken utterances and events. 286 These aim to make the in itself of 
foreign policy present, but all they do is show the impossibility of presenting this 
presence in language. Rather than the presence of 'foreign policy' itself, the signified, 
standing at the origin of this chain of signifiers (decisions, actions and so on), what we 
see rather is the absence of foreign policy, the impossibility of presenting 'foreign 
policy' as such. 
Crucially, as was perhaps clear in the example, this representative structure is true of 
writing and speech. Speech is itself always a sign, a representation of the pure self- 
presence of thought as this cannot be communicated as such, but only through its 
representation. 287 Representation then, in both speech and writing, "mingles with what it 
represents", 288 such that what is represented itself represents something else, there is 
nowhere the thing itseýf, or what Derrida calls the "transcendental signified 5ý289 (foreign 
policy itseýf in the example given) - that which comes from outside language and 
discourse as the ultimate represented, the presence beyond representation. In such a 
"play of representation, the point of origin becomes ungraspable" and we are left with 
reflecting pools and images, "an infinite reference from one to the other, but no longer a 
source, a spring 15 . 
290 In all language and communication, signs are signs of signs, 
nowhere is there the presence of this thing available outside of signs. 
Secondly, linking to the way that writing denotes absence through functioning despite 
the absence of either addressor or addressee, we can say that writing is iterable. This 
means that, to retain meaning, even in the absence or death of the communicator or 
receiver, the writing must be repeatable in other contexts . 
291 There is only meaning in the 
communication if the writing is generalisable, capable of making sense to everyone, 
even without knowing the author's intentions. Writing denotes absence because we can 
remove its repeatable meaning from the specific context, its specific chain of references 
286 See p. 65 for this list of how 'foreign policy' has variously been conceived. 
287 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays On Husserl's Theory of Signs, translated 
by David B. Allison (Evanston, 11: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 40. 
288 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 36. 
289 bid 
., p. 
50. 
290 Ibid., p. 36. 
29 1 Derrida, "Signature Event Context", p. 9. 
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and "recognize other possibilities in it by inscribing it or grafting it onto other chains". 292 
Thus, 'iterable' does not mean just repeatable, but also transformative. The intentional 
meaning is structurally capable of being lost, or rather changed, so that it means 
something other than the author's conscious intention. As well as writing denoting 
absence because of its representative character, it also signifies absence through its 
iterability; the meaning of its communication can be repeated and transformed in 
different contexts, in the absence of the author and reader. 
However, this structure of iterability is equally true of the spoken word as it is of the 
written. As Derrida observes, every sign "can be cited, put between quotation marks", 
and as such "it can break with every given context, engendering an infinity of new 
contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable". 293 The iterability of the spoken 
word is demonstrated by the very possibility of being 'quoted out of context'. Such a 
quotation can completely change the apparent intentional meaning of what was allegedly 
said. Therefore, any communication, whether spoken or written, must be capable of 
iteration. If it were not iterable, a communication would be totally singular and 
unrepeatable; as such it could communicate nothing, it would have no meaning. Rather, 
every mark of language must be inscribed in a chain of references for it to make any 
sense. 
Whether in the order of spoken or written discourse, no element can function as a sign without 
referring to another element which itself is not simply present. This interweaving results in each 
gelement' - phoneme or grapheme - being constituted on the basis of the trace within it of the 
other elements of the chain or system. This interweaving, this textile, is the text produced only in 
the transformation of another text. Nothing, neither among the elements nor within the system, is 
anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of 
traces. 294 
These two functions of writing, its representative nature and iterative structure, which 
are not wholly separable, have been shown to be equally the case in speech. The 
292 Ibid., p. 9. 293 Ibid, P. 12. 
294 Derrida, Positions, p. 26. 
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significance of this is that, rather than writing being derivative of speech, merely its 
dangerous representation, speech, and language in general, is "founded on the general 
295 
possibility of writing" . If speech and 
language also exhibit the impossibility of 
presence, and the defining feature (or what Derrida calls elsewhere the -specýfic 
dýffýrenee") 296 of writing is absence, all language becomes an "arche -writ in g". 
297 , Fhe 
chain of signifiers leaves a trace, interweaving with other contexts to form a lext of 
references with no transcendental signified ever making itself present. Thus, Derrida has 
inverted the hierarchy, placing writing above speech, making the latter a derivative of the 
former and has displaced the general opposition by making it clear with 'trace' and 'text' 
that nothing "is anywhere evershnpývpresent or ab, yenl", 298 
This arche-writing, or what Derrida more often calls "the movement ot'differance 199 is 
, 
K, rance questions and radically displaces tile of course, very difficult to think. Dýl 
fundamental basis of logocentrism and Western thought, the originary opposition 
between presence and absence. The word dýlkrance is a neologism which Derrida 
formed from the two meanings of' the French verb dý#ýrei-: to deller, or "the action of' 
putting off until later ... of taking account of time ... a detour, a delay", in one word 
"temporization"; and, the more common usage, to dift , er, or "to be not identical, to be 
other... an interval, a distance", in one word ". Ypacing". 300 , Dlffýrence' loses the first 
meaning, and thus Derrida compensates this with the 'a'. I lowcvcr, crucially tile 'il' Is 
heard only in silence; in French, Q -ance Sounds the same Lis dif6crence, thus, as I 
word it can only be read or written. In its very inscription, therefore, (lifterance disturbs 
the opposition between writing (where it appears as present) and speech (where it 
disappears as absent). 
At one and the sarne time then, (1ý11ýrance is a movement ofditllcring (a V? alial rclation 
of difference) and detlerring (a lempor(il rclation of delay). In dialogtic with Richard 
295 Derrida, Qf Givn7matology, p. 52. 
29" Derrida, "Signature Event Context", p. 6. 
297 Derrida, Ql'Gi-ammulology, p. 56. 
208 Derrida, Positions, p. 26. 
209 Derrida, Qf(Wtimincilology, p. 60. 
300 Derrida, Alargins qf'Philosopkv, p. 8. 
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Kearney, Derrida observes "it is neither 1his nor 1hat; but rather th is and that". 301 Thus, it 
produces and problernatizes all binary oppositions, starting with the foundational 
presence and absence on which all the others are figured. The production of difference 
and delay is important to re-state in terms of t#1 'rance. To be absolutely purely self- 
present a concept would refer only to itself, but this is impossible as "no element can 
function as a sign without referring to another element which itself is not simply 
present". 302 Thus, we must "go through the detour of the sign", hence the sign 'is 
"deferred presence". 303 Conceptual isation of the concept is made possible by dýl -ance: 
it must differ from other concepts in the chain which form its trace; it must deter, 
postpone, delay the presentation of the thing itself'. It is the origin ordifferences while at 
the same time making 'origin' impossible, as a simple origin or source, implies a 
presence ; 304 it can only ever be a non-origi*naiýv origin. 
We have come across this movement of dýl -unce in the previous chapter, though it was 
not flagged up as Such. The way the ethical is excluded From conventional (and some 
unconventional) FPA was on the basis of the binary opposition: inside/outside. Richard 
Ashley's argument that this exclusion was performed by a realist 'double-111ove' call be 
, 
krance making the inside/outside distinction possible. Firstly, lie expressed as dýf 
observes that a spatial relation of difference is invoked between inside (figUred as 
ordered, community based with the possibility of' justice) and outside (figurcd as 
anarchic, war based, with no Justice). Secondly, the first move 'justifies a 
ternporal 
movement of deferring the ethical pro. ject of the inside until order is achieved outside: 
until the inside can be made present outside. ")5 In explicitly Derridean terms we call noxv 
see that the rnarginalisation ofethics From FPA is not based on a non-diSCUrsive material 
'reality, ' but rather on the reilication ofa textual movement of(liNrance. 
"" Derrida, "Dialogue with Jacques Derrida", p. 110. 
302 Derrida, Positions, p. 26. 
303 Derrida, Ahit-gitis (? ý'Philosoj)hy, p. 9, 
I(A Jacques Derrida, "The Original Discussion of'Dill'6rance-, in Wood and l3crnasconi (cds. ), Oerritki (mil 
Dilki-cince, p. 85. 
3 `5 Ashley, "The Gcopoliticq of'Geopolitical Space". 
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Foreign Policy as Texi 
Now we are in a far better position to explain what it rneans to read (and thus 
deconstruct) foreign policy as text. This understanding undercuts all the clairns to foreign 
policy as decision, events, actions, bureaucratic product, spoken utterance and so on. All 
these attempts to get to what 'foreign policy' really Ly are disallowed by the fact that we 
can never get to this presence, this is, of foreign policy. Rather, any 'foreign policy' will 
always be interpreted, relayed and described through discourse (which Derrida describes 
as the "representation of a text within the experience of the person who writes or reads 
it,, ), 3 C16 thus it can only ever be the differing and deferral of a presence, Foreign policy 
can only be understood as the interweaving of traces and chains of signifiers with no 
307 signified -a text . 
This does not mean that deconstruction Simply Suspends reference to 'reality'. Rather, 
reality "functions inside the text to indicate that which exceeds the text bill can be given 
no, five(Ifio), m oul. yhle some sort qftextualisation". 308 'Reality' can only ever be textually 
constituted. This is what Derrida ineans when he says, -[I]hei-e is nolhimý olitsi(le ofthc 
-309 text [there is no outside-text; il nýa pas de hors-lexle] . What is rarely quoted beyond 
this sentence is revealing. He observes that what is 'behind' the text, the "real Jif`c of' 
these existences 'of flesh and bone"', is simply "substitutive significations which could 
corne forth in a chain of differential references, the 'real' supervening, and being added 
only while taking on meaning firorn a trace". 310 In Limiled Ine, Dcrrida clarifics Further, 
observing that there being nothing outside the text means nothing other than "there is 
,,, 311 nothing outside context", and context means *the entire 'real -h istory-o f-the-world . 
By treating floreign policy as text, therefore, we do not suspend rel'erence to 'rcality, 
world, history, and so on, as to speak ofthese things is only ever done "in a movement of' 
306 Derrida, (? f'(; i-amma1o1ogy, p. 10 1. 
307 Derrida, Posilions, p. 26. 
308 William Connolly, ldcnliiy, 4)ý#ýrence. I)ciiioc-i-alic, \egolititiot7. y qfl'olilical Pai-adox (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991 ), p. 54. 
309 
Derrida, QfGrammalology, p. 158. 310 
Ibid., p. 159. 
"' Derrida, Limited Inc, p. 1-36. 
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interpretation which contextualizes them according to a network of differences". 312 
Rather than suspending reference, it actually increases references, it opens up every 
context, shows that context/text can never be totalised, or totally comprehended. Every 
text refers to other texts, to other experiences, cultural and historical interpretations, 
within a "general text" that is "everywhere". 313 Thus what is called deconstruction can 
be seen as "the effort to take this limitless context into account, to pay the sharpest and 
broadest attention to context, and thus to an incessant movement of 
recontextualisation". 314 
This expansion of reference means that 'foreign policy' is no longer strictly 
circumscribed to governmental, or inter-governmental, activity at all. The foreign policy 
text, or context, cannot be exhaustively ring-fenced, and thus we can never say that a 
certain aspect of life, history or culture is irrelevant to a foreign policy decision. This 
separates a deconstructive approach from that of Larsen's combination of Foucault and 
Habermas in his constructivist take on the discursive formation of foreign policy. As 
observed in Chapter 1, Larsen problematically separates 'national' discourses, and 
'national' from 'international' discourses, using Foucault. 315 However, he also separates 
316 political discourse from popular, using a Habermasian understanding. Such a 
distinction falls down when we see all such discourses as individual representations of 
the general societal text. Every text, all experience, thus refers to and is constituted by 
other texts. Texts are always already therefore intertexts: spaces where representations 
overlap, blend and clash. 317 
An important implication of this is that we are no longer able to say that foreign policy is 
made by 'foreign policy makers' in any simple sense. Rather, as everyone works to 
constitute and reconstitute the societal context, everyone makes foreign policy and there 
can be no 'real' boundary between the popular and political discourse. This, of course, 
312 Ibid., P. 137. 
313 Derrida, Positions, p. 60. 
314 Derrida, Limited Inc, p. 136. 
315 Larsen, Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis, pp. 224-28. 
316 Ibid., p. 26. 
317 Der Derian, Antidiplomacy, p. 27. 
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means that there can be no ultimate justification for limiting the research for this thesis to 
the speeches and speech makers on which the next three chapters concentrate. As stated 
in the Introduction to this thesis, it cannot be claimed that these speeches and public 
statements (of the Prime Minister and Foreign Ministers in British foreign policy, and 
the HR for the CFSP, the Commissioner for External Relations and the President of the 
Commission in EU foreign policy) exhaust, or fully constitute, their foreign policy texts. 
The context is inexhaustible as has been made clear. But it is suggested that the posts 
mentioned are uniquely suited to communicating 'Britain' and the 'EU' to the world. 
They both speak and are spoken by the texts of British and EU foreign policy in a way 
that, for example, a Minister for Finance, aj oumalist or an 'ordinary' citizen are not. 
When we see foreign policy as textually constituted, it does mean we all to some extent 
'make' foreign policy, but this is not to say that the terms 'foreign policy' and 'foreign 
policy maker' cease to function. As Derrida makes clear, just because a sign refers to no 
transcendental signified, no 'reality' outside of text/context, does not stop its operation 
and it can remain indispensable, but within limits. 318 As will become clear through the 
discussion of subjectivity in Chapters III and VI, the myth of the responsible subject will 
continue to function and produces effects even while its mythical status is rigorously 
explicated. 
Perhaps most importantly for this thesis, however, the absence of anything called 
'foreign policy' outside of text allows me to take at face value the logic asserted by 
British and EU foreign policy when they make a claim to ethics. Much extant literature 
rules out this approach by arguing, for example, that such claims really serve as 
rhetorical devices to hide a conventional power politics, 319 or as a cynical attempt to 
evade domestic political accountability by appealing to a universal morality. 
320 These 
criticisms of ethics and foreign policy appeal then to a real driving force behind foreign 
"' Derrida, Positions, pp. 19-29. 
`9 Put very forcefully by Mark Curtis, Web of Deceit: Britain's Real Role in the World (London: Vintage, 
London, 2003). 
320 David Chandler, "Rhetoric without Responsibility: the attraction of 'ethical' foreign policy" British 
Journal of Politics and international Relations Vol. 5, No. 3 (2003), pp. 295-316. 
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policy, which is never ethics. Those who support the opposite view tend to argue that 
moral norms really do influence foreign policy decision making. 321 
In contrast, this thesis does not have to take a position on whether ethics really did 
influence British foreign policy between 1997-2006, or EU foreign policy between 1999- 
2004. Simply put, it does not matter, and for at least two reasons. Firstly, it does not 
matter because we cannot know such a 'reality' - all we can know is its representation in 
discourse. Thus we are perfectly justified in examining how this textualised reality is 
represented. Secondly, it does not matter because the aim of this thesis is not to claim 
whether foreign policy was, or is, based on an ethical dimension. Rather, the goal is to 
show how these claims to the ethical deconstruct. How the logical basis of their 
discourse on ethics undermines its own basis, and where we can go from there. 
This section has outlined what it means to read foreign policy as text. It began by 
showing that the FPA search for what foreign policy 'is' could be described as a 
particular instance of 'logocentrism', or the privileging of being as presence. Such 
logocentrism gives rise to a series of hierarchical binary opposites based on that of 
presence/absence. Derrida's deconstruction of logocentrism focuses initially upon the 
opposition speech (always designating presence) and writing (as absence). Using 
writing's representative and iterative structure as the basis for this absence, Derrida 
reveals that all language is in fact founded on absence. Thus, we can say that all 
communication, and therefore all cultural and historical reality (which can only be 
relayed and interpreted through language) can be conceived as a textually constituted 
web of signifiers and traces based on a non-originary diffirance. 'Foreign policy' to the 
extent that it is, can only 'be' a writing, a text. 
"' McElroy, Morality andAmerican Foreign Policy, see especially p. 30. 
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Deconstructing Text 
The first section demonstrated the validity of treating foreign policy as text. This second 
section concentrates on how such a text deconstructs; how deconstruction operates. Of 
course, Derrida's thinking of text is itself a deconstruction of logocentric thought: the 
oppositions of presence and absence, speech and writing, the 'rhetoric' and 'reality' of 
foreign policy. The purpose of this section, however, is to explain how deconstruction 
takes place such that it can be illustrated in the next four chapters. The words in this last 
sentence have been selected very carefully and carry caveats with them. 
Firstly, it states that an explanation will show how deconstruction 'takes place', not how 
it can be used by an agent/subject. This is because, strictly speaking, we, or 1, cannot 
deconstruct a text; the text deconstructs. "Deconstruction takes place" and does not 
depend on "the deliberation, consciousness, or organization of a subject". 322 It does not 
require our understanding it, formulating it and putting it to work. Quite simply, "[i]t is 
what happens, what is happening today in what they call society, politics, diplomacy, 
economics, historical reality... Deconstruction is the case. , 323 
Secondly, it is suggested that deconstruction could be 'illustrated' in the next four 
chapters. This is because deconstruction is not analysis, critique nor method; 324 nor is it a 
theory, philosophy, school, act or practice. 325 To treat it as any of the above would have 
the danger of formalising deconstruction, and deconstruction cannot be formalised. 
326 
Any formalisation, whether as method, theory, practice and so on, would reduce 
deconstruction to a program, a technical operation that could be simply 'applied' to a 
given case or text. Derrida emphasizes that there is never a single deconstruction that can 
be defined thus, outside of all context. "Deconstruction does not exist somewhere, pure, 
322 Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese Friend", p. 4. 
323 Jacques Derrida, "Some Statements and Truisms About Neologisms, Newisms, Postisms, Parasitisms, 
and Other Small Seismisms", translated by Anne Tomiche, in David Carroll (ed. ), The States of 'Theory': 
Histor Art, and Critical Discourse (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 85. Y, 
324 Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese Friend", p. 3. 
32' Derrida, "Some Statements and Truisms... ", p. 85. 
326 Jacques Derrida, Negotiations: Interventions andInterviews 1971-2001, translated by Elizabeth 
Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 193. 
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proper, self-identical, outside of its inscriptions in conflictual and differentiated contexts; 
327 it 'is' only what it does and what is done with it, there where it takes place". Thus, the 
two caveats stress that we cannot apply 'deconstruction' pure and simple; we can read its 
taking place, wherever it may occur in a text. 
Overturning, Displacing, Undecidability 
Having stressed the lack of set procedures for deconstruction, given that which is 
deconstructed is always the binary dichotomies of logocentric thought, it is unsurprising 
that there emerge certain regularities, or tendencies, in deconstructive reading. Thus, 
while deconstruction should not, and cannot, be made into a technical procedure there 
c6are also some general rules" that can be "transposed by analogy". 328 However, "these 
rules are taken up in a text which is each time a unique element and which does not let 
itself be turned totally into a method" . 
329 This is indeed a fine line to tread. Yet, we can 
see Derrida navigating this line when he notes that, while these general rules may be 
considered as a "two-phase" approach, these phases cannot be strictly separated other 
than "for the sake of clarity". 330 
What are these "general rules" that can be transposed only by analogy? Derrida makes it 
clear that we must avoid simply neutralising binaries, or remaining within them. 
Deconstruction, rather, demands a double gesture. It "puts into practice a reversal of the 
classical opposition and a general displacement of the system". 33 1 Thus, on the one hand 
deconstruction tends to a reversal or overturning of the violent hierarchies imposed by 
logocentrism, making the first term a derivative of the second - "[flo deconstruct the 
,, 332 opposition, first of all, is to overturn the hierarchy at a given moment. Thus, we saw 
above Derrida's overturning of the speech/writing binary, such that rather than writing 
32' Derrida, Limited Inc, p. 141. 
328Derrida, Points..., p. 200. 
329 ibid. 
310 Ibid, p. 100. 
33 1 Derrida, "Signature Event Context", p. 21. 
332 Derrida, Positions, p. 41. 
78 
deriving from, and complicating speech, speech came to be a type of writing. This phase 
of deconstruction is absolutely essential and too often brushed over. Ignoring it, 
however, reduces the influence a deconstruction can have in the field it deconstructs. 333 
Nonetheless, simply to stop at this overturning would be to remain within logocentrism; 
although we have inverted it, the hierarchical binary remains. Thus, as well as 
overturning, deconstruction displaces the system by moving towards the "irruptive 
emergence of a new 'concept', a concept that can no longer be, never could be, included 
in the previous regime". 334 Such a movement beyond metaphysics is, however, 
impossible. Thus, the displacement envisaged by deconstruction is seen as the "marking 
of the interval", between a remaining within and a complete transgression of logocentric 
metaphysics. To "better mark" this interval, Derrida allows certain words, or marks, 
within the history of philosophy and the literary text that, by analogy, he calls 
"undecidables". 335 
Such undecidables cannot be reduced to opposition but reside within it, "resisting and 
disorganising it, without ever constituting a third term", and thus without even becoming 
dialectical. 336 Undecidables are terms which neither exist simply inside nor outside of 
metaphysical discourse and its constitutive binaries, but rather work on their margins and 
limits, disrupting and displacing them. As such, their status is inherently undecidable. 
One undecidable, the supplement, is illustrated below, but the basic structure of all 
undecidables is that they are "[n]either/nor, that is, simultaneously, either/or. 037 
133 Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
334 Ibid., p. 42. 
335 Ibid., pp. 42-3. 
336 Ibid ., p. 
43. 
337 ibid. 
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Supplementary Undecidability 
As neither inside nor outside, but on the margins and at the limits of thought, 
undecidables indicate the play of diffirance, examined above. Diff6rance, as we have 
seen, is the "non-full, non-simple, structured and differentiating origin of differences. 
Thus the name 'origin' no longer suits it.,, 338 Like the traces of references it produces, 
diffirance is neither fully present nor fully absent, but disrupts the dichotomy 14, hile 
never constituting a third term outside of the opposition. A crucial undecidable, which is 
used especially in Chapters III and IV, is the supplement, which emerges as a form of 
diffirance in Derrida's deconstruction of the speech/writing opposition. Derrida's 
understanding of the supplement arises from the text he deconstructs - Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau's account of the origin of language. 
Rousseau uses the term 'supplement' to describe writing's relation to speech. For 
Rousseau, writing is a technical ploy to divert the immediate presence of thought to 
speech into representation, to represent something as present when it is actually absent. 
In one sense, it therefore saves the presence of speech by recording and archiving it, thus 
writing becomes necessary when "speech fails to protect presence". 339 But writing is 
340 then a "dangerous supplement" as it can make one forget that it is only an imitative 
substitute for presence 341 _ the addition of absence to a presence; the making absent of 
presence. 
Therefore, Derrida points out that there are at least two meanings that can be taken from 
the word 'supplement. ' Firstly, it is an insignificant and inessential extra, a "surplus" to 
what was already complete in and of itself - the presence of speech to thought. But, 
secondly, the very possibility of this surplus supplement suggests that that which is 
supplemented is incomplete. Why else would a supplement be added? As Culler 
describes it, when a supplement is added to a dictionary it is an extra section which is 
338 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, p. 11 
339 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 144. 
340 jbidý p. 142. 
341 bid., P. 144. 
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added on, "but the possibility of adding a supplement indicates that the dictionary itself 
is incomplete". 342 As well as an addition then, "the supplement supplements. It adds only 
to replace. It intervenes or insinuates itself in-the-place-of. 5ý343 Thus, the supplement both 
adds to what is already full and substitutes one signification for another; both meanings 
are present within Rousseau's text. 
The supplement is for Rousseau a "scandal" and a "catastrophe" to logic. 344 If speech 
were a full-presence, it would not need the supplement of writing, after all, what is added 
must be nothing, as it is exterior to a full-presence. 345 Yet Rousseau sees the possibility 
of physical "gesture" as a more immediate sign than speech, more immediate to the self- 
presence of thought. Therefore, speech can itself only ever be a supplement of a more 
natural language - that of gesture. 
346 Speech is also marked by absence, itself the 
supplement of the intuitive presence of thought, 347 and it cannot be otherwise. Rousseau 
finds himself in a dual position. Throughout his text he decries the supplement as an 
unnecessary and dangerous addition and praises it as a progress. 348 The supplement is 
both bad and good, the worst and the best, and yet neither one nor the other. 
Rather than gesture, speech or articulation being the origin of language, we have a 
"relationship of mutual and incessant supplementarity or substitution" as the order of 
language. 349 And this structure of supplementarity recurs throughout the Rousseauian 
text. It is equally applicable to the way nature is supplemented by culture and reason, 
normal sexual behaviour by masturbation, innocence by evil and the origin by history. 350 
Yet Rousseau is "not alone in being caught in the graphic of supplementarity. All 
meaning and therefore all discourse is caught there .,, 
35 1 This movement of what Derrida 
342 Culler, On Deconstruction, p. 102. 
343 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 145. 
344 bid P. 148. 
345 bid P. 167. 
346 bid 
. P. 134-5. 347 Ibid P. 167. 
348 bid p. 229. 
349 bid p. 23 5. 
350 Ibid., p. 167. 
351 Ibid., p. 246. 
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calls "supplementary diff6rance"352 is the origin of all signification, "an infinite chain, 
ineluctably multiplying the supplementary mediations that produce the sense of the very 
thing they defer: the mirage of the thing itself, of immediate presence". 353 
The logic of supplementarity, enacting the movement of diffirance, is thus shown to be 
inherently undecidable: it both inhabits the binary opposition of presence and absence, 
and disrupts them by being neither strictly one nor the other. It both adds to and detracts 
firom presence, "neither an outside nor the complement of an inside". 354 Supplementarity 
demonstrates that a strict presence or absence is impossible, and yet produces both as 
their non-origin. Examples of undecidability in Derrida's work abound, such as the 
pharmakon, the hymen, the hinge, yet all conform to this logic of "[n]either/nor, that is, 
simultaneously, either or. 5ý355 
Undecidables, in embodying its disruptive logic, are crucial to the possibility of 
deconstruction. The two phases outlined above include an overturning of the binary 
opposition that orders and fixes meaning in a text (for example, such that speech 
becomes derivative of writing, instead of vice-versa), and the displacement of the 
opposition (a generalisation of 'writing' which shows that all language, history and 
meaning is marked by 'absence'). But deconstruction does not occur just anywhere in 
the text. Rather, what Derrida calls the incision of deconstruction happens "only 
according to lines of force and forces of rupture that are localizable in the discourse to be 
356 deconstructed" . To 
illustrate deconstruction taking place in the text, we must look for 
the points where it can make its incision, points at which the text disrupts itself. These 
points are nothing other than 'undecidables'; forces of rupture that disturb the text by 
inhabiting it, but on the margins and incompletely. Illustrating the work of 
deconstruction is about finding the undecidability operating to subvert and disorder the 
text being read. 
352 Ibid., p. 238, but see also, p. 167 and p. 183. 
353 Ibid., p. 157. 
354 Derrida, Positions, p. 43. 
355 ibid. 
356 Ibid., p. 82. 
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Incisions: Subjectivity, Responsibility and Hospitality in IR 
Section two drew out the general rules of deconstruction, which can never be formalised 
into a method. This means there should always be some suspicion and discomfort over 
Derrida's use of the word 'rules'. The two 'phases' of deconstruction cannot be simply 
applied, but must work within the logic of the text that is deconstructed in the inversion 
and displacement of binary hierarchies. What is signalled by the movement of diffirance 
and the logic of supplementary substitution is that to read deconstructively is to search 
for the fault lines and points of rupture within a text: points of undecidability. This is to, 
as Michael J. Shapiro puts it, "make use of insurrectional textuality"; 357 that within the 
text which disrupts its own logic. 
In order to deconstruct discourses of ethics and foreign policy within the foreign policy 
text, three such points of incision have been selected which are inherently undecidable 
(products of the play of dififirance): subjectivity, responsibility and hospitality. As stated 
in the Introduction to this thesis, these concepts are in fact all tied together within the 
British and EU foreign policy texts through the overarching theme of an ethical foreign 
policy as a responsible relation to otherness. As inseparable concepts of responsibility, 
they will be examined consecutively in the following three chapters to expose their 
'insurrectional textuality', how they both constitute (or make possible) discourses of 
ethics and foreign policy and disrupt them at the same time. Like dififirance, which both 
gives presence and absence while being neither, conceptions of subjectivity, 
responsibility and hospitality reveal both the possibility and impossibility of ethics and 
foreign policy, while signifying simply neither. 
The Derridean deconstruction of these terms is employed (such as that of 'responsibility' 
in The Gift of Death), but within the specific context of the foreign policy text. However, 
before moving on to this deconstructive reading, it is important to take note of how these 
357 Michael J. Shapiro, "Textualizing Global Politics", in Der Derian and Shapiro (eds. ), International/ 
Intertextual Relations, p. 13. 
83 
terms have been questioned and alternatively theorised in IR, especially from a 
poststructuralist perspective. This section will give a brief introduction to some 
important contributions, highlighting how the thesis does not operate in a vacuum but 
nonetheless works differently, using different foci and raising different questions. 
Subjectivity 
Subjectivity has "become a key notion in recent attempts to retheorize the political", 
especially in poststructuralist and critical thought influenced by feminism, 
deconstruction and psychoanalysi S. 358 The necessity of "decentering" the subject means 
that the issue has been given centrality in discussions of the depoliticization and 
repo liticization of international relations. 359 These 'decenterings' have taken many 
forms, many of which accord with the themes outlined in Chapter III. For example, 
Dillon invokes Julia Kristeva in order to problematise subjects as always "strangers to 
themselves... because of this active constitutive difference that they bear within 
themselves as the selves that they are". 360 This unavoidable difference is why, as Edkins 
and Pin-Fat maintain, "the subject never achieves the completion and wholeness toward 
which it strives". In a Derridean sense, the subject never achieves presence, but always 
"remains haunted by that which has to be excluded for subjectivity to be constituted in 
the first place". 361 Constitutive difference and the exclusion of otherness is crucial to the 
representations of responsibility in Chapters IV and V. 
Poststructuralist literature has often focused its critique on the noted tendency in 
orthodox IR theory to upgrade the Cartesian subject (rational, conscious, sovereign 
individual)362 to the level of the state. For example, in Kenneth Waltz's 'Third Image' 
focus on the international system, sovereign states become capable of reasoning, acting 
358 Jenny Edkins and Veronique Pin-Fat, "The Subject of the Political", in Edkins et al. (eds. ), Sovereignty 
and Subjectivity, p. 1. 
"9 See Edkins, Poststructuralism and International Relations, especially Chapter 2, pp. 21-40. 
360 Dillon, "The Sovereign and the Stranger", p. 118. 
36 1 Edkins and Pin-Fat, "The Subject of the Political", p. 1. 
362 Stuart Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity", in Stuart Hall, David Held and Tony McGrew (eds. ), 
Modernity and Its Futures (Oxford: Polity, 2003), pp 282-283. 
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and speaking as rational, unified subjects. 363 Ashley argues that, though the "sovereign 
subjectivity of a state" is an ordering principle of international anarchy for orthodox IR, 
"the sovereignty of reasoning man" retains primacy. 364 
They accord 'sovereignty' to the state as an agency of action only on the condition that the 
transcendental foundations of man's free, public, and universalizing use of reason are established 
as the fundamental principle of state conduct, the objective of state policy, and the ground of state 
legitimation. 365 
This assumption of state sovereignty, and its link to reasoning man, extends its influence 
beyond 'realism' and 'idealism' in IR, also reaching more 'critical' approaches. Nalini 
Persram thus argues that social constructivism's refusal to shake this assumption will 
forever limit it as a truly critical approach to international relations and confirms its 
status as a "newly adorned neo-orthodoxy". 366 
However, rather than discussing subjectivity in general, this thesis focuses specifically 
on the construction of the subject of ethics and foreign policy in the British and EU text. 
This emerges as a subject which can take responsibility. The deconstruction of this 
subject in Chapters III and VI is therefore both similar to, and different from, Vivienne 
Jabri's advocacy of a movement away from the subject of responsibility conceived only 
as a citizen within a sovereign state. Jabri argues that normative IR theory, structured 
around the cosmopolitan versus communitarian debate, restricts the possibilities for 
taking responsibility by remaining wedded to a reconciliation of sovereignty and 
subjectivity within the state. Breaking with this limiting thought of subjectivity means 
that "we are no longer constrained in our imagination by the imprint of the state but, 
363 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1959), see especially pp. 160-179. 
364 Richard Ashley, "The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty, and the Domestication of Global Life 
(1988)", in James Der Derian (ed. ), International Theory: Critical Investigations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1995), pp. 106-107. 
365 bid 
., P. 107. 366 Nalini Persram, "Coda: Sovereignty, Subjectivity, Strategy", in Edkins et al. (eds. ), Sovereignty and 
Subjectivity, p. 170. 
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rather, make the move towards the construction of self as the starting point for a post- 
positivist ethical agenda". 
367 
Jabri's aim is a liberation, or what she calls a Foucauldian 'restyling', of subjectivity, 
leading to a multiplication of possible sites of responsibility and moral agency. Ethics 
and responsibility in international relations then would no longer just mean the state 
44enact[ing] an ethical policy towards other states". 368 This thesis takes a clearly different 
approach, though it agrees that ethics and responsibility in foreign policy, as well as 
international relations, cannot only be about the ethical policies of one state to another. 
However, the use of Derridean deconstruction (rather than Jabri's use of Foucault and 
Kristeva) means that the analysis of this thesis is based in the text of British and EU 
foreign policy. 
The understanding of ethical subjectivity which emerges in this deconstructive reading is 
both similar to, and breaks from, the subject as sovereign state. After all, the EU in 
constructing itself as a subject of international affairs makes no claims to being a 
sovereign state. In addition, while there is definite cross-over with Jabri's focus upon 
freeing up subjectivity, the focus is not only on individuals but primarily collective 
subjects. In Chapter VI, the negotiation of subjectivity in foreign policy demands a 
contextual decision as to which particular subject in the chain of supplementary 
signifiers should be affirmed in any situation. 
Like Cynthia Weber, this thesis views subjectivity as performative, 369 or rather a 
declarative performance of subjectivity. It examines this Problematic and unstable 
declaration in specific contexts, bringing the argument closest to the work of Zehfuss 
and Campbell. Zehfuss uses the thought of Judith Butler to problematise the prior 
existence, independence and invulnerability of the 'we' - the claim to subjectivity - on 
which the invasion of Iraq was based. This makes it impossible to simply ask whether 
367 Vivienne Jabri, "Restyling the Subject of Responsibility in International Relations" Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies Vol. 27, No. 3 (1998), p. 592. 
368 Ibid, pp. 594-5. 
369 Cynthia Weber, "Masquerading and the U. S. 'Intervasion' of Haiti", in Edkins et al. (eds. ), Sovereignty 
and Subjectivity, p. 5 1. 
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the invasion was ethically right or wrong, as too much is already assumed in this 
question. Primary amongst these assumptions is the prior existence of an invading 'we' 
which is separate from an invaded 'them. ' "In other words, the question of ethics, of 
how we should relate to others, is in danger of obscuring the way in which we are always 
,, 370 already related to them . Zehfuss' point is well made but this thesis argues further 
that, while 'we' are always yulnerable to and inseparable from otherness, this does not 
mean 'we' should stop looking for the better way to construct and relate to the other. 
It is unsurprising that Campbell's explicitly deconstructive examination of the 
performance of subjectivity and identity in Bosnia is closest to that of this thesis. He is 
able to generalise from 'Bosnia' to show that the "deconstruction of the state as subject 
is not restricted to those states subject to destruction". 371 Using Derrida's account of the 
mystical foundation of authority in 'Force of Law', Campbell shows that the founding 
moment of every state is an interpretive and performative coup de force: a claim to 
subjectivity, an assertion of a 'we' without ground. 372 Chapter III's account of British 
and EU subjectivity has many similarities to Campbell's (such as the impossibility of 
providing a firm ground for claims to a 'we'), without making use of the coup deforce. 
Rather, the 'concept' of diffirance and the way it produces effects of subjectivity, as well 
as Derrida's account of democratic 'autoimmunity, ' are used. These accounts excavate 
the way, as Campbell says elsewhere, foreign policy becomes "an arena of practice in 
which some subjects emerge with the status of actors" and others do not. 373 
"0 Maja Zehfuss, "Subjectivity and Vulnerability: On the War with Iraq", in James Brassett and Dan 
Bulley (eds. ), "Ethics in World Politics: Cosmopolitanism and Beyond? " Special Issue, International 
Politics Vol. 44, No. I (forthcoming, 2007). 
37 ' David Campbell, "Violence, Justice, and Identity in the Bosnian Conflict", in Edkins et al. (eds. ), 
Sovereignty and Subjectivity, p. 24. 
372 Ibid., pp. 24-27. See also Campbell, National Deconstruction. For Derrida's original discussion see 
Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority"', in Drucilla Cornell, Michael 
Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson (eds. ), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (London: 
Routledge, 1992), pp. 3-67. 373 Campbell, Writing Security, p. 39. 
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Responsibility 
The work of Campbell is also central to a critical re-theorization of responsibility in 
international relations. Using the philosophy of Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas, 
Campbell pays close attention to the undecidability of responsibility. For example, 
regarding the participants in the 1990 Gulf War, he notes how it became "impossible to 
draw any clear boundary which would clarify where agency and responsibility reside". 374 
This work also began a debate with another key theorist of responsibility - Daniel 
Warner. Warner is important because, as Campbell remarks, he also goes some way 
towards a "social" theorising of responsibility and ethics in international affairs through 
his use of the philosopher Martin Buber. 375 Of the extant literature on responsibility in 
international relations, it is this debate, and Campbell's subsequent suggestion of a 
"deterritorialization of responsibility", 376 that is most relevant to situating Chapter IV's 
deconstruction of responsibility. 
Warner and Campbell, like this thesis, share a view of ethics as fundamentally social - 
responsibility is always a responsibility to, and for, others. 377 Where they differ is in 
their characterisation and extent of this responsibility. Warner uses Buber to show that 
the relation to the other is split, into that of an I-Thou and an I-It relation. 378 Whereas the 
I-Thou, or I-You, relation to the other is one of openness and mutuality - treating the 
other (the ThoulYou) as a subject equal to the self (the I) - the I-It relation treats the 
other as an object (the It) for the purposes of the self (the I) who remains a subject . 
379 For 
Warner (and Buber), one must always maintain "the possibility of moving from one kind 
of relationship to another". 380 
374 Campbell, Politics Without Principle, p. 43. 
375 jbid., fn. 12, pp. 100- 10 1. 
376 David Campbell, "The Deterritorialization of Responsibility: Levinas, Derrida, and Ethics after the End 
of Philosophy", in Campbell and Shapiro (eds. ), Moral Spaces, p. 29. See also Campbell, National 
Deconstruction, p. 166. 
377 Daniel Warner, An Ethic of Responsibility in International Relations (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 
199 1), p. 2 1. 378 jbid, pp. 20-21 and p. I 11. 
379Daniel Warner, "Levinas, Buber and the Concept of Otherness in International Relations: A Reply to 
David Campbel I" Millennium: Journal ofInternational Studies Vol. 25, No. I (1996), pp. 112-113. 
380 Ibid., P. 114. 
88 
In contrast, Campbell uses the thought of Levinas to show that the I, the subject - 
whether as individual or state - before it even is, is responsible to the other. 38 1 Buber's I 
and the Thou are radically interdependent for Campbell and Levinas because the very 
possibility of the I is constituted and depends on the prior existence of the Thou. 382 Thus, 
when the other is suffering "there is no circumstance under which we could declare that 
it was not our concern". 383 There is no ethics involved in the I-It relation for Campbell 
and Levinas, as the other is treated as an object (an It) for our own use. Rather, an ethical 
relation can only ever be one of I-Thou, where we are radically responsible for the other 
as a subject, prior to our own subjectivity. 
Warner criticises Campbell's Levinasian view of responsibility because, by disallowing 
the I-It relation, Levinas allows "no possibility for movement or choice between the two 
worlds". 
384 However, as Campbell points out, this criticism is unfounded as both 
385 Campbell and Levinas recognise that the I-It relation is all too common. But this 
points to a larger problem with Warner/Buber: "[w]hy is the possibility of I-It relations 
desirable? " asks Campbell. Why should one want to retain the possibility of treating the 
other as an object for our own use? Levinas and Campell are aware that I-It relations are 
"unavoidable", but they are also fundamentally "undesirable, and are the very relations 
with the Other to be contested because of their unethical nature". 386 The argument of this 
thesis is in fundamental agreement with Campbell on the undesirability of the I-It 
relation. Indeed, it is this irresponsible treatment of the other as object which will be the 
focus during the deconstruction of a responsibility to save others contained within 
British foreign policy (Chapter IV). 
However, this is not to say that the thesis entirely subscribes to Campbell's alternative 
theorization of responsibility. There are at least two things that separate the two. Firstly, 
381 Campbell, Politics Without Principle, pp. 95-6. 382 Campbell, "The Deterritorialization of Responsibility", pp. 32-35. 
383 Ibid., p. 35. 
384 Warner, "Levinas, Buber and the Concept of Otherness in International Relations", p. 115. 
385 David Campbell, "The Politics of Radical Interdependence: A Rejoinder to Daniel Warner" 
Millennium: Journal ofInternational Studies Vol. 25, No. 1 (1996), p. 134. 386 ibid. 
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in Chapter IV's Derridean reading of responsibility and its subsequent negotiation in 
Chapter VI, there is no reference made to Levinas. Campbell contrasts his use of Levinas 
to that of Simon Critchley, who concludes that deconstruction's undecidability cannot 
make political decisions and therefore requires supplementation (both an adding to and a 
replacing) by a Levinasian conception of unconditional responsibility. 387 Campbell, on 
the other hand, suggests that Levinas' idealisation of the state and politics themselves 
require a Derridean supplement in order to interrupt this ideal's potential 
388 "total ization". 
It is acknowledged that Derrida was both inspired by, and agrees with, much of what 
Levinas has to say concerning responsibility and hospitality. Indeed, the similarities and 
differences between the two are fine-grained and difficult to separate. 389 However, 
Campbell does not make a convincing case as to why a Levinasian supplementation of 
Derrida is necessary. His argument seems to hang on the fact that, just as an "unalloyed 
faith in Levinas" is "insufficient", SO "the invocation of Derrida is similarly 
incomplete". 390 However, the insufficiency of deconstruction is "not because the 
arguments are inherently flawed but because politics cannot be resolved... by a resort to 
philosophy". 39 1 Though there is no necessary flaw in deconstruction, we cannot put 
unalloyed faith in it as a "philosophy" to resolve "politics". 
This argument is problematic for several reasons. In the first instance, it relies on a 
division between politics and philosophy which cannot be upheld. It also appears odd 
that Campbell justifies his turning to Levinas, another philosopher, by the fact that 
philosophy cannot resolve politics. Surely this would suggest an appeal to something 
other than another phi losophy/ph i losopher. But, most importantly, Campbell's argument 
suggests that if we do not supplement Derrida we are showing an almost religious faith 
387 Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992), 
p. 189. 
388 Campbell, "The Deterritorialization of Responsibility", p. 42. 
3 89 For an excellent reading of the differences between Derrida and Levinas specifically in Derrida's 
reading of Levinas, see Alex Thomson, Deconstruction and Democracy: Derrida's Politics of Friendship 
(London: Continuum, 2005), especially pp. 103-143. 
390 Campbell, "The Politics of Radical Interdependence". p. 136. 
391 Ibid., p. 134. 
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in deconstruction as a resolution. However, the reading of Derrida in Chapter VI is used 
specifically to keep responsibility undecidable, politics unresolved and political. Indeed, 
it treats this undecidability as the condition of politics and responsibility. 
The second difference between this thesis and Campbell's work is that, while the 
reasoning behind his call for a "deterritorialization of responsibility" (as responsibility 
towards the other should not be limited by his/her existence within the inviolable borders 
of a nation-state)392 is fully appreciated, a worry remains that such a deterritorialisation 
will also have a deresponsibi Ii sing effect. The removal of responsibility from any notion 
of a territorial 'home' endangers a key possibility of ethical enactment: hospitality. 393 
After all, as Chapter V explains, without a home there is nothing to welcome the other 
into. Thus, while the territorialised responsibility can produce a terrifying "moral 
cartography', 394 by removing our responsibility for those outside our territory, it also 
allows for the possibility of another enactment of responsibility and ethics to which the 
analysis now turns. 
Hospitality 
Unlike subjectivity and responsibility, hospitality is given little attention by IR theorists. 
This is partly because of its liminality, existing as neither simply a 'domestic' nor 
'international' concept, but rather disturbing the opposition between the two. Noting 
Walker's explanation of traditional IR theory as structured around a differentiation 
between an 'inside' the state, constituted by community and justice, and an 'outside' the 
state, constituted by anarchy and a deferral of ethical community, 395 we can see why 
hospitality should be given more consideration in international relations. What could be 
more ethical than welcoming the other into our ethical community? As such, we could 
even perhaps say hospitality is constitutive of question of ethics and international 
392 Campbell, National Deconstruction, p. 166. 
393 Dan Bulley, "Negotiating Ethics: Campbell, Ontopology and Hospitality" Review of International 
Studies Vol. 32, No. 4 (forthcoming, 2006). 
394 Campbell, National Deconstruction, p. 208. 
395 Walker, InsidelOutside, p. 152. 
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relations. Dillon, however, draws attention to the way the figure of a refugee disturbs this 
coherent picture. The fact that the refugee is neither inside nor outside means that the 
question of hospitality and the refugee "brings the very 'inter' of international relations 
to the foreground in a disturbing and unusual way". 396 
Discussion of hospitality arises most often through a confrontation with, or reading of, 
Immanuel Kant, especially in Perpetual Peace. Derrida also gives Kant a privileged 
position in his reading of hospitality. 397 Kant proposed a system of ethical enactment in 
international relations through the cosmopolitan right to "universal hospitality", while 
accepting the discourse of inside/outside. In the third Definitive Article for perpetual 
peace Kant talks about hospitality as "the right of a stranger not to be treated with 
hostility when he arrives on someone else's territory". 398 While such a stranger cannot 
claim the rights of a guest, they can claim a "right of resort, for all men are entitled to 
present themselves in the society of others by virtue of their right to communal 
possession of the earth's surface". 399 This view of hospitality has been left fundamentally 
unchanged by modem cosmopolitan theorists. 400 
Shapiro favourably contrasts this Kantian, cosmopolitan hospitality to the "radically 
inhospitable" security mapping of Samuel Huntington's thesis of clashing 
civilisations . 
401 However, this is not to say that cosmopolitan hospitality is ethically 
unproblematic. Shapiro notes that because of Kant's attachment to state sovereignty, and 
thus his continued reliance on an inside/outside logic, he "lacked a sensitivity to peoples 
and nations that were not organised in the form of states". 402 Nick Vaughan-Williams 
396 Michael Dillon, "The Scandal of the Refugee: Some Reflections on the 'Inter' of International 
Relations and Continental Thought", in Campbell and Shapiro (eds. ), Moral Spaces, p. 10 1. 
397 See, for example, Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, translated by Mark Dooley 
and Michael Hughes (London: Routledge, 2001). 
398 Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, 2 nd Edition, translated by H. B. Nisbet, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1991), p. 105. 
399 bid 
., P. 
106. 
400 For example, see James Bohmann and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, "Introduction", and David Held, 
"Cosmopolitan Democracy and Global Order: A New Agenda", in James Bohmann and Matthias Lutz- 
Bachmann (eds. ), Perpetual Peace: Essay's on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal (London: MIT Press, 1997). 
401 Michael J. Shapiro, "The Events of Discourse and the Ethics of Global Hospitality" Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies Vol. 27, No. 3 (1998), p. 697. 
402 bid 
., p. 
70 1. 
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also draws attention to this limited and limiting form of hospitality in his Derridean 
critiques of cosmopolitan thought. "' Shapiro suggests that we move beyond this 
restricted hospitality to citizen/subjects of another state, towards subjects which Kant 
404 
cannot think . Such subjects would include Dillon's scandalous refugees, who resist the 
inside/outside distinction. Doty, for one, has begun to think these scandalous subjects 
from a deconstructive, hospitable point of view. 405 
While in fundamental agreement with Dillon, Shapiro and Vaughan-Williams, the major 
difference between their discussion and that of this thesis is that of who is granting 
hospitality to whom. Their focus is on the need to move beyond the state granting 
hospitality to the citizen of another state, but the 'subjects' examined in Chapter V are 
very different. Instead of states and individuals, Chapter V looks at the EU's foreign 
policy of hospitable 'enlargement' towards nation states. A concentration on the EU 
somewhat disturbs the logic of inside/outside, but it does not of necessity escape it. The 
temptation remains to reinstate it at a different 'level' of analysis, with the state now 
seen as the citizen/subject and the EU substituting for the state. Therefore, while this 
analysis will differ because of the different context, any examination of hospitality must 
remain wary of the ethical pitfalls Dillon, Shapiro and Vaughan -Wi I liams highlight. 
A useful example of the way ethical hospitality can be unethical is revealed through 
Shapiro's separation of attitudes to the 'home' which enables hospitality. The Levinasian 
comparison between the Abrahamic journey away from the home towards the other, 
never to return, and Odysseus's journey towards alterity, only to return to his home in 
Ithaca, is employed to illustrate these two attitudes. The Abrahamic journey 
demonstrates a treatment of alterity that "must remain infinitely other... not to be 
domesticated... [but] allowed to serve as a disruption of the self'. Odysseus, who only 
journeys to return home, exemplifies a dialectical journey "in which alterity simply 
403 See Nick Vaughan-Williams, "Protesting Against Citizenship" Citizenship Studies Vol. 9, No. 2 (2005), 
pp. 167-179; Nick Vaughan-Williams, "Beyond a Cosmopolitan Ideal: the Politics of Singularity", in 
Brassett and Bulley (eds. ), 'Ethics in World Politics: Cosmopolitanism and BeyondT. 
404 Shapiro, "The Events of Discourse", p. 710. 
405 Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Humane Borders and the Ethics of Responsibility", Paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the International Studies Association, Town and Country Resort and Convention Center, San 
Diego, California, USA (22 March 2006). 
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serves the enhancement of the self' . 
406 It is therefore suggested that global hospitality 
should, perhaps, embody a more ambivalent, open attitude to the 'horne. ' 
This excursus reflects the continuing stress that will be placed upon the importance of a 
territorial 'home' in Chapter V; a stress, it was suggested above, that Campbell is 
insensitive to. Unlike Campbell, Shapiro advises that "ethical practices realized as 
writing performances require a degree of unreading, unmapping, and re-writing". 407 The 
'home' must be unread by degrees, such that hospitality is still possible: such that there 
is still a home to invite the other into, while becoming a "community always open to 
unforeseeable encounter". 408 The necessary return to the importance of subjectivity (as 
shown in Chapter V and VI) is also demonstrated by Shapiro, who ends by going back to 
the fragmented subject of hospitality. Thus "cosmopolitanism must begin at home", 
through an "ethic of hospitality... to one's collective self', which always contains the 
other within it. 409 
This section introduced the ways in which the undecidables this thesis uses as levers in 
the deconstruction of ethics and foreign policy have been alternatively theorised. None 
of these concepts - subjectivity, responsibility or hospitality - are new to 
poststructuralist IR. While there are substantial differences in the way they are handled 
here, particularly in relation to subjectivity, there are also significant cross-overs, 
especially with the work of Campbell. The only areas of difference outlined with 
Campbell are over his supplementation of Derrida with the philosophy of Emmanuel 
Levinas and his suggestion of a deterritorialization of responsibility - which potentially 
imperils an ethic of hospitality. 
406 Michael J. Shapiro, "The Ethics of Encounter: Unreading, Unmapping the Imperium", in Campbell and 
Shapiro (eds. ), Moral Spaces, p. 66. 
407 Ibid., p. 77. 
401 Ibid., p. 80. 
409 Shapiro, "The Events of Discourse", p. 713. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to build on the critique of FPA in Chapter I by demonstrating the 
way foreign policy will be read and deconstructed as text. While having many of the 
characteristics of a 'methodology' or 'theory, ' deconstruction is neither. It cannot be 
simply applied to British and EU foreign policy. Rather, the value of deconstruction is 
the way that it operates regardless of a conscious subject to operate it. Simply put, 
deconstruction "is what happens". 410 
Section one set out what it means to say that foreign policy will be read as text. This 
demanded an explanation of the logocentrism which orders western philosophy on the 
basis of a privileging of presence over absence. It was explained that this centrality of 
logos (meaning speech, reason, Word of God) forms the basis without foundation of a 
whole system of hierarchical binary oppositions. The central opposition which Derrida 
examines is that of speech, favoured as denoting presence, and writing considered 
merely derivative and thus connected to absence. By revealing how the absence which 
structures writing (as both representative and iterable) is equally constitutive of speech, 
Derrida demonstrates that all language, experience and history is textually constituted; 
our only access to 'it' is through representative discourse. Foreign policy is not 
something we can find, out there, a thing itse4f, rather 'it' is always discursively 
mediated and thus written as text. 
While this first section illustrated deconstruction taking place, the second section 
explicated the 'something-like' general rules of deconstruction which could never be 
formalised outside of context. The two 'phases' of deconstruction were traced: the 
overturning of a binary hierarchy (for example, showing that speech is derivative of 
writing); and the displacement of this opposition. This displacement takes place by 
demonstrating that every logocentric opposition relies upon, and is produced by, 
undecidable terms such as the supplement and diffirance. Thus, deconstruction takes 
place in a text where undecidability disrupts its structure. To deconstruct a text, then, 
4 10 Derrida, "Some Statements and Truisms... ", p. 85. 
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means looking for and noting how an undecidable operates to subvert its surrounding 
logic. 
Finally, section three contextualised the forthcoming analysis of the three undecidables 
around which the discourse of ethics and foreign policy deconstruct in British and EU 
foreign policy. Subjectivity, responsibility and hospitality were all situated within 
poststructuralist IR literature and indications were given as to how the analysis of this 
thesis would both follow and break with these theorizations. It was especially important 
to illustrate that this thesis does not simply repeat the work of academics such as 
Campbell and Shapiro, but is heavily influenced by it. 
The next three chapters are not the application of a 'theory' or 'method' to an empirical 
field of knowledge called 'foreign policy'. Rather they outline the importance of the 
three concepts (subjectivity, responsibility, hospitality) to the possibility of a discourse of 
ethics and foreign policy, and subsequently reveal how they also constitute the 
impossibility of its own logic. They make it both possible and impossible, yet neither 
possible nor impossible; they reveal the undecidability of ethics and foreign policy. The 
im-possibility (not simply impossible) of an ethical foreign policy through negotiation 
demonstrates the affirmative aspect of deconstruction in Chapter VI. 
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Chapter III 
Subjectivity: Failing and Supplementing 
Introduction 
Chapter 11 both explicated how foreign policy can be read as text and drew out the 
deconstructive approach to reading a text. The three undecidables on which this thesis 
concentrates were then situated within poststructuralist IR literature. This chapter turns 
to the British and EU foreign policy texts and observes their deconstruction around the 
undecidable concept of subjectivity. While responsibility and hospitality (or hospitality 
as the way the EU exercises its responsibility) may seem more obviously important to 
the possibility of ethics and foreign policy, the construction of subjectivity, or rather, of 
the subject which can act ethically in world politics through its foreign policy, is of 
fundamental importance. Indeed, it allows the possibility for the representation of some 
'thing', or 'someone', acting responsibly, hospitably or ethically. 
The focus of this chapter is confined to the construction of the subject of ethics and 
foreign policy, but some discussion of 'subjectivity' and 'the subject' is necessary by 
way of introduction. A minimum definition, while desirable for clarity, would only be 
useful for thinking about how the subject was constructed at one time and by a specific 
philosophy. As Caroline Williams puts it, the "subject cannot be reduced to a 
homogeneity... There are as many histories as there are conceptions of the subject; the 
history of the subject does not exist. A1 1 Nonetheless, Stuart Hall tells such a "highly 
simplistic" story of the subject as a "device entirely for the purpose of convenient 
exposition". 412 
411 Caroline Williams, Contemporary French Philosophy: Modernity and the Persistence of the Subject 
(London: Athlone Press, 200 1), p. 13. 
412 Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity", p. 28 1. 
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Hall's narrative begins with the "Enlightenment subject" of Descartes: a human person 
44as a fully centred, unified individual, endowed with the capacities of reason, 
consciousness and action". 413 The source of the subject's identity was the core of its 
sel f. 414 Williams agrees with this picture of Cartesian primacy (though it must be noted 
415 that others do not) , claiming that the essence of subjectivity for Descartes is "given by 
the cognitive capacities of the self alone", regardless of its relation to the world and other 
416 
people/subjects . Along with Kant's separation between subjectivity (that which knows 
and acts) and objectivity (that which is known and acted upon), this conception of the 
subject "has been viewed by many to constitute the dominant paradigm in Western 
political and philosophical thought". 417 Fundamentally it sees the subject as "the 
objectifying ground of all knowledge and as the foundation for all possible being". 418 
Hall continues his story of the subject with the sociological subject . 
41 9 This subject 
retained an identity, its inner core, but this was no longer seen as "autonomous and self 
sufficient, but was formed in relation to 'significant others, ' who mediated... the cultural 
world he/she inhabited". Identity came to be seen as formed through an interaction 
between the self and society. 420 Finally, Hall brings us to the 'postmodem' subject. Here, 
the subject's inner core, its identity, is fragmented and split. There is nothing fixed, 
permanent or essential about the postmodern subject's identity, rather it is "formed and 
transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the 
cultural systems which surround us". 421 This displacement of the Cartesian subject, he 
says, is performed by five great advances in social theory: those of Marx (and 
subsequently Althusser), Freud (and subsequently Lacan), de Saussure (and subsequently 
Derrida), Foucault and Feminism. 422 
413 Ibid., p. 275. 
414 Edkins, Poststructuralism and International Relations, p. 2 1. 
415 See Etienne Balibar, "Citizen Subject", in Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy (eds. ), 
Who Comes After the Subject? (New York: Routledge, 199 1), pp. 33 -5 7. 416 Williams, Contemporary French Philosophy, p. 17. 
417 jbid., P. 18. 418 Ibid., P. 12. 
4 19 Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity", p. 285. 
420 Ibid., pp. 275-6. 
421 Ibid., p. 277. 422 Ibid ., pp. 285-291. 
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These differential displacements illustrate Williams' assertion that "the history of the 
subject does not exi§t. 5,423 Rather, subjectivity is always a constructed basis for 
knowledge and action; it is always a representation of something that is never present in 
and of itself. Nonetheless, the possibility of subjectivity is still of great importance to the 
possibility of ethics., Derrida observes that, even after the postmodern displacements of 
the subject, we must still ask "who or what 'answers' to the question 'who' ? 51424 For 
Williams it remains. crucial "to consider the position from which the subject may speak 
and act", as what i. s "still required by classical and deconstructive position alike is a 
certain responsibility". 425 The possibility of ethics demands a subject which can speak 
and act. 
As stated, this chapter limits itself to the description and deconstruction of subjectivity 
only as it pertains to the possibility of ethics and foreign policy - the construction of a 
subject that can act ethically, responsibly and hospitably in world politics. Thus, when 
this chapters uses the terms 'subjectivity' and the 'subject' it does not refer to all 
constructions of subjectivity, but specifically the subject of ethics and foreign policy. 
British and EU foreign policy is replete with assertions of such subjectivity. Indeed, just 
days after becoming Foreign Secretary in 1997 Robin Cook launched the "ethical 
dimension" of British foreign policy with an immediate claim to a collective British 
ethical subject: 
We are instant witness in our sitting rooms through the medium of television to human tragedy in 
distant lands, and are therefore obliged to accept moral responsibility for our response... Our 
foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other peoples for 
the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves. 426 
423 Williams, Contemporary French Philosophy, p. 13. 
424 Jacques Derrida, "'Eating Well, ' or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida", 
in Cadava, Connor and Nancy (eds. ), Who Comes After the Subject?, p. 98. 
425 Williams, Contemporary French Philosophy, p. 149. 
426 Cook, "Mission statement" - emphases added. 
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The claims to subjectivity, the 'we', the 'our' and the 'ourselves' are the basis for the 
ethical dimension. There would be no possibility of an ethical dimension without a 'we' 
to accept or enact it. 
Such declarations are also a refrain of EU foreign policy from the beginning of the 
period under study. Javier Solana, in one of his first speeches as the new HR for the 
EU's CFSP, asserted that the EU could not ignore others' conflicts. "Our survival is not 
always at stake, but our moral standing is. " Europe, he claims, is "above all a community 
built on a set of principles and a set of values. And we must be intransigent when these 
, 427 fundamental values and principles are under threat . Again, 'we' must safeguard 'our' 
moral standing and principles, and this subjectivity allows the possibility of ethics and 
foreign policy. 
This chapter proceeds in three sections. Firstly, a commentary is provided on the way 
British and EU foreign policy construct subjectivity, both their own and that of others in 
international politics. Subjectivity is constructed in both foreign policies as the ability, or 
capacity, to take responsibility for the prevention of human suffering. Here we begin to 
see how responsibility becomes the dominant signifier for these representations of ethics 
and foreign policy. As stated in the Introduction to this thesis, rather than subjectivity, 
responsibility and hospitality being strictly separate concepts in the foreign policy text, 
they all refer to a responsible relation to otherness, the 'foreign'. The subject of ethics 
and foreign policy is the subject of responsibility, the subject that can take responsibility, 
while hospitality is the primary way the EU represents its enactment of responsibility. 
The commentary contained in section one may sound as though a coherent 'British' or 
'EU' subject is being presupposed. Rather, it examines the invocations and 
presuppositions of a constructed coherence contained within the text. This invocation is 
then deconstructed from two angles in sections two and three. The second section 
demonstrates how the centrality of the 'failing state' to Britain's (and, less so, the EU's) 
discourse of subjectivity is undermined by the terrorist attacks on London in 2005. This 
427 Javier Solana, Speech to the Fernandez Ordonez Seminar, 14 January 2000 - emphasis added. 
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will generalise the 'failing subject' to show that any subject of international politics will 
always be both succeeding and failing, marking the presence and absence of subjectivity. 
The third section examines 'who' precisely is claiming responsibility in British and EU 
foreign policy. Rather than simply 'Britain' and 'EU' as autonomous, coherent, capable 
subjects, the 'who' changes from moment to moment. The resulting chain of 
supplementary signifiers for subjectivity corroborates the claim that, rather than a pre- 
existent entity capable of responsibility, the subject is produced as an effect of 
supplementary diffirance. Where this leaves the possibility of ethics and foreign policy 
will be examined in the conclusion. 
Constructing Subjectivity in British and EU Foreign Policy 
This first section asks how Britain and the EU construct their own and others' ethical 
subjectivity in international affairs. How do they constitute a coherent picture of 
themselves as a subject of ethics and foreign policy? The British and EU foreign policy 
texts have significant overlap and yet are very different in this regard, therefore each will 
be tackled in turn. The conception of subjectivity affirmed for both 'Britain' and other 
actors in the British text is highly assured. To be a subject is to be a member of the 
'international community', which gives the subject both rights and responsibilities. It is 
the capacity to accept and fuýfil these responsibilities which defines the subject in 
Britain's 'ethical' foreign policy. 'Britain' in this case, considers itself a leading member 
of the international community. 
In contrast, the EU discourse of subjectivity is differentiated and insecure. In terms of a 
general structure of subjectivity, it largely adheres to the British construction as that 
which is capable of taking responsibility. However, the EU represents its own status as a 
subject as highly circumspect. It describes itself as maturing toward the ability to take 
responsibilities globally. The greatest responsibility claimed is towards those nearest to 
it: a responsibility of proximity, or a territorialized responsibility. It is capable of 
enacting this responsibility as a hospitality, presenting its subjectivity in a regional 
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context as a 'home' which it welcomes others into. The former, more general sense of 
subjectivity, is the focus of this chapter; the latter is examined in Chapter V. 
7-he Subject in British Foreign Policy 
I 
The connection between the 'we' and the taking of responsibility is immediately 
apparent in Cook's inaugural foreign policy speech of the new Labour Government. 
"We" are constructed as "witnesses" to suffering, and as such are "obliged to accept 
moral responsibility for our response". 428 While the structure for this subjectivity is not 
yet in place, Cook nonetheless argues that the "ethical dimension" given to foreign 
policy "aims to make Britain a leading partner in a world community of nations". 429The 
structuring of subjectivity around responsibility and community becomes clearer two 
months later when Cook declares the starting point of British foreign policy to be that "in 
the modem world all nations belong to the same international community", and as such 
"it is reasonable to require every government to abide by the rules of membership. They 
are set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. , 430 
From 1999 onwards, this structuring idea of the international community develops. A 
conception of subjectivity is at the heart of this: the subject of international politics as 
that which is capable of taking responsibilities and accepting rights. Thus, in fleshing out 
the international dimension of his domestic 'Third Way', Blair emphasises over and 
again that its basis is an international community "defined by common rights and shared 
responsibilities"431 for its members. In his speech to the Global Ethics Foundation in 
June 2000, Blair stresses that community, whether national or international is "based on 
428 Cook, "Mission Statement". 
429 ibid. 
430 Robin Cook, "Human Rights Into a New Century", 17 July 1997. 
43 1 Tony Blair, "Facing the Modem Challenge: The Third Way in Britain and South Africa", 8 January 
1999. Unless otherwise stated, all speeches, interviews and press conferences by Prime Minister Tony 
Blair have been downloaded from the Downing Street website: http: //www, 10 down i ngstreet. gov. uk 
(accessed between 27 August 2004 and I May 2006). 
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the equal worth of all, on the foundation of mutual rights and mutual responsibilities". 432 
This idea was still being emphasised in British foreign policy by March 2004.433 
Jack Straw adds steel to the argument, observing that "[t]he rights of members of the 
global community depend exclusively on their readiness to meet their global 
,, 434 responsibilities. In this way, the British foreign policy text structures its concept of 
the subject as a member of the international community, with rights and responsibilities. 
However, Straw clarifies that the subject's rights depend "exclusively" on the "readiness 
to meet their global responsibilities". In other words, responsibilities come first. 
Essential to the definition of subject in the British foreign policy text is this capacity to 
take responsibility. 
Nonetheless, despite the emphasis on responsibilities, subjects do have rights as 
members of the international community. They have the right to receive development aid 
and relief from their debt burden, to experience an unpolluted environment and to trade 
435 in free markets . 
This latter element is underlined by the trade sanctions against Iraq, 
represented as a result of Iraq's own choice to position itself outside the international 
community. 436 Equally, the ending of sanctions against Libya was associated with its 
rejoining the international community. 437 Subjects have the right to enter into 
international treaties and organisations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and even the EU. For example, Cook 
emphasised to the Bosnian government (in language that would become rife in EU 
foreign policy) that if they fulfilled their responsibilities, "[w]e can then welcome you 
,, 438 back into the family of European nations. Blair went further, saying that if 
responsibilities were accepted, we have a "moral duty" to offer accession to the EU. 439 
432 Tony Blair, Speech to Global Ethics Foundation, Tubingen University, Germany, 30 June 2000. 
433 See Tony Blair, "Speech on the threat of global terrorism", Sedgefield, 13 July 2004. 
434 Jack Straw, "Principles of a Modem Global Community", 10 April 2002. 
435 Blair, "Facing the Modem Challenge". 
436 Robin Cook, "Europe and America: The Decisive Partnership", 15 January 1998. 
437 Tony Blair, "Prime Minister Welcomes Libyan Weapons of Mass Destruction Announcement", 19 
December 2003. 
438 Robin Cook, "Bosnia: a new hope", 4 March 1998. 
439 Tony Blair, "The New Challenges for Europe", 20 May 1999. 
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The central right of a subject is, however, "the right to live free from the threat of 
force". 440 As a member of the international community, one's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity is respected. If you are not part of the international community, this right is 
relinquished. Thus British foreign policy's construction of subjectivity makes freedom 
from force conditional. Initially this is played down: the "principle of non- interference" 
remains valid, but it "must be qualified in certain respects". 44 ' Later, this is represented 
as a break from the "traditional" philosophy of international relations which has "held 
442 sway since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648" . It is no longer the case that "a country's 
internal affairs are for it and you don't intervene unless it threatens you, or breaches a 
treaty, or triggers an obligation of alliance". 443 Denis MacShane thus declared in 2002 
that "[t]he Westphalian era of inter-state relations is over. The days when what happened 
inside a state was of no interest to other nations is over. 444 Mark Wickham-Jones 
suggests that the most interesting aspect of this early period in Labour's foreign policy 
was the "quiet burial of the doctrine of non-intervention". 445 
However, it is the falfilment of one's responsibilities that allow an actor to be considered 
a subject with rights in British foreign policy. What are these responsibilities? There is 
no definitive list but various claims are made, such as Cook's above, that respect for 
human rights formed the "rules of membership" of the international community. 446 Bill 
Rammell, a Junior Minister at the Foreign Office under Jack Straw, observes that "[t]he 
core role of any state is to guarantee basic human rights: life, security, the rule of law. 
But some fail in this responsibility. , 447 Thus, the primary responsibility of a subject of 
ethics and foreign policy is to respect and protect the human rights of one's population. 
440 Blair, "Facing the Modem Challenge". 
44 1 Tony Blair, "Doctrine of the International Community Speech", Economic Club, Chicago, 24 April 
1999. 
442 Blair, "Speech on the Threat of Global Terrorism". 
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444 Denis MacShane, "Diplo-Military Politics: The Future Strategic Context of Conflict Prevention and 
Conflict Resolution", 25 April 2002. 
445 Mark Wickham-Jones, "Labour's trajectory in foreign affairs: the moral crusade of a pivotal power? ", 
in Little and Wickham-Jones (eds. ), New Labour's Foreign Policy, p. 17. 
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Another general responsibility is that a subject must not threaten international peace and 
security, either by committing acts of genocide and producing refugees, 448 or by 
threatening its neighbours. 449 Subsequent to the terrorist attacks of II September 2001 
(9/11), two other responsibilities grew in importance within the British foreign policy 
discourse: a responsibility not to support terrorism ; 450 and a responsibility neither to 
develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nor to proliferate them to other 
countries. 451 If others fail to meet these responsibilities, the international community 
itself has a responsibility to act. 452 Thus, by 2004, the principle of non -interference was 
no longer being buried quietly by Jack Straw: 
States have the right to non-interference in their internal affairs; but they also have 
responsibilities, towards their own people, and towards the international community and their 
international engagements. Where those responsibilities are manifestly ignored, neglected or 
abused, the international community may need to intervene: the cost of failing to do so in Rwanda 
or in Bosnia still haunts us today. 453 
The construction of subjectivity in British foreign policy then comes down to this: if one 
does not fulfil one's (normally a state's) responsibilities, one ceases to be a member of 
the international community, and therefore ceases to be considered a subject of 
international politics. In this case, one can be treated as an object, something incapable 
of knowing and acting (taking responsibility), and thus only capable of being known and 
being acted upon. That which does not have the capacity to take responsibility thus 
becomes the object of a subject's responsibility. 
There are also a range of responsibilities which link directly to some of the rights that 
were mentioned first. These responsibilities, however, are generally used in reference to 
448 Blair, "Doctrine of International Community Speech". 
449 Blair, "Facing the Modem Challenge". 
4'0 For example, in relation to Syria and Iran: Tony Blair, Press Conference, 15 January 2004. 
45 1 For example, in relation to North Korea: Tony Blair, Doorstep press conference in Beijing, 21 July 
2003. 
452 ibid 
453 Jack Straw, "Shaping a stronger United Nations", 2 September 2004. 
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African nations - something that will become more important in Chapter IV. For 
example, the right to development aid depends upon the responsibility to use the aid 
productively and not corruptly. 454 The same goes for debt relief To gain the benefits of 
free trade, access to markets and IMF/World Bank assistance, there is the responsibility 
to comply with internationally agreed rules on trade and market regulation. 455 In 
summing up the help Britain and the G8 gave African nations in 2002, Blair speaks of 
the rights and responsibilities of both sides. A massive increase in aid is granted, but 
only "provided the Africans keep their side of the bargain", 456 their responsibility to 
make progress on education, infrastructure and governance. These responsibilities are 
later outlined as "a whole series of initiatives on the rule of law, on proper commercial 
and legal systems, on rooting out corruption, on respect for democratic rights, and the 
process of democracy". 457 More or less specifically for Africans then, we can add to the 
list of responsibilities one must be capable of fulfilling to be considered a subject: the 
maintenance of the rule of law, ending corruption and preserving democratic processes 
(or putting them in place). 
But what is the specificity of the British subject; what identity does the 'we' take on as a 
4we' in international politics? Cook's 'Mission Statement' aimed to "make Britain a 
leading partner in a world community of nations", and as such, "a force for good in the 
world". 458 At times Britain declares itself to be a global leader, such as when welcoming 
others back into the international community, 459 and on debt relief. 460 Britain apparently 
takes on more responsibility than other members of the international community. For 
example, Blair claims that Britain has a "special responsibility" for Africa. 461 When 
human rights have been threatened in Africa 'we' are said to be always at the forefront, 
taking responsibil ity. 462 Thus, in Sierra Leone, Britain did what it could to "save African 
454 Blair, "Facing the Modem Challenge". 
455 ibid. 
456 Tony Blair, Doorstep interview at G8 summit, 28 June 2002. 457 ibid. 
458 Cook, "Mission Statement". 
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nations from barbarism and dictatorship and be proud of it". 463 Yet our leadership is not 
just evident in Africa. When the values of the international community - described as 
freedom, democracy and the rule of law - are threatened in Iraq, "Britain will defend 
them with courage and certainty". 464 
The Subject in EU Foreign Policy 
This general construction of subjectivity as the capacity to accept responsibility is also in 
evidence from an early stage in the EU foreign policy discourse. However, in contrast to 
British foreign policy, the EU text focuses on affirming, justifying and describing its own 
status as a subject, its own capacity to accept responsibility. This is unsurprising when 
one considers the evident insecurity the EU demonstrates when claiming to be an 
independent, autonomous actor in international affairs. Chris Patten illustrates this on a 
visit to New Delhi: 
The last time I came here, it was in my capacity as the British Development Minister. In those 
days, I never needed to explain what Britain was, or how it fitted into the world. My French or 
German counterparts - indeed representatives of any EU member state - were similarly never 
called upon to do so. But today I am here to represent the European Union. An entity, a 
construction, that is far from clear to many outsiders. And frequently opaque to some of those 
inside as wel 1.465 
Unlike 'Britain', the 'EU' is a problematic subject. Britain simply is, one does not even 
need to explain what or that it is, but the EU's subjectivity needs to be proven, 
publicised, demonstrated. Thus Patten continues by stating that "Europe wants to live up 
to its international responsibilities... Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy 
463 Tony Blair, Mansion House Speech, 13 November 2000. 
464 Tony Blair, Statement to Parliament on NATO Summit, 25 November 2002. 
465 Chris Patten, "The Role of the European Union on the World Stage", Speech at the India Habitat 
Centre, Jawarharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 25 January 2001. Unless otherwise stated, all speeches, 
interviews and press conferences by Chris Patten, Commissioner for External Relations, have been 
downloaded from the Commission archives website: 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/archives/commission 1999 2004/patten/index. htm (accessed 7 July 2005). 
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now has operation (sic. ) teeth. 5466 The EU's problem living up to its international 
responsibilities means it rarely considers itself fully present as a subject of foreign 
policy. This is reflected in the academic literature, where Roy H. Ginsberg notes that 
scholars agree the EU "has an international 'presence"' in that it is "visible in regional 
and global fora" (thus present only to the extent that it is visible), but that it only 
"exhibits some elements of 'actorness' 59 . 
467 
Many EU foreign policy speeches appear as justifications of this lack of full presence. In 
2003, Javier Solana recalls what he claims is sometimes forgotten; it was only in 1993 
that the EU began to build a CFSP. 468 While admitting that much "remains to be done", 
he intriguingly suggests that in foreign policy "we are moving from a phase of theory to 
a phase of practice. We therefore stand on solid ground. " Crucially, Solana claims the 
EU now has significant responsibilities, "[b]ut I am convinced that the same reasons that 
give us responsibilities - our size and interests, our history and values - also equip us to 
take responsibilities. , 469The movement from theory to practice, to the EU becoming a 
subject of international politics and proving its presence practically, is a movement 
towards taking on responsibilities. 
Foremost in demonstrating the EU's practical presence on the world stage (as 
responsible subject) is the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which comes 
under the remit of the CFSP. For some, this represents the possibility of the EU moving 
from "weakness to power". 470 Others see its operation as finally demonstrating the EU's 
46claim to have become a fully-fledged actor in its own right". 471 This is demonstrated by 
the examples of ESDP peace-keeping actions in Bosnia, the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (FYROM), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
472 
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Solana proposes that the ESDP is a sign that "the Union is not prepared to stand idly by 
in the face of crises. Nor always to let others shoulder responsibility. " Thus, as an 
instrument allowing the EU to "shoulder" responsibility, "[i]t will be a sign that the 
European integration dreamed by Europe's founding fathers has come of age. 5,473 The 
ESDP signifies the maturation of the EU as an international subject, its becoming 
capable of taking responsibility. A few months later, Solana claims that "[w]e need 
effective common foreign and security polities, with sufficient means and sufficient 
capabilities... The time has come for us to take our responsibilities seriously. , 474 Even 
by 2003, the EU appeared not to havefully achieved foreign policy subjectivity. Thus, 
Solana says, "the EU has achieved a degree of maturity in this area - without yet having 
entirely grown up". 475 
Romano Prodi, President of the EU Commission (1999-2004), suggests that 9/11 had a 
big impact on the development of the EU as a subject. The terrorist attacks on New York 
and its implications, 
... 
have forced Europe to face up to its own responsibilities in a new way. Until not very long ago, 
it was possible to conceive of Europe playing a part on the international stage as a 'civil power', 
an actor promoting specific principles and values without any autonomous capacity for political 
action. Today we cannot allow ourselves the luxury of that kind of Europe. 476 
In fact, this is similar to what Patten and Solana were saying pre-9/11 about the ESDP - 
the EU is being forced to accept responsibilities and thus become a subject of ethics and 
foreign policy. As Ann Deighton suggests, the ESDP ended "the age of 'innocence' of 
473 Javier Solana, "The Development of a Common European Security and Defence Policy - the 
Integration Project of the Next Decade", Speech to EU-Commission Institut fur Europdische Politik 
Conference, Berlin, 17 December 1999. 
474 Solana, Speech to the Fernandez Ordonez Seminar. 
475 Javier Solana, Speech on the occasion of the Award of the 'Honoris Causa' Doctorate in Social 
Science, University of Wroclaw, 2 October 2003. 
476 Romano Prodi, "Nation, Federalism and Democracy - The EU, Italy and the American Federal 
experience", Speech at "The Nation, Federalism and Democracy" Conference, Trento, 5 October 2001. 
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477 
civilian power Europe". For Prodi, however, this is not a neutral ending but a decisive 
rejection of the EU as 'civilian power'. It is important to consider why this is rejected: a 
civilian power, for Prodi, has no "autonomous capacity for political action" in the 
international sphere. 478 In other words, it cannot fulfil its responsibilities and so cannot 
be considered a subject - autonomous, with control and capability of action. As Solana 
confirms, "[h]aving the capacity to use force when all other means fail is an essential 
component of a credible foreign PoliCy.,, 479 
Crucially, during 1999-2004, the foreign policy discourse of the EU never stabilized 
around an assured conception of its own subjectivity in global affairs. Whereas nation 
states' capacities appear static and given, the EU's capacities are represented as 
constantly developing and maturing. Considering the EU's concentration on its own 
subjectivity, it is perhaps unsurprising that it has little to say about subjectivity in 
general. The rare times that subjectivity, as the capacity to accept responsibility, is 
attributed to another entity is in relation to the Balkans. This is dealt with in more detail 
in Chapter V, but a brief introduction is necessary here. 
The EU accepts significant responsibility for the plight of the Balkans. "' However, as 
the reconstruction process gets underway, it is increasingly emphasised by Prodi, 481 
Patten 482 and Solana 483 that the Balkan nations themselves are responsible for their own 
recovery. For example, in a speech to the Kosovar Assembly in Pristina, Patten 
emphasises the role of the Assembly in a successful dialogue with Belgrade. This, he 
says, would, 
477 Anne Deighton, "The European Security and Defence Policy" Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 
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... send a very positive message to the international community, as it would show that your 
leaders are capable of assuming their responsibilities in a constructive manner. It would clearly 
show that when we say that Kosovo is on the path towards Europe it is not solely because 
geographically and politically you are part of the old continent but because you are mature 
enough to talk to those with whom you have extremely strong disagreements. 484 
In other words, EU foreign policy encourages Kosovo to do exactly what the EU is 
telling itseýf to do: grow up, mature and show themselves capable of assuming their 
responsibilities; show themselves capable of subjectivity. In this way, the EU replicates 
the discourse of British foreign policy, which constructs a more general subject of 
international affairs within an international community. The EU's representation of 
Kosovo's problem is essentially that of Kosovo showing itself to the international 
community as capable of responsibility. They are being told, and helped, to become a 
subject. 
This section has revealed the EU's doubts regarding its own subjectivity, its own 
presence on the global stage. The area in which it is most confident, its status as a 
regional 'home', capable of taking responsibility for those closest to it, will be examined 
and deconstructed in Chapter V. However, as a subject of world politics the 'EU' 
emphasises its own insecurity throughout the period. It does not represent itseýf as ever 
fully present as subject. This means that the deconstructions in sections two and three 
which follow will primarily focus on subjectivity in British foreign policy. Nevertheless, 
they will resonate with EU foreign policy due to some overlap in their constructions of 
subjectivity. 
484 Chris Patten, Speech to the Assembly of Kosovo, Pristina, II September 2003. 
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Failing Subjectivity 
The above section outlined the way British and EU text construct the subject. In British 
foreign policy especially, other bodies were conceived to be subjects if they have the 
capacity for accepting the responsibilities required of them. This section argues that the 
most important signification for entities deemed incapable was the failing state. State 
failure is what Doty, invoking Laclau and Mouffe, calls a "nodal point" - privileged 
discursive points, or master signifiers, that establish the oppositions which make 
meaning possible, and fix it there. 485 In this sense, the text of British foreign policy is 
built upon an oppositional structure of succeeding (subjects) and failing (objects). 
Initially, the overlap with EU foreign policy will be illustrated, but subsequently the 
focus will be upon the greater development of the failing state discourse in the British 
text. Through a Derridean reading of the terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005 (7/7), 
the succeeding/failing opposition will be overturned and displaced. It is established that 
to the extent subjectivity is possible, it will be an always alreadyfailing subjectivity. 
Subject and Object: State SuccesslState Failure 
The concept of the 'failing state' plays no great role in the EU foreign policy text. 
Nonetheless, it develops as a line of representation post 9/11. The failing state is never 
particularly well defined here, but in October 2001 Solana begins to see economic and 
political failure of states as the key source of conflict in the world. 486 Patten uses them as 
an example of the inefficacy of unilateralism. Afghanistan, he says, should have taught 
us that we cannot ignore "these festering parts of an anarchically dangerous world. The 
international community has no choice but to work together to manage and resolve the 
problems caused by state failure. 487 In 2003, Patten connects state failure to a failure of 
485 Doty, Imperial Encounters, p. 10. 
486 Javier Solana, Speech at "The Fire and the Crystal" Conference, Rimni, 21 October 200 1. 
487 Chris Patten, "Coherence and co-operation: the EU as promoter of peace and development", Speech to 
the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, 4 December 2001 - emphasis the original. 
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good government, poverty, AIDS, terrorism and international crime. As such state failure 
can neither be risked nor tolerated. 
488 
The discourse on failing states is far more developed in British foreign policy. The 
biggest responsibility of any entity wishing to be considered a subject of international 
politics (and member of the international community) is the responsibility to be 
successful. This is the nodal point, the master signifier which all other responsibilities 
defer back to. In 1999, the then Junior Foreign Office Minister, Peter Hain, argued that 
Britain's policy in Africa was "clear, transparent and unequivocal. We will back 
success. "489 The successful, he claimed, are "those who stand up for democracy and 
human rights", who "want to reform their economies" and who commit to "freeing their 
people from poverty". But, "the reverse is true as well. We will not support corrupt 
governments... economic mismanagements... repression or bankroll dictatorship" 
because such "evils have failed Africa. And we will not back failure. , 490 Here then we 
have the dichotomisation of international politics into successful and failing states. 
Successful means democratic, protecting human rights, reformed, poverty-free 
economies; failure means corruption, mismanagement, repression, dictatorship and evil. 
State failure became central after Straw was made Foreign Secretary in 200 1. States such 
as Somalia, Liberia and the DRC, Straw observed in 2002, are failing to such an extent 
that they resemble Thomas Hobbes' state of nature. "As members of an international 
community", Straw argues, we must be worried for the human rights and freedoms of 
those caught in this chaos. 491 And this chaos may spread, as it did in Afghanistan. A 
failing state cannot be a subject, as it is incapable of accepting its responsibilities. No 
longer subjects, capable of taking action and responsibility, failing states can only be 
seen as objects of international politics, capable only of being acted upon and taken 
responsibility for. Success/failure is a variation upon the classic opposition between 
subject/object. 
488 Chris Patten, "Europe in the World: CFSP and its relation to Development", Speech to the Overseas 
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According to Straw, in these incapable states, it is the international community which 
must take action. His claims that "[t]his leads me to the issue of Iraq", provides a further 
division: 
... in Iraq it is an all too powerful state -a totalitarian regime - which has terrorised its population 
in order to establish control. From one perspective, totalitarian regimes and failed or failing states 
are at opposite ends of the spectrum. But there are similarities: one is unable to avoid subverting 
international law; the other is only too willing to flout it. And in failing to secure widespread 
popular support, both have within them the seeds of their own destruction. 492 
The metaphor - seeds of destruction - is important and shall be called upon later. The 
point Straw is making here is clear: failing states do not live up to the responsibilities 
required of subjects; for some this is because they cannot (e. g. Somalia); for others this is 
because they refuse to (e. g. Iraq). This is a significant distinction. While Iraq may not be 
an object, as 'it' is certainly represented as capable of taking responsibility, it chooses 
not to. It deliberately flouts its responsibilities and thus is a subject which can be treated 
as an object. It places itself outside the international community by refusing to accept its 
responsibilities. 
Now we have a division within the concept of the failing state. On the one hand, there 
are those regimes, like Milosevic's Serbia in 1999, the Afghan Taliban in 2001 and 
Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003, who are all failing in not accepting their responsibilities. 
This means that they can be treated with discursive violence: called evil, cruel and 
barbarous dictators (Milosevic) ; 493 described as the "sworn enemies of everything the 
civilised world stands for" (the Taliban) ; 
494 
or brutal, dictatorial '495 barbarouS, 496 evil, 
497 
depraved, cruel beyond comprehension and "without an ounce of humanity" (Saddam 
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498 Hussein) 
. These are still subjects, but subjects that choose not to act as such and thus 
have all their rights removed. Their rights, including that of non -interference, are 
removed because, as we heard earlier from Straw, "[t]he rights of members of the global 
community depend exclusively on their readiness to meet their global 
responsib ilitieS.,, 499 
On the other hand, there are the genuine objects of ethics and foreign policy, those that 
cannot do, but can only be done to, those incapable of any responsibility. These Blair 
describes in his 2001 Labour Party Conference speech as "the starving, the wretched, the 
dispossessed, the ignorant, those living in want and squalor from the deserts of North 
Africa to the slums of Gaza, to the mountain ranges of Afghanistan". 500 This gives us a 
clear distinction between 'Milosevic' (and his regime) on the one hand, and 'Serbians' 
on the other, between 'the Taliban' and 'Afghans, ' between 'Saddam' and 'Iraqis. ' Blair 
clarifies this distinction, saying 'we' have no argument with the 'Afghans' as "[t]hey are 
victims of the Taliban regime. They live in poverty, repressed viciously, women denied 
even the most basic human rights and subject to a crude form of theocratic dictatorship 
that is as cruel as it is arbitrary. 5ý50 1 Thus, 'the people' ('Afghans', 'Serbians' and 
'Iraqis') of these countries are seen as a hapless object, powerless victims incapable of 
assuming any responsibility for their barbarous leaders. 
Generalising Failure: the Autoimmune Subject 
A deconstructive reading overturns and displaces hierarchical dichotomies. Thus, if the 
subject of British and, to a much lesser extent, EU foreign policy is opposed to an object, 
a deconstruction exposes the object present within the subject, the failure inherent in 
every successful state. Through a parallel reading of Straw's medical analogy of state 
failure and Derrida's concept of democratic autoimmunity, it is demonstrated that far 
49' Tony Blair, Press Conference with President George Bush at Camp David, 27 March 2003. 
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from being the subordinate terms, failure and objectivity are in fact general. The subject 
(that capable of taking responsibility) of ethics and foreign policy is always already an 
object (that which is incapable of taking responsibility). This overturns and displaces the 
hierarchy. Taking responsibility in foreign policy (achieving subjectivity) is both 
possible and impossible, yet neither simply one nor the other. The subject of ethics and 
foreign policy is inherently undecidable. 
The British foreign policy text carefully divides the world into subjects (successful) and 
objects (failing) - though the latter hides a division between genuine objects and subjects 
who act as objects. Subjectivity is constructed in this manner firstly by dichotomy, but 
subsequently by the use of analogy. Straw's keynote speech on 'Failed and Failing 
States' includes an important section sub-headed 'Diagnosing State Failure'. 502 This 
section explicitly treats state failure as a disease or medical condition to be treated. After 
9/11 , Straw says, he asked officials at the Foreign Office to "look more closely at the 
underlying causes of state failure and identify a broad 'at risk' category". 503 Those at risk 
could easily slide towards failure "causing significant problems for the international 
community". Straw compares this to risk assessments made by corporations before 
investing in a certain market. Governments "now need to put similar calculations at the 
heart of their foreign policy". This leads to a medical analogy: 
In medicine, doctors look at a wide range of indicators to spot patients who are at high risk of 
certain medical conditions - high cholesterol, bad diet, heavy smoking for example. This does not 
mean they ignore everyone else nor that some of those exhibiting such characteristics are not able 
to enjoy long and healthy lives, against our expectations. But this approach does enable the 
medical profession to narrow down the field and focus their efforts accordingly. We should do the 
same with countries. 504 
In a suggestion reminiscent of the computational analyses of foreign policy seen in 
conventional FPA (Chapter 1), Straw recommends that with sharpened criteria and 
weighting, we can and should be able to intervene before states fail. "Returning to my 
502 Straw, "Failed and Failing States". 503 ibid. 
504 ibid. 
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medical analogy, prevention is better than cure. It is easier, cheaper and less painful for 
all concerned. ý15O5 
The fundamental test of the onset of such disease and failure is the health of human 
rights. Straw notes that "the key measure of a state's success is the extent to which it 
guarantees the human rights of its population" . 
506 Thus, human rights and the rule of law 
should be used as an "early warning system" of future crises and state failure. 507 To 
extend Straw's medical analogy, we could say that human rights are the immune system 
of the international community. They reveal signs of disease and can be used to fight 
against this disease both by those within the state and, if need be, by the international 
community. Thus, the first line of Straw's definition is that a state fails when it is unable 
to "control its territory and guarantee the security of its citizens; to maintain the rule of 
law, promote human rights and provide effective government". 508 To establish failure, 
one must first ask of a state whether there are areas of its territory the government cannot 
control, significant ethnic or religious tension or terrorist activity. 509 Fundamentally, a 
state's success depends on whether it is strong enough to control such tension and 
activity and maintain the safety, security and human rights of its citizens. 
Derrida used a similar medical analogy, that of 'autoimmunity', to explain the 
contradictory, even suicidal, nature of democracy. Democratic states essentially work 
against their own 'success, ' against their own subjectivity in the terms of this thesis. 
'Autoimmunity' is a "strange illogical logic by which a living being can destroy, in an 
autonomous fashion, the very thing that is supposed to protect it against the other". 510 it 
describes a biological process in which an organism's immune system turns on itself, on 
505 ibid. 
506 Jack Straw, "Human Rights Ensure International Security and Prosperity", 18 April 2002. 
507 Ibid., repeated in Jack Straw, "Re-ordering the World", 25 March 2002. 508 Straw, "Failed and Failing States". 
509 ibid. 
5'0 Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 123. 
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its own cells, thus destroying its own immunity. Hence it is "quasi -suicidar' as it "works 
to destroy its own protection, to immunize itself against its 'own' immunity". 511 
Democracy is not just a system of government confined to the state for Derrida. 
Following Plato's portrait of the democrat in the Republic, Derrida associates democracy 
with freedom/liberty (eleutheria) and license (exousia), which is also whim, free will, 
ease, freedom of choice, the right to do as one pleases. Thus, from Ancient Greece 
onwards, 'democracy' is conceived on the basis of this freedom. 512 This freedom and 
license associates itself with the concept of human rights, the rights which protect one's 
democratic freedoms. As such, both Britain and the EU can be seen to define their own 
subjectivity (as those with a responsibility to protect such rights and freedoms) as 
successful - and successful as democratic. Yet, the point of autoirnmunity is to show 
that such democratic subjectivity attacks its own defences from within. 
This can happen for at least two reasons. Firstly, the very openness of such democracy, 
the free speech it allows, the right to stand for election to public office, and so on, can 
allow a party intent on ending democracy to triumph legitimately by election. An 
example used by Derrida is Algeria in 1992, where an extremist Islamic party was 
expected by many to triumph, to "lead democratically to the end of democracy". 513 In 
this situation, the Algerian government decided "to suspend, at least provisionally, 
democracyfor its own good, so as to take care of it, so as to immunize it against a much 
worse and very likely assault .,, 
514 Democracy always has this quasi-suicidal possibility 
within itself - it may commit suicide (impose authoritarian rule and end democracy) to 
prevent its murder (the democratic end to democracy). 
51' Jacques Derrida, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides -A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida", in 
Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time o Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques )f 
Derrida (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 94. 
512 Derrida, Rogues, p. 22. 
513 bid 
' p. 
33. 
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The second autoimmune reaction is far more applicable to our current deconstruction. 
The true terror of autoimmune subjectivity comes through terrorism. 515 9/11, the March 
2004 train bombings in Madrid, and 7/7 all attest to how the openness and freedom of a 
successful, democratic, subject can literally be seen as "contain[ing] the seeds of its own 
destruction" (as Straw says of failing states). 516 Those who flew planes into the World 
Trade Center in New York were armed and trained to fly in the US; 517 similarly, it would 
appear that the Madrid train bombings were perpetrated by a group of North Africans 
518 gathered in Spain . In Britain, the bombers were British nationals, educated in 
extremist views, armed and trained almost entirely in Britain. 5 19 They were allowed to 
attend meetings where terrorism was praised and were encouraged to acts of murder, all 
the time in Britain. On the 7 July 2005, these British nationals were allowed to travel to, 
and through, a capital city carrying deadly bombs without let or hindrance. 520 
The successful democratic subject, is here caught in a double bind. On the one hand, the 
very openness of Britain and the EU's democratic culture of freedom and rights, which 
signify precisely success and subjectivity, are in fact the very source of their ownfailure 
as subjects. Britain and the EU can no longer claim to protect the human rights, 
freedoms and security of their own citizens (the definition of a successful state/subject), 
and specifically because of the human rights they seek to protect. On the other hand, 
however, what is represented as the necessary solution to this suicidal openness is a 
strengthening of the invasive powers of the state and a basic suspension of human rights 
and democratic freedoms. 
This was revealed in the starkest terms on 22 July after the Metropolitan Police 
implemented Operation Kratos, which involved a 'shoot-to-kill' policy towards 
suspected suicide bombers. The Brazilian electrician Jean Charles de Menezes was shot 
seven times in the head and once in the shoulder as he boarded a train at Stockwell 
515 See Derrida, "Autoimmunity", fn. 7, pp. 187-188. 
516 Straw, "Failed and Failing States". 
517 Ronan Bennett, "Inside the mind of a terrorist" The Observer, 22 August 2004. 
518 Giles Tremlett, "Madrid school used by British on bombers' list" The Guardian, 2 July 2004. 
"9 Duncan Campbell and Sandra Laville, "British suicide bombers carried out London attacks, say police" 
The Guardian, 13 July 2005. 
520 ibid. 
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underground station . 
52 1 Thus 'Britain' was not only incapable of protecting human rights 
on 7 July; less than two weeks later it was actively attacking them, attacking its own 
immune system. The immune system continued to be attacked with proposals and 
measures instituted by the Labour government, presented precisely as a necessary curb 
on human rights. Primary amongst these was the attempt to increase to 90 days the 
period of possible detention without trial of terrorist suspects. Those who opposed and 
eventually defeated this measure were branded "irresponsible" for their defence of 
human rights by Blair. 522 
The autoimmunity of the subject means that its success can only ever also be failure. 
Democratic rights are suspended in order to preserve them. The double bind of the 
successful, healthy, subject is that it necessarily attacks its seýf, its "early warning 
system", making itself diseased - whether by terrorists attacking it due to its very 
openness, or by its own closure through suspension of democratic rights. Subjectivity 
(success), that which is capable of taking responsibility for its own and others' citizens 
security, rights and freedoms, cannot help but always be inhabited by objectivity 
(failure). 
To some extent, this structural failure is acknowledged within the foreign policy text. In 
an interview with the BBC after 7/7, Straw was asked what reassurances could be given 
that this will not happen again. He replies that the only reassurance is to "level with 
people ... We cannot provide a reassurance that nothing 
like this will happen in the 
future 
... We 
have been successful in many ways, but you can never provide 100 per cent 
security. , 523 If we recall, Rammell's definition of a state's core role is to "guarantee 
basic human rights: life, security, the rule of law". 524 Straw's own definition of state 
failure is when it is unable to "control its territory and guarantee the security of its 
521 Peter Walker, "Q&A: the De Menezes investigation" Guardian Unlimited, 17 July 2006, 
http: //www. guardian. co. uk/menezes/story/O,, 1822504,00. hti-nl (accessed 19 July, 2006). 
522 Tony Blair, Monthly Downing Street press conference, 7 November 2005. 
523 Jack Straw, Media Interviews, Gleneagles, 7 July 2005 - emphasis added. 
524 Rammell, "Why Human Rights Matter". 
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citizens". 525 If no assurance can be given and insecurity is inherent, then there can be no 
successful state/subject. 
However, as Derrida makes plain, there is something yet more disturbing for the 
possibility of subjectivity. The most unsettling element of autoirnmunity is that it is 
always a matter of the self revealing the impossibility of the self. 
... what I call the autoimmune consists not only 
in harming or ruining oneself, commiting suicide 
or threatening to do so, but, more seriously still, and through this, in threatening the I [moi] or the 
self [soi], the ego or the autos, ipseity itself, compromising the immunity of the autos itself. it 
consists not only in compromising oneself but in compromising the self, the autos - and thus 
ipseity. It consists not only in committing suicide but in compromising sui- or seýflreferentiality, 
the self or sui- of suicide itself. Autoimmunity is more or less suicidal, but, more seriously still, it 
threatens always to rob suicide itself of its meaning and supposed integrity. 526 
The very fact that this endangering of the subject is done by the seýf and to the se4f is the 
most terrifying thing about terrorism; it reveals that there is no seýflsame self in the first 
place. The self is fragmented, constituted by difference as well as sameness, a difference 
that attacks the coherent self-sameness of the subject. As outlined, the terrorists on 7/7 
were British nationals operating domestically. No matter how much we try to exteriorise 
terrorism, it is always more or less interior, it "has something 'domestic, ' if not national, 
about it". 527 
Attempts to exteriorise, to make foreign, the terrorism of 7/7 occurred in several ways. 
Firstly, on the day of the attacks, the Foreign Secretary was called upon to conduct a 
range of media interviewS528 in what is surely the Home Secretary's territory. This could 
be explained by Straw being a senior member of the Government. However, secondly, 
Straw was the only member of the Government (alongside Blair) to be included with 
opposition party leaders in a meeting with Muslim community leaders about the 
525 Straw, "Failed and Failing States". 
526 Derrida, Rogues, p. 45. 
52' Derrida, "Auto immunity", fh. 7, p. 188. 
52' For example with Guardian Unlimited, the BBC and ITV News; see Jack Straw, 
Media Interviews, 
Gleneagles, 7 July 2005. 
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bombings. Why should this be the case? Again, in an apparently domestic matter such as 
this, it would normally be the Home Secretary who is included. In fact, this is another 
attempt to exteriorise and make foreign this attack by the self on the seýf Thirdly, and 
finally, the most explicit exteriorisation of terrorism comes when Blair, two months on, 
separates the bombers from their ideology. "The terrorist attacks in Britain on 7 July 
have their origins in an ideology born thousands of miles from our shores. , 529 Later, 
Blair focuses on Mohammed Sadiq Khan (the "ringleader" of the 7/7 bombers), asserting 
that "[h]e may have been born here. But his ideology wasn 5t. 5ý530 
We can see here that the bombings of 7/7 have disturbed the simple inside/outside, 
self/other, domestic/international boundary upon which Britain's subjectivity is built (as 
a successful state, which has the capacity to responsibly protect 'its' citizens both within 
'its' territorially drawn state, and in others' territorially drawn states). This 
exteriorisation of terrorism and insecurity is an attempt to make 'Britain' as subject 
appear less autoimmune (as the attack came from the other not the seo, less unstable, 
less incapable, less fragmented, less failing. Yet, as Derrida observes, this is the most 
effective type of terrorism, that which "seems external and 'international, ' is the one that 
installs or recalls an interior threat, at home... and recalls that the enemy is also always 
lodged inside the system it violates and terrorizes". 53 1 Attempts at exteriorisation will 
always fail because it recalls the fact that Sadiq Khan was British, that his 'ideology' 
was taught to him in Britain, that the attack was fundamentally a 'British' attack on 
'Britain'. 
Now we are in a position to appreciate the aptness of Straw's medical analogy. What 
Straw describes is the structure of all subjectivity. If failing subjects are diseased, then 
they are far from abnormal. The successful/failing dichotomy is reversed and displaced 
by the generalisation of failure. The double-bind of autoirnmunitary subjectivity means 
that Britain and the EU can never be anything but failing subjects/objects - and by their 
own description - attacking themselves and putting their very 
'selves' in doubt. Either 
529 Tony Blair, Speech to the General Assembly at the 2005 LN World Summit, 15 September 2005. 
530 Tony Blair, "Clash about Civilisations", 21 March 2006. 
53 1 Derrida, "Auto i mm unity", fh- 7, p. 188. 
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their openness allows their subjectivity to be attacked from within or they commit 
suicide by attacking this very openness which makes them what they claim to be. Their 
inherent autoirnmunity means that they undo their own understanding of their 
subjectivity; they 'themselves' are incapable of accepting responsibility and this reveals 
the instability of the 'themselves'. 'Britain' and the 'EU' are always already both subject 
and object, yet fully neither at the same time. Their autoimmune subjectivity is 
inherently undecidable. 
Supplementing the Subject(s) 
The above section has demonstrated the way in which subjectivity, mainly in the British 
foreign policy text, relies upon an internally contradictory notion of success over failure. 
When failure is shown to be general, that all subjects must fail by their own definition, 
we can see that the subject of ethics and foreign policy is always inhabited by its object. 
Another approach to the deconstruction of subjectivity would be to ask what precisely is 
affirmed as subject of ethics when Blair, Straw, Cook and so on, say 'we' or 'our'. 
This section concentrates again on the British foreign policy text, while making 
reference to the EU. Who, or what, is this 'we' affirmed by the British and EU foreign 
policy establishment? Is it the same entity every time? If not, what implications does this 
have for the presence of the subject itselP This section argues that the affirmation of a 
gwe' is that of a different 'subject' at different times. Rather than demonstrating several 
subjects, this merely shows the way the 'we', the subject, that which can take 
responsibility, never fully achieves this ability at any point. The 'we' attaches itself to a 
linked chain of supplementary signifiers whose origin is not a present subject, but a non- 
originary diffirance. 
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Who or What is the Subject? 
Who, or what, answers to the question 'who' in British and EU foreign policy? Who, or 
what is it that takes responsibility? At times, though very rarely in both cases, it is 'Tony 
Blair' and 'Javier Solana' who are affirmed as the subject of their 'ethical' foreign 
policies. While it is the 'we' that has been drawing attention, the 'I' is also used when 
taking responsibility. When asked in an interview if he felt responsible for what 
happened in Abu Ghraib, Blair responded that "I feel a responsibility for everything that 
,, 532 happens in Iraq. Asked why the EU failed to speak with one voice over Iraq, Javier 
Solana agrees that "[t]here we failed. " It was the 'we' of the 'EU' that failed. Yet Solana 
goes on to take personal responsibility, observing that "this is most bitter for me, as I 
saw this as my task". 533 Straw manages to further diffuse the concepts of responsibility 
and subjectivity. Speaking of the decision to invade Iraq, Straw claims, "I believe that I 
and we and the British Government and above all the British Parliament made the right 
,, 534 decision. But which is the subject taking responsibility for the decision here? Is it the 
'F, the 'we', the 'British Government' or the 'British Parliament".? 
Even when a 'we' is affirmed, it is very rare that this 'we' is simply 'Britain' or the 'EU. ' 
For the EU this is often, as has been mentioned, because there is an insecurity about its 
own subjectivity beyond its region. We can see this in operation when Solana, having 
claimed a few months earlier that the EU failed as a subject of foreign policy over Iraq, 
now says that it was not the EU's responsibility. 
I think it would have been better to have a common position on Iraq... [but] it was not a 
possibility for those four members of the Security Council that belong to the European Union to 
have a common position. But it is a problem for them, not a problem for the European Union. It's 
at this point, it's a subject which is beyond the European Union. 535 
532 Tony Blair, Interview with Channel 4 in Istanbul, 28 June 2004. 
533 Javier Solana, Interview with Tasspiegel, 26 March 2003. 
534 Jack Straw, Interview BBC Radio 4 on the Draft Iraqi Constitution, 30 August 2005. 
535 Javier Solana, Interview with BBC Breakfast with Frost, 13 July 2003. 
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It is no longer a problem that the EU is incoherent as a subject of ethics and foreign 
policy. It is simply stated that the EU cannot take responsibility in this matter - 
essentially Solana affirms the EU as an object, or failed subject, in this discourse - and 
the problem is now one for individual member states. Thus subjectivity passes from the 
EU towards its members and this does not seem to trouble Solana in the way it appeared 
to a few months earlier. 
There is a similar, though perhaps less predictable problem with the subjectivity of 
'Britain'. From the end of 1998 onwards, Blair begins to imply that the subject of British 
foreign policy is no longer 'Britain'; often the 'we' is the 'international community', 
which is then charged with taking responsibility. For example, speaking in September 
1998 regarding Kosovo, Blair notes that the international community, rather than Britain, 
has "clear responsibilities". 536 These affirmations increase in 1999 around the time Blair 
formalised the importance of 'community' in his 'Doctrine of International Community' 
(DIC) speech. If countries do not live up to their responsibilities, Blair argues, "the 
international community has a responsibility to act"537 _ not Britain. Similarly, Cook 
observes that, faced with overwhelming humanitarian violence, the international 
community must intervene. 538 
This probably reaches its zenith when Blair is answeringfor the international community 
rather than for Britain. At Prime Minister's Question Time in 2006, Sir Menzies 
Campbell asked whether, with hundreds of thousands dead and two million people 
displaced, "have we not failed the people of Darfur? "539 One can perhaps assume that 
when Campbell asks about a 'we' in the British Parliament, to the British Prime 
Minister, he is asking about 'Britain' and its failure to take responsibility. Blair's 
response was revealing, beginning with: "[t]he international community is failing the 
,, 540 people of Darfur... In one sense this response demonstrates that the international 
536 Tony Blair, "A New Era of International Partnership", 21 September 1998. 
537 Blair, "Facing the Modern Challenge". 
538 Robin Cook, "Guiding Humanitarian Intervention", 19 July 2000. 
539 Sir Menzies Campbell, Prime Minister's Question Time, 25 January 2006, 
http: //www. theyLvorkforyou. com/debates/? id=2006-01-25a. 1421.7 (accessed 16 June 2006). 
540 Tony Blair, Prime Minister's Question Time, 25 January 2006. 
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community is failing to accept its responsibility, and thus showing its failure as a subject. 
But in another, it shows that Blair is now answering for the international community. 
The subject, the 'we' and 'our' affirmed by British foreign policy since late 1998, has 
often been the 'international community' 
Questioning the subject of ethics and foreign policy in the British text becomes even 
more complicated in the period after 9/11. This is where we see the appearance of an 
entity called the 'international coalition'. By the end of October 2001, the 'international 
community' has been replaced in Blair's representations of British foreign policy, by the 
"international coalition" which "remains strong". 541 Making a tour of the Middle East, 
apparently gathering support for this new subject, Blair stops in Riyadh and thanks 
Crown Prince Abdullah and Saudi Arabia for their assistance; "[t]hey are very much part 
,, 542 of the international coalition against terrorism. A clear separation is made between 
the 'international coalition' and the 'international community' when Blair thanks the 
Austrian Chancellor, who has been "immensely important in sustaining this international 
coalition against terrorism, and the fact that that coalition is so broad has, I think, been 
something of enormous comfort to the international community". 543 
The 'international coalition' falls into disuse as a subject of British foreign policy after 
the invasion of Afghanistan. Indeed, in the escalation towards conflict in Iraq, it is the 
subjectivity of the United Nations (UN) which is both affirmed and questioned. For 
example, in November 2002, the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 
(demanding that Iraq allow the re-entry of, and comply with, UN weapons inspectors) 
was represented by Straw as showing that the "UN has declared itself ready to accept its 
responsibilities". 544 The UN now appears to be the privileged signifier for the 
subjectivity of the international community itself. It is further endowed with subjectivity 
in 2003, when Blair claimed that by "going down the UN route we gave the UN an 
54 1 Blair, Speech to the Welsh Assembly. 
542 Tony Blair, Doorstep interview with the Prime Minister in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, I November 200 1. 
543 Tony Blair, Doorstep interview with the Prime Minister and Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel of Austria, 
16 November 2001. 
544 Jack Straw, "The Role of Free Press in Foreign Policy", 16 November 2002. 
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extraordinary opportunity and a heavy responsibility". 545 The opportunity is to "meet the 
menace" of Iraq "collectively and as a united international community... The 
responsibility, however, is to deal with it. 5,546 
The UN seems to be endowed with subjectivity by the British foreign policy text and 
then put on trial as a subject: it has the right to be considered the forum for action by the 
international community, but only if it can accept the responsibility to deal with this. 
This representation builds such that it is not only the UN that is questioned as a subject, 
but the international community itself. In two press conferences held the same day, Blair 
declares Iraq to be a "test" for the international community. 547 Shortly before the attempt 
to secure a second UN Security Council Resolution (authorizing the invasion of Iraq) 
fails, a "warning" is issued to the international community: 548 if Iraq could not be tackled 
46as a unified international community, then our ability to cope in a unified way with 
future crises... will be hugely diminished" . 
549 Nonetheless, despite the UN and the 
international community's failure to accept its responsibility over Iraq, this failure is 
short lived. By 2006, as quoted earlier, Blair is again answering on behalf of the 
international community as the subject of British foreign policy. 
Chain of Supplements 
As we can see then, there is no clear answer to the question of who answers to the 
question 'who' in British and EU foreign policy. For the EU, subjectivity is variously 
invested in 'Solana', the 'EU' and, when the latter fails by being incapable, the 
individual member states. In the British text the subject could be seen as 'Blair, ' 
'Britain', the 'international community', the 'international coalition' and the TY., But 
545 Tony Blair, "Let the United Nations mean what it says and do what it means: Speech to Labour Party 
Spring Conference", 15 February 2003 http: //www. labour. or_g. uk/news/tbglasgow (accessed 3 March 
2006). 
546 ibid. 
547 Tony Blair, Press conference with PM and Spanish PM Jose Maria Aznar; and Press conference with 
PM and President Bush at the White House, 31 January 2003. 
548 Tony Blair, Statement to Parliament following his meeting with President Bush, 3 February 2003. 
549 Tony Blair, Joint press conference with PM and Spanish PM Jose Maria Aznar, 28 February 2003. 
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what does this show us? What is the relationship between these various bodies that are 
endowed with subjectivity? Why is there a need for so many, especially in British 
foreign policy? 
The relation between these entities can be considered one of supplementarity. When 
British foreign policy no longer answers for 'Britain' but also for the 'international 
community', we can see that the 'international community' is here being used as a 
supplement to the subjectivity of 'Britain. ' As outlined in Chapter 11, a Derridean 
'supplement' has two meanings. Firstly, it is an insignificant and inessential extra, a 
surplus to what was already complete in and of itself. 550 In this understanding, the 
'international community' is simply added to the British foreign policy text as a surplus, 
to add to the responsibility already accepted by 'Britain'. It is inessential, though helpful, 
to have the international community's support for foreign policies regarding Kosovo and 
Sierra Leone. 
However, the second meaning of a supplement is that the very possibility of adding to 
something, immediately questions that thing's completeness. The second term thus "adds 
only to replace" the first. 551 If 'Britain' is a subject, fully capable of accepting 
responsibility, why should it be nice to have the support of the 'international 
community'9 It would be entirely unnecessary. Equally, why should it be, as Blair 
claimed, that the breadth of the 'international coalition' should comfort the 'international 
community' 9 552 Surely, if 'Britain' or the 'international community' were capable of 
accepting responsibility on their own, the breadth of the 'international coalition' would 
be wholly irrelevant. Rather, the supplementation of each (of 'Britain' by the 
'international community', and subsequently of the 'international community' by the 
'international coalition') reveals that the initial subject was insufficiently capable: 
insufficiently a subject. Thus, it required an addition, which inevitably replaces the first 
term. 
"0 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 145. 
551 ibid. 
552 Blair, Doorstep interview with the Prime Minister and Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel of Austria. 
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Yet, as we have seen, there is a perpetual movement of supplementation, especially in 
British foreign policy. Each 'subject' is found to be insufficiently endowed with 
subjectivity: inadequately capable of taking responsibility. We have seen how the 'UN' 
is criticised for failing the test of subjectivity set up for it, 553 and equally "we", the 
"international community", Blair says, is failing in Darfur. 554 Therefore each needs 
supplementation, producing a whole series of signifiers. Derrida clarifies the significance 
of this in Of Grammatology: 
Through this sequence of supplements a necessity is announced: that of an infinite chain, 
ineluctably multiplying the supplementary mediations that produce the sense of the very thing 
they defer: the mirage of the thing itself, of immediate presence. "' 
The chain of supplements reveals that the discourse never rests on a subject, an entity 
that will answer to the question 'who', that will accept responsibility. It shows that the 
discourse is made up of a chain of substitutive and supplementary signifiers with no 
signified where it can settle as presence. And it does not rest because it cannot. There is 
no subjectivity ever simply present in British or EU foreign policy. Rather, both are 
marked by an absence of subjectivity which requires constant supplementation. 
At the 'origin' of ethics and foreign policy is not the presence of a subject, a 'we', a 
'Britain' or an 'EU' that is capable of accepting responsibility. Rather, "[t]he concept of 
origin or nature is nothing but the myth of addition", the constant supplementation of an 
"originary diffidrance". 556 This is the diffirance then that itself has two significations. 
Firstly, it is that which gives differences: between a present subject and an absent object, 
between state success and state failure. Such differences are simply "effects of 
diffirance". 557 Secondly, it is that which defers: "the action of putting off until later... a 
detour, a delay, a relay, a reserve, a representation". 558 Each difference then, each 
supplementary addition of a new signifier ('Blair', 'Britain', 'international community' 
153 Blair, "Let the United Nations mean what it says and do what it means". 
554 Tony Blair, Prime Minister's Question Time, 25 January 2006. 
555 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 157. 
556 Ibid 
., P. 167. 557 Derrida, Positions, p. 9. 
558 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, p. 8. 
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and so on) constitutes a moment of deferral, of delaying the presence of the subject 
itseýf 
This is not to suggest that the hierarchy has simply been inverted and that all 
deconstruction elucidates is the simple absence of the subject. Christina Howells 
criticises Derrida for precisely this, suggesting that his "conception of the subject seems 
uncannily stuck in what he himself might call the 'reversal phase"'. Thus, it "appears 
closer to the non-subject of structuralist discourse than to a radically deconstructed 
subject". 559 Yet the subject, as an effect of diffirance, can never be simply absent, just as 
it cannot be simply present either. Rather, as Williams says, "diff6rance envelops the 
subject before itself, forever preventing and unsettling its attempts to become a subject", 
and thus the moment of full presence or constitution "never quite arriveS,,. 560 The 
subject is not simply object or non-subject, rather, it never fully is. It is never fully either 
present or absent, subject or object, capable or incapable of taking responsibility andyet 
both at the same time. It is always a becoming object of the subject and a becoming 
subject of the object, or, as Williams more elegantly puts it, "[s]ubjectivity undergoes a 
perpetual play of (de)constitution or 'constitutive loss of self. , ý561 
This section outlined the way in which subjectivity in EU, but mainly British, foreign 
policy has only ever made itself present as a chain of supplements. 'Britain' was 
supplemented by the 'international community', the latter with the 'international 
coalition', and so on. Never was any signification of subjectivity able to fully 
demonstrate its capacity to accept responsibility. This chain of signifiers revealed the 
lack of a signified, the lack of a subject capable of making itself present. Rather, 
presence is always deferred and subjectivity becomes explicable as a supplementary 
diffirance. What this demonstrates is that each body invested with subjectivity by the 
British and EU foreign policy text is at once capable and incapable of accepting their 
"9 Christina Howells, Derrida: Deconstructionftom Phenomenology to Ethics (Oxford: Polity Press, 
1998), p. 135. 
560 Williams, Contemporary French Philosophy, p. 133. 
561 bid ., P. 134. 
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responsibility, but never fully realisable as either. The subject of ethics and foreign 
policy is thus confirmed to be undecidable. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has substantiated the extent to which the subject of ethics and foreign policy 
can never be made present, but will always remain undecidable. It has not sought to end 
all reference to subjectivity, nor liquidate it. Indeed, the importance of the subject to any 
possibility of ethics and foreign policy has been fully recognised. In response to a 
question from Richard Kearney about his apparent annihilation of the subject, Derrida 
replies that his critics need not worry: 
I have never said the subject should be dispensed with. Only that it should be deconstructed. To 
deconstruct the subject does not mean to deny its existence. There are subjects, 'operations' or 
'effects' of subjectivity. This is an incontrovertible fact. To acknowledge this does not mean, 
however, that the subject is what it says it is. The subject is not some meta-linguistic substance or 
identity, some pure cogito of self-presence; it is always inscribed in language. My work does not, 
therefore, destroy the subject; it simply tries to resituate it. 562 
This chapter has shown that the subject of British and EU foreign policy is not what it 
claims to be: the full presence of an agent capable of taking responsibility. Subjectivity 
has been resituated, revealed to be never simply present nor absent, but rather both and 
neither at the same time. There are still effects of subjectivity, as we shall see in the 
following two chapters - effects which produce claims to responsibility and 
hospitality. 
The subject is, as Derrida says elsewhere, "a 'who' besieged by the problematic of the 
trace and of differance, of affirmation, of the signature and of the so-called 'proper' 
name 51 . 
563 
The deconstructive resituation of the subject undertaken in this chapter began, in section 
one, with a commentary on the constitution of subjectivity in British and EU foreign 
562 Derrida, "Dialogue with Jacques Derrida", p. 125. 
56' Derrida "'Eating Well' or the Calculation of the Subject", p. 100. 
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policy. This subject of ethics and foreign policy is constructed as that which is capable of 
taking responsibility in world politics. Section two, however, illustrated how British 
foreign policy especially represented this subject as a state which is succeeding rather 
than failing. The predicates of success and failure were then turned against the 
subjectivity of 'Britain' through a parallel reading of Straw's conception of failing states 
as diseased, and Derrida's analysis of the autoirnmunity of democracy. This illuminated 
the fact that, by the British text's own description, British subjectivity failed on 7/7, and 
subsequently could not fail to continue this constitutive failure. 
The success of Britain as a subject was called into question by its inability to protect its 
citizens' human rights from its se4f (indeed, the very possibility of a self was 
problematised), and the subsequent restrictions on human rights exemplified by the 
killing of Jean Charles de Menezes. 'Britain's' construction of subjectivity and the 
successful subject was shown to be always inhabited by failure and the object - that 
which is incapable of taking responsibility. The subject of ethics and foreign policy is 
thus riven with undecidability. 
Section three concentrated on the way in which the affirmed subject, that which answers 
to the question 'who? ', is always shifting in British and EU foreign policy. At different 
points in the text, a different subject is affirmed. This constant movement illustrated the 
impossibility of the subject, the impossibility of the complete capacity to take 
responsibility. The constitutive absence of this capability required the constant 
supplementation of the 'subject' with a greater, more present, subjectivity. The inability 
of this chain of supplementary significations for the subject to ever rest upon the thing 
itself - the responsible subject - illustrated the fact that subjectivity is always an 
undecidable effect of diffýrance: never fully present or absent, yet both at the same time. 
This resituation of the subject - that which is capable of taking responsibility - reveals 
that subjectivity is always plagued by the problems of its trace, its diffirantial 
production. That which performs ethics and foreign policy can only ever be both capable 
and incapable of such enactment. The possibility of ethics and foreign policy itself is 
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thus thrown into undecidability. However, this leaves us in the position of examining the 
effects of this resituated subjectivity for ethics and foreign policy. The effects are, 
primarily, a matter of enacting responsibility in British and EU foreign policy. 
133 
Chapter IV 
Responsibilit : Protecting and Saving y 
Introduction 
The previous chapter revealed something of the centrality and yet deeply problematic 
nature of responsibility. A close reading of the texts of British and EU foreign policy 
illustrated that both rely on the capacity for responsibility as the way they construct the 
subject and, for Britain, membership of the international community. Within this 
representation, British foreign policy describes 'Britain' as a leading subject in the taking 
of responsibility. What was deconstructed in the last chapter was therefore this 
possibility of subjectivity in ethics and foreign policy as the capacity to take 
responsibility. It was not responsibility per se, but rather one aspect of it: the taking of 
responsibility, the possibility of taking responsibility. 
This chapter moves from the taking of responsibility, to the being responsible or, rather, 
the enactment of responsibility. These two aspects of responsibility are not wholly 
separable, but the separation can be maintained for heuristic reasons. Both this and the 
following chapter firstly outline how British and EU foreign policy conceive their own 
ethicality, how they enact their own responsibilities, variously conceived. The question 
these chapters seek to answer is: how do Britain and the EU represent their foreign 
policies as responsible and/or ethical? It is established that the EU text generally 
conceives of its ethical foreign policy in terms of a territorialized responsibility of 
proximity: they are responsible to those closest to 'Europe'. The basic way this 
responsibility is envisaged is as hospitality. The welcoming of states into the EU is seen 
as its most successful and ethical foreign policy. Thus EU foreign policy will largely be 
examined in Chapter V, on hospitality. 
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In contrast, due to the structure of the international community set up by British foreign 
policy, this chapter examines how ethics in British foreign policy is constructed around 
two issues of responsibility. These are, firstly, the responsibility to protect. Particularly 
from 1999-2004, this was the primary way in which responsibility was represented in 
British foreign policy; a responsibility to protect human life, regardless of location. They 
concentrate especially on the 2003 invasion of Iraq, demonstrating that this is at once 
marginal to other such interventions (in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan) and yet 
also central to their understanding. The second issue of responsibility is a responsibility 
to save. Particularly in 2005, but stretching back to 2001 and up to 2006, the issue of 
'Africa' is given primacy. This discourse represents Britain's policies in Africa as the 
consensual intervention in 'African' states to prevent human suffering. This policy is a 
matter of saving both human life (from AIDS, poverty, oppression) and states (from 
failure). 
The distinction between the two responsibilities is essentially one of human agency. 
People need protecting from others' agency (e. g. Milosevic's); people and states need 
saving from others negligence (e. g. corrupt African govemment's). Britain's ethical 
responsibility does not extend to disasters which involve no agency: 'acts of God' such 
as the Asian Tsunami of December 2004. In Blair's first press conference after the 
Tsunami, he makes it quite clear that it will not take his attention away from Africa, 
"[t]he Tsunami is not a political issue... Africa is a political issue, that is an issue of real 
,, 564 political leadership. 
The analysis then turns to demonstrating a deconstruction of the discourse of ethical 
responsibility in British foreign policy. This involves both phases of overturning 
(showing that such responsibility is truly irresponsible, its ethics unethical) and 
displacement. The displacements illustrate the undecidability of responsibility, both 
founding and undermining the very heart of the British foreign policy text. The 
problematic of ir-responsibility attests to both the possibility and impossibility of ethics 
and foreign policy. The chapter proceeds in three sections. The second and third outline 
564 Tony Blair, PM Press Conference, 6 January 2005. 
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and then deconstruct the responsibility to protect and save. Firstly, however, it is 
necessary to explore the construction of responsibility in British foreign policy, the way 
it answers the question 'why act responsiblyT 
Responsibility in British Foreign Policy: Why Act Responsibly? 
What has not been explicitly considered thus far in this thesis is where responsibility 
comes from. How does post-1997 'Britain' represent itself as being obliged to act 
'ethically"? What is the ethical foundation of the foreign policy, its guiding principle? 
Britain's responsibility appears to come from two sources, one of which emerges as the 
basis for the other. Firstly, though this is often taken for granted, it is the prevention of 
human suffering which forms the ethical basis of British foreign policy. Cook's May 
1997 'Mission Statement' declared that "[w]e are instant witness in our sitting rooms 
through the medium of television to human tragedy in distant lands, and are therefore 
obliged to accept moral responsibility for our response. , 565 It is the human tragedy (and 
the 'witnessing' of it) which provides the motivating force for our moral responsibility. 
In his 2001 Party Conference speech, which Michael White described as the most 
powerful of his career, 566 Blair defended Britain's intervention in Kosovo in similar 
terms. He continued by arguing that "if Rwanda happened again today as it did in 1993, 
when a million people were slaughtered in cold blood, we would have a moral duty to 
act there also". 567 Jack Straw similarly argued that it was the "humanitarian catastrophe" 
in Kosovo which made "the British Prime Minister's moral case for a military response 
unanswerable". 568 
This is refined later in our time period, especially in relation to Africa. It is not simply 
death and humanitarian disasters which demand responsible, ethical foreign policies; it is 
565 Cook, "Mission Statement". 
566 Michael White, quoted in Anthony Seldon, Blair (London: Free Press, 1990), p. 499. 
567 Blair, Party Conference Speech 2001. 
568 Jack Straw, "Commitment to the Liberation and Future Prosperity of Iraq", I April 2003. 
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preventable suffering and death. As Blair says in 2005, "it barely needs saying, but it 
cannot be morally right that so many people die when their deaths could be 
prevented" . 
569Kim Howells, a junior minister at the Foreign Office, makes a slightly 
different, if more traditional point, in justifying the concentration on Africa, 
There is of course a clear moral reason for us to do so. How could there not be? In the decade 
beginning in 1994 it is estimated that in Africa alone, more than nine million people died as a 
result of conflict. That's more than the number killed on all the horrific battlefields of the first 
world war. Moreover, the vast majority of the deaths in Africa were non-combatants - women 
and children struck down by disease and malnutrition. 570 
Both Blair and Howells emphasise the perfectly obvious nature of this moral basis (it 
"barely needs saying", the moral reason is "clear"). But for Howells it seems to be that, 
by definition, the death of 'non-combatants' is outrageous, presumably because of their 
innocence. The implicit assumption is that only certain death and suffering 'counts' as a 
moral issue. Some deaths and suffering appear as unavoidable and so do not 'count. ' But 
the intrinsic value of human life means that preventable and outrageous misery is 
morally repugnant. The prevention of preventable and outrageous loss of human life then 
is the seemingly unproblematic basis for a responsible, ethical foreign policy. 
The second reason Britain acts responsibly has already been mentioned in Chapter 111, 
and is clearly built on this underlying foundation. That is the DIC itself. Community, 
whether domestic or international, Blair tells us in his Global Ethics Foundation speech 
of 2000, is based on the "equal worth of all". 571 If human life has intrinsic moral value, 
responsibility can have no territorial boundaries. Here we will see another difference as 
compared to the explicitly territorial and proximity based ethics of EU foreign policy. 
572 
As a member of an international community, a subject is responsible for protecting and 
569 Tony Blair, Meeting with the Africa Commission in Rome, 27 May 2005. 
570 Kim Howells, "Why the UN Millennium Review Summit matters to the UK", Speech to the IPPR, 
London, 7 September 2005. 
57 1 Blair, Speech to the Global Ethics Foundation. 
572 Although the justifications for the Kosovo intervention in 1999 are mixed up temporarily with a 
discourse on territory and proximity - see Chapter V: 
Hospitality. 
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saving life regardless of that life's location. This is further emphasised in the 
aforementioned Party Conference speech of 2001: 
That is what community means, founded on the equal worth of all. The starving, the wretched, the 
dispossessed, the ignorant, those living in want and squalor from the deserts of Northern Africa to 
the slums of Gaza, to the mountain ranges of Afghanistan: they too are our cause. 573 
Thus, in setting out proposed guidelines for humanitarian intervention, Cook states that, 
"faced with an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe" which a state is failing to 
prevent (or even seeks to promote, as in Kosovo), "the international community should 
intervene". 574 As Straw observes in 2004, where a state's responsibilities are "manifestly 
ignored, neglected or abused, the international community may need to intervene: the 
cost of failing to do so in Rwanda or in Bosnia still haunts us today". 575 
These two principles are the basis of how the ethics of responsibility are represented in 
British foreign policy. Firstly, human life is intrinsically morally valuable and it is 
therefore ethical to seek the prevention of preventable and outrageous death and 
suffering. This value is equal no matter where the life happens to be. Such equality gives 
the basis for the second principle: a logic of international community. International 
community means that where human life is being ill-treated, the rest of the community is 
morally obliged to prevent such ill-treatment. 
The two main sections of this chapter examine the way such intervention is represented, 
and then deconstruct these representations. The first case explored is the responsibility to 
protect human life from aggressive forces within a state. In other words, this is a direct 
intervention in a state's affairs by military force in order to protect the lives of the state's 
citizens. 576 In terms of subjectivity, this means the responsibility to protect is enacted 
towards two types of international entities, both presented as failing state-subjects. This 
573 Blair, Party Conference Speech 2001. 
574 Cook, "Guiding Humanitarian Intervention". 
575 Straw, "Shaping a Stronger United Nations". 
576 In this way perhaps Nicholas J. Wheeler's book could have more appropriately, though less 
alliteratively, been called Protecting rather than Saving Strangers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
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could be, firstly, states conceived as objects, with no central control, security or 
guarantee of human rights over a territory. There are surprisingly few examples of an 
intervention represented in this way in post-1997 British foreign policy - only Sierra 
Leone and perhaps, at times, Afghanistan. The responsibility to protect is more 
commonly represented as the second category, being enacted towards the helpless 
objectified citizens of states as subjects -treated -as-obj ects (see Chapter 111). These are 
subjects which, though capable of taking responsibility, act as objects in refusing to do 
so: Kosovo, Afghanistan (though this has elements of both) and Iraq. 
The second responsibility examined in this chapter is generally enacted, by consent, in 
the affairs of other state-subjects. As subjects, these states are capable of responsibility 
and thus capable of giving consent. This responsibility to save human life is invariably 
invoked in relation to 'Africa' in British foreign policy. Such a responsibility to save has 
very much come to the fore since late 2004, with Britain holding the G8 chair and the 
EU Presidency, and is far less controversial than the stark interventions by force in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. However, both these representations of an ethical, responsible 
foreign policy will be shown to deconstruct, undermining their own claims to ethicality 
and responsibility. 
Responsibility to Protect 
This section, in the first instance, outlines the history of how a responsibility to protect 
came to be represented as a key enactment of the ethical in British foreign policy. It then 
examines how the various 'humanitarian interventions', such as those in Kosovo, Sierra 
Leone and Afghanistan, fitted into this framework. Iraq, however, is shown to be the key 
intervention. While it was declared marginal to the responsibility to protect under the 
DIC, and therefore an exception in British foreign policy, the logic by which this 
marginality is expressed demonstrates its centrality. The way the morality of the 
invasion is represented is crucial to demonstrating how such a responsibility undermines 
itself. In this way the 'responsibility to protect', which constitutes the 'ethical' in British 
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foreign policy, is revealed as deconstructing under close examination. The 
'responsibility to protect' will always already necessarily be an undecidable ir- 
responsibility. 
Development of the Responsibility to Protect 
Cook's 'Mission Statement' reveals how Britain's post-1997 'ethical dimension' was 
represented early on as being concerned with human suffering. However, beyond this, 
there was remarkably little initial focus to the 'ethical dimension'. 577 This is reflected in 
the literature: in New Labour's Foreign Policy. - A New Moral Crusade?, examining the 
first two years of Labour's foreign policy, Richard Little and Mark Wickham-Jones 
collected chapters on a diverse range of subjects with little or no focal point - arms sales, 
human rights, Iran, the 'Third Way', Kashmir, internal Labour party politics, and so 
on. 578 It was only in 1999 that the elements of a 'responsibility to protect' began to 
emerge. 
With civil war and ethnic cleansing once more breaking out in the Balkans, Blair took up 
the concept of 'international community' as a structure for a much more focused 
ethical/moral viewpoint. In his now famous DIC speech, Blair argued that the "most 
pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify the circumstances in which we 
should get actively involved in other people's conflicts". 579 While the "principle of non- 
interference" is still important and still stands, it "must be qualified in important 
respects". The most important qualification, he added, was that "[a]cts of genocide can 
never be a purely internal matter. , 580 
Though widely ignored by commentators, a more interventionist point was in fact made 
by Blair in a visit to South Africa a few months before the DIC speech. If a country is 
577 A point also made by Wheeler and Dunne, "Good international citizenship: a third way for British 
foreign policy", p. 848. 
578 Little and Wickham-Jones (eds. ), New Labour's Foreign Policy. 
579BIair, "Doctrine of the International Community Speech". 
580 ibid. 
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attacking, or threatening to attack its neighbours, Blair argued in January 1999, "the 
international community has a responsibility to act". 581 Such a responsibility to protect 
the lives of innocents could be performed in a variety of ways: through the UN, such as 
in Mozambique, or through regional bodies, such as the Nigerian-led ECOMOG troops 
in Sierra Leone. Crucially, however, he declares that "sometimes, if collective action 
cannot be agreed or taken in time, [the international community must act] through 
countries with a sense of global responsibility taking on the burden". 582 Here Blair is not 
only calling for the international community to intervene to prevent human suffering, but 
for individual countries to do so. He underlines this by agreeing that while we cannot 
make ourselves the sole guardians of right and wrong, "when the international 
community agrees certain objectives and then fails to implement them, those who can 
act, must". 583 Here we see Britain identifying itself as a leader of the international 
community, as illustrated in Chapter 111. 
From 1999 then, a key enactment of the Britain's ethical dimension to foreign policy was 
considered to be this responsibility to protect. And Britain's role of leadership in the area 
was crucial. Cook, in 2000, submitted a series of six guidelines on humanitarian 
intervention to the UN Secretary General. 584 He subsequently claimed in 2001 that 
Britain's proposals to help decide when the international community can intervene in a 
state's affairs were rejected by others in the UN, suspicious of greater intervention. 585 In 
September 2000, however, the Canadian Government established the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in response to Kofi Annan's 
plea for an agreed approach and principles to 'humanitarian intervention'. 586 The 
subsequent ICISS report suggested moving from the language of 'humanitarian 
intervention' and the 'right to intervene' towards that of a 'responsibility to protect'. 587 
51 1 Blair, "Facing the Modem Challenge". 
582 ibid. 
583 ibid. 
584 Cook, "Guiding Humanitarian Intervention". 
585 Robin Cook, "Human Rights -A Priority of Britain's Foreign Policy", 28 March 2001. 586 The Responsibility To Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), p. VIL 
587 Ibid ., P., 1. 
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Several recommendations along these lines were made to the UN General Assembly, 
Security Council and Secretary General. 588 
It was via this intertextual. route that, by 2005, the specific phrase, a 'Responsibility to 
Protect' is incorporated into the British foreign policy text. In welcoming the Secretary 
General's range of suggestions for the reform of the UN (arising partly from the ICISS 
report) on behalf of the British Government, Bill Rammell hailed Annan's "boldest 
recommendation" as the suggestion that all governments share this responsibility to 
protect the citizens of other states. 589 Similarly, Straw argues that while several decisions 
taken by the General Assembly, following Annan's recommendations, would make the 
UN more effective, 
I believe that it will be the agreement on our Responsibility to Protect that will be seen in the 
future as the decision of greatest significance. If we follow through with that Responsibility to 
Protect, then never again will genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity be allowed 
to take place under our noses with nothing done. The Responsibility to Protect is, of course, a 
reflection of our common morality. But it is also a recognition that the world in which we now 
live is too small for us to be unaffected by or indifferent to the innocent victims of murder and 
590 oppression . 
According to Straw, it should not be surprising that Britain is supporting such a policy in 
the UN, as they have been campaigning for such a responsibility for a long time. This 
specifically ties such a responsibility up with the rules of the international community 
stated previously. By March 2006, this concept of a 'responsibility to protect' is so 
thoroughly entangled with the British discourse that the agreement on such a policy is 
seen as merely part of the development of Britain's foreign policy. Straw argues that the 
Labour government's values are 
588 Aid., pp. 74-75. 58913ill Rammell, "Towards the Summit: The Path to Larger Freedom", UKMis, New York, 22 March 
2005. 
590 Jack Straw, "Our Changed and Changing World", Speech at the 2005 World Summit, New York, 17 
September 2005. 
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... the reason behind our determination to see a clear recognition that we have a 'Responsibility 
to Protect' all the world's citizens from genocide and crimes against humanity; and that there is a 
collective responsibility to act where states fail to fulfil this essential task. '9' 
What Blair had described as the "most pressing foreign policy problem , 592 faced in 1999 
was largely resolved by 2006, and with Britain's help and leadership. An agreement in 
the UN on a 'Responsibility to Protect' was represented as the achievement of what 
Britain had been pressing for: an agreement that there is a responsibility to intervene by 
force to protect humans from suffering. Yet British foreign policy, as seen in Blair's 
1999 South Africa speech, is still represented as more ethical than that of others'. To 
repeat an earlier quotation, he states that "if collective action cannot be agreed or taken 
in time" this responsibility must still be enacted "through countries with a sense of 
global responsibility taking on the burden". 593 As will now be highlighted, it has very 
often been Britain that has shown this ethical "sense" of a global responsibility to 
protect. 
Britain's Ethical Leadership: Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan 
Since 1997, Britain has engaged in a significant number of forceful interventions. 
Indeed, Kampfher in 2003 suggested the debatable statistic of five wars in six years (the 
bombing of Iraq (1998), Kosovo (1999), Sierra Leone (2000), Afghanistan (2001) and 
Iraq (2003)) to be "without precedent in modem British political history and without 
parallel internationally". 594 It is certainly the case, however, that three of these 
'interventions' were represented as 'humanitarian', part of Britain's leadership as a 
nation with the sense of a global 'responsibility to protect'. In other words, these 
interventions were represented as fitting within the framework of an ethical, responsible 
foreign policy - the DIC. A brief outline is offered of how interventions in Kosovo, 
591 Jack Straw, "Active Diplomacy For A Changing World", Launch FCO White Paper on International 
Strategic Priorities, FCO Leadership Conference 2006,28 March 2006. 
592 Blair, "Doctrine of the International Community Speech". 
593 Blair, "Facing the Modem Challenge". 
594 Kampffier, Blair's Wars, p. 385. 
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Sierra Leone and Afghanistan were described as an enactment of an ethical framework, 
and more specifically of a responsibility to protect. It was not denied that there were 
other reasons for these interventions, but the responsibility to protect provided the ethical 
justification. 
Blair's DIC speech set out a redescription of British foreign policy, but more 
immediately commentators saw it as a justification of the intervention in Kosovo and an 
attempt to compel Bill Clinton to use ground troops. 595 To this end, Blair talks about the 
"unspeakable crimes" taking place, the "tear stained faces" of refugees with "heart- 
rending tales of cruelty". 596 For these reasons, 44[w]e cannot let the evil of ethnic 
cleansing stand. We must not rest until it is reversed. ý, 597 In a speech to the Muslim 
Council of Britain, Blair emphasises this even more strongly. He described meeting the 
Muslim refugees, "victims of a terrible crime", in Macedonia as "one of the most 
disturbing, shocking few hours of my life". 598 These people, he says, "are the reason for 
our military action, " and "no civilised country could stand by and watch such brutality 
without acting". 599 The intervention was represented as an enactment of Britain's 
responsibility to protect the people of Kosovo. Their suffering is literally the reason for 
Britain's action. 
Other reasons were of course given for the intervention in Kosovo. The most prominent 
among them was, as Cook put it, the credibility of NATO. "What credibility would 
NATO be left with if we allowed that [Rambouillet] agreement to be trampled on 
comprehensively by President Milosevic and did not stir to stop him? " 600 This is further 
emphasised by Blair who claimed that NATO's credibility is under threat in Kosovo; 
"[o]n its 50th birthday NATO must prevail... If NATO fails in Kosovo, the next dictator 
'9' For example, see: Kampfner, Blair's Wars, pp. 48-53; Andrew Rawnsley, Servants of the People: The 
Inside Story of New Labour, Revised Edition (London: Penguin, 200 1), pp. 270-272; Peter Riddell, Hug 
Them Close: Blair, Clinton, Bush and the 'Special Relationship' (London: Politico's, 2004), pp. 10 1- 103; 
Seldon, Blair, pp. 396-398. 
596 Blair, "Doctrine of the International Community Speech". 
597 Ibid. 
598 Tony Blair, "Speech to the Muslim Council of Britain". 5 May 1999. 
599 Ibid. 
600 Robin Cook, "Kosovo and the Modern Europe", 14 April 1999. 
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to be threatened with military force may well not believe our resolve to carry the threat 
through . ýý60 
1 Nonetheless, the need for NATO to succeed is still brought back to human 
suffering. As Cook said, it is "for our own sake but also for the sake of the refugees", 602 
while Blair stated that NATO must make the victory of justice over evil "a reality for 
Kosovo's long-suffering people". 603 
The intervention in Sierra Leone, in May 2000, was described as a forceful intervention 
to prevent another Rwandan style genocide and maintain peace. 604 It was a limited action 
and was not justified in any way other than the responsibility to protect Sierra Leonian 
citizens. Kampfher quotes Blair as reacting angrily to suggestions that it was a neo- 
imperialist war; "[w]hen people say 'run an ethical foreign policy', I say Sierra Leone 
was an example of that, not an example of not doing it. It is up in the high ground. 3,605 
Blair justified the action as an attempt "to do what we can to save African nations from 
barbarism and dictatorship, " thus he says, we can "be proud of it". 606 Britain, once again, 
is represented as taking a leading role in the international community, exercising its 
sense of a global responsibility to protect in the absence of collective action. 
Afghanistan is a more complicated case than either Kosovo or Sierra Leone. The primary 
reason presented for the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 was the terrorist attack 
on the World Trade Centre on 9/11. Afghanistan, and its Taliban regime, was said to be 
harbouring Osama Bin Laden and AI-Quaeda terrorist training camps. The Taliban 
refused, in Britain's representation, to comply with the will of the international 
community and hand Bin Laden over to the allied forces. Therefore, said Blair, "our 
enemy's friend becomes our enemy too... in choosing to help the friends of terror, they 
are choosing to be enemies of ours". 607 Yet, the humanitarian element of the intervention 
to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan was also very much to the fore. Not only had 
the Taliban chosen to side with terrorism, this extremist regime had made the Afghan 
60 1 Blair, "Doctrine of the International Community Speech". 
602 Cook, "Kosovo and the Modern Europe". 
603 Tony Blair, Statement to Parliament on the NATO Summit in Washington, 26 April 1999. 
604 Mike O'Brien, "Morality in Asymmetric War and Intervention Operations", 19 September 2002. 
605 Tony Blair, quoted in Kampfner, Blair's Wars, p. 69. 
606 Blair, Mansion House Speech. 
607 Tony Blair, Statement at 10 Downing Street, 25 September 2001. 
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people suffer for years. It is "a regime without respect or justice for its own people... 
They care little for human life. 53608 In contrast Blair observed that "we do care about the 
humanitarian plight of people in Afghanistan". 609 
This responsibility to protect the Afghan people was at times emphasised so strongly as 
to appear the fundamental reason for the action in Afghanistan. Blair states that Britain is 
not fighting the Afghan people, "[t]hey are victims of the Taliban regime. They live in 
poverty, repressed viciously, women denied the most basic human rights and subject to a 
crude form of theocratic dictatorship that is as cruel as it is arbitrary. 556 10 He ties the 
action in directly with the more explicitly humanitarian action in Kosovo, comparing the 
Taliban exactly with the "hated regime" of Milosevic. "We acted against Milosevic 
because what he was doing... was unjust", 611 similarly, Britain must lead the fight 
against injustice and human suffering in Afghanistan. 
The representations of Britain's foreign policy actions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and 
Afghanistan, while often having other motivations and justifications, are explicitly 
connected in the speeches of British foreign policy makers. The link is that Britain as a 
leading member of the international community, and a prominent subject of international 
politics, has a responsibility to protect the innocent people of these nations. The 
connection with the invasion of Iraq is less obvious. Yet, as will be explained, while this 
intervention was declared to be an anomaly, breaking with Britain's ethical framework 
and the DIC, it becomes the most prominent example of how such an ethical 
responsibility to protect undermines itself. 
608 ibid. 
609 ibid 
61 0 Tony Blair, Statement to the House of Commons, 8 October 2001. 
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Iraq: Exemplary Anomaly 
The invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was declared by the British foreign policy 
establishment to be a matter of the enforcement of UN resolutions on Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD). Blair explicitly stated that the "United Nations Mandate on 
Weapons of Mass Destruction" was the "reason we act". 612 He emphasised that the aim 
of the invasion was never regime change, but rather the disarmament of WMD. 
Justifying the war in October 2004, after it had emerged that there probably were not any 
WMD present at the time of invasion, Straw claims that Iraq's breaking of UN 
resolutions, and its refusal to demonstrate that it had no WMD, provided the legitimate 
reason for the invasion. 613 We can see that in the British government's representation, 
the reason for the invasion was not the same as in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and 
Afghanistan. The invasion was largely presented as a legal matter: the enforcement of 
international law and the will of the international community. 
A fascinating speech in July 2004, gives an overview of Blair's thinking on international 
affairs; to "attempt an explanation of how my own thinking, as a political leader, has 
evolved" over the past few years. 614 Directly linking his keynote speeches from 1999 
onwards (such as that on the DIC and his 2001 Conference speech), Blair states that Iraq 
was anomalous to his ethical framework of international community. He notes that 
'humanitarian intervention' has been gaining currency and that he had tried to set this 
out in his DIC speech. 
So, for me, before September II th, I was already reaching for a different philosophy of 
international relations from a traditional one that has held sway since the treaty of Westphalia in 
1648; namely that a country's internal affairs are for it and you don't interfere unless it threatens 
you, or breaches a treaty, or triggers an obligation of alliance. I did not consider Iraq fitted into 
this philosophy, though I could see the horrible injustice done to its people by Saddam. 615 
612 Tony Blair, Press Conference on Iraq, 25 March 2003. 
613 Jack Straw, Iraq Statement, 12 October 2004. 
614 Blair, Speech on the threat of global terrorism. 
615 Ibid. - emphasis added. 
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The invasion of Iraq did not fit into his DIC, it did not fall within the remit of Britain's 
responsibility to protect human life. The difference between the intervention in Iraq and 
that of the three other examples cited is also represented by Blair in the difficulty of the 
decision it involved. He draws direct parallels in his speech: "Kosovo, with ethnic 
cleansing of ethnic Albanians, was not a hard decision for most people; nor was 
Afghanistan after the shock of September 11; nor was Sierra Leone. Iraq in March 2003 
was an immensely difficult judgement. , 616 This is underlined during an interview with 
Channel 4 News, three months later, with Blair observing that the Iraq decision was 
difficult, while "I felt that Kosovo was an open and shut case, I felt that Afghanistan in a 
sense with the Taliban was. , 617 
However, despite these differences, Blair crucially brings the invasion of Iraq back into 
the DIC and the responsibility to protect. And this is done in the same speech. In 
justifying Britain's action he comes close to acknowledging that an intervention such as 
that in Iraq may be illegal under international law, but questions whether this should be 
the case. Using the rhetoric of rights and responsibilities, he argues that the DIC is no 
longer a vision of idealism. 
The essence of community is common rights and responsibilities. We have obligations in relation 
to each other. If we are threatened, we have a right to act. And we do not accept in a community 
that others have a right to oppress and brutalise their people. We value the freedom and dignity of 
the human race and each individual in it... Emphatically I am not saying that every situation 
leads to military action. But we surely have a duty to act when a nation's people are subjected to a 
regime such as Saddam S. 618 
The decision on going to war with Iraq is thus brought back to the question of 
community and whether "in a community others have a right to oppress and brutalise 
their people". This means that we have a "duty to act when a nation's people are 
subjected to a regime such as Saddarn's". He continues by tying this up with the issue of 
human rights, the protection of which, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is the 
616 ibid. 
617 Blair, Interview with Channel 4 in Istanbul. 
61 ' Blair, Speech on the threat of global terrorism. 
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ultimate responsibility of any state as a sub ect in international PolitiCS. 
619 "The UN j 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights is a fine document", declares Blair, "[b]ut it is 
strange that the United Nations is so reluctant to enforce them .,, 
620 Thus, in one speech, 
despite declaring Iraq to be different to Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, he 
effectively describes their sameness, their identical nature. 
Crucially, this identity is described in other speeches, especially by Foreign Secretary 
Jack Straw. Using Kosovo as the main comparison, Straw observes that "[a]s the 
humanitarian catastrophe was relayed live on our screens, the British Prime Minister's 
moral case for a military response became unanswerable. , 62 1 The difference between 
Kosovo and Iraq, however, was not that there was a humanitarian catastrophe in one and 
not the other, but simply that in Iraq the catastrophe was not visible. Saddam has 
"conducted his reign of terror off camera. So unlike Kosovo, Iraq has not pricked the 
,, 622 world conscience through our television screens. Yet the comparison with Kosovo 
remains. Straw acknowledges that while there "are never exact parallels... I do remind 
my audience that many argued against military action in Kosovo. Who today would 
question the moral case for the Allied intervention which led to the fall of MiloseviC? "623 
The responsibility to protect, while at times declared irrelevant, remains crucial to the 
representation of the invasion of Iraq. As Straw says elsewhere, until his "long reign of 
terror is ended, Saddarn Hussein will remain a scar on the conscience of the world, and a 
standing affront to the ideals which underpin the foreign policies of the UK, the United 
States and our European allies". 624 The scar on the UK's conscience is not caused by the 
legal reasons given for going to war, but because of the nature of Saddam Hussein's 
regime, which, Blair says, "represents the very antithesis of all the values we stand 
fo r ýq . 
625 Iraq is described with many of the same adjectives as were used in relation to 
61 9 For example, Cook, "Human Rights into a New Century" and Rammell, "Why Human Rights Matter". 
620 Blair, Speech on the threat of global terrorism. 
621 Jack Straw, "Iraq: A Challenge We Must Confront", II February 2003. 
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626 627 Milosevic's Serbia and the Taliban's Afghanistan: brutal, dictatorial, barbarous, 
evil, 628 depraved, cruel beyond comprehension and "without an ounce of humanity". 629 
Blair and Straw clearly bring their representation of the war in Iraq back into the 
structure of the DIC and the responsibility to protect. However, it still remains 
anomalous, or rather, marginal to both. It is not always considered to be part of the DIC 
and can perhaps best be used as a liminal case to show the particular characteristics of 
those that are central, the easy, open and shut cases of a responsibility to protect: 
Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. However, this very marginalisation of the Iraqi 
invasion is what makes it interesting to a deconstructive reading. Culler observes that a 
common operation of deconstruction is to take what is apparently marginal to a text, 
such as a footnote, and transfer it to a place of centrality. This is because "what has been 
relegated to the margins or set aside by previous interpreters may be important precisely 
for those reasons that led it to be set aside". 630 
In 'Signature Event Context', Derrida performs such a reading of Austin's speech act 
theory, focusing on the possibility of the performative utterance (where something is 
accomplished through speech itself - e. g. 'I now pronounce you man and wife' said by a 
vicar in a marriage ceremony). Austin is interested in what makes a successful 
performative utterance, one which succeeds in accomplishing an act - such as marrying 
a couple. To analyse successful performatives, he excludes from consideration the 
possibility that every performative utterance can be quoted or cited outside the correct 
context, for instance, in a play. If an actor playing a vicar quoted the performative, 'I 
pronounce you man and wife' when on stage, this would not be a serious Performative. 
Therefore, Austin pushes the possibility of citation to the margins as abnormal and 
parasitic. 631 
626 Blair, Speech to the TUC Conference in Blackpool. 
627 Straw, "Reintegrating Iraq into the International Community -A cause with compelling moral force". 
62' Blair, Answering questions at MTV forum. 
629 Blair, Press Conference with President Bush at Camp David. 
630 Culler, On Deconstruction, p. 140 - emphasis added. 
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However, as Derrida asks, is the citation that "Austin excludes as anomaly, exception" 
not "the determined modification of a general citationality - or rather, a general 
iterability - without which there would not even be a 'successful' performative? ý632 As 
demonstrated in Chapter 11, language must have this general structure of iterability - the 
possibility for it to be repeated and transformed in different contexts - for it to be 
understandable. We must always be quoting, or citing; if we produced genuine "singular 
and original event-utteranceS,, 633 we would be understood by no one, thus our 
performative utterance would be afailure. For any utterance to be a success it must be a 
citation. A vicar can only be successful in his performative because he is citing other 
vicars, and pronouncing words from within the iterable structure of language. In this 
way, Derrida takes what is marginal and makes it central, takes what is anomalous and 
makes it exemplary, while deconstructing the distinctions between these oppositions. 
A similar operation can be performed with the question of Iraq and the responsibility to 
protect. If the invasion of Iraq is marginalised and treated as a liminal anomaly to this 
responsibility, we can ask precisely why this has been the case. What reasons are there 
for this marginal isation? It is suggested that the reason is precisely the difficulty of the 
decision emphasised above. The significance of this, as demonstrated below, is that the 
difficulty of the Iraq decision stands for each and every intervention enacted as a 
'responsibility to protect'. Rather than this difficulty marking it out as simply marginal to 
questions of ethics and foreign policy, it also marks its very centrality. 
Iraq. - Deconstructing the Ethics of a 'Responsibility to Protect' 
In early 2003, the moral case for war became the dominant government narrative of the 
decision to invade Iraq. Nonetheless, as suggested above, the moral arguments, as a 
responsibility to protect, were always present within the government's discourse. For 
example, in September 2002 Mike O'Brien, a junior minister at the Foreign Office, uses 
632 bid., P. 17. 633 Ibid., P. 18. 
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Iraq as a fundamental issue in a speech on 'Morality in Asymmetric Warfare and 
Intervention Operations'. Here, he ties together the legal and moral justifications for war 
as an over-arching ethical question. Firstly, he asks "[h]ow should we respond to 
Saddam's state's callous use of chemical weapons against his own people? " Secondly, 
how, he enquires, can we ignore "Saddam's power-crazy determination to develop 
Weapons of Mass Destruction and to threaten the region and the international 
community ... 
T' These two are tied together with O'Brien's final question of underlying 
importance: "[e]ssentially, how should we deal with the threat posed by Saddam's 
immorality? 51634 
Given that the responsibility to protect is represented as making an invasion of Iraq, and 
the removal of Saddam, necessary, why is the decision problematic? Crucially, because 
Iraq is represented as a difficult case (unlike Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan), we 
have open discussion of the crux of the problem in all these interventions. In a speech to 
the 2003 Labour Party Spring Conference, Blair makes his biggest pitch for the decision 
to go to war in Iraq being based on an ethical responsibility to protect. Here, we see why 
Iraq was represented as problematic as Blair recognises for the first time that those who 
oppose the war have a "moral purpose". 635 But this does not mean that a decision to 
attack Iraq is immoral. 
The moral case against war has a moral answer: it is the moral case for removing Saddam. It is 
not the reason we act. That must be according to the United Nations Mandate on Weapons of 
Mass Destruction. But it is the reason, frankly, why if we do have to act, we should do so with a 
clear conscience... This is a regime that contravenes every single principle or value anyone of our 
politics believes in... So if the result of peace is Saddam staying in power, not disarmed, then I 
tell you there are consequences paid in blood for that decision too. But these victims will never be 
seen. They will never feature on our TV screens or inspire millions to take to the streets. But they 
will exist nonetheless. Ridding the world of Saddam would be an act of humanity. It is leaving 
him there that is in truth inhumane. 636 
634 O'Brien, "Morality in Asymmetric War and Intervention Operations". 
635 Blair, "Let the United Nations mean what it says and do what it means". 
636 ibid. 
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Thus, Iraq is morally problematic because there is morality on both sides of the 
argument. Nonetheless, the morality of the decision is different to the reasonfor the 
decision. As already shown, the reason for the decision was to enforce the UN's will on 
WMD. In his speech to the House of Commons opening the debate on Iraq Blair 
emphasised this, saying that he has "never put our justification for action as regime 
change... But it is the reason, I say frankly, why if we do act we should do so with a 
clear conscience and a strong heart. , 637 Legality may supply the reason, but the ethical 
dimension to the decision arises from the responsibility we owe Iraqis. Just as there were 
other, not necessarily moral, reasons for invading Kosovo (the credibility of NATO) and 
Afghanistan (to prevent the operation of terrorist training camps), so WMD is a reason, 
but not the only one. 
However, unlike in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, regarding Iraq it is 
acknowledged that there is an ethical argument for opposing the war. But where does 
this other morality come from? Crucially, it comes from the fact that an enactment of the 
responsibility to protect will inevitably mean that people are killed and injured. Acting 
responsibly and intervening to protect Iraqis will mean the death and injury of other 
Iraqis, as well as invading troops. Literally, invading will mean both protecting and 
attacking Iraqis. Straw sums this up best. He notes in 2003 that if Britain has to invade, 
"huge efforts will be made to ensure that the suffering of the Iraqi people is as limited as 
possible". 638 Nonetheless, he says, we find ourselves in an "eternal moral dilemma" due 
to the inevitable deaths of innocents. 
639 
This eternal moral dilemma is brought about by the morality on both sides of the 
argument: that the responsibility to protect Iraqis inevitably is also a responsibility to 
attack and kill Iraqis. We are left to ponder why an eternal moral dilemma was absent 
from the representations of interventions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan; why 
there was no concern shown, especially for the deaths of Sierra Leonians. People who 
die as a result of the intervention simply do not exist in the Sierra Leone of British 
637 Tony Blair, Statement to House of Commons opening Iraq debate, 18 March 2003. 
638 Straw, "Iraq: A Challenge We Must Confront". 
639 ibid. 
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foreign policy. Yet the Iraqi example, while it was marginalised because it was a 
difficult decision, can now be seen as central precisely because of the difficulty of the 
decision. It reveals the moral dilemma which must exist for each invasion. 
Derrida analyses a situation where there is precisely such a dual responsibility in The 
Gift of Death. Noting the deep connection between the concept of responsibility and 
religion, 640 Derrida turns to the figure of Abraham, who unites all three 'religions of the 
book' (Judaism, Christianity, Islam). In Genesis 22, God orders Abraham: "[flake your 
son, your only son, Isaac, whom you love, and go to the region of Moriah. Sacrifice him 
there as a burnt offering on one of the mountains I will tell you about. " Abraham does 
this. Without asking any explanation from God he binds his son on the altar and 
"reached out his hand and took the knife to slay his son". At this point God steps in 
641 again, telling Abraham not to harm Isaac and that his faith was being tested . 
Questions of ethics and responsibility inevitably arise here. Did Abraham act 
responsibly? Did he make the responsible decision in being prepared to kill Isaac? The 
reason this story is both scandalous and revealing in relation to responsibility in British 
foreign policy is that there is, as with Britain in Iraq, morality on both sides of 
Abraham's decision. Just like Blair and Straw, Abraham has two duties, not just one. If 
Abraham were only responsible to God, there would be no dilemma. Equally, if he only 
had a father's responsibility to protect his son Isaac, there would be no issue. But 
Abraham is absolutely responsible to both imperatives: to his God, the absolutely Other, 
upon whom he relies completely, but also to Isaac and his family, who he had a duty to 
protect. He cannot act absolutely responsibly towards both. The story is "monstrous, 
outrageous, barely conceivable", nothing could be worse "vis-a-vis love, humanity, the 
family, morality" and yet "isn't this also the most common thing? " Isn't it what the 
64most cursory examination of the concept of responsibility cannot fail to affirM? "642 So 
640 Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, translated by David Willis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996), p. 2. 
64 1 Genesis 22: 2-12, The Bible (New International Version). 
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what is the revelation about responsibility that is affirmed by this story? That 
responsibility is paradoxical and internally contradictory. 
We can see the operation of this double moral claim, this dual responsibility, in the 
decision to invade Iraq (and with Iraq being exemplary, in all Britain's decisions to 
intervene). We can intervene to fulfil our 'responsibility to protect' certain others, but 
what about those who will be killed as a result of this intervention? What about our 
responsibility to protect them? But, if we act responsibly towards those others, what 
about those who we wanted to intervene to protect in the first place? Now we are acting 
irresponsibly towards them. For both Straw and Blair, despite its "eternal" nature, this 
moral dilemma is swiftly resolved. Straw argues that for "the sake of the Iraqi people... 
it is a challenge we must confront". 643 Similarly, Blair in the long quotation above begins 
with the pained acknowledgement that the ethics of the Iraqi invasion are not 
straightforward. The case can be made either way. Ethical responsibility is owed on both 
sides and "consequences paid in blood" will be incurred on both sides. Yet, shortly after 
this observation, Blair asserts that one side of the argument is humane and the other, in 
truth, inhumane. 644 
The problem is that, in the claim that there is morality on both sides of the debate on 
Iraq, a crucial observation is made about the problematic nature of ethical, responsible 
action. This observation then removes the very basis for Straw and Blair's resolution of 
that problem. The argument seems to be that an invasion will mean the death of US, UK 
and Iraqi soldiers and civilians. Causing such death and danger would be morally wrong. 
But, equally, if Iraq is not invaded and Saddam not removed, he will continue to 
suppress and brutalise his people, WMD may be used by Iraq to destabilise the region, or 
given to terrorists to attack Western democracies. Meanwhile for the Iraqi people, "the 
darkness will close back over them again; and he [Saddam] will be free to take his 
revenge upon those who must wish him gone". 645 This too would be morally wrong (and 
643 Straw, "Iraq: A Challenge We Must Confront". 
644 Blair, "Let the United Nations mean what it says and do what it means". 
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has "consequences paid in blood"). But if both are morally wrong, no straightforward 
moral resolution is possible. There can be no straightforward 'responsibility to protect'. 
For Blair and Straw, the "eternal moral dilemma" is, as has been shown, easily (and 
miraculously? ) resolved. But this resolution cannot be of the order of responsibility, 
morality, or ethics. As Derrida observes, 
I cannot respond to the call, the request, the obligation, or even the love of another without 
sacrificing the other other, the other others. Every other (one) is every (bit) other [tout autre est 
tout autre], every one else is completely or wholly other. The simple concepts of alterity and of 
singularity constitute the concept of duty as much as that of responsibility. As a result, the 
concepts of responsibility, of decision, or of duty, are condemned a priori to paradox, scandal, 
and aporia. 646 
If "[e]very other (one) is every (bit) other" then there can be no reason for, as Straw and 
Blair do, resolving the dilemma in favour of one other or the other other. Any such 
resolution is problematic and therefore any such assertion of a 'responsibility to protect' 
is, as Derrida observes, "condemned a priori to paradox, scandal and aporia" . 
647 This is 
precisely what makes the decision, as Straw himself affirms, an eternal moral dilemma. 
The moral of both stories (Abraham and Issac and the invasion of Iraq) is morality itself- 
that morality must always be sacrificed to morality, responsibility to one other (Iraqi 
soldiers and civilians) must be sacrificed to our responsibility to other others (Western 
civilians, Iraqi dissidents and the Middle East region), ethical duty sacrificed to ethical 
duty. "One must behave not only in an ethical or responsible manner, but in a nonethical, 
nonresponsible manner. , 
648 
The crucial aspect of showing that the Iraq invasion is central to the responsibility to 
protect is that, unlike the other examples, the eternal moral dilemma is acknowledged as 
problematic. Previous interventions are represented as clear-cut, obvious, easy decisions. 
Yet, in fact, according to the British government's own reasoning, there is morality on 
646 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 68. 
647 bid . p. 68. 648 bid . p. 67. 
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both sides of each such decision. This illuminates the morality of responsibility, the 
responsibility of responsibility, as inherently undecidable. This section exposed how the 
ethics involved in the representation of each intervention, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Iraq 
comes down to the fact that under the DIC Britain has an ethical responsibility to protect. 
It has then demonstrated how the acknowledgement of two moralities, two 
responsibilities, means any 'responsibility to protect' will also be an irresponsibility, its 
morality will always be an undecidable im-morality. The next section turns to look at the 
second enactment of responsibility in British foreign policy which emerged strongly in 
Labour's second and third term foreign policy. 
Responsibility to Save 
In November 2000, Blair hinted that Sierra Leone was also an example of a different 
type of responsibility in British foreign policy. He suggested that Britain must 
"intervene, not excessively, but to do what we can to save African nations from 
barbarism and dictatorship and be proud of it". 649 This section argues that such a 
'responsibility to save' forms the second aspect of the way the British foreign policy text 
constructs its ethical dimension. The reference to 'African' nations, it is argued, is not 
coincidental, but integral to this responsibility. 
Firstly, this section demonstrates the prominent emphasis on 'moral' and ethical aspects 
of this responsibility to save Africa. While 'humanitarian intervention' may have been 
the moral question of 1999-2003, the discourse shifts in 2004 to a focus on saving Africa 
as the major concern. Secondly, a description is given of how this 'responsibility to save' 
has developed within the foreign policy text, how it is represented in the New 
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the Commission for Africa (CA), 
how it meshes with wider aspects of subjectivity/objectivity, rights and responsibilities 
and the DIC. Thirdly, the section illustrates the deconstruction of the responsibility to 
save. Whilst there is a declaration of partnership and responsibility, the effective 
649 Blair, Mansion House Speech. 
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supplementation of the NEPAD with Blair's CA shows an entrenchment of the subject- 
object relation morally questioned by the British foreign policy discourse itself Finally, 
how the responsibility to save, like the responsibility to protect, is irresolvably caught up 
in ethical contradiction is explicated. 
The Morality of the Cause: a Responsibility to Save 'Aftica' 
Blair's 2001 Party conference speech was described by political journalist Peter Riddell 
as highly "moralistic", even "messianic". 650 Michael White suggested that its "sweep and 
moral fervour caught friend and foe off guard". 651 In the most widely quoted section, 
Blair calls for the international community to act against the "starving, the wretched, the 
dispossessed, the ignorant, those living in want and squalor" from Africa, to Gaza to 
Afghanistan. 
This is a moment to seize. The kaleidoscope has been shaken. The pieces are in flux. Soon they 
will settle again. Before they do, let us re-order this world around us. Today, humankind has the 
science and technology to destroy itself or to provide prosperity to all. Yet science can't make 
that choice for us. Only the moral power of a world acting as a community can. 652 
There is a responsibility to save and protect everyone, and this constitutes the "moral 
power" of the world "acting as a community". However, in an earlier section of the 
speech Blair called specific attention to Africa, using the famous lines: "[t]he state of 
Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if the world as a community focused 
,, 653 on it, we could heal it. And if we don't, it will become deeper and angrier. Here the 
responsibility to save is a responsibility to heal, and the focus on Africa is clarified. As 
Blair claims in 2002, "[i]f Africa is a scar on the conscience of our world, the world has 
a duty to heal it, heal it we can and we MUSt...,, 654 
650 Riddell, Hug Them Close, p. 165. 
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2001 was not the beginning of the selection of Africa as a moral issue. As with so many 
concerns in British foreign policy post-1997, Cook emphasised the issue long before 
Blair. 655 Similarly, Peter Hain during his time as a Junior Minister in the Foreign Office, 
called supporting Africa "a moral imperative" in 1999.656 Both Cook and Hain were 
suggesting that it was "not only" a moral imperative, but also a matter of self interest, a 
theme Blair adopted emphatically. Regardless of these precursors, it was only in late 
2004, and especially 2005, that British foreign policy began a concerted effort at 
presenting 'Africa' as a, or rather the, moral/ethical issue. There are several possible 
reasons for this shift in 'ethical' priorities: it could be seen as an effort to shift attention 
from the increasingly unpopular occupation of Iraq to a relatively uncontroversial 
'ethical' issue; it also coincided with Britain holding the chair of the G8 and the EU 
Presidency simultaneously. Thus, in December 2004, in a BBC Radio interview for 
World Aids Day, Blair acknowledged that there is self interest in the desire to help 
Africa, but "I also think it is a moral question". 657 
In 2005, it became clear how Africa is presented as a moral/ethical issue in British 
foreign policy. In line with section one above, it is the unnecessary and outrageous death 
and suffering caused by negligence that marks it as such. Blair declares in a New Year's 
day Economist article, "it can't be morally right, in a world growing more prosperous 
and healthier by the year, that one in six African children still die before their fifth 
,, 658 birthday... Comparing it to the Asian Tsunami, which happened just days before, 
Blair states that the difference is in the preventability of what is happening in Africa. 
Asked in a press conference whether it is a battle between good and evil in Africa, he 
replies that "it is evil that you have preventable death on such a scale in Africa... That is 
an evil and what would be good is to do something about it.,, 
659 It is crucial then that, 
unlike the natural disaster in Asia, the death and suffering in Africa is preventable, and 
this is what makes it moral issue. This is presented as perfectly evident to anyone. As 
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Blair observes, "it barely needs saying, but it cannot be morally right that so many 
people die when their deaths could be prevented. That I think is obvious and we would 
all share that. , 
660 
Straw reinforces this representation. Quoting statistics on the suffering of Africans and 
Africa's economic regression, Straw claims "[flhat situation is a moral affront to us 
all . ý566 
1 Lord Triesman, the newly appointed Minister for Africa (as of May, 2005), 
claimed in the Tanzanian Parliament that "it is a moral imperative that the world act 
now" in relation to Africa. 662 Crucially, the responsibility to save Africa is not just 
presented as a moral cause, but as Blair says, there is "no doubt at all that the biggest 
moral course [sic. ] is Africa in the world today". 663 In 2006, "Africa is probably the great 
moral cause of our time. , 664 And why? "[B]ecause of the numbers of people who die, 
millions of people who die unnecessarily through conflict, or famine, or disease". 665 
So, just as 'responsibility to protect' civilians was a moral issue, and the most important 
foreign policy question from 1999-2003, the 'responsibility to save' Africa is the great 
moral cause of the time, or, at least from late 2004 onwards, in British foreign policy. 
The development of the 'responsibility to save' is now examined, how it fits into 
Britain's foreign policy framework of subjectivity/objectivity and the DIC. This will 
help frame the later deconstruction of Africa's representation in the foreign policy text. 
660 Tony Blair, Meeting with the Africa Commission in Rome, 27 May 2005. 
661 Jack Straw, "A Partnership for Wider Freedom", Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington DC, 18 May 2005. 
662 Lord Triesman, "Africa's Instability is our Instability", Tanzanian Parliament, 15 June 2005. 
663 Tony Blair, PM's interview with Downing Street website, 30 June 2005. 
664 Tony Blair, Carte Blanche Interview, South Africa, II February 2006. 
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Development of the 'Responsibility to Save' 
New Labour's foreign policy towards Africa is represented as a departure from the old 
relationship. While, as stated above, the concentration on the 'responsibility to save' 
Africa may have been present in the British foreign policy discourse before 2002, the 
precise contours of this policy were not fully worked through. By 2002, the operative 
word, emphasised over and again in the relationship to Africa, is partnership. And this is 
extremely significant. Blair chose a visit to Africa in February 2002 to set this out in 
relation to Britain's policy of supporting NEPAD, an African based initiative to promote 
African solutions to problems of underdevelopment, disease and poverty. Speaking to 
the Ghanaian Parliament, Blair talks about the need for partnership in development. He 
wants a "fundamental shift in our approach to aid", not "a hand-out but aid as a hand- 
up", not to, 
... create 
dependence but to create sustainable independence, so that the relationship between the 
developed and the developing world is not one of donor and passive recipient but one of equal 
partners in building prosperity for all. This is aid as investment in our collective economic and 
political security. 666 
The problem with this old relationship appears to be that it aims to, or certainly has the 
effect of, creating dependence and passivity. In contrast, Blair's vision, through the 
support of NEPAD, is that of "globalisation driven by a global ethic". 
667 Setting out his 
agenda for the G8, which Britain was chairing in 2005, Blair says that the "[t]he old 
,, 668 donor/recipient relationship is patronising and unworkable. Old enactments of the 
responsibility to save are condemned as patronising, unethical and immoral. The new 
partnership ethical drive is essentially one of treating Africa as "equal partners" to the 
"developed world". 669 
666 Tony Blair, Speech to Ghana's Parliament, 2 February 2002. 
667 Blair, "Partnership for African Development". 
668 Tony Blair, PM's Speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, 26 January 2005. 
669 ibid. 
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The responsibility to save is also emphasised as enacting a relationship of equality and 
partnership in 2004, when Blair announced his CA. The CA emerges from what Blair 
calls, "the need to tackle the African problem as a whole". 670 An initiative emerging 
from the British Government, Blair describes his CA in a speech to the African Union as 
a commission of seventeen people drawn from government, civil society and the 
business community in Africa and the developed world, to "produce a comprehensive 
plan" for Africa. 67 1 This plan, published in 2005, was to be focused on "how the 
international community can support African development in partnership together". At 
the "core" of this plan then, is the "real partnership between Africa and the developed 
world. ýý672 The comprehensive nature of this plan means that the subject of Africa is truly 
brought within the foreign policy remit, rather than just that of development. Blair 
observed in June 2005 that the purpose of the plan for Africa "is to try and put all the 
different aspects of the problem of Africa, not just that of aid and debt, but also that of 
governance and conflict to put all those items together in a comprehensive plan". 673 
It is also through the concepts of equality and partnership that we can see how Britain's 
representation of its ethical dimension to foreign policy, as a responsibility to save 
Africa, is drawn into the question of international community with its rights and 
responsibilities. Chapter III underlined that to be considered part of the international 
community one had to be capable of accepting one's responsibility. While "[s]tates have 
the right to non-interference in their internal affairs", the rights of a subject, "they also 
have responsibilities, towards their own people, and towards the international 
community and their international engagements". 674 If a state ignores, neglects or is 
incapable of fulfilling these responsibilities, "the international community may need to 
intervene". 675 Literally, to be treated as a subject of international affairs, and allowed the 
rights that go with that, one has to accept and deal with one's responsibilities. 
670 Tony Blair, Q&A session given by PM Tony Blair and President Jacques Chirac with French and 
British students in Paris, 9 May 2004. 67 1 Tony Blair, Speech on Africa, 7 October 2004. 
672 ibid. 
673 Tony Blair, Press conference with the Italian Prime Minister in Rome, I June 2005. 
674 Straw, "Shaping a stronger United Nations". 
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In June 2002, Blair notes that this "partnership" also has the character of a "bargain", it 
is not a hand-out but rather a "deal". The responsibility of the developed world to 
support NEPAD financially is "dependent on African countries fulfilling their side of the 
bargain". 676 Their side of the bargain is later outlined as an agreement to "a whole series 
of initiatives on the rule of law, on proper commercial and legal systems, on rooting out 
corruption, on respect for democratic rights, and the processes of democracy". 677 This is 
similarly the case with the CA. In a joint press conference with George Bush in June 
2005, Blair says that the African agenda is "not a something for nothing deal", but rather 
a "two-way commitment" in which "we" require commitments on governance against 
corruption and favouring democracy and the rule of law. 678 
NEPAD and the CA, the entire 'responsibility to save' Africa, are all represented as part 
of the DIC. It is a foreign policy designed to fundamentally move the relationship 
between Africa and the developed world onto a basis of the rights and responsibilities of 
subjects, of equal partners. As such, it replaces an unethical policy with an ethical one. 
"Africa should not be seen as a victim but as a partner... This is about what we can do 
together, as equals, with mutual respect. ..,, 
679 The shift is represented as a movement 
from Africa as a patronised, dependent, passive and unequal victim; an object of British 
foreign policy; a group of failing states incapable of responsibility and thus subjectivity. 
Now it is treated as a partner, an equal, a subject capable of fulfilling its responsibilities 
and being active participants in the international community. 
676 Tony Blair, Doorstep Interview at G8 Summit, 28 June 2002. 
677 ibid. 
678 Tony Blair, Tony Blair and George Bush joint press conference at the White House, 7 June 2005. 
679 Blair, "Partnership for African Development". 
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Objectification of 'Aftica': Supplementing Partnership 
Given the equality of the partnership espoused by British foreign policy, it may be 
surprising that the choice of a 'Responsibility to Save' was made for this section. Would 
not a 'responsibility to partnership', a 'responsibility to bargain' or a 'responsibility to 
equality' be more appropriate? These are perhaps more descriptively accurate as well as 
having the advantage of not implying inequality. After all, someone who needs saving 
literally needs the one who saves. And this is acknowledged by Blair, who, as observed 
above, dismisses the old relationship between Britain and Africa as passive, 
disrespectful, dependent and patronising. 
There is an unexamined power relationship in operation here similar to that of Rosenau's 
'penetrated political system' 680 discussed in Chapter 1: she who saves is seen to have an 
abundance of something she who is saved lacks. If Britain, as Blair claims, "save[s] 
African nations from barbarism and dictatorship" 681 it is because Britain has abundance 
of what Sierra Leone lacks: well trained security forces, established rule of law, limited 
corruption, economic prosperity for instance. In fact, the subtitle of 'responsibility to 
save' is appropriate, and precisely for this reason. This section demonstrates that the 
responsibility enacted and espoused towards Africa shows specifically the unequal 
relationship which Britain is said to be avoiding with its 'new' partnership. Effectively 
'Africa', while declared an equal subject, is essentially described as a passive, unequal, 
homogenous object of British foreign policy. This becomes a little clearer when 
examining precisely how the relationship between Britain's two main 'Africa' policies 
(NEPAD and CA) is represented. 
So what is the relationship between Britain's support for NEPAD on the one hand, and 
the CA's comprehensive plan for Africa on the other? During a revealing interview with 
the South African magazine TV show, Carte Blanche, Blair is asked precisely this 
question. The interviewer notes that many people saw Britain's establishment of the CA 
680 See Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy". 
68 1 Blair, Mansion House Speech. 
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as "being quite arrogant because there was already a plan - called NEPAD - which was 
set up by Africans, for Africans". 682 Why then, "the need for another plan, which was 
spear-headed by Britain? "683 Blair replies by saying that NEPAD was Aftica's effort, 
while the CA was a developed nation's comprehensive plan. 
Well I don't think people really thought it was arrogant, because I mean the NEPAD process, 
which I was also heavily involved in, and obviously President Mbeki was the main mover in it, 
the whole purpose of that was to see what Africa could do for its own development. But I think 
everybody recognises, and indeed this is how our conversation began, that the outside world also 
has a responsibility and obligation to act... So I think you need the combination of the developed 
and the developing world working together. 684 
The explanations given by junior ministers such as Ian Pearson and Lord Triesman 
(Minister for Africa) are even more revealing. While touting 2005 as the 'Year for 
Africa' in Japan, Junior Minister Ian Pearson argued that African governments "must 
take the lead in Africa's development, and they are" through NEPAD. 685 This he 
describes as "their [progressive African leaders'] own blueprint for tackling the 
continent's problems". 686 However, the role of the CA is "that Africa can not [sic. ] on its 
own achieve the take-off point in development. It needs our help - in terms of trade 
,, 687 access, Overseas Development Aid, debt relief and investment... Lord Triesman 
repeats this, again in June 2005: "[flhe Commission argues - and we agree - that Africa 
cannot, on its own, achieve the take-off point in development. , 688 
In Derridean terms, we can see the CA operating here as a 'supplement' to NEPAD; the 
British plan supplementing the 'African'. Derrida's conception of the 'supplement, ' as 
outlined in the previous two chapters, contains two meanings. 
689 Firstly, it is an 
insignificant and inessential extra, a surplus to what was already complete in and of 
682 Interviewer, Carte Blanche Interview, II February 2006. 
683 ibid. 
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685 Ian Pearson, "G8 2005: A Year For Africa", Tokyo, 6 June 2005. 
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itself. Thus, the CA is merely a surplus to NEPAD, an ultimately useless addition to the 
African plan (NEPAD) which was complete in and of itself. In 2002, Britain's foreign 
policy of supporting NEPAD, supporting progressive African leadership in finding 
solutions to 'Africa's' problems, was enough. It was fulfilling a responsibility to save by 
a genuine partnership. 690 It was sufficient to Africa's needs while being an ethical, non- 
patronising way of helping an equal. The addition in 2005 of the CA was unnecessary. 
Secondly, however, the very possibility of this surplus suggests that that which is 
supplemented is incomplete. Otherwise the addition of a supplement is futile. But such a 
"supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. It intervenes or insinuates itself in-the- 
place-of. 5ý69 1 Thus, at the very beginning of Blair's 'Year of Africa 5692 (2005), the 
support of NEPAD is no longer sufficient. In his New Year Economist article, Blair 
5,693 declares that "[t]ruly a new partnership is required . The partnership involved in 
NEPAD, it seems, was not enough. This is why the CA was set up: to produce a truly 
comprehensive plan. As Blair observes, "we put together that comprehensive plan for 
Africa and it is the only thing that will give the continent a hope". 694 If the CA will 
produce a fully comprehensive plan four years after NEPAD, then NEPAD must have 
been deficient. It must have lacked something or been incomplete in some way. It was 
not enough for Africa to "achieve the take-off point" in development. 695 'Africa' needed 
gus' to bring hope in our comprehensive plan of true partnership. Quite literally the CA 
adds "only to replace" NEPAD. It replaces the deficient, lacking, incomplete African 
effort with British completeness, plenitude and abundance. 
Derrida's reading of Rousseau in Of Grammatology makes the distinction between what 
Rousseau 'declares' (i. e. what he wishes to say) and what he 'describes' (i. e. what his 
696 
discourse ends up saying, what effect it produces contrary to intention). Thus, we can 
say that, as observed above, British foreign policy declares African nations to be 
690 Blair, Speech to Ghana's Parliament, 2 February 2002. 
69' Derrida, Of Grammatology, P. 145. 
692 Straw, "A Partnership for Wider Freedom". 
693 Blair, PM's article for The Economist on G8 - emphasis added. 
694 Blair, BBC Radio Interview to mark World Aids Day. 
695 Lord Triesman, "Africa's Instability is our Instability". 
696 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 229. 
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subjects, to be "equals" in a "partnership", capable of accepting their responsibilities as 
members of the international community. While this is declared, however, what is 
described works against this. Africa is described, is represented, as precisely the 
opposite, as an object, incapable of accepting responsibility, lacking a comprehensive 
plan, and incapable of coping alone. NEPAD requires supplementation by the CA. While 
British foreign policy declares a 'responsibility to partnership' between equals, a 
'bargain' or a 'deal', it describes an unequal, patronizing and morally problematic 
cresponsibility to save'. 
Of course, to a certain extent we do not even need the logic of deconstructive 
supplementarity to reveal how British foreign policy makes 'Africa' into an object. 
'Africa' is simply treated as an unproblematic, homogeneous lump from the beginning of 
the period of foreign policy under study. In all the speeches above it is not specific 
problematic nations of Africa (such as the Sudan and the DRC, for example), or even 
'certain African states' that are being talked of, but simply 'Africa'. Blair's speech to the 
African Union announcing the CA is entitled 'Speech on Africa'. 'Asia', 'South 
America', 'North America, ' or other land masses, would never merit such an 
undifferentiated speech. At this point it would be possible to produce statistics which 
show how internally diverse Africa truly is, how there is no "problem of Africa" as Blair 
continually declares. 697 However, this is the not the critique currently undertaken. Rather 
than bringing in other discourses, a close examination of the British foreign policy text 
illustrates how the discourse undermines itself. 
Much more important, in this sense, is the way that Blair's 'Speech on Africa' 
acknowledges the status of 'Africa' within British foreign policy. Declaring 2005 a year 
of decision for Africa, Blair arg . ues that a comprehensive plan finally exists, having "at 
its core a real partnership between Africa and the developed world. 19698 The price of 
failure, he says, is immense. "The prize for success would be an Africa standing proud in 
69' For example, Tony Blair, PM Press Conference, 6 January 2005, and Tony 
Blair, Press conference with 
the Italian Prime Minister in Rome, I June 2005. 
698 Blair, Speech on Africa. 
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its own right in the international community . "699The important thing to note is how this 
supports the earlier claims made about the logic of the supplement regarding NEPAD 
and the CA. The aim, the goal, the prize is Africa "standing proud in its own right in the 
international community" - implicitly, it currently cannot do so. 'Africa' (or certainly 
African nations) is either not considered part of the international community, because it 
cannot fulfill the responsibilities of a subject, or is seen as within the international 
community, but not "proud[ly]" so, nor "in its own right". If it can be seen as within the 
international community, it is only there because of Britain's magnanimous 
responsibility to save. So here we have the clear acknowledgement that Africa, and 
NEPAD, require Britain, and the CA, to survive and eventually become true subjects. 
Pity: Deconstructing the Responsibility to Save 
With the supplementation of NEPAD by the CA, of African efforts with British, we can 
see that the ethics of a 'responsibility to save' appear stuck in the reversal phase of 
deconstruction. It seems that the 'responsibility to save' rather than being a moral, 
ethical principle is revealed to be precisely immoral and unethical. However, things are 
not so simple. If we look at this 'responsibility to save' as primarily a matter of pity, we 
can see that, once again, responsibility deconstructs within the British foreign policy 
text. The 'responsibility to save' is always already both moral and immoral, responsible 
and irresponsible action. 
Referring to section one, we can see that primarily, the obligation and responsibility in 
British foreign policy arises from being, as Cook put it, witnesses to human tragedy. 700 
In other words, we are responsible because we experience pity when we see human 
suffering. The word 'pity' comes from the Latin pietas, via the Old French pite meaning 
a feeling of 'compassion' at the suffering of others. 701 We can see this compassion in the 
699 ibid. 
700 Cook, "Mission Statement". 
701 Judy Persall (ed. ), The Concise Oxford Dictionary, I OthEdition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), P. 1090. 
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speeches of foreign ministers and the Prime Minister. But, crucially, we can also see 
another aspect of 'pity', that noted by Nietzsche: its irrevocable link with 'contempt'. 
This draws out the conception of Africa being marked by a 'lack' which needed 
supplementation above. 
In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche claims that pity is "felt as a sign of contempt 
because one has clearly ceased to be an object offear as soon as one is pitied". 702 In 
Daybreak he expands somewhat, saying that pity is as good as contempt because we get 
no enjoyment from seeing a "contemptible creature suffer", but to see an enemy, who is 
your equal, suffer is an "enjoyment of enjoyments". 703 This is because you admire your 
enemy; to see him suffer is to increase your respect for his resilience. This respect, 
because he is your enemy, is also a form of fear. To show pity is to show that you do not 
see the person as capable of handling the pain, thus you do not fear him, indeed that you 
must save him because he is incapable of helping himself. Pity is an acknowledgement of 
a person's incapacity and lack, and therefore deeply humiliating for the person pitied. To 
pity a person is to see them as incapable where you are capable, as beneath you. In the 
terms used in the current discussion, to pity is to view as an object who is done-to, rather 
than a subject who does. To pity is to view with contem t. 
In this way, the possibility of morally saving 'Africans' is undermined by its necessary 
corollary: to do so is to objectify, patronise and treat 'Africa' with contempt. This is 
shown by the way that 'Africa' is treated as a homogeneous problem, and African efforts 
at development (NEPAD) are seen as insufficient and requiring British supplementation 
(CA). The 'responsibility to save' reveals both a moral responsibility to help one's 
fellow man but, equally necessarily, an immoral, irresponsible contempt. The 
responsibility to "intervene... to do what we can to save African nations from barbarism 
and dictatorship,, 704 both seeks to bring African nations into the international community 
as subjects capable of accepting responsibilities ("[flhe prize for success would be an 
702 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, all too Human: A Bookfor Free Spirits, translated by R. J. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 322. 
703 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, translated by R. J. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 86. 
704 Blair, Mansion House Speech. 
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Africa standing proud in its own right in the international community 11), 705 and 
reproduces their patronised 'object-hood', their status as a 'scar' to be healed by the 
developed world ("[i]f Africa is a scar on the conscience of our world, the world has a 
duty to heal it, heal it we can and we MUSt...,, )706 The 'responsibility to save' cannot be 
simply either responsible nor irresponsible, ethical or unethical. It can only ever be both 
and neither at the same time, undecidable as to its true nature. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the ethical dimension in British foreign policy through the 
concept of 'responsibility'. The previous chapter looked at the importance of the taking 
of responsibility, the possibility of which appears to constitute subjectivity in the British 
and EU foreign policy text. This chapter, in contrast, focused on the enactment of 
responsibility, or rather, how such enactment is represented. However, just as the subject 
of British and EU foreign policy deconstructed under a close reading, showing itself to 
be undecidable, so the possibility of enacting responsibility has demonstrated its 
undecidability. 
The chapter was split into three sections. The first of these sought to establish with 
textual evidence that moral 'responsibility' in the British foreign policy discourse 
appeared to come from unnecessary human suffering. To the extent that this conception 
of responsibility is grounded, it is grounded in a particular conception of the 'human'. 
The second and third sections split British foreign policy up into the two most prominent 
examples of how the enactment of responsibility is represented. The first of these, the 
'responsibility to protect' citizens in other states, has been given the most attention as it 
surrounds the possibility of 'humanitarian intervention'. 
705 Blair, "Speech on Africa". 706 Blair, Speech to WSSD in South Africa. 
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Having outlined the development of this 'responsibility to protect' within the DIC, with 
its rights and responsibilities, the cases of Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan were 
presented as examples of this in British foreign policy. This revealed the anomaly of 
Iraq, which was said not to fit into the DIC. However, closer analysis shows that Iraq is 
brought back into the DIC and the 'responsibility to protect'. The invasion of Iraq as 
both marginal and central is crucial because it means we can generalise out from the 
discourse surrounding it. The acknowledgement of morality on both sides of the 
argument in Iraq (producing an 'eternal moral dilemma') meant that we could show how 
the very concept of the 'responsibility to protect' deconstructs. It is both moral and 
immoral, responsible and irresponsible, always-already ethically undecidable. 
The third section focused on the latter half of Britain's post-1997 foreign policy. Since 
2001/2 it is argued that there has been a growing effort to enact a 'responsibility to save' 
Africa, culminating in the 2005 'Year for Africa'. It was initially demonstrated how this 
was constituted as a moral cause, and how this 'responsibility to save' developed in line 
with the rights and responsibilities principles of the DIC. The key word, it appeared, was 
a 'partnership' of equals, abandoning the old, unethical, patronising and contemptuous 
attitude of donor and passive recipient. This was especially promoted in relation to the 
two key British foreign policies: support for NEPAD and the institution of the CA. 
The deconstruction of this 'responsibility to save' was made possible, however, by 
examining how the relationship between these two key policies was represented in the 
British foreign policy text. NEPAD, the African leaders' effort to help themselves, was 
revealed to be inadequate and required the Blairite supplement: the CA. As a classic 
Derridean supplement, African efforts were revealed as both complete in themselves, 
and then wholly inadequate and in need of replacement by more 'comprehensive' British 
policies. The responsibility to save thus embodies two contradictory elements of the 
word pity: a compassionate prevention of unnecessary death and suffering, and a 
contemptuous objectification of the 'African' other. Once again, these two elements of 
'responsibility' are inseparable, and responsibility is shown to be both ethical and 
unethical, responsible and irresponsible. 
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Throughout this chapter the undecidability of responsibility has been stressed. When 
combined with the previous chapter we can see the implications of this for ethics and 
foreign policy in the British text. Not only is the subjectivity constructed by Britain, the 
possibility of taking responsibility, inherently unstable and undecidable, the way that 
ethical responsibility is enacted is also both ethical and unethical. Neither the taking of 
responsibility, nor its enactment, can be stabilised in an ethical representation. However, 
as noted in the previous chapter, the construction of EU subjectivity and the way it 
represents its responsibility are different to that of the British text. Responsibility for the 
EU 'home' is primarily exercised as a hospitality. The next chapter thus examines 
whether these effects of the unstable 'EU' subject are any more secure than those of the 
'British'. 
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Chapter V 
Hospitality: Home and Family 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the undecidability of responsibility as an effect of the 
problematic construction of subjectivity in British foreign policy. Analysis of the EU and 
British foreign policy text in Chapter III revealed that the ability to accept one's 
responsibilities was central to the way the subject of ethics and foreign policy is 
represented. The representation of the way ethical responsibility is exercised differs 
markedly between the two foreign policies. While the text stresses the responsibility to 
protect and save, this chapter examines how EU foreign policy constructs its discourse 
of responsibility around the notion of hospitality. This marks, once again, the way the 
three concepts examined (subjectivity, responsibility and hospitality) are far from 
separate; all three refer to the British and EU construction of the possibility of ethics and 
foreign policy as that of a responsible relation to otherness. 
As illustrated in Chapter 11, hospitality is an important concept in international relations, 
though often ignored in the extant literature. When it is used, the emphasis is placed on 
707 
granting hospitality to individuals, especially the refugee. In the EU foreign policy 
text, the focus in contrast is upon welcoming in nation-states. Kant's cosmopolitan right 
to "universal hospitality" was defined as "the right of a stranger not to be treated with 
hostility when he arrives on someone else's territory". 708 In broader terms, we can see 
hospitality as simply an openness to the other, the stranger, who comes from outside and 
is received into our home. This definition is elaborated upon and problematised in 
section two. 
'07 For example, Dillon, "The Scandal of the Refugee". 
708 Kant, Political Writings, p. 105. 
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There are three EU foreign policies examined in this chapter all of which are based, to 
varying degrees, on such a hospitable openness to the other. Firstly, there is the 
cornerstone of EU foreign policy during this period: enlargement. 709 This is represented 
as the most simply hospitable foreign policy, literally a welcoming of other countries 
into the EU home. Secondly, there is the policy towards the Balkans. This develops 
through the period under study from an offer of 'virtual membership' into a matter of 
conditionally beckoning the Balkan countries into the EU. Finally, there is the far more 
circumscribed hospitality of the ENP. This is represented as friendly and generous, while 
notfully welcoming the other into the EU. 
The chapter proceeds in three sections. The first expands upon the brief discussion of the 
ethical in EU foreign policy in Chapter IV and how it is based on a responsibility of 
proximity. This responsibility sees its main enactment in the concept of hospitality as 
described above. Just as with Derrida's concept, EU hospitality is based on the EU as 
'home' or 'family'. This familial imaginary of the EU is both geographical (bounded by 
the 15, and by 2004, the 25 member states borders) and moral (based on a range of 
ethical and political values seen as 'European'). Welcoming others into this family home 
can only be the height of ethical foreign policy for the EU. As Patten put it: "[w]hat 
better way could there have been of treating a neighbour than inviting them into our 
home? ', 710 
Section two examines the first two EU foreign policies mentioned above: enlargement 
and the policy towards the Balkans. A close reading of the discourse surrounding these 
policies will reveal the internal tensions within the ethical concept of hospitality. What 
Derrida calls the 'two laws' of hospitality means that hospitality, like responsibility, is 
essentially undecidable and divided against itself. A policy of hospitality is caught up in 
the contradiction between an absolute, unconditional welcoming of the other, and a 
limited, conditional welcoming. Thus. the policy towards the Balkans, especially, 
709 The fact that this can also be seen as a 'domestic' policy is considered on p. 186 below. 
710 Chris Patten, Not Quite the Diplomat: Home Truths about WorldAffairs (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 
p. 177. 
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demonstrates that the EU can only ever be welcoming and unwelcoming, ethical and 
unethical towards others. 
Section three shows how this contradictory ethics is further borne out by the ENP. The 
heavily circumscribed hospitality offered by this policy emphasises that, in the EU's own 
terms, its concept of the ethical deconstructs. Furthermore, the ENP reveals the way that 
hospitality deconstructs the very possibility of the 'home' which enables it. The 
unconditional form of hospitality, which even the ENP must retain a reference to, 
undermines the basis for its own enactment: the inviolable home discussed in section 
one. Thus, finally, we see that the way EU foreign policy represents its responsibility 
(through hospitality) undermines its own subjectivity, its own concept of the 'European 
home'. 
Responsibility, Hospitality and the 'Common European Home' 
There is, as observed in the previous chapter, much overlap between how the EU regards 
the ethical in foreign policy and the British foreign policy discourse. Prodi has already 
been quoted as saying that that, as Europeans, "our distinguishing feature is our sense of 
responsibility". 71 1 The stress is, as in Chapter IV, placed on the notion of a responsibility 
to protect and save human life. In the most coherent and extensive statement of the 
ethical in EU foreign policy, Solana notes that humanitarian intervention is a "modem 
way to describe a very ancient practice. To help out one's fellow human being in a 
situation of distress". 712 This "simple gesture" is first of all connected to the European 
welfare state by Solana, but he then expands this beyond both nation-state and EU 
borders: 
However, European solidarity goes far beyond the frontiers of the European Union... 
Catastrophes happen. Some we put down to 'natural causes'; others we blame on the darker side 
711 Prodi, "The European project in the world: between values and politics". 
712 Solana, Speech at the inaugural conference of the course, "Towards a new international morality: the 
humanitarian interventions". 
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of human nature - be it embodied in a person or a regime... the consequences are the same: 
people suffering, lives at risk... The essence of humanitarian relief is the job of saving lives and 
of helping the suffering... Bringing relief is always worth it - and almost at whatever cost when 
human lives are at stake. But even an intrinsically ethical action must be carried out according to 
rules and principles, and cannot be standard free. "' 
He acknowledges that such catastrophes have been happening since before the end of the 
Cold War and all that has changed since is that we see more of it. But this "does not alter 
the enormous responsibility we have in the face of those tragedies". It would, he 
declares, "be morally untenable, sometimes unthinkable, to sit idle, without reacting to 
such human misery and distress. Therefore we are compelled to act. , 714 
In this representation of the EU's moral responsibility, we almost see a replication of 
Cook's 'Mission Statement' in 1997, which affirmed that our being "witness... to human 
tragedy in distant lands... obliged us to accept moral responsibility for our response". 715 
The EU's responsibility in a similar way comes from, to paraphrase Solana, the 
responsibility to save lives and prevent suffering. One interesting difference with this 
representation and that of responsibility in British foreign policy is that no moral 
difference is made between preventableloutrageous and unpreventablelacceptable death. 
While British foreign policy seems to emphasise the moral repugnance of non-combatant 
suffering and deaths from preventable disease, Solana stresses that whatever form 
suffering and death comes in, "the consequences are the same: people suffering, lives at 
risk". 716 
... Ibid. - emphasis in original. 714 ibid. 
715 Cook, "Mission Statement". 
716 Solana, Speech at the inaugural conference of the course, "Towards a new international morality: the 
humanitarian interventions". 
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Territorialised Responsibility: The Importance of Proximity 
A more important difference between the British and EU representations of ethical 
responsibility is the stress placed upon proximity. In the British foreign policy discourse, 
there is no distinction made between responsibility for those close to us, and those far 
away. 717 As Blair stated in his 2001 Party Conference Speech, those starving, wretched 
and dispossessed "from the deserts of Northern Africa to the slums of Gaza, to the 
mountain ranges of Afghanistan: they too are our cause". 718 In contrast, the EU discourse 
places much greater emphasis on its responsibility for those geographically closest to the 
EU. Chris Patten argued in 2000 that the CFSP is crucial to ensuring the EU is able "to 
shoulder its share of global responsibilities, beginning - but not ending - with its own 
backyard" . 
719 Responsibility, wherever it may end, begins with those closest to the EU. 
Similarly, reflecting on a year in office, Solana states that the Balkans have been the top 
priority for EU foreign policy, while its second priority is the Mediterranean as, "like the 
Balkans, this region is on our doorstep". 720 Such foreign policy priorities are justified by 
proximity over and over again. 721 Chris Patten observes that the EU's development has 
given it more responsibilities, but "Europe is bound to give a very high priority to 
717 The one exception to this rule is in relation to the Kosovo conflict in 1999. Here we saw a stress placed 
by Blair especially upon the fact that Kosovo was close to us, and specifically, close to the EU. For 
example, Blair reminds those who disagree with the intervention, "[wle are talking here not about some far 
away place of which we know little. We are talking about the doorstep of the European Union, our own 
back yard" (Blair, "The New Challenge for Europe"). There are at least two explanations for this 
aberration. The first is that Kosovo occurred early on in the period under study, when the place of ethics 
and responsibility were not fully worked out in the discourse. The second is that this is a case of 
'intertextuality' - when the EU foreign policy discourse, never wholly separate 
from the British, 
significantly influenced the way the intervention was represented. Later in this section I show the way the 
EU represents its responsibility to the Balkans as precisely because they are on the 'doorstep' of the 
EU 
and in our 'backyard'. 
"' Blair, Party Conference Speech 2001. 
719 Chris Patten, "What does Europe's CFSP mean for Asia", Speech to the Japanese Institute for 
International Affairs, Tokyo, 19 July 2000. 
720 Javier Solana, "Reflections on a year in office", Speech to the Swedish Institute of International Affairs 
and Central Defence and Society Federation, 27 October 2000. 
721 See, for example: Solana, "Some Reflections About European Foreign Policy", 
Address to the Adam 
Mickiewicz University, Poznan, 12 February 2000; Javier Solana, "The Foreign Policy of the EU", Speech 
at the Liberal International, The Hague, 7 November 2000; Chris Patten, 
"Developing Europe's External 
Policy in the Age of Globalisation", Speech at Central Party School, Beijing, 4 April 2002; 
Javier Solana, 
Address to the National Forum on Europe, Dublin Castle, 8 January 2004. 
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relations with its closest neighbours". 
722 Enlargement, for Prodi, gives the EU even more 
responsibilities, but once again this is "especially as regards our immediate 
723 
neighbours". Towards the end of the period studied there remains an emphasis upon 
the primacy of proximity when it comes to responsibility. Speaking to the European 
Parliament, Prodi declares that "we assume a clear responsibility in the region... But our 
,, 724 responsibilities stretch beyond our region. Nonetheless, it is proximity that brings a 
clear responsibility. 
Solana appears deeply uneasy when pushed on the EU's wider responsibility in 2003. In 
an interview with Die Zeit about the ESDP operation to protect key facilities in the Ituri 
region of the Congo, he is asked what the "European interest" in the Congo is. Solana 
states that while the EU has an interest in regional stability, it "furthermore bear[s] a 
responsibility in the face of human suffering. We must not simply shut our eyes to it.,, 725 
Yet, the full extent of this responsibility is left unclear. Asked if this responsibility 
extends to the whole of Africa, the response is, "[n]o, of course not. We are not the 
Africa CorpS.,, 726 A follow-up question involves whether this responsibility extends to 
Africa today, Latin America tomorrow and "the following day the rest of the world? " 
Once again, the response is ambiguous and uneasy. "No. We do not feel called upon to 
become a global police force. But we do bear a responsibility for the world, whether we 
like it or not. , 727 
Patten ties this question of wider responsibility in with the development of the EU, and 
yet always brings it round to the prioritisation of proximity. In a speech on the EU's 
relations with Latin America, he notes that as "Europe develops further, it will have to 
take ever more account of its global responsibilities and challenges". With globalisation 
increasing it is "no longer possible to shut out the rest of the world". However, he 
722 Chris Patten, "A Common Foreign Policy for Europe: Relations with Latin America", Speech to the 
Consejo Argentino par alas Relaciones Internacionales (CAIRJ), Buenos Aires, 9 November 2000. 
723 Prodi, "The reality of enlargement". 
724 Romano Prodi, Speech to European Parliament, Strasbourg, 10 February 2004. 
725 Javier Solana, "We are not the Africa Corps", Interview by Joachim Fritz-Vannahme and Petra Pinzler, 
in Die Zeil, 12 June 2003. 
726 ibid. 
727 ibid. 
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immediately follows this by ignoring Latin America: "Europe is bound to give a very 
,, 728 high priority to relations with its closest neighbours. Speaking in Beijing, Patten talks 
about the breadth of EU commitments in Latin America, North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, 
DRC, "[b]ut not unreasonably much of our attention focuses on our 'near abroad' that is, 
on what is happening in our neighbourhood. 59729 
The fact that the EU does not really have a strong ethical or responsible representation of 
its foreign policy towards thefar abroad, theforeign foreign (rather than the 'European' 
foreign) is shown by the triviality accorded to it in Patten's memoirs. "As for other 
countries and continents, it would be wearisome to tour the world, describing visits here, 
there and everywhere, recounting small victories and whitewashing small defeatS.,, 730 As 
a speech writer he used to call such speeches a tour d'horizon, but now prefers Denis 
Healey's term - "a 'tour de gloSS. 5 5ý73 
1 There is thus uncertainty regarding the EU's 
wider responsibility. While the EU does bear a responsibility "for the world, whether we 
like it or not", 732 it is not yet fully capable of accepting it. There is also confusion about 
precisely the nature of this wider responsibility, as Solana makes it clear that the EU 
does not wish to become a global police force. It appears that the EU lacks confidence in 
its status as a truly global subject. The concentration remains on the EU as a regional 
actor, with primarily regional responsibilities. 
Hospitality and the Common European Home 
The EU's representation of its responsibility, the ethical dimension to its foreign policy, 
while extending to the whole world, is far clearer and more confident when expressed in 
terms of proximity. The EU's priority is always represented as those closest to it: its 
'neighbours' and those on its 'doorstep'. Given that these countries and peoples clearly 
take priority in the EU's ethical dimension, how this responsibility is enacted will now 
728 Patten, "A Common Foreign Policy for Europe: Relations with Latin America". 
729 Patten, "Developing Europe's External Policy in the Age of Global i sation". 
730 Patten, Not Quite the Diplomat, p. 174. 
731 ibid. 
732 Solana, "We are not the Africa Corps". 
179 
be examined. This enactment, as has been suggested, is represented as an offering of 
hospitality. After all, when someone is in trouble on our doorstep, what is the obvious, 
most ethical, thing to do? Surely it is to invite them into our home? 
The EU foreign policy discourse during 1999-2004 is replete with hospitable metaphors 
of families and homes. Much of this emerges in sections two and three when the 
representations of specific EU foreign policies are investigated. These policies come 
together in the concept of the European family/home. It is important to examine how the 
'architecture' of this home is represented, as it forms the basis for the way the EU sees 
itself and how it enacts its ethical dimension to foreign policy: through hospitality. First 
of all, however, the importance of a concept of the 'home' to a discourse of hospitality 
must be demonstrated. 
This importance is outlined by Derrida in an interview he gave in 1993 (though it was 
only published in English in 2003). While the international relations context of the 
interview, the massacres and ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian conflict, reveal that the 
concept of a national home can be used in an insidious way to violently exclude and kill 
others, Derrida nonetheless defended the 'home'. This is because the "unconditional 
desire [for the home], which is impossible to renounce" also "should not be renounced", 
for without the home, "there is no door nor any hospitality". 733 The singularity of the 
home should not be given up because, while it can be a violent "closedness", it is also 
the very "condition of openness, of hospitality, and of the door". 734 
On a purely practical level, the possibility of my welcoming someone, of offering 
hospitality, is predicated on my having a home to welcome them into. Reflecting upon 
hospitality demands, or presupposes as Derrida says elsewhere, "the possibility of a 
rigorous delimitation of thresholds or frontiers", 
735 
a separation from otherness. 
736 A 
733 Jacques Derrida and Bernard Stiegler, Echographies of Television: Filmed Interviews, translated by 
Jennifer Bajorek (Oxford: Polity, 2002), p. 81. 
734 ibid. 
735 Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourmantelle, Of Hospitality, translated by Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 47-49. 
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home must be separated and closed, but also, as we shall see in relation to the EU, it 
must have windows and doors, such that the other can be welcomed in. For hospitality to 
be possible there must be an inviolable home, but that home must be constituted by 
closure as the very possibility of openness. And for Derrida, 'hospitality' in this sense is 
as close as one can get to a synonym for ethics. 
Insofar as it has to do with the ethos, that is, the residence, one's home, the familiar place of 
dwelling, inasmuch as it is a manner of being there, the manner in which we relate to ourselves 
and to others, to others as our own or as foreigners, ethics is hospitality; ethics is so thoroughly 
coextensive with the experience of hospitality. "' 
The 'home' is crucial then to the very possibility of both hospitality and ethics. Without 
it, we have nothing to welcome the other into, nothing to give the other. 
This idea of the European, or EU, 'home' is closely connected with the metaphor of 
'family'. During one of his first speeches as President of the EU Commission in October 
1999, Prodi declares the ambition involved in the enlargement project. "[F]or the first 
time in history we are unifying Europe! We are bringing together not only countries but, 
above all, peoples into a new and much larger European fami ly.,, 738 In an interesting 
narrative of the CFSP, Patten notes how the EU has acted to encourage and support 
candidate countries in their process of reform towards becoming free-market 
democracies. It has worked at "smothering flash points", teaching these countries 
tolerance of criticism and diversity. 739 "In short", he says, the aim has been to help 
"these countries become normal, and take their rightful place in the family of European 
,, 740 nations. 
736 Jacques Derrida, Adieu: to Emmanuel Levinas, translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 92. 
73' Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, pp. 16-17. 
738 Romano Prodi, Speech to the EU-Japan Business Dialogue Roundtable, Brussels, 7 October 1999. 
739 Chris Patten, "A voice for Europe? The future of the CFSP", Brian Lenihan Memorial Lecture, Dublin, 
7 March 2001. 
740 ibid. 
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In 2002, Prodi adds the 'home' to his metaphor of the family, suggesting that the policies 
of enlargement and cooperation with neighbouring countries "will lead to a new 
architecture for the whole continent. A new structure for our common European 
,, 741 home 
. 
Patten had already championed this spatial imagery early in 2000. Speaking to 
the Foreign Affairs and Legal Committees of the Albanian Parliament, he praises 
Albania's democratic reform and hospitality to Kosovan refugees. "In short, you have 
returned to the European family and you look, rightly, to the rest of Europe to welcome 
you home... The challenge is to maintain these efforts, to stay on the right road - the 
,, 742 road to Europe . If Albania is returning to Europe on this road, it appears that the 
metaphorical road becomes circular -ftom Europe, to Europe. This will be picked up 
later. There is clearly a distinction here, however, between the Europeanjamily, which 
Albania has returned to through its democratic reform and hospitality, and a European 
home, which Albania has not yet reached. Rather, it is on the road towards that home. 
This 'road to Europe' will take up great prominence in the discussion of EU policy 
towards the Balkans in section two. 
In this section however, we can already see that Patten characterises EU policy towards 
the Balkans as "about building peace and security, not just in our backyard but in our 
front yard too". 743 The difference is not quite clear, but he adds that its importance is 
because peace and security is necessary as "an integral part of our European common 
home". 744 Perhaps here there is an indication that the Balkans are potentially part of the 
common home but are currently its front/backyard. Certainly this confusion is a 
constituent part of the EU's ambiguous representation of the Balkans. As we have seen, 
occasionally they are treated as part of the European family, though not yet the home, 
while other times they are treated simply as a neighbouring region, along with Russia 
and the 'Mediterranean' -a term largely designating the Middle East. 
745 However, by 
74 ' Romano Prodi, "The EU, the UK and the world", Speech to Said Business School, Oxford, 29 April 
2002. 
742 Chris Patten, Speech to the Foreign Affairs and Legal Committees of the Albanian Parliament, Tirana, 
6 March 2000. 
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, 
iament on the Stabilisation and Association Process and the 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Strasbourg, 12 April 2000. 
744 ibid. 
745 Prodi, "The EU, the UK and the world". 
182 
the end of 2002 the Balkans are being sent a "clear message" of hospitality by Prodi, 
who says that "the EU's door is open and we hope to invite them in as soon as 
possible". 746 Solana further emphasises this hospitality, telling Bosnians that if they 
chose reform, "the door of Europe is open to YOU55.747 Similarly, though they are not yet 
being invited in, he tells Serbians that their "new democratic leadership opened the door 
for Serbia to join the European mainstream". 748 
The potential resolution of the Balkans liminal status illustrates how the European family 
home, as well as having a road which leads to its door, also has a neighbourhood, which 
is sometimes described as a backyard. This illustrates the importance of proximity in the 
EU's foreign policy discourse. A major aspect of EU foreign policy is concentrated on, 
as Prodi puts it, "our neighbourhood in the literal sense of the word, our backyard". 
These countries, including "our future eastern neighbours and the whole Mediterranean 
,, 749 area" are described as a "ring of friends... from Morocco to Russia to the Black Sea. 
This representation of such countries as 'neighbours' and 'friends' of the EU is repeated 
over and over again in the speeches of Prodi from 2003 onwards. 750 It is significant that, 
firstly, the spatial metaphor designates them as neighbours to the European home - i. e. 
not within the home, but outside - and, secondly, the relationship metaphor designating 
them asftiends to the Europeanfamily - i. e. not part of the family, but close to it. 
As stated in the introduction, although there is an evident geographical element to who is 
'in' the EU family home, who is on the road to it, and who is consigned to the backyard 
neighbourhood, there is also an ethical element. As Derrida observes, hospitality is about 
ethics as the ethos, as "the residence, one's home, the familiar place of dwelling, 
746 Prodi, "The reality of enlargement". 
747 Solana, Interview with Dnevi Avaz (BiH newspaper). 
748 Javier Solana and Franco Frattini, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, "Choosing Reform", Article in 
Politika (Serbian newspaper), 15 December 2003. 
749Romano Prodi, "A Wider Europe -A Proximity Policy as the key to stability", Speech at Sixth ECSA- 
World Conference, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002. 
750 For example, Romano Prodi, Speech at the signing of the Treaty of Accession Ceremony, Athens, 16 
April 2003; Romano Prodi, Speech to EU-Balkan Summit, Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003; Romano Prodi, 
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inasmuch as it is a matter of being there, the manner in which we relate to ourselves and 
to others" . 
75 1 The 'home' or residence constitutes us, forms our subjectivity. For the EU, 
this ethos, this 'home', is not just about geography, but also about European values and 
ethics. In setting out Europe's role in a future system of world governance, Prodi argues 
in March 2000 that any such system must be based on "shared values such as justice and 
fair play, sustainability and subsidiarity, transparency and democratic accountabi lity. 5,752 
Why should these specific values be at the heart of the EU's foreign policy? Because 
they are part of the EU's ethos, part of what makes the EU the EU, a constitutive element 
of the common European home. 
The European Union already enshrines and promotes precisely those values. They are a part of 
Europe's distinctive political and ethical heritage, and they reflect in large measure our humanist 
tradition and the moral legacy of the three Mediterranean faiths. That is why I want Europe to be 
at the forefront of global progress, shaping the world of tomorrow... It also means making 
progress on enlargement unifying our continent around ethical and political values, and 
influencing our neighbours to share those values. "' 
Building on this speech a week later in Vienna, Prodi argues that "social and ethical 
values such as tolerance, inclusiveness, social justice and respect for other cultures... are 
what give Europe its sense of corporate identity". 754 
These ethical and political values are explicitly associated with the European family, and 
the enlargement policy of the EU. Prodi claims that the reconstitution of the "extended 
family of European nations and, above all, peoples" is not about homogenisation but 
about "bringing together diverse people who are heirs to a common civilisation". 755 The 
peoples in this family share "unchanging fundamental values such as democracy, respect 
for human rights, the protection of minorities and the rules of law. Values that give us 
751 See p. 181 for full quotation. 
752 Romano Prodi, "Europe and Global Governance", Speech to 2 nd COMECE congress, Brussels, 31 
March 2000. 
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unity in our diversity. , 
756 These 'values' are, says Solana, what the EU's foreign policy 
is about. The EU, he claims, is "founded on the values of tolerance, democracy and 
respect for human rights... Our foreign policy should be nothing less than the projection 
,, 757 of those values . Similarly, in the wake of what he calls the "crisis" of the EU's 
inability to agree a common position on the war in Iraq, Prodi dismisses the possibility 
of a return to nineteenth century balance-of-power politics. "[I]t would be contrary to the 
very nature of the Union, which is based on dialogue, solidarity, multilateralism and an 
ethical dimension to politics". 758 
This section has established that, while responsibility to protect and save human life is 
key to the way the EU views ethics and foreign policy, there is a significant element of 
proximity in its representation of this responsibility. In other words, responsibility 
towards those closest to the EU in geographical terms is given highest priority. The 
primary way this ethical responsibility is exercised is through the EU's discourse of 
hospitality: a welcoming, or beckoning, of the proximate other into the EU home or 
family. Such a hospitality however, presupposes the importance of a 'home' which the 
other can be welcomed into. Thus, the concept of the 'common European home' is 
emphasised as a community of political and ethical values which define the subjectivity 
of the EU as a foreign policy actor. The EU 'home' is thereby represented as an ethical 
and moral space, and thus nothing could be more ethical, more responsible, than 
welcoming an other into that space. 
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Enlargement, the Balkans and the Two Laws of Hospitality 
This section problematises the simplicity of this hospitality by examining two EU 
foreign policies with an ethical, hospitable dimension and explaining how they reveal 
problems integral to hospitality. Enlargement and the EU's policies towards the Balkans 
are represented as a simple enactment of hospitality, but having illustrated these 
representations, the contradictions they show in the possibility of hospitality and the 
ethical are drawn out. What Derrida calls the two laws of hospitality759 show that 
although EU foreign policy is ethical and hospitable, even in its own terms it is also 
always-already unethical and inhospitable towards its proximate others. 
Enlargement: Welcome to the European FamilylHome 
As explained above, the most basic ethical foreign policy tool that can be used by an 
institution which describes itself as a family and home is that of inviting others into its 
home. This could be seen as hospitality plain and simple, what was termed an openness 
to the other. And it is the policy pursued by the EU under the title of 'Enlargement'. 
Such hospitality/enlargement may, however, be considered problematic as a 'foreign' 
policy. After all, Patten himself observes that "the EU was in a sense created as an 
alternative to foreign policy". 760 To bring other peoples and nations into the EU then 
could be seen as an ending of foreign policy rather than a tool of it. Nonetheless, 
enlargement is represented by the EU as very much a foreign policy. Indeed, Patten 
claims in 2002 that "in Central and Eastern Europe, we are using the prospect of 
EU 
membership as a specific and successful tool of foreign policy". 
76 1 Later he even 
describes it as "the most successful foreign policy pursued by Europe". 
762 
759 Derrida, Of Hospitality, p. 77. 
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As emphasised in section one, this highly successful policy is also represented in moral 
terms because it is about welcoming others into the EU family of ethical and political 
values. It is, as Prodi puts it, a matter of the "Slavonic world... rejoining the common 
European family". 763 Just as Patten's metaphorical road appears to be circular (moving 
ftom Europe and to Europe), the language is of rejoining. A meta-narrative thus develops 
in the enlargement discourse of a family home pre-existing the EU, one which was 
perhaps broken up by the Cold War and can now be reunited. Enlargement is, therefore, 
an example of a responsibility exercised towards those closest to the EU, who were part 
of its pre-institutional family home. This is clearly stated by Solana who, soon after 
taking up his post as HR for the CFSP, claimed that the possibility of enlargement means 
"[w]e are... confronted with the responsibility for the reunification and reconstruction of 
, ý764 765 Europe. This makes enlargement a political, economic and "moral imperative". 
The EU, he says elsewhere, has "a political and moral responsibility" to support these 
countries seeking to enter the EU. 766 
Patten, in 2000, calls the enlargement "morally right', 767 and emphasises the democratic 
nature of the ethical family home the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are being 
welcomed into. 
Enlargement is a profoundly important moral and strategic cause for us. It is the chance to unite 
our continent at last; the opportunity to entrench liberal plural democracy within Europe's 
borders, and to bring fully into the European democratic community our fellow Europeans who 
161 
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Prodi, as ever, goes one step further, suggesting that the economic reasons for 
enlargement are secondary to the "political and ethical reasons. Enlargement" he 
declares "is the fulfilment of the European project". 769 
If we conceive of hospitality as, primarily and simply stated, an openness towards the 
other, what could be more ethical than the EU's policy of enlargement? When Patten 
asks if there could be a better way of treating the neighbour than inviting them into our 
home, 770 we should clearly take this 'better' in an economic, political and moral sense. 
Given that 'our home' is represented as a space of political and economic good 
governance, where human rights and other ethical values flourish, enlargement can be 
viewed as a transparently ethically successful foreign policy. It is ethics and 
responsibility primarily conceived in terms of an open hospitality. 
The Balkans: On the 'Road'to the Home 
Discussion of the Balkans is ever present in the EU foreign policy discourse from 1999- 
2004. Patten talks about "events in the Balkans" being "etched" into every European's 
conscience. 771 Prodi affirms this in claiming that it is the "moral duty" of the EU "to take 
care of the Balkan countries". 772 Solana describes the EU's experience of the Balkans as 
"sobering", but also as providing an "opportunity. It is a test of our commitment to the 
region, to a wider Europe, and to a mature common foreign and security policy. 35773 
Patten emphasises this representation, saying "the region offers the defining test of our 
nascent CF Sp, ý. 774 
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To refer back to Chapter III on subjectivity, viewing the Balkans as a test for EU foreign 
policy means it is a test of the EU's constructed subjectivity as an international actor. 
Testing the maturity of the CFSP is also a test of the EU's capacity to take 
responsibilities, to accept its international duties, or at least its regional duties as 
illustrated above. And nowhere could this test be stronger than in the region where "[a]s 
Europeans we cannot avoid a heavy share of responsibility for what happened", 
775 especially in Kosovo . Therefore, the way the Balkans are handled in this period is 
formative for how the EU constructs itself as a subject. The development of the EU 
foreign policy to a coherent point suggested in section one is demonstrated here - the 
Balkans as on the road to the EU, knocking at the door of the family home. However, the 
reasons for this 'road-bound' status illustrate Derrida's observations on the divided and 
problematic nature of 'hospitality' itself. 
From 1999-2002, the EU foreign policy discourse, as stated earlier, was somewhat 
ambiguous on the status of the Balkans in the EU's spatial imaginary of its home and 
family. In 1999, at the very beginning of his term as President of the EU Commission, 
Prodi talked about the importance of "mak[ing] it clear to Albania and the countries of 
the Former Yugoslavia that we see them as part of the European family of nations". 776 
Initially, they are offered "virtual membership". 777 This was designed to ensure they felt 
part of the family "and that once they have met the criteria for membership we shall 
welcome them into the EU, provided certain important steps are taken beforehand". 778 
Nonetheless, in 2002, Prodi still occasionally refers to the Balkans as a "neighbouring 
region", such as Russia and the Mediterranean . 
779Similarly, Patten talks about extending 
peace, stability and prosperity to "our Balkan neighbours". 780 
775 Patten, "The Western Balkans: The Road to Europe". 
776 Romano Prodi, Speech to the European Parliament on enlargement, Brussels, 13 October 1999. 
777 Romano Prodi, "The European Union and the challenge of the 21" Century", Speech to 21't Forum on 
Financial Policy and Taxation, Karlsruhe, 12 November 1999. 
778 bid. 
779 Prodi, "The EU, the UK and the world". 
780 Patten, "A voice for Europe? The future of the CFSP". 
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Therefore, though the EU foreign policy text retains ambiguity on the ethics and 
hospitality that would be offered to the Balkans, 781 it also begins to settle into the spatial 
metaphors mentioned in section one. As Patten stated in 2000, Albania is looking to 
Europe to be welcomed "home" and they must "stay on the right road - the road to 
Europe". 782 Solana begins to talk about the Balkans as on a "journey" which "[w]e must 
help them to complete. " We must also, he says, "help the straggler [Serbia] along". 783 
The metaphor of the "road to Europe" is used often by Patten, and it develops further. 
For example, in a speech to Bosnians, Patten suggests that the EU can "help build that 
road... we can flag the staging posts, and applaud you as you pass them", all of which 
means they will ensure "BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina] never has to walk the road to 
Europe alone". 784 
Speaking of a metaphorical "road to Europe, " which has staging posts, as well as of a 
46straggler" on a journey, represents progress towards membership of the EU as a linear 
track. On this track you can be more or less advanced. Each step taken forwards is 
towards the European home, towards becoming European. The only other options are to 
move slowly, like Serbia, stop, or even move backwards. But sideways movements 
appear to be impossible. As members of the European family of nations the Balkans can 
only move unilinearly towards, or away from, the home. And at the end of this road is 
the door, which they are assured is open to them. 785 Yet, the metaphor does not always 
work. As mentioned previously, the 'road' or Journey' is represented as a circular return 
of the Balkans to the family home. If this is the case, moving back would also take them 
towards the family home. Given that backwards movement is represented as regressive, 
the Balkans are not returning or rejoining the same family home, but rather joining 
something very different: the EU. 
78 1 This was a constructive ambiguity. While the UK had stated its position that Balkan accession was a 
moral requirement - see Cook, "Bosnia: a new hope"; Blair, "The New Challenges for Europe", 20 May 
1999 - this was by no means a consensus position within the EU as a whole. 782 Patten, Speech to the Foreign Affairs and Legal Committees of the Albanian Parliament. 
783 Javier Solana, "The European Union is assisting recovery - but much work remains to be done", Article 
in The Wall Street Journal Europe, 24 March 2000. 
784 Patten, Speech to the Peace Implementation Council. 
785 Solana, Interview with Dnevi Avaz (BiH newspaper). 
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What has barely been mentioned thus far, however, is the conditionality which is placed 
on the EU's hospitality to the Balkans. The unilinear progress down the European road 
means precisely progress on meeting the conditions for entry into the home, and thus 
membership of the EU. The Stabilisation and Association Agreements made with each of 
the Balkan countries are represented as commitments by the EU to help them "along 
what I call the 'road to Europe'; and commitments on the part of the countries 
themselves to thoroughgoing reform". 786 In a generalised representation of the conditions 
the Balkan countries must meet Patten says that, "if they chose democracy, if they chose 
open economics, if they chose the rule of law, we would want to bring them closer to the 
European family". 787 
While, as was revealed earlier, the EU feels a great responsibility for the Balkans which 
is "etched" in their conscience, the responsibility for entering the European home is 
shifted to the Balkan countries themselves. Patten tells Bosnians that "we have to 
redouble our efforts" towards this reform. He specifies that this 'we' is meant "in its 
most inclusive sense. But it is a we whose main burden actually falls on you, you the 
leaders and people of Bosnia Herzegovina. 55788 Similarly, when asked by a Macedonian 
journalist what answer the FYROM can expect from the EU on its application for 
membership, Solana replies "[t]hat question is not for me to answer, it is for the people 
and politicians of your country. "789The responsibility for the EU's hospitality is placed 
on the shoulders of the Balkans itself. They are now responsible for the EU's ethical 
foreign policy. This places the subjectivity of the EU, as that which is able to take 
responsibility by acting hospitably, in question. It is no longer the EU who takes 
responsibility, or acts ethically, but rather the Balkans. 
786 Chris Patten, Speech to the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 23 November 2000. 
787 Chris Patten, Interview with BBC and ITN Television, Zagreb, 24 November 2000. 
788 Patten, Speech to the Peace Implementation Council - emphasis in original. 
789 Javier Solana, Written interview with Solbodanka Jonavoska in Ultrinski Vesnik (FYROM Newspaper), 
23 February 2004. 
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In 2001 Patten translates this into his spatial metaphor once again: 
The Agreements [Stabilisation and Association Agreements] are the vehicle that helps you along 
the road, the road to Europe. The speed at which you travel along that road is up to you. The 
faster you reform, the more you show that our values, the values the EU represents, are your 
values, the faster we will be able to cover the distance - politically, at least - between Brussels 
and Skopje, or Brussels and Belgrade, Sarajevo, Tirana, or Zagreb. '90 
In other words, to place your self on the road to the European home, you must 
demonstrate that you are already part of it, in terms of the values (democracy, free 
markets, human rights, rule of law) set out above, in section one. These are the 
conditions that must be met. As Solana puts it, "[t]he path to Europe is paved with 
,, 791 concrete reform, not just good intentions . 
The Two Laws of Hospitality 
Clearly the enactment of the EU's ethical dimension towards the Balkans is represented 
differently to that of their enlargement policy. What is the status of this far more 
conditional hospitality? Is it still ethical? Can we still call it hospitality? On a basic level, 
as suggested in the introduction, hospitality is simply openness towards the other. This 
does not get us very far however: the EU may seem open to the Balkans, but certainly 
not as open as it is to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. What is needed 
therefore is a closer reading of the concept of hospitality, for which we can turn once 
more to the work of Derrida. 
The simplicity of this definition (hospitality as an openness to the other) is problematic 
because it hides within it a crucial distinction between what Derrida calls the two laws of 
'90 Chris Patten, Speech to the South East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP) Summit, Skopje, 23 
February 2001. 
'91 Solana, Interview with Dnevi Avaz (BiH newspaper). 
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hospitality: or rather the law, and the laws. 792 The unconditional law of absolute 
hospitality, 
requires that I open up my home and that I give not only to the foreigner... but to the absolute, 
unknown, anonymous other, and that I give place to them, that I let them come, that I let them 
arrive, and take place in the place I offer them, without asking of them either reciprocity (entering 
into a pact) or even their names. '9' 
Absolute, unconditional hospitality then calls for us not just to invite the guest into our 
home without asking questions, but to allow them to come without invitation (a 
hospitality of visitation as opposed to invitation). 794 We must not just give them a bed to 
sleep in and food to eat, but our bed and our food. 
As such, absolute hospitality must break with hospitality by right, or duty, what Derrida 
calls the Juridico-political laws of hospitality, which are always conditional. 795 They are 
conditional because, like the asylum and immigration laws in any country, they put a 
variety of conditions upon hospitality (you must have the right documentation, a visa, a 
job to go to etc. ), ask a variety of questions (your name, your origin, your purpose for 
entry etc. ), may partake of an economy of reciprocity (such as a visa waiver agreement 
between states), or demand an invitation (such as a work permit). 
The hospitality offered to the Balkans by the EU is heavily conditional: it asks questions, 
is involved in a reciprocal notion of responsibility and demands an invitation. These 
countries must demonstrate what Patten and Prodi call their "properly European 
vocation". 796 This can only be done by showing that they are European, that they belong 
in the European home. Far from an absolute hospitality, where no questions are asked of 
the other prior to their being welcomed into the home, the EU literally asks thousands of 
792 Derrida, OfHospitality, p. 77. 
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794 Derrida, "Autoimmunity", p. 129. 
795 Derrida, OfHospitality, p. 77. 
796 Patten, Interview with BBC and ITN Television. 
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797 questions (in fact, over 2,500) . When the FYROM applied for membership of the EU, 
when one could say it was knocking on the door of the European home, the door turned 
out to be not as open as was previously suggested. Prodi inducted a ceremony in 2004, 
handing over a questionnaire to the FYROM government. "We expect", he says, "to 
receive replies to an impressive number of questions... which will allow the 
Commission (together with other information) to formulate its Opinion if the country is 
ready to undertake the rights and obligations of membership to the EU". 798 Entry into the 
common European home demands an invitation, which the EU Commission will give an 
opinion on whether to offer or not. 
To be absolutely responsible then, the EU would have to enact an absolute form of 
hospitality, to ask no questions, to set no conditions upon entry and to demand no 
reciprocal responsibility. Each condition that is set upon entry into the home is a 
nullification of hospitality, a violent exclusion that attempts to make the other into the 
same before entry is granted. It makes hospitality the responsibility of the Balkan 
countries rather than that of the EU; a responsibility to become European, to no longer be 
other, to no longer be outside, before being allowed inside. Quite literally, it makes of 
hospitality a hostility to otherness. The conditional hospitality of enlargement, with its 
selection of the same and exclusion of the other, cannot help but be both hospitable and 
hostile. It is hostile towards the other who is absolutely excluded, and hostile to the 
otherness that must become the same to be included. 
Yet, the absolute, unconditional law of hospitality is, as Derrida himself acknowledges, 
impossible to practically implement or organise. One cannot derive a politics from it. 799 
In one sense it is absolutely naYve and utopic. Such a pure hospitality "can have no legal 
or political status. No state can write it into laws .,, 
800 Nonetheless, the retention of 
unconditional hospitality is essential. Without "at least the thought of this pure and 
797 Romano Prodi, "Croatia's journey towards EU membership", Speech to Croatian Parliament, Zagreb, 
10 July 2003. 
79' Romano Prodi, "On the path to the EU: challenges and opportunities", FYROM Government 
Assembly, Skopje, I October 2004. 
799 Derrida, Echographies of Television, p. 17. 
800 Derrida, "Auto immunity", p. 129. 
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unconditional hospitality, of hospitality itseýf' there could be no conditional hospitality, 
or way to determine its rules. 801 As Patten says, quoting Samuel Butler (the literary 
historian and author of Erewhon), "[eIxtremes are alone logical, and they are always 
absurd; the mean is alone practicable and it is always illogical. ýM2 
Conditions upon an unconditional, such as those placed on the Balkans entry into the 
European home (the EU), can only arise as contaminations of the pure ethical concept. 
Yet to retain the name of that concept (hospitality and ethics) these contaminations must 
also retain a reference to it. To remain logical, to still be hospitable, one must retain a 
reference to the extreme or absolute form of hospitality. But any dilution of this extreme 
can be nothing but illogical, and thus inhospitable. Thus, for the EU to only give 
hospitality to the Central and Eastern European countries (as happened in the 2004 
enlargement) is less hospitable than to give hospitality to the Balkan countries as well; 
but we can only say this because we refer to the unconditional form of hospitality as 
absolute openness. Hospitality to all countries would be closer to the ideal. The 
unconditional is the condition of the conditional. In other words, unconditional 
hospitality as a complete openness to the other is a necessary reference point for a 
conditional, selective hospitality. Without the unconditional law of hospitality, the laws 
would be just that, laws, rather than laws of hospitality. The laws are impossible to 
determine without reference to the law. 
Hospitality, on which the EU bases the ethical dimension of its foreign policy, is both 
divided against itself, and yet necessarily joined in one concept. The two laws, as 
Derrida puts it, are at one and the same time, heterogeneous and indissociable. 803 They 
are heterogeneous because they are mutually antagonistic; one always seeks to displace 
the other. Conditional hospitality denies the possibility and utility of the unconditional; 
unconditional hospitality denies that the conditional is hospitality. As heterogeneous, 
801 ibid. 
802 Samuel Butler, quoted in Patten, Not Quite the Diplomat, p. 127. 
80' Derrida, OfHospitality, p. 27. 
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movement from one to the other is not possible without an "absolute leap. , 804 But they 
are also indissociable, as, 
I cannot open the door, I cannot expose myself to the coming of the other and offer him or her 
anything whatsoever without making this hospitality effective, without, in some concrete way, 
giving something determinate. This determination will thus have to reinscribe the unconditional 
into certain conditions. Otherwise it gives nothing. What remains unconditional or absolute... 
risks being nothing at all if conditions... do not make of it some thing. 'O' 
Just as the laws need the law, and politics needs absolute hospitality, so the law of 
absolute hospitality needs politics and laws of conditional hospitality. One can see the 
irony in a concept of absolute hospitality giving nothing, thus it requires a reference to its 
bastardized form which gives concretely - if never giving enough. Nonetheless, despite 
this indissociability the necessary heterogeneity remains. One does not nullify the other. 
They are both true, at the same moment. Hence the hostility contained within the 
conditional laws, and the hospitality contained in the unconditional law of hospitality are 
one and the same. This is why Derrida coins the term hostipitality to reveal the way 
hostility and hospitality are joined within the same undecidable (un)ethical concept. 806 
Consequently, using Derrida's analysis we can see why there is confusion over whether 
the EU's foreign policy towards the Balkans is still hospitable and, as such, ethical. A 
close reading of hospitality reveals the way it both enables and disables itseýf It is 
enabled as the two laws work together indissociably, but it disables as their 
heterogeneity means they work against each other. It is important to note, however, that 
while the policy towards the Balkans reveals this problem it is no less a constitutive part 
of the hospitality shown towards Central and Eastern European countries through 
enlargement. Solana notes in early 2000 that although the EU has a "political and moral 
responsibility" to support the countries that will accede four years later, the EU should 
804 Derrida, "Autoimmunity", p. 129. 
805 ibid. 
806 See Jacques Derrida, Acts ofReligion, translated by Gil Anidjar (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 356- 
420. 
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nonetheless not weaken its criteria or the standards they must reach for membership. 807 it 
was because the conditions upon this hospitality were so strong that, despite enlargement 
being "priority number one for this Commission since its very beginnings [in 1999] 5 
9808 
it was only in 2004 that they gained entry to the European home. 
The undecidable nature of hospitality, or hostipitality, is equally applicable to both the 
enlargement and Balkan foreign policies of the EU. Because the conditions set by the 
EU's hospitality are contaminations on a pure concept, we can neither say that the 
hospitality offered by EU foreign policy is simply ethical or unethical. In making 
reference to the pure ethicality of hospitality they retain an ethical element. But the set 
conditions, the need to have entrenched democracy, human rights, free markets and the 
rule of law, the need to answer over 2,500 questions, remain contaminations on this pure 
ethicality and, in this sense, unethical. Thus, both the enlargement and Balkan policies 
can only be seen as both hospitable and inhospitable, inclusive and exclusive, ethical 
and unethical, and yet neither one nor the other at the same time. The hospitality, and 
thus ethics, of EU foreign policy is inherently undecidable. There is one other EU 
foreign policy however, yet to be discussed, which contains a reference to ethics as 
hospitality. This variously conceived 'Proximity, ' or 'Neighbourhood, ' policy raises 
even greater problems with the possibility of a simply ethical foreign policy based on 
hospitality. 
Deconstructing the European Home: The ENP 
The argument that has been made relies heavily on the idea that hospitality requires 
some notion of an 'at-home' for its possible performance. As shown in section one, 
without the home there can be no possibility of hospitality. While the home can be a way 
to close off the outside, to exclude, it is also the very "condition of openness, of 
807 Javier Solana, Speech to the European Parliament, I March 2000. 
808 Romano Prodi, Speech to the European Parliament on Enlargement, Strasbourg, 13 November 200 1. 
197 
hospitality, and of the door". 809 Yet this key point is far from simple. To leave the matter 
here would be to ignore the further aporias and contradictions within the concept of 
hospitality, contradictions which deconstruct the very possibility of the home. This 
section examines the third key EU foreign policy with an ethical dimension - the 
neighbourhood policy - and shows how it problematises and deconstructs the very 
possibility of the European 'home'. While the two laws of hospitality problematise the 
possibility of a simply ethical or hospitable foreign policy, this deconstruction 
problematises the very basis of hospitality itself- the home. As such it is also a 
deconstruction of the EU's subjectivity. 
The ENP: ExcludinglIncluding the 'Friend' 
While the previous two EU foreign policies discussed have been explicitly hospitable, 
with varying degrees of conditionality, this section discusses a sometimes explicitly 
inhospitable policy. It is argued, however, that the EU's policy towards its 
'neighbourhood' retains a reference to hospitality, and more importantly describes the 
limits of its hospitality. This reference to hospitality means that what becomes the ENP is 
still considered ethical in its intent in the EU discourse. However, the limits it places on 
hospitality, and the way the policy is described, reveals even more starkly the 
inseparability of hospitality and hostility - the undecidability of hospitality as 
hostipitality. 
As early as 1999, Prodi was stressing the importance of working with the EU's Eastern 
and Southern "neighbours" to produce peace, stability and prosperity: a "new European 
order". 8 10 The aim of this cooperation with the "new neighbours" the EU has gained 
from enlargement is also, however, "to spread our ethical and political values through 
the wider Europe". 811 One impulse for the future ENP is represented as the desire to 
'09 Derrida, Echographies of Television, p. 8 1. 
"0 Romano Prodi, "My Vision of Europe", Lecture to Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, 
Carleton University, Ottawa, 16 December 1999. 
"' Romano Prodi, Speech to the European Academy of Sciences and Arts, Bilbao, 28 April 2000. 
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spread the values of the EU, the principles of the European home/family. In this sense, it 
could potentially be seen as hospitable. However, the other key impulse is the desire to 
stop enlargement, to prevent more hospitality, to close off the European home and 
preserve its integrity. This latter representation comes to the fore towards the end of 
2002 as Prodi sets out the initial reasoning for a new "neighbourhood" policy: 
When we look to the East and the South, it is very difficult to make out the new frontiers of 
Europe. This, of course, is nothing new: it has been hard to decide where Europe ends in these 
two compass directions for thousands of years. However, this does not mean that we can just keep 
on enlarging Europe. The cost would be too great, since it would effectively mean abandoning the 
European political project. At the same time we cannot draw a neat demarcation line, as some 
Mediterranean countries - Malta and Cyprus - are preparing to become members of the Union, 
others, Turkey are candidates for membership, and all are linked to Europe by ties of tradition, 
special situations and interests. ' 12 
While this foreign policy goes through various names (the "Wider Europe" initiative, 813 
the "Proximity poliCy,, 814), in January of 2004 Prodi announces the new ENP, a 
"partnership based on shared values and enhancing economic development, 
interdependence and cultural linksfor those neighboursfor which accession is not on the 
agenda". 815 In other words, the ENP is about extending, or offering something to those 
that are excluded from the European home. 
In his memoirs Patten translates this policy into the spatial metaphors he uses so well. 
So, if we can persuade our citizens that enlargement should continue, where do we tell them that 
it should stop? Do we simply continue adding rings of friends and neighbours until we get to the 
Caspian Sea or the Pacific? What do we say when Israel, Iraq or even Azerbaijan come knocking 
on the door? Plainly there has to be an end to the process somewhere, and we have tried to put it 
firmly in place with a so-called Neighbourhood Policy... These agreements offer the countries 
that are parties to them a share in our market and in some of our policies... in return for 
812 Romano Prodi, "Europe and the Mediterranean: time for action", Speech at Universite Catholique de 
Louvain-la-Neuve, 26 November 2002. 
813 Prodi, "Looking ahead in transatlantic relations". 
814 Prodi, "Sharing stability and prosperity". 
815 Romano Prodi, Speech on visit to Bogazici University, Istanbul, 16 January 2004 - emphasis added. 
199 
implementing democratic and economic reforms. But membership of the EU is not on the table. 
Our partners are welcome to set up their stall in the marketplace, but not to setfoot in the town 
hall. ' 16 
The spatial metaphor is once again revealing in illustrating how the ENP fits into the 
EU's hospitable foreign policy. When Israel, Iraq or Azerbaijan come knocking, the aim 
is to be able to answer them (though why the emphasis on 'even' Azerbaijan is 
somewhat puzzling). And the answer, this sharing of 'everything except institutions', 
means that these neighbours can make the most of EU values, prosperity and stability, 
but only come as far as the 'marketplace'. They are barred from the centre of the 
European home, the 'town hall'. 
The way the ENP is represented by Prodi recalls the 'road-bound' policies towards the 
Balkans presented earlier in the period under study. Prodi gives three almost identical 
speeches in September 2004 to students and 'representatives of civil society' in 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia summing up the benefits of the ENP. For example, in 
Azerbaijan he claims that "[b]y promoting democracy, the rule of law, human rights, the 
market economy and conflict settlement, the ENP will help to improve life for 
Azerbaijanis". 817 Yet, he says, the provision of such help will "require Azerbaijan to 
demonstrate it shares values with the Union in practice as well as in principle... You will 
not be surprised that our assistance will be conditional. 55818 Just as the Balkans had to 
demonstrate that they shared European values, that they were capable of reforms on 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the market economy, so it is with 
Azerbaijan and neighbouring countries. 
It is important, declares Prodi, that the EU plays its part in this cooperation. But 
"ultimately, Azerbaijan's future relationship with the European Union and Azerbaijan's 
816 Patten, Not Quite the Diplomat, p. 142 - emphasis in original. 
817 Romano Prodi, Meeting with students of Baku State University, Azerbaijan, 17 September, 2004 - 
essentially the same speech as: Romano Prodi, To students and representatives of civil society in Georgia, 
Tbilisi University, 18 September 2004; Romano Prodi, To students and representatives of civil society in 
Armenia, European Regional Institute of Information and Communication Technologies, Yerevan, 19 
September 2004. 
818 Prodi, Meeting with students of Baku State University. 
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own future will depend on you yourselves - on your own determination to make your 
country work". 819 In another repetition of the Balkans policy, we can see that the 
responsibility for EU hospitality is shifted to the neighbouring countries themselves. 
Now it is 'ultimately' Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia's responsibility to meet the 
conditions of EU's hospitality. Neighbouring countries, in an almost identical way to the 
Balkans, are being offered a limited form of hospitality on the understanding that they 
first become like the EU, that they cease to be other and become the same, even if these 
countries do not get the same in return as the Balkans. 
Yet, while the stable representation of the policy towards the end of 2004 is interesting, 
what is crucial to this discussion of hospitality is the way it is spoken of during its 
development. In 2002, Prodi talks about a "duty" to formulate a clear response to other 
countries' expectations, to find a new system of relations between the enlarged EU and 
4can encircling band of friendly countries stretching from the Maghreb to Russia. , 820 But 
s P? 5,82 
1 This is firstly, there is need to answer the question, "[w]here does Europe to 
explicitly not about separating countries, "[w]e want to tear down old divisions - to 
integrate, not separate. , 822 This gives the policy its reference to hospitality. Yet, limiting 
this hospitality, he repeats that, "clearly we cannot keep on enlarging the Union 
indefinitely... We need to maintain the EU's internal equilibrium and cohesiveness" and 
retain the EU's capacity "to act on its basis of shared values and objectives". 823 In other 
words, they must maintain the integrity of the European home, based on what he calls a 
9ý 824 "broader idea of 'belonging' . Thus, Prodi calls 
for a framework of cooperation with 
the EU's neighbours, "where we share everything but institutions". 825 
"9 Ibid. 
820 Romano Prodi, "Europe in transition: hopes and fears", Speech at Fifth Europa Forum: "Europe facing 
the decision - EU Enlargement and 
Global Challenges", Brussels, 3 December 2002. 
821 Ibid - emphasis in original. 
822 Ibid. - emphasis in original. 
823 Ibid - emphasis in original. 
824 Ibid. - emphasis in original. 
825 Ibid - emphasis 
in original. 
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These themes of the 'ring of friends', as opposed to family, and the sharing of 
4 826 everything but institutions' are repeated over and again . Prodi justifies this limited 
hospitality in various ways which all come back to the same theme: continued 
enlargement would risk "water[ing] down the European political project and tum[ing] 
the European Union into just a free trade area on a continental scale 5ý . 
827 While this is 
exclusionary, it is, as has been stated, crucial to hospitality. If the European home was 
cwatered down' and became just a free trade area, it would no longer be the European 
home discussed in section two: an area of shared ethical and political values. And if 
there was no home, then there could be no hospitality. As well as being about openness, 
hospitality presupposes what Derrida calls this "possibility of a rigorous delimitation of 
thresholds or frontiers", 828 a separation from otherness. 829The policy of the ENP shows 
precisely the inseparability of hospitality and hostility shown earlier. The delimitation of 
borders, the cordoning off of the European home is both crucial to hospitality and a 
violent, hostile exclusion. The ENP then, in a similar yet different way to the 
enlargement and Balkan foreign policies, can only ever be undecidable: both ethical and 
unethical, as well as neither ethical, nor unethical. 
Deconstructing the European Home 
While this hostile, exclusionary aspect is more explicit and acknowledged than in the 
policy towards the Balkans, it is also clear that the there is discomfort surrounding it. 
The ENP is considered to be about tearing down divisions, integrating rather than 
separating. Hostility and hospitality are continually mentioned together, yet the 
hospitable aspect is stressed as if to try and convince neighbouring countries that the 
policy is not hostile. In a speech tackling the subject of where 'Europe' ends, Solana 
emphasizes that, while "[a]ll roads should not lead to Brussels", the EU's new "borders 
826 A few examples include, Prodi, "A Wider Europe -A Proximity Policy as the key to stability"; Prodi, 
"Looking ahead in transatlantic relations"; Prodi, "Sharing stability and prosperity". 
827 Prodi, "A Wider Europe -A Proximity Policy as the key to stability". 
828 Derrida, Of Hospitality, pp. 47-49. 
829 Derrida, Adieu, p. 92. 
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must be lines that connect not lines that divide". 830 The difficulty of drawing these lines 
in relation to the ENP, however, reveals a further aporia of hostipitality which has not 
thus far been mentioned. This aporia goes to the very heart of the EU's ethical, 
hospitable foreign policy, undermining the possibility of the European home itself. 
In his memoirs, Patten warns that while the ENP is "an imaginative try" at solving the 
question about where to draw the line around the European home, two events will make 
it difficult to "hold the line". 831 These are the agreement with Turkey to begin accession 
negotiations and the Ukrainian Orange Revolution (when Ukrainian citizens forced the 
state to award the election to a pro-European candidate after initially undemocratically 
appointing a pro-Russian). Patten recounts how, in his first meeting with a foreign 
minister from the Ukraine in 1999, he was asked why Turkey was seen as a European 
country and Ukraine was not. 
What, he [the Ukrainian foreign minister] asked, was so special about Turkey's European 
vocation and so deficient about Ukraine's? I stumbled through an unconvincing answer, one that 
convinced me even less in retrospect when I discovered that two of my officials present at the 
meeting had parents who had been born and worked in what is now Ukraine, but which then had 
832 different borders . 
It is revealing that Patten finds it difficult to respond convincingly to the question, but 
the most interesting aspect of Patten's story is the presence of two EU foreign policy 
officials who have Ukrainian parents. As we have seen, the integrity of the 'home' is 
based upon the ability to draw lines and delimit otherness. Yet in the act of drawing this 
line, Patten reveals that the other is already inside. The Ukraine is clearly represented as 
the other, a 'friend' and 'neighbour' to the EU as opposed to being part of the 'family' or 
in the EU 'home. ' Yet, as this line is drawn, as a clear threshold to the home is delimited, 
the friend is revealed to be alreadyfamily, the neighbour already in the home. 
"0 Javier Solana, "The Limits of Integration - Where Does the European Union End? 
" Address to the 
Europa Forum, Vienna, 19 November 2004. 
8" Patten, Not Quite the Diplomat, pp. 142-143. 
832 bid., P. 143. 
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This raises profound questions about the possibility of demarcating a 'home' in the first 
place. Yet these questions are not merely specific to EU foreign policy. Derrida observes 
that they are already installed in the language of hospitable discourse itself. In French, 
the subject of hospitality is the h6te, which means both 'host' and 'guest'. Literally, the 
h6te is both the giver and receiver of hospitality. To translate it as either simply one or 
the other, either 'host' or 'guest, ' is impossible. The h6te, as host, is the subject that 
833 welcomes the h6te, as guest; but the h6te is both at the same time. 
Such a point could merely be dismissed as one of translation; a problem created by the 
vagaries of the French language. 834 Yet we can see its operation in the above example of 
the Ukraine taken from the EU foreign policy discourse. The EU is the 'host' and the 
Ukraine the potential 'guest', which the EU is granting a highly circumscribed form of 
hospitality through the ENP. But the Ukrainian foreign minister questions this status, 
suggesting that the Ukrainian 'European vocation' is far from deficient - perhaps 
Ukrainians are better considered a 'host"? To allow the operation of hospitality, 
however, Patten must assert the thresholds and boundaries of the home, and the 
difference between 'guest' and 'host'. Yet the subject of hospitality as h6te reasserts 
itself in his realisation that his officials are Ukrainian. Discomfort is brought about by 
the fact that the EU finds itself to be also the 'guest' of the 'host', the Ukrainians, within 
what it thought was its own, common European home. 
Up to this point the critique has mainly surrounded precisely this limited form of 
hospitality that the EU enacts. The only argument against an unconditional form of 
hospitality is that we cannot organise it, or derive a politics from it. 835 Yet this problem 
of the h6te applies even more strongly to absolute, unconditional hospitality, which 
every hospitality (including that offered in the enlargement, Balkan and neighbourhood 
policies) which deserves the name must refer to. As outlined above, this means giving 
place to the other in our own home. This is not simply a matter of allowing them to 
833 Derrida, Adieu, pp. 41-2. 
834 This is not easy, however, because the term 'hospitality' in English derives from the Latin hospitalarius 
via the Old French, hospitalite. If this dual meaning is constitutive of the subject of French hospitalite then 
it also constitutes the English subject of hospitality. Persall (ed. ), The Concise Oxford Dictionary, p. 687. 
83' Derrida, Echographies of Television, p. 17. 
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occupy part of our home, giving them shelter and asking no questions, but it literally 
means that the other takes our place. If they take our place then we are no longer in the 
simple position of host. Indeed, effectively, the positions have been reversed - we are 
now a guest. 
In this way, our home is no longer simply 'ours'; hospitality makes us, as host (h6te), 
literally a guest (h6te) in our own home. My home then is only 'mine' in so much as it is 
also the other's. The question of hospitality is no longer just about us giving hospitality 
to the other, it is about hospitality being granted to ourselves in our own 'at-home', 
which is always the home of the other. 836 In a supplementary irony then, though the 
home is a prerequisite for hospitality, hospitality itself makes the very concept of the 'at- 
home' impossible. As Derrida says, hospitality "is a name or an example of 
deconstruction. Of the deconstruction of the concept, of the concept of the concept, as 
well as of its construction, its home, its 'at-home. ' Hospitality is the deconstruction of 
the at-home". 837 
In other words, the unconditional form of hospitality, which EU hospitality must retain a 
reference to for it to be conceived as in any way ethical, undermines the very possibility 
of the home: the condition of hospitality itself. The European home, as discussed in 
section one, is both fundamental to the operation of hospitality, and yet is also disabled 
by this very hospitality. Importantly, this deconstruction and putting into question of the 
possibility of the self and the home cannot be felt as benign. When these fundamental 
aspects of our identity are put into question, invaded by others, hospitality can only be 
felt as a radical form of persecution. As such, the subject of hospitality, the h6te, is not 
only both host and guest, but both are also hostage. 838 Our home is no longer where we 
can relax, feel free to be ourselves, but where we are persecuted. It is no longer our 
space, indeed it never was, but rather the space of the other. The other can arrive at any 
time, without invitation, and take what he likes in our place. The 'at-home' becomes 
where we are held hostage. But this is the case for everyone: the structure of substitution, 
836 Derrida, OfHospitality, p. 99. 
837 Derrida, Acts ofReligion, P. 364. 
838 Derrida, Adieu, p. 56. 
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where everyone is h6te, as guest and host, "make[s] everyone into everyone else's 
hostage". 839 
As has been demonstrated, hospitality cannot be separated from hostility, but now we 
can see that this is true for both its conditional and unconditional forms. In a conditional 
form of hospitality such as that of enlargement, the necessary filtering and choosing (of 
who and what is included) necessitates a violent exclusion of the other. This exclusion 
occurs on a spectrum from those geographically distant (such as Latin America and Asia, 
who are absolutely excluded), to neighbourhood countries (who are largely excluded), to 
the Balkans (who are excluded until they stop being other and become the same). Thus, 
in what may appear the ethical concept par excellence, hostility, violence and injustice 
are inevitably installed . 
840 For unconditional hospitality the hostility is even more 
extreme, however. After all, our very sense of self, our subjectivity, our being-as-we-are, 
is persecuted, questioned and occupied. Hence, even unconditional hospitality is always 
already hostipitality. That which we have conceived as coextensive with the ethical 
relation to the other, is hostile and unethical. EU policies, even those such as 
enlargement that are more hospitable, cannot be anything but hostile. Enlargement, 
whatever the conditions or lack thereof that it sets, will inevitably fall into the ethical 
undecidability of hostipitality. 
What is most important about unconditional hostipitality, however, is that it deconstructs 
the possibility of the home and thus the subjectivity of the EU. As demonstrated in 
section one, the EU conceives its home as a place of shared ethical and political values. 
As such, it seeks to keep countries such as the Ukraine outside the European home, 
because it is not seen as representing those values. Yet the ENP reveals that, contrary to 
its intention, hospitality has already been offered and accepted. The Ukraine is already in 
the home, it is already part of the family. This is demonstrated both by the Orange 
Revolution, which Patten sees as demonstrating its European-ness, 84 1 but also by the 
presence of Ukrainians within the institutions of the European home. The outside is 
839 Derrida, OfHospitality, p. 125. 
840 bid 
., p. 55. 841 Paften, Not Quite the Diplomat, p. 143. 
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therefore already a constitutive part of the inside, and the delimitation of frontiers which 
are so crucial to the possibility of the home (and thus hospitality) is always already 
impossible. 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored how 'hospitality, ' as the dominant enactment of the ethical in EU 
foreign policy, serves to undermine both its own ethicality, and the subjectivity of the 
EU as an international actor. As such it has drawn out many of the themes of Chapters 
III (on subjectivity) and IV (on responsibility). Rather than using an external definition 
of ethics to critique the way the EU has enacted its foreign policy, the way the EU 
discourse itself conceives and represents ethics has been the focus of the analysis, 
demonstrating how this deconstructs without any external aid. 
The first section examined the way that, like British foreign policy, the EU discourse 
bases its ethics on a responsibility to protect and save human life. However, unlike the 
British, the EU places greater stress on its responsibility to those countries and people 
which are geographically closer to Europe. Its idea of responsibility is based on a notion 
of proximity to the European 'home'. The emphasis of the ethical is therefore that of a 
responsibility of hospitality: welcoming others into this 'horne. ' Such hospitality is 
considered ethical because of the way that the EU describes its 'family' or 'home': not 
just as a geographically bounded space, but as a community of shared ethical and 
political values. The European home conceived as a moral community means that the 
most ethical foreign policy is necessarily that of hospitably welcoming others inside. 
Such a bounded 'home, ' delimited from otherness, is essential to the possibility of 
hospitality. Without the home, without something to welcome the other into, there is no 
way in which hospitality can be performed. 
Section two analysed the two foreign policies which have been represented as the most 
hospitable, and thus the most 'ethical': enlargement and policy towards the Balkans. 
The 
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conditions placed upon the welcoming of both the Balkan countries and Central and 
Eastern European nations into the common European home revealed a problem for the 
discourse of hospitality. To probe this further required a reading of Derrida's two laws of 
hospitality: the conditional and the unconditional. While the conditional hospitality 
offered by the EU retains a reference to ethics, such conditions are also contaminations 
upon the purely ethical, unconditional hospitality. Hospitality is, in this sense, divided 
against itself and as such, any conditional policy deriving from it can only ever be 
undecidable, both hospitable and hostile, ethical and unethical, yet being neither one nor 
the other at the same time. 
Section three expanded upon this dual nature of hospitality (as both hostile and 
hospitable) through the third EU foreign policy examined: the ENP. While this policy is 
exclusionary and hostile, such exclusion is essential to the very possibility of the home; 
and without the home there can be no hospitality. However, when the ENP is justified to 
the EU's neighbours, the possibility of delimiting the home is revealed as impossible. 
The exclusion of the Ukraine from the EU is shown to be both problematic in the EU's 
terms (because of its European-ness), and already not the case. The Ukraine already 
constitutes the European 'home' through the presence of Ukrainian officials in the EU's 
institutional structures. 
This reveals the hostility contained also within absolute hospitality. The unconditional 
welcoming of the other into our home means that the home is no longer simply ours. It is 
also the others, and the place where our subjectivity is held hostage and questioned by 
the other. The EU is therefore both host and guest within its own home. The presence of 
the outside within the EU calls the very subjectivity of the EU into question; it is not 
what it claims to be. Its subjectivity is already held hostage by the other. The chapter 
thereby completes its circuitous route back to the home. While the demarcation of the 
home from otherness is fundamental to the possibility of hospitality, hospitality also 
deconstructs this home, showing that it can never be ultimately 'ours'. The very 
possibility of hospitality is undecidably both possible and impossible, hostile and 
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hospitable, ethical and unethical, responsible and irresponsible, but neither simply one 
nor the other of these terms. 
Chapters 111, IV and V have deconstructed three crucial elements of the 'ethical' in 
British and EU foreign policy: subjectivity, responsibility and hospitality. The 
representation of each, however, deconstructs and undermines itself, revealing its 
constitutive undecidability. The subject is always an object, responsibility is always 
irresponsible, hospitality forever a hostility. But where do we go from here? Does 
Derridean deconstruction leave us in a moral wasteland where all ethical action is 
fundamentally impossible? Should we abandon or ignore possibilities for ethics in 
foreign policy, like most FPA, because it has shown itself to be an unachievable goal? 
The next chapter outlines how the aporetic undecidability of the ethical can prove to be 
enabling rather than simply disabling. Through the Derridean concept of 'negotiation' 
we can and must retain the ethical (as well as a certain subjectivity, responsibility and 
hospitality) through what Shapiro calls a "degree of unreading, unmapping, and 
rewriting"842 of the foreign policy text. 
842 Shapiro, "The Ethics of Encounter", p. 77. 
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Chapter VI 
Negotiation: Invention and Im-Possibility 
Introduction 
The previous three chapters have not only ascertained the importance of three concepts 
for ethics and foreign policy (subjectivity, responsibility, hospitality), but have also 
deconstructed the way they are used in the foreign policy texts of Britain and the EU. 
This deconstruction means that while a subject (a 'Britain' and an 'EU), a responsibility 
(to 'protect' and 'save') and a hospitality (based on 'home' and 'family') have all been 
declared, what has been described in these foreign policies is the impossibility of a 
simple subject, responsibility and hospitality. The undecidability of these concepts has 
been described, and with it the undecidability of ethics and foreign policy. 
This chapter asks 'where do we go from here? ' There are two obvious responses to the 
antinomies of ethical concepts: either acknowledging them and resolving that a foreign 
policy involving ethics is impossible; or, ignoring the contradictions and paradoxes and 
acting as if we know who/what 'we' 'are', what responsibility and hospitality mean and 
how they can be enacted. Both these responses are rejected asfundamentally unethical: 
the first because it acknowledges itself as such; the second because, as Derrida says of 
responsibility, any inadequate thernatisation of the ethical is itself an irresponsible, 
unethical thernatisation. 843 It mischaracterises and misleads, it allows one to think one 
has acted responsibly when the opposite is true, and limits our awareness of other, more 
responsible, possibilities. But what other response, what other solution, is there for the 
undecidability of ethics and foreign policy? 
While this chapter does not propose a solution, it does seek to move forward. This 
movement forward cannot be conceived teleologically and thus would be better 
84' Derrida, The Gift ofDeath, p. 25. 
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described as a problematic and contingent movement through the paradoxes of ethics in 
foreign policy, rather than a movement toward a fully ethical foreign policy. This 
movement through is made possible by introducing the Derridean concept of negotiation. 
This is not 'negotiation' as traditionally understood. As Derrida makes clear, it does not 
"imply a diplomatic operation that takes place in political-institutional contexts. It is an 
operation that takes place in every sentence: no, in every word, practically, that 1 
, 5844 publish . 
This negotiation operates between the poles of contradiction within a concept (such as 
unconditional and conditional hospitality). It does not seek to dialectically resolve these 
contradictions as, for instance, the laws of hospitality cannot be resolved in a third term, 
a real hospitality. The contradictions are interminable and there can be no simple 'third 
way' or 'middle ground. ' Rather, negotiation suggests the possibility of particular 
context-specific decisions. These are taken without renouncing either of the poles of a 
contradiction - the unconditional or conditional, the incalculable or calculation - but 
without merelyfollowing either. As such, negotiation makes no claims to achieving an 
ethical foreign policy, it cannot produce a responsible relation to otherness, but rather 
opens the possibility of a movement through the logical contradictions of ethics and 
foreign policy. 
This movement through must, of necessity, remain irresolvably problematic and subject 
to perpetual re-negotiation. In other words, this movement must maintain the 
undecidability of the problem, as this is the condition of ethical and political 
responsibility as well as the decision itself. 845 In this way, the possibility of negotiation is 
not that of an ethical foreign policy but an ethico-political foreign policy. Instead of 
resting on an ethics or an ethical, negotiation keeps ethics always political, always open 
to question. As such, it retains openness to the unexpected and unanticipatable arrival of 
the other, the possibility of the impossible ethical foreign policy. This is why negotiation 
is central to the thesis: rather than abandoning ethics and foreign policy or simply 
844 Derrida, Negotiations, p. 25. 
845 Derrida, LimitedInc, p. 116. 
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denying its antimonies, negotiation provides the possibility of a movement through them. 
As such, permanent deconstructive negotiation is anything but fatalistic or anti-ethical. 
The chapter proceeds in section one by setting out some problems associated with a 
deconstructive ethics. Using the notion of 'aporia' deconstruction can be read as merely 
revealing ethical and political paradoxes in which language situates us, without 
providing the tools to extricate ourselves from them. This is refuted using Derrida's 
work on the law and justice to demonstrate that, as he puts it, "incalculable justice 
requires us to calculate". 846 The only guide to such a calculation, however, must be a 
problematic openness to the future and otherness that may bring a hyperbolic idea of 
justice. The concept of negotiation is suggestive of how such a calculation of the 
incalculable could take place. Four of its implications are drawn out in section two. 
Finally, in section three, this analysis of negotiation furthers a discussion of the three 
undecidably un-ethical concepts key to ethics and foreign policy: subjectivity, 
responsibility and hospitality. 
The structure of this chapter may suggest the establishment of an ethical rule followed 
by its application to foreign policy, similar to much extant literature on ethics and 
foreign policy discussed in the Introduction to this thesis. The separation of these areas 
(ethics and foreign policy), however, will be problematised by the very concept and 
practice of negotiation, which can only ever be an invention within a specific context. 
An unproblematic application of negotiation to each of the concepts examined here is 
impossible. The goal is not to affirm a subject, a responsibility, a hospitality, or an 
ethics. Rather it is to show how a negotiating ethico-political foreign policy, while 
necessarily closing with each decision, can leave itself as open as possible to the im- 
possible arrivance of the ethical. 
846 Derrida, "Force of Law", p. 28. 
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A Derridean Ethics? 
Approaching Derrida as a philosopher of ethics in an unproblematic manner would be a 
mistake. We are warned against this approach by Derrida himself. He notes that an 
attempt to "remoralize deconstruction... at each moment risks reassuring itself in order 
to reassure the other and to promote the consensus of a new dogmatic slumber". 847 This 
warning must be considered throughout the chapter as it becomes clear that no assurance 
can be found. The first section outlines an important critique of the way deconstruction 
potentially disallows the possibility of political and ethical judgement. Drawing upon 
Derrida's writing on a justice beyond law and right, the poverty of this critique is 
revealed. 
Critiques and Calculation 
There are certainly better and worse critiques of Derrida's 'ethics. ' An example of the 
worse would be Mary Warnock, who labels deconstruction "irresponsible", an "absurd 
and esoteric" doctrine with "a creeping and insidious effect" upon ethics. 848 All of this is 
stated without a single supporting quotation from Derrida's work, or indeed any 
evidence that Derrida's work has been read; an approach to 'continental' thinkers which 
is all too common in the English-speaking 'analytical' school of philosophy. 849 
Perhaps the best critique is that deconstruction reveals logical contradictions, without 
showing a way to resolve them. 850 The previous three chapters demonstrated how the 
concepts of subjectivity, responsibility and hospitality are marked by the logical 
847 Jacques Derrida, "Passions: 'An Oblique Offering"', in David Wood (ed. ), Derrida: A Critical Reader 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 13-14. 
848 Warnock, An Intelligent Person's Guide to Ethics, pp. 166-169. 
849 For a useful critique of 'analytical' philosophy's marginalisation of the 'continental' see Simon 
Glendinning, "The Ethics of Exclusion: Incorporating the Continent", in Kearney and Dooley (eds. ), 
Questioning Ethics, pp. 120-13 1. 
"0 See, for example, Peter Dews, Logics ofDisintegration: Poststructuralism and the Claims of Critical 
Theory (London: Verso, 1987). 1 focus on the similar, though more sophisticated arguments of Critchley, 
The Ethics of Deconstruction. 
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undecidability of what Derrida calls the aporia. Deriving from the Greek word aporos 
(meaning 'impassable') an aporia is an irresolvable contradiction internal to a text or 
argument, a path that is blocked, the "impossible passage, the refused, denied, or 
prohibited passage". 851 
Aporia then, is precisely what this thesis has revealed as the undecidability of ethics and 
foreign policy. Subjectivity cannot be definitively established. The subject of ethics and 
foreign policy (that which can take responsibility) is always already contaminated by the 
object (that which is incapable of taking responsibility), subjectivity cannot be placed on 
firm ground (Chapter 111). Responsibility, whether to protect or save, is marked by a 
contaminating irresponsibility as we must always choose who to (responsibly) protect 
and save, and who to (irresponsibly) abandon and sacrifice. Even those who we choose 
to (responsibly) save are, as such, (irresponsibly) marked out as deficient objects 
(Chapter IV). Hospitality is always already marked by hostility as those we (hospitably) 
allow to enter our home are faced with (hostile) questions and conditions. Even an 
unconditional hospitality (hospitably) opens our home to the other such that it is 
(hostilely) no longer our home (Chapter V). 
These logical contradictions make ethical concepts undecidable aporias; impassable 
blocks to the possibility of ethical foreign policy. For Simon Critchley then, Derrida 
leaves us in an "impasse of the political", which deconstruction provides no way out 
of . 
852 "The rigorous undecidability of deconstructive reading fails to account for the 
853 
activity of political judgement, political critique, and the political decision". 
While a 
cogent critique, Critchley is relying upon a particularly narrow conception of the 
'political'. For Derrida, there is no possibility of politics, ethics or the decision without 
undecidability: "a certain undecidability is the condition or the opening of a space 
for an 
ethical or political decision, and not the opposite". 
854 
851 Jacques Derrida, Aporias, translated by Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1993), p. 
8. 
852 Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, pp. 189-190. 
853 ibid. 
854 Derrida, Negotiations, p. 298. 
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If the decision were decidable, whether through the application of a rule, or on the basis 
of the knowledge we have of a situation, we would no longer take the decision; it would 
be already made and the decision becomes "nothing but the mechanical application of a 
855 
rule". Thus, for Derrida contra Critchley, "[e]thics and politics, therefore, start with 
undecidability.,, 856 They can only begin when "I am in front of a problem and I know 
that the two determined solutions are as justified as one another. From that point I have 
to take responsibility which is heterogeneous to knowledge. qi857 While this is crucial, to a 
certain extent it fails to answer Critchley's critique. If undecidability is the condition of 
the ethico-political decision, how are we to decide? Surely, the ethical and political 
necessity of preserving undecidability means that there can be no decision as this would 
end undecidability? 
As Campbell points out, 858 Derrida engages precisely this issue in his discussion of a 
justice beyond law. Justice is separated from the law in the same way as unconditional 
hospitality is separated from its conditional form; or absolute responsibility to all others 
is separated from a legal, or moral, responsibility to an other. These concepts are entirely 
heterogeneous, yet they are also indissociable as law, responsibility and hospitality must 
retain a reference to justice, responsibility and hospitality to keep their name. The 
unconditional requires conditions to be able to give anything at all. Thus, an analysis of 
justice and law is also applicable to the problems of responsibility and hospitality. 
Crucially, this aporetic heterogeneity and indissociability, Derrida argues, "cannot and 
should not serve as an alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles". "' The reasoning 
for this is vital and worth quoting and length. 
Left to itself the incalculable and giving idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the 
worst for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation. It's always possible. 
And so incalculable justice requires us to calculate... [In the juridical] but also in all the fields 
855 Ibid., p. 232. 
856 Derrida, "Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility", p. 66. 
857 Ibid., p. 66. 
858 Campbell, "The Deterritorialization of Responsibility", p. 44. 
859Derrida, "Force of Law", p. 28. 
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from which we cannot separate it, which intervene in it and are no longer simply fields: ethics, 
politics, economics, psycho-sociology, philosophy, literature, etc. Not only must we calculate, 
negotiate the relation between the calculable and the incalculable, and negotiation without the sort 
of rule that wouldn't have to be reinvented there where we are cast, there where we find 
ourselves; but we must take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find ourselves and beyond 
the already identifiable zones of morality or politics or law... This requirement does not properly 
belong either to justice or law. It only belongs to either of these two domains by exceeding each 
one in the direction of the other. 860 
The most important stipulation here is that an incalculable concept of justice requires 
one to calculate. Rather than allowing us to stay out of political battles because of the 
incalculability of ethical concepts, this very incalculability in fact gives us a duty to get 
involved, to calculate a response, to make a decision. This requirement is not entirely a 
revelation as the very indissociability of justice and law, responsibility to an other and 
all others, the law and the laws of hospitality, demands that they give something as 
concepts. While they remain heterogeneous, their indissociability demands such a 
calculation. 
Yet how are we to calculate what is incalculable? This is where the concept of 
negotiation becomes central. As Derrida says in the quotation above, the relation 
between the incalculable and the calculable must be negotiated The need for this 
calculation is a dual duty requiring both openness to the future and the avoidance of the 
worst. This is the essentially nonfoundational founding for calculation and negotiation. 
Such a problematic 'nonfoundation', however, requires much greater explanation before 
we go any further with the concept of negotiation as a way of moving through 
undecidability. An outline of each duty is given, beginning with 'openness to the future'. 
860 ibid. 
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First Duty of Calculation: Openness and the Future-to-Come 
The future, as 'future-to-come, ' is as difficult a concept to grasp as its importance is 
difficult to overstate. In one interview Derrida declares, "[i]t's better to let the future 
open - this is the axiom of deconstruction, the thing from which it always starts out and 
which binds it, like the future itself, to alterity. ýiM 1A responsibility, or unconditional 
duty to let the future open, to let the future as absolute other come, is as close as we get 
to a statement of what the 'ethical' could be for Derrida. 
The temptation is to ask, 'what is this future-to-come? ', 'what is this other, this alterity, 
towards which we must remain open? ' Yet these are precisely the questions of presence, 
questions which call on the future to present itseýf, which are necessarily unanswerable. 
The future-to-come, whose grammar is necessary here and imposes the very injunction of its 'it is 
necessary, ' has precisely the impossible-to-anticipate figure of that which comes, which is 
coming, which remains to come. Irreducible to calculation, program, project, subject, object, and 
anticipation, what is coming can receive indifferently the names 'event' and 'other. ' What 
remains to be thought remains to come and thus resists thinking. The word 'thinking' thus takes 
in, without being able to house or contain, this inappropriable resistance of the other. 862 
The 'future-to-come' is entirely beyond anticipation or apprehension. Like the 
incalculable concepts of justice, hospitality and responsibility it remains always to come 
and resistant of presence. We cannot name this future, we cannot predict it, we cannot 
anticipate it, as these would all seek to make it present. It must remain 'to-come' rather 
than simply being 'fiature, ' precisely to differentiate it from what will come, what we 
know wi II arrive, what will be present. 
A future-present, a future that will be present, is how we commonly understand the 
future. Derrida illustrates this using the weather. We do not know for sure whether 
tomorrow it will rain, but this does not make the coming of rain an event, a future-to- 
86 1 Derrida, Echographies of Television, p. 21. 
862 Jacques Derrida, Without Alibi, translated by Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 
P. xxxiii. 
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come. 863 We know what rain is, we know that it will possibly come, we can anticipate 
and expect its arrival, and we have experienced it before. It is a future-present, 
something that will be present in the future. Even if there is an interminable drought, all 
these things remain true of 'rain'. In contrast, they cannot be said of the arrivant, the 
absolute other, the future-to-come, of which we can know nothing, can expect nothing, 
and cannot have any experience. This future will always be an experience of the 
perhaps. 864 Here the word 'perhaps' is the best figure of the French peut-etre, literally 
peut meaning 'can' or 'may', and etre, to 'be'. 865 All concepts designated as being of this 
future-to-come Oustice, responsibility, subjectivity, hospitality and the other) cannot 
simply be, but always may be. 
Here we can see the first duty of calculating the incalculable: to let the future open, to 
leave ourselves open to the coming of the unanticipatable absolute other, arrivant, 
justice, ethics. This is perhaps given a less abstract formulation in The Gift of Death. 866 
As discussed in Chapter IV, Abraham has a duty to the absolute other, God, who has told 
him to sacrifice his son Isaac. In sacrificing his son, Abraham is leaving himself open 
and acting responsibly towards the absolutely other, while closing and acting 
irresponsibly to his family. 867 
Derrida's reading is problematic in one sense because the absolute other, as future-to- 
come in the above formulation, cannot be Abraham's God. The God of the Old 
Testament is not absolutely Other. As with the example of rain, Abraham knows 
something of this God (even if there is much that cannot be understood), Abraham 
knows that he will possibly come, thus he can expect and anticipate his arrival. Though 
God is not a perfect future-present, neither is he an absolute arrivant. The knowledge 
and expectation that Abraham has of God problematises the absolute otherness, or 
alterity, or arrivant-ness of this God. Surely then, we cannot say that Abraham has an 
863 Derrida, Echographies of Television, p. 13. 
864 Derrida, Without Alibi, p. 235; see also Jacques Derrida, Specters ofMarx: The State of the Debt, the 
Work ofMourning & the New International, translated by Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 
1994), p. 
35. 
... Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship, translated by George Collins (London: Verso, 1997), p. 263. 
866 This was used in Chapter IV to analyse the possibility of responsibility 
in foreign policy. 
867 Derrida, The Gift of Death, pp. 66-67. 
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absolute duty or responsibility to God because God himself is not absolutely other as 
future-to-come? 
There is some merit in this argument, though it is blunted by the reverse logic Derrida 
explicitly employs. He suggests that "[i]f God is completely other, the figure or name of 
the wholly other", something we have reason to dispute, "then every other (one) is every 
(bit) other. Tout autre est tout autre. " "' This implies that "God, as the wholly other, is to 
be found everywhere there is something of the wholly other, " as Derrida suggests. 
And since each of us, everyone else, each other is infinitely other in its absolute singularity, 
inaccessible, solitary, transcendent, nonmanifest, originarily nonpresent to my ego ... then what 
can be said about Abraham's relation to God can be said about my relation to every other (one) as 
every (bit) other [tout autre comme tout autre], in particular my relation to my neighbour or my 
loved ones who are as inaccessible, as secret and transcendent as Jahweh. Every other (in the 
sense of each other) is every bit other (absolutely other)... Through its [the story's] paradox it 
speaks to the responsibility required at every moment for every man and every woman. At the 
same time, there is no longer any ethical generality that does not fall prey to the paradox of 
869 Abraham . 
Thus, while God is not as absolutely other as Derrida suggests, neither is he entirely 
accessible, knowable or devoid of secrecy. Derrida thus reverses the logic that was 
deconstructing his own deconstruction. Or, to put it more accurately, he further displaces 
the binary distinction between the wholly, or absolute other (God), and the knowable, 
accessible and predictable same (every other). Just as there is the knowable and 
accessible same in God, the apparently wholly other, Derrida shows that in every other's 
unknowable and inaccessible singularity, there is the absolutely other. Therefore, if we 
have an absolute duty to be open to the future-to-come, to the absolutely other, we have 
an absolute responsibility to every other as wholly, or every bit, other. In other words, 
there is something of the absolutely other in every other, thus we owe the same 
responsibility to every other as we do the absolutely other. 
868 Ibid., pp. 77-8. 
869 Ibid., p. 78. 
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Second Duty of Calculation: Closure to the 'Worst' 
The analysis so far has revealed how an absolute, unconditional openness to the future- 
to-come or the wholly other can be an "axiom" of deconstruction. 870 The word "axiom" 
should of course be treated with extreme caution, more as a 'something-like-axiom' than 
simply an axiom. Yet this has still not accounted for the second prong of the dual duty to 
calculate the incalculable. The problem remains that, while we recognise the need for an 
openness toward the future-to-come and the absolutely other, if "every other (one) is 
every (bit) other', 871 then how do we choose which other to be most open towards? How 
do we remain open to the future-to-come and yet still enact a decision that must close 
towards a certain future so as to avoid the 'worst' ? 872 
The problem arises because openness to the future and the other, though an 'axiom' of 
deconstruction, is fundamentally dangerous; 873 it cannot be considered an a priori good 
thing. Unconditional openness to the future would give no possibility of preventing 
danger and thus could be considered reckless. However, in 'Force of Law' calculation is 
demanded by incalculable justice precisely because "[fleft to itself the incalculable and 
giving idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst for it can always 
be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation. 
474 Leaving oneself open to the 
incalculable and unknowable 'figure' of the future, justice, arrivant, or other, risks the 
'worst', the most obvious figures of which could be genocide, ethnic cleansing, Nazism 
and a nuclear holocaust. 
But why are these policies considered the 'worst'? Why do they 
demand that we 
calculate the incalculable? Quite simply because they close the 
future to the coming of 
the other: "we are only ever opposed to those events that we think obstruct the 
future or 
bring death, to those events that put an end... to the affirmative opening for the coming 
"0 Derrida, Echographies of Television, p. 21. 
87 1 Derrida, The Gift ofDeath, p. 77. 
872 Derrida, "Force of Law", p. 28. 
873 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 5. 
874 Derrida, "Force of Law", p. 28. 
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of the other". 875 The policies, ideologies and atrocities of genocide, Nazism and nuclear 
holocaust seek precisely this. They work to set a limit, a barrier, to the coming of the 
other and the future. There is a danger that this 'worst' is figured only in terms of loss of 
human life. This would make discussion of 'openness', the 'future' and 'the other' 
merely a way of camouflaging a conventional subscription to the protection of human 
life. In essence, Derrida would be in agreement with British and EU foreign policy that 
the 'ethical' is about the prevention of outrageous human death and suffering (Chapters 
IV and V). 
However, the 'other' which we keep the future open for is not just the human other 
(other people) which contains something of the absolutely other. The other, the future-to- 
come, is also the coming of justice, responsibility, forgiveness, the gift, hospitality - the 
ethical. These are what remain to come; unanticipatable and unknowable as absolute 
otherness, the closure towards their possible coming is also a figure of the 'worst. ' And 
remaining open to such concepts of the to come may well complicate a simply duty to 
the protection of human life. Thus, every policy, every decision, which is necessarily a 
closure must be a closure which also characterises an opening. It must be a closure that 
opens. This may close toward a human life rather than a principle, or vice-versa, or 
towards one principle/human rather than another. But each such closure must aim to 
open. This will be outlined further when discussing negotiation, but in general terms, 
while every closure is problematic, the decision must aim to close towards the 'worst, ' 
while remaining open towards the other, the arrivant, and the future-to-come. 
What is lacking in Derrida's account is certainly a basis, a sure foundation, upon which 
to build an ethics. This is why the dual duty to the future-to-come and avoidance of the 
gworst' must be considered a nonfoundational founding. The instability of deconstructive 
openness is not only due to its problematisation of decisions, but also because it does not 
unearth a fundamental, timeless truth of ethics per se. There can be no ultimate, 
transcendental basis for what Derrida privileges in the future-to-come, or guards against 
in terms of the 'worst'. This is perhaps the reason behind Derrida's reluctance to 
875 Derrida, Echographies of Television, p. 11. 
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condone a moralistic account of deconstruction which would make foundationalist 
claims. Yet, what this future-to-come appeals to is precisely a taking of traditional 
thinking to its very limits; a 'limit thinking' of the western metaphysical tradition. 
No claims are made to simply exceed traditional ethics, subjectivity, justice, 
responsibility and hospitality. But these concepts, like diffirance, exist on the margins 
and at the limits of metaphysics. 876 They appeal to what cannot be formalised, 
programmed and processed in such thought. They are the limit without foundation for 
Western thought, which reveal a desire for, and thus an openness toward, the possibility 
of that coming which will exceed our current thinking. These concepts are "hyperbolic" 
rather than foundational, in the sense that hyperbole announces the possibility of 
transcendence. Hyperbole thus "signals an open possibility, but it also provokes thereby 
the opening of possibility". 877 As such, they appeal to a potential ethics to come. 
Derrida's open, hyperbolic ethical concepts (such as justice, responsibility and 
hospitality) also demand that we enter ethical, policy and legal battles. Such an entry 
must, however, be based on the injunction of this hyperbole to calculate the incalculable. 
The calculation of a closure upon the future-to-come needs to be thought, or negotiated, 
specifically as a way of opening towards them at the same time. The calculation of 
closure must have the character of an opening. This is the only possibility for moving 
through the aporetic undecidability of ethics and foreign policy. But how do we attempt 
to discern the 'better', more open calculation, from the 'worst"? Only through a 
negotiation without rules. 
878 
876 Derrida, Writing and Difference, p. 3 70. 
877 Jacques Derrida, On The Name, translated by David Wood, John P. Leavy, Jr, and Ian 
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87' Derrida, "Force of Law", p. 28. 
222 
Negotiation and its Implications 
Negotiation is charged with the duty of calculating the incalculable, placing conditions 
on the unconditional, yet preserving openness and undecidability as the possibility of 
ethics and politics. As a concept, especially when compared to notions such as 
diffirance, undecidability and supplementarity, negotiation is little used in secondary 
Derridean literature. Therefore, this section examines what precisely 'negotiation' 
means, before drawing out four implications of this rule without rule. This discussion of 
negotiation and its implications is employed in section three as a way of moving through 
the aporetic undecidability of key concepts in ethics and foreign policy: subjectivity, 
responsibility and hospitality. 
Negotiation 
The word 'negotiation' arises from the Latin neg-otium, meaning 'no-leisure'. Derrida 
sees this " [u]n-I ei sure" as the "impossibility of stopping or settling in a position... 
establishing oneself anywhere. " Its best figure is that of a shuttle, going back and forth 
between different positions: 879 the incalculable and the calculable, the universal and 
particular, the unconditional and conditional. In the example of justice and the law, 
incalculable justice does not give any rest because it requires the calculation of law to 
prevent the coming of the worst, or the perverse calculation. This is equally the case with 
hospitality. Unconditional hospitality cannot offer rest because it requires conditions and 
restrictions to preserve the 'home' and thus the very possibility of hospitality. Yet, 
neither can we simply opt for laws without a reference to justice, or conditional 
hospitality which loses its reference to the unconditional. This would close to the future- 
to-come of these concepts. In claiming that the right laws were made, the hospitable 
conditions achieved, we would close the responsibility we owe to the other as other. 
879 Derrida, Negotiations, p. 12. 
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Hence, negotiation must shuttle between the unconditional and conditional, absolute and 
relative, without either of these poles allowing a resting place; without them allowing the 
decision to become decidable. Yet this shuttling movement does not negate the fact that 
negotiation involves decision. It must always decide, it must cut and close. Otherwise 
there would be no movement through the undecidability of the concepts outlined. But a 
negotiated decision, as movement through the aporia, cannot resolve the aporetic 
undecidability of subjectivity, responsibility and hospitality, as this is the condition of 
ethics, politics and the decision. 880 Negotiation is about a decision in some sense without 
rule, without knowledge, without decidability. Such an ethico-political movement aims, 
through its decision, to preserve the possibility of itself, of its own undecidability. 
The decision taken by negotiation then cannot achieve justice, a subject capable of 
taking responsibility, absolute hospitality, or responsibility for all others. These must 
always remain the may be, to come. This is implied in the common understanding of 
negotiation, which, as Derrida notes, is associated with compromise and impurity. There 
is no crisis in acknowledging that "[n]egotiation is impure", yet just as the obligatory 
closure of a negotiated decision must have the character of an opening, so the necessary 
contamination resulting from negotiation arrives "in the name of purity" . 
88 1 Rather, 
negotiation seeks "intermediate schemas" between the two poles of the undecidable. 882 
These intermediate schemas aim to avoid the 'worst', or as Derrida clarifies in Adieu, 
negotiation seeks to find the "better" or "least bad" closure. Nothing, he observes, counts 
more than the quotation marks which must always surround this 'better' which is "not 
good, it is only a stopgap, but one that it is necessary to seek, that it is necessary not to 
stop seeking". 883 
880 Derrida, Limited Inc, p. 116. 
Derrida, Negotiations, p. 14. 
882 Derrida, OfHospitality, p. 147. 
88' Derrida, Adieu, p. 112-113. 
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Implications 
In summary, we can display the barest details of negotiation as an oscillation between 
the poles of the incalculable and the calculable, the open and closed, always seeking the 
'better' place to cut, to close and decide. These decisions must have the character of 
intermediate schemas which belong wholly neither to the incalculable justice, nor to the 
calculable law. 884 Such closures must strive for the character of an opening by seeking to 
prevent the coming of that which closes toward the other. This still appears extremely 
abstract. Therefore, it is necessary to expand upon four of the most important 
implications of negotiation's effort to retain ethico-political undecidability, whilst 
deciding. These are what must be considered when negotiating subjectivity, 
responsibility and hospitality in section three. 
i) A (non-) policy of decisions 
The first aspect of negotiation is that it can never be a policy in a narrow sense of the 
term. 'Policy' is a widely used concept without a clear and unambiguous definition. 885 
However, in an almost ideal typical sense, 'policy' implies that action cannot be 
"arbitrary or capricious: it is governed by a known formula of universal application... it 
frees [officials] from the need to make choices". 886 If cpoliCyý is thus an authoritative 
rule which one can simply follow in the making of each individual decision then 
negotiation cannot be considered as such. 887 This is elaborated in an interview Derrida 
gave in 1987: 
884 Derrida, "Force of Law", p. 28. 
885 H. K. Colebatch, Policy, Second Edition (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002), p. 7. 
886 bid 
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887 It must be acknowledged that policy is not always considered such. There are much looser definitions, 
including in Colebatch, Policy. This narrow definition is used to draw out the implications of negotiation. 
For alternative views and a review of the literature, see Wayne Parsons, Public Policy: An Introduction to 
the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995). 
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An essential aspect of negotiation is that it is always different, differential, not only from one 
individual to another, from one situation to another, but even for the same individual from one 
moment to the next. There is no general law, there is no general rule for negotiation. Negotiation 
is different at every moment, from one context to the next. There are only contexts, and this is 
why deconstructive negotiation cannot produce general rules, 'methods. ' It must be adjusted to 
each case, to each moment without, however, the conclusion being a relativism or empiricism. 
This is the difficulty. That there is something like an absolute rule of negotiation that can only be 
adjusted to political, historical situations. "' 
As a 'policy, ' negotiation does not rule anything in or out. What Derrida calls the 
44categorical imperative, the unconditional duty of all negotiation" is "to let the future 
have a future... to leave the possibility of the future open" . 
889This is the "something like 
an absolute rule" of negotiation referred to above. All we have then are the two poles to 
oscillate between and the requirement that each decision, each closure, must remain as 
open as possible. 
Negotiation is always about individual decisions; how openness is negotiated in each 
closure depends entirely on the context of that decision. There is no rule or moral norm 
that we can simply apply as this would make the decision decidable and make the 
decisionfor us. For example, a moral norm that unites the representation of British and 
EU foreign policy is the value of 'human rights'. 890 Yet, negotiation does not allow us to 
make our decisions based on such a moral norm. If we did, we would not be making the 
decision, nor taking responsibility for it. Rather, we would be establishing a process 
whereby foreign policy decisions are produced. This is one danger associated with 
Straw's suggestion that Britain should enact a "diplomacy of foresight" with human 
rights acting as "a sort of early warning system" of state failure. 891 Such a model could 
justify a simple application of the norm of human rights to any individual foreign policy 
... Derrida, Negotiations, p. 17. 
"9 Derrida, Echographies of Television, p. 85. 
'90 For example, in Cook's "Mission Statement" he pledged that the "Labour Government will put human 
rights at the heart of our foreign policy". Javier Solana declared to the European Parliament that a "key 
element" of EU foreign policy "must be the promotion of human rights anywhere in the world" - see 
Speech to European Parliament, Strasbourg, 17 November 1999. 
891 Straw, "Re-ordering the World". 
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situation, similar to the way that a machine is applied to raw materials. Britain's 
intervention in Sierra Leone could occur then not as a decision, but because British 
foreign policy is programmed to produce this Policy in the case of human rights abuses. 
The result is not a decision but the product of a moral norm, as the product of a machine. 
This does not mean, however, that moral norms can be abandoned. Rather, in each 
individual context-bound foreign policy situation, negotiation makes a difficult double 
movement of both referring to, and suspending, moral norms and rules. Such norms must 
be conserved and destroyed. 892 In the example of human rights, we must preserve the 
importance of 'human rights', yet not allow them to give the decision. We must remain 
always suspicious of moral norms such as human rights, yet we must always intervene to 
prevent the worst. Destroying moral norms such as human rights (in the way they are 
currently framed, or represented) would open us to the future, but it would potentially 
usher in the worst: a killing under any circumstances. The moral norm thereby preserves 
its utility to negotiation as a tool for the prevention of the worst, which closes towards 
the other. 
Each reference to a norm must be justified with regard to the specific context. Thus, if 
the decision is taken to preserve the policy rule or norm, this preservation must have the 
character of a reinvention or at least a rejustification of the rule. The decision must 
literally be made as if the moral rule, the policy, was being invented there and then. Thus 
the decision is not the mechanical following of a policy rule or moral norm, but a newly 
invented policy each and every time. 893 
The point is that while negotiation has "something like" an absolute rule, "' it cannot 
produce answers or policies that can be transferred between contexts. Instead, Derrida 
says that a "silence is kept concerning the rules or schemas... that would produce for us 
892 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 23. 
893 Derrida, "Force of Law", p. 23. 
894 Derrida, Negotiations, p. 17. 
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,, 895 'better' or less bad mediations. We can neither tell which moral norms or policies 
will produce the 'better' negotiated decision (that which closes to the 'worst' while 
opening to the future) outside of the context, nor can we make such a 'successful' 
mediation into a policy. Rather than being or producing a simple policy then, negotiation 
proves, at most, a guide to making the individual, context-bound ethico-political foreign 
policy decisions. 
ii) A structure of urgency 
A second implication of a negotiated decision concerns what Derrida calls the "structure 
of urgency". 896 While the importance of negotiation as oscillation between imperatives 
has been emphasised thus far, this cannot mean an indefinite deferral of the decision. 
The negotiated decision must be made "with the utmost urgency. And by urgency I mean 
the necessity of not waiting, or rather, the impossibility of waiting for the end of 
reflection. " 897 Thus, in 'Force of Law' Derrida observes that the just decision, "however 
unpresentable it may be", is demanded immediately. 898 The tendency is to see the need 
for oscillation and the ultimate unjustifiability of the decision as a deferral, a putting-off 
till later, a delaying of the decision. Yet this is precisely what cannot be the case. 
Further, this structure of urgency is not just about the temporal aspect of decision: how 
long the decision takes. It also concerns the knowledge and information one seeks to 
gather to justify the decision. The demand made above that a 'policy' of negotiation 
must involve the specific context also means trying to take the whole of this context into 
account. 899 Yet the decision cannot collect all this knowledge for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, the context is boundless and thus the decision "cannot furnish itself with infinite 
895Derrida, Adieu, p. 114. 
896 Derrida, Negotiations, p. 296. 
897 ibid. 
898 Derrida, "Force of Law", P. 26. 
899Derrida, Negotiations, p. 295. 
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information and the unlimited knowledge of conditions, rules or hypothetical imperatives 
that would justify it" . 
900 
Secondly, and more importantly, even if all the knowledge and information where 
available, the moment of decision "must not be the consequence or the effect of this 
theoretical or historical knowledge". 901 In a way, the negotiated decision must be taken 
without knowledge. This 'in a way' is very important. It does not mean that a decision 
must be taken in ignorance, or without knowing anything. Indeed, "one needs to know 
and one needs to know as much as possible and as well as possible". 902 But, crucially, 
between this knowledge and the decision "the chain of consequence must be 
ý9903 interrupted . That 
is to say, the relationship between knowledge and the decision 
cannot be one of cause and effect; the decision cannot result as a simple consequence of 
knowledge. Similar to the reference and suspension of moral norms discussed above 
(where the decision cannot be the consequence of, but must refer to, moral norms), the 
relationship between knowledge and the decision must be interrupted 
Without this interruption, the decision would be taken out of the order of the 
undecidable; it would become decidable on the basis of knowledge. As with the 
application of moral norms, attempting to make the decision decidable would mean it is 
not a decision but a produced policy. The decision becomes a product of knowledge, a 
calculable equation which gives the decision. Contrary to this, negotiation demands that 
the decision be made by interrupting such chains of consequence. This makes the 
structure of urgency more than a matter of "the empirical briefness of a lapse of time. "904 
The urgency would be the same if the decision were demanded now, immediately, or 
after an unlimited time of reflection. Regardless of time, the decision must remain 
undecidable for a negotiated decision to take place. 
900 Derrida, "Force of Law", p. 26. 
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It is important to underline the fact that this 'structure of urgency' which marks 
negotiation does not require ignorance. It does not mean that we should ignore context, 
research, information or knowledge of the situation. Rather, the structure of urgency has 
two implications: one temporal, the other causal. Temporally, the decision is demanded 
immediately and must cut through reflection and oscillation. Causally, a decision cannot 
be the simple consequence of knowledge, it cannot be given by knowledge. Rather the 
decision must urgently interrupt this chain of consequence. 
iii) Lack of assurance 
An important consequence of the latter two points is that negotiation "is everything but a 
position or an assurance". 905The possibility of negotiating movement through ethics and 
906 foreign policy can only mean possible "advances without assurance". This is 
contained within the very definition of negotiation as 'no-leisure' meaning that one will 
never be able to relax, feel satisfied or assured with one's decision. It is the consequence 
of negotiation always being a matter of deciding the undecidable, calculating the 
incalculable, literally negotiating the 
responsibility. 
907 
nonnegotiable subj ectivity, hospitality, 
This lack of assurance keeps negotiation loyal to the double-bind of deconstruction, what 
,, 908 Derrida calls the difficulty of "gestur[ing] in opposite directions at the same time. 
The duty towards the incalculable and calculation, towards an undecidable and decidable 
subject, responsibility and hospitality, means we forever find ourselves in a "perpetual 
uneasiness. "909 If these two duties, these two oppositional gestures, are resolvable into a 
905 Ibid., p. 195. 906 ibid. 
90' Ibid., p. 304. 
908 Derrida, "Dialogue with Jacques Derrida", p. 120. 
909 Ibid. 
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third position, we would be in the realm of a dialectical reasoning. This third position 
would rest, it would be at leisure. 910 But this is exactly what must be avoided because 
the resting, the assurance, would mean we would only be gesturing in one direction, 
obeying one duty. The intermediate schemas that result from a negotiation are precisely 
not dialectical resolutions. Rather, they continue to be shifting, context-bound positions 
which cannot rest because they retain both duties and gestures. 
The structure of urgency demands that we decide, that we do not allow an interminable 
oscillation between imperatives. Such a decision must be a closure, but with the 
character of an opening. Yet this does not nullify the fact that it is a closure, and every 
closure is problematic, as it fails to obey the 'axiom' of deconstruction: to let the future 
come. 911 We can never say then that 'we' are capable of responsibility, that we have 
acted responsibly, hospitably, or indeed, ethically. We can never have a good or clear 
conscience about our negotiated decisions. 912 When such a positive claim is made ('I 
know who I am; that I have made a responsible decision; that I have given hospitality; 
that I have acted ethically') we know that ethics and foreign policy are being "reduced to 
what they must exceed"9 13 -a coherent subjectivity, a simple responsibility, a 
conditional hospitality and an ethical rule. 
Another element to the avoiding of assurance is that a negotiated decision cannot avoid 
risk. A movement through the aporetic undecidability of ethics and foreign policy 
remains inherently risky. By maintaining an openness to the future, negotiation also 
maintains an openness to the coming of the 'worst'. Even the attempt to close towards 
this 'worst' through negotiative intermediate schemas aims to be a closure that maintains 
openness. This danger must not be played down, nor deconstructive thought made 'safe'. 
But at the same time we can acknowledge that there is no other option. 
910 Derrida, Negotiations, p. 13. 
911 Derrida, Echographies of Television, p. 21. 
912 Derrida, Negotiations, p. 232. 
913 Jacques Derrida, The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe, translated by Pascale-Anne 
Brault and Michael B. Naas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 80-8 1. 
231 
As observed in the introduction to this chapter, there are two non-deconstructive 
considerations of ethics that would seek to avoid this risk. Firstly, one could 
acknowledge the aporetic structure of ethics and foreign policy and conclude that it 
should be abandoned as too problematic or risky. Secondly, one could simply deny the 
aporia, reduce ethical concepts to that which they exceed, and artificially simplify their 
application in foreign policy. The first is itself an example of the 'worst' as it could be 
used to justify any foreign policy cloaked in the 'national interest'. The second also risks 
the worst by having no clear idea of what ethical concepts truly involve. This, for 
Derrida, is even worse than the first option as it risks "the worst along with good 
conscience" that one has done the right thing. 914 In contrast, negotiation allows us to 
think other options, other possibilities, other inventions of ethics and foreign policy. A 
negotiated risk, while irreducibly risky, can be experienced "both as a threat and as a 
chance", 915 a chance of avoiding the worst, and even inventing the 'better'. 
Negotiation must not be thought of as a solution to the undecidability of ethics and 
foreign policy, or indeed any decision. It solves nothing. Rather, it places us in a position 
of perpetual uneasiness, discomfort and insecurity. We can neither know that we have 
achieved ethical subjectivity, made the responsible decision or offered hospitality. Nor 
can we be assured that any negotiated decision or position we take will avoid the coming 
of the worst. Yet this is not negative. Rather, it is the only way to remain open to the 
possibility of ethical foreign policy, and to the invention of 'better' intermediate 
schemas. 
914 Derrida, Negotiations, pp. 178-9. 
9'5 Derrida, Echographies of Television, p. 65 - emphasis added. 
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iv) Inventing the im-possible 
The final implication of negotiation examined is precisely this invention of new 
possibilities, the unprecedented and the unthought. 916 Such an invention, as described 
earlier, can be a matter of the reinvention of a moral norm, the affirmation of a rule as if 
it had been invented there and then. However, negotiation cannot be just a way of 
affirming existing moral norms. Of course the truly unprecedented is impossible - 
repetition and iterability contaminates what it is possible for us to think, as demonstrated 
in Chapter 11. However, there are at least three characterisations to such an 
unprecedented invention. 
In the first sense, everything that results from a negotiation is an unprecedented 
invention. As observed earlier, each negotiation is a context-bound decision to close and, 
as such, will differ from one person to the next, and for the same person from one 
moment to the next. 917 Any closure that breaks with all moral rules, that breaks with 
knowledge, and that depends upon the individual context must be an invention or 
inauguration without a program. 918 Although there is inevitable repetition between each 
such negotiation, this is repetition as iterability meaning both repetition of the same as 
well as alteration and change. When that which is repeated is also transferred to a 
different context, "[o]ne can perhaps come to recognize other possibilities in it by 
inscribing it, or grafting it onto other chains. "919 Thus any negotiation we make will be 
both a repetition and an original invention, an inaugural thinking of the unprecedented. 
In a second sense the openness of negotiation makes the invention of new possibilities 
possible. Traditional foreign policies are structured by a profoundly limited thinking that 
does not challenge unquestioned assumptions about subjectivity, responsibility, 
916 Derrida, Negotiations, p. 238. 
917 Ibid., p. 17. 
9" Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow... :A Dialogue, translated by Jeff Fort 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 96. 
919 Derrida, Limited Inc, p. 9. 
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hospitality and the ethical. This has been illustrated with reference to British and EU 
foreign policy in the previous three chapters. But negotiation must begin and end with a 
questioning of all such assumptions. An essential part of thinking the ethical and the 
political is a "questioning without limit 15 . 
920 
Initially such questioning results in the revealing of aporias at the heart of traditional 
systems of thought. Chapters 111, IV and V illustrated this in ethics and foreign policy. 
Through negotiation, however, which remains as open as possible to the future-to-come, 
we open up a far greater range of possibilities for thought. The retention of what Derrida 
calls an unconditional "'hyperbolic' ethical vision" of his concepts keeps us always 
"tom" (always with a bad conscience, un-leisure, perpetual uneasiness) but allows the 
possibility to "inflect politics", to change things, to think differently, to invent. 921 
Examples of such inventions require a specific context, thus the next section explores 
potential inventions of the un-thought subjectivity, responsibility and hospitality in 
British and EU foreign policy. 
Invention is also important in a third and far more radical sense. What Derrida calls the 
invention of the "im-possible". 922 The hyphen both joins and separates possibility and 
impossibility. Thus the im-possible is not a simple opposite to the possible. 923 Rather, 
such an invention of the decision, justice, subjectivity, responsibility, hospitality or 
ethics is the possibility of the impossible. Derrida's best explanation of this difficult 
notion comes in his discussion of 'decision' in Deconstruction Engaged Here he says 
that for a decision to be a true decision it must be impossible for me to make. Thus, my 
decision should not be taken by me, but should rather be "the decision of the Other, my 
decision should be the Other's decision in me, or through me". 924 
920 Derrida, Negotiations, p. 296. 
92 ' Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, p. 5 1. 
922 Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction Engaged: The Sydney Seminars (Sydney: Power Publications, 2006), 
p. 63. 
923 ibid. 
924 Ibid., P. 103. 
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What is meant by the decision not being mine is that it literally "exceeds my own being, 
my own possibility, my own potentiality". 925 If an individual is described as a set of 
capacities, attributes or predicates, and the decision simply follows from this set of 
features or possibilities, it is not a decision. Rather, it is the individual operating as the 
machine discussed earlier. The decision must be that which breaks from how we define 
ourselves; it must no longer be of me as I see myself, but of the other in, or through, me. 
This thinking can be related to all Derrida's im-possible concepts. Thus, the true 
negotiated invention of responsibility, the genuinely unprecedented hospitality, must be 
that which it is impossible for the subject as they define themselves. The im-possible 
invention must be that which goes beyond what we see as possible for ourselves. It is 
only possible for the other, that which exceeds our being, our list of predicates, that 
which is of the future-to-come. 926 
This section has expanded upon the Derridean concept of 'negotiation' and drawn out 
some of its important implications for a movement through the undecidability of ethics 
and foreign policy. Negotiation, as an oscillating movement, seeks to obey the two 
imperatives of deconstruction (the calculable and incalculable, the conditional and 
unconditional, and so on), while necessarily closing to part of this future-to-come. This 
closure is characterised as an attempt to find 'better', or more open, 'intermediate 
schemas' which still avoid the 'worst'. Such a negotiated closure was shown to be 
possible neither as a policy following a rule, nor as a simple consequence of knowledge. 
Rather, it must be a context-bound decision which breaks with both rules and 
knowledge. While such a negotiation cannot provide assurance against the worst, or give 
a good conscience, it allows the space for invention of the unthought and im-possible 
enactment of ethics. It is necessary now to provide some illustrations of how negotiation 
could be played out in ethics and foreign policy - specifically regarding the inseparable 
concepts of subjectivity, responsibility and hospitality. 
925 ibid. 
926 This may suggest that, as the decision is taken by the other and only through me, I become the machine 
of the other just as I may become the machine of moral norms or knowledge which give the decision. 
However, the 'I' and the 'other' are both fragmented and split, meaning there can be no simple machine- 
like operation here. 
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Negotiating Ethics? Subjectivity, Responsibility, Hospitality 
It was acknowledged in the introduction to this chapter that a danger arose from its 
structure. The way the discussion moves from an examination of Derridean ethics and its 
apparent 'rules', to a concentration on foreign policy may lead to the assumption that it 
is treating ethics as a set of rules to be applied to foreign policy. What have been 
outlined, however, are not 'rules' as commonly understood. These "something like""' 
rules of negotiation must be invented and reinvented in each moment of foreign policy. 
Indeed, as will be shown, negotiation alters the way that 'foreign policy' itself is 
conceived and represented. 
This section then, is not simply 'applying' any thing to any thing. Rather, it provides 
examples of what could be possible, perhaps, regarding the negotiation of ethics and 
foreign policy. It suggests possibilities for a movement through the undecidability of 
subjectivity, responsibility and hospitality. These are, of necessity, only indicative 
sketches, as they are outside the immediacy of the context. Such sketches cannot stand in 
judgement over the ethics of British and EU foreign policy. They do not say what should 
or should not have been done, which construction of subjectivity is better, which 
decision more responsible, which policy more hospitable. As observed above, "silence is 
kept" about the better, or least bad, intermediate schemas that are negotiated, lest they 
become a de-politicized application of 'policy'. 928 These sketches cannot even say 
whether a negotiation happened in a specific foreign policy, whether openness was 
abandoned to a policy of calculated knowledge or the application of a moral norm. We 
can certainly never say whether an aporia has been successfully negotiated. 
These illustrations, therefore, remain suggestive rather than prescriptive, outlining 
possibilities and im-possibilities which remained unthought in British and EU foreign 
policy. They criticise the representations of subjectivity, responsibility and hospitality in 
927 Derrida, Negotiations, p. 17. 
928 Derrida, Adieu, p. 114. 
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these foreign policies, but do not condemn them. How each concept is negotiated has 
major implications for the negotiation of the other two. This will become apparent as the 
divided sections cross over each other constantly. 
Negotiating Subjectivity 
In Chapter 111, an analysis of the way 'Britain' and the 'EU' constructed the subject of 
ethics and foreign policy found that the capacity to take responsibility in international 
affairs was crucial. This representation was deconstructed along two lines: firstly, by 
demonstrating the generalisability of state/subject failure as opposed to 'success' in 
taking responsibility; and, secondly, in the way each subject exists within a chain of 
supplementary subjects which reveals the impossibility of afully present subject capable 
of taking responsibility. What is required of a negotiation then is the possibility of 
moving through the undecidability of subjectivity. Rather than simply abandoning the 
subject, a negotiation works to "rearrange it, to subject it to the laws of a context it no 
longer dominates from the center". 929 
The first deconstruction examined how the British discourse of subjectivity relied on a 
dichotomy between the 'successful' state/subject (capable of taking responsibility) and 
the failing state/subject (incapable of responsibility). The inability of 'Britain' to take 
responsibility for its own citizens rights and security on 7/7 revealed what Derrida calls 
the 'autoimmunity' of democracy. This generalises state/subject failure as, on its own 
account of subjectivity, Britain fails. Either 'Britain' remains open to the other and risks 
failure by suffering further terrorist attacks (thus failing to protect security and human 
rights) or it fails by closing to the other - both internally and externally (thus restricting 
human rights and democratic freedoms). Failure is thus generalised and the basis of this 
constructed subjectivity fragments. 
929 Derrida, "'Eating Well' or the Calculation of the Subject", p. 105. 
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The negotiation that must be enacted in this context is between absolute openness of the 
subject towards the other (which obeys a hyperbolic ethicality but risks the coming of 
the worst), and a closure of the subject (which risks a self-imposed 'worst' in the 
restriction of human rights and freedoms). How can a closure in this situation have the 
character of an opening? An initial concern is that simple solutions be eschewed and the 
aporia be acknowledged both for 'foreign' and 'domestic' policy (as well as the 
deconstruction of this distinction through terrorism always being a matter of the other 
within the se1j). 
In a 'domestic' setting, this would, at a minimum, produce a profound questioning of 
policies such as shooting suspected suicide bombers in the head. This policy was perhaps 
only truly questioned after 7/7 because the man who died as a result of it was not a 
suicide bomber (but rather a Brazilian electrician). But is there a danger that this policy 
as a policy (rather than a context-bound negotiated decision) of ultimate closure towards 
the other, leads to a radical failure of the state's claim to subjectivity? A policy of 'shoot 
to kill', in order to defend itself, risks the subject becoming other than what it claims to 
be. The attempt to take responsibility for the security of its citizens leads to the 
possibility of actively attacking that security. 
The decision to shoot Jean Charles de Menezes may have been a negotiated decision, this 
is not something we can judge. But what must be guarded against is this 'worst' being 
generalised into dogmatic policy. Each decision regarding potential suicide bombers 
must be made in the moment, knowing that there are always competing responsibilities 
for the state subject: towards the victims of the bombing and towards the suspect; 
towards ethical norms and an absolute ethical openness; towards the openness of the 
subject and its closure. Every decision constitutes an unassured closure which cannot be 
absolutely right, but negotiation gives the possibility of moving through this 
undecidability by trying to avoid absolute closure. 
Acknowledging the aporia which constitutes every subjectivity in international politics 
as always already failing would have at least two effects in 'foreign' policy. Firstly, it 
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would lead to a questioning of policies towards 'failing' states which Britain has a 
'responsibility to save' in its foreign policy. This is discussed below. Secondly, we can 
inquire as to the impact upon the assertion of 'Britain' and the 'international community' 
as subjects. Similarly to 7/7,9/11 was represented in British foreign policy as an attack 
not just on an individual nation state, but upon the subjectivity of the international 
community. Blair thus represented 9/11 as "attacks on the basic democratic values in 
which we all believe so passionately and on the civilised world". 930 Straw subsequently 
described 9/11 as a moment of "strategic opportunity", which "[w]e owe it to those who 
founded the international community to seize". 93 1 This is also the case in EU foreign 
policy, with Patten calling 9/11 an "attack on the values that we all share: the values of 
decency and the values which the whole of the international community has to 
uphold". 932 
Such representations seem to require the subsequent objectification of Afghanistan as a 
failing state in order to assert a subjectivity as successful 'international community' or 
'state', which has so clearly been proven a failure. What we should be asking is whether 
such a closure can be justified. Does it have the character of an opening? If 9/11 and 7/7 
had been characterised as inevitable possibilities contained within, and constitutive of, 
'our' (the 'international community's' and 'Britain's') own open, fragmented, failing, 
subjectivity, would any other policies have become thinkable? 
The crucial unthought, the potentially im-possible negotiated invention of the 
autoimmune 'Britain' and 'international community', would perhaps be to do nothing. 
Perhaps the 7/7 attack need have produced no extra closure towards the other - no 
assertions of the capacity to protect security and human rights through the warranting of 
identity cards; no attempts at legislation allowing 90-day detention without charge of 
terrorist suspects; and no 'shoot to kill' policy for suicide bombers. Perhaps 9/11 need 
have produced no extra closure towards the other either - no violent assertion of 
9'0 Tony Blair, Statement to the House of Commons following the September II attacks, 14 September 
2001. 
9" Jack Straw, "The Task of Defeating International Terrorism", II November 200 1. 
932 Chris Patten, Interview on Sky News, 12 September 2001 and Chris Patten, Interview with Arab News 
Network, 18 October 2001. 
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subjectivity as the capacity to take responsibility by invading Afghanistan; no 
6 933 enforcement' of the international community's 'will' by attacking Iraq . On one level 
such a policy of inaction would have been precisely what Derrida calls an im-possible 
invention: the decision that 'we', as we define ourselves, are unable to take. Yet, 
because the subjectivity of the international community and 'Britain' is split - both 
failing and succeeding - it is also possible for 'us' as a democratic, open subjectivity, to 
produce precisely this lack of extra closure. 
The second deconstruction of subjectivity examined how that which answers to the 
question 'who? ' (that which is affirmed as the subject) is always shifting between several 
signifiers. This is especially the case in British foreign policy, where at various times it is 
'Blair', 'Britain', the 'international community', and the 'international coalition' which 
is affirmed as that which can take responsibility. The shifting significations illustrated 
the inability of the subject to ever achievefull presence, as each signifier supplements for 
the lack of responsibility taken by its predecessor. Rather, the subject of ethics and 
foreign policy exists as an undecidable effect of supplementary diffirance. 
That which is capable of responsibility in international politics is therefore never 
obvious, but rather remains to be negotiated. The negotiation must take place between 
the poles of an open subjectivity that remains undetermined and undeterminable, and the 
stability and assurance of a subject that can respond to the call of the other, that can take 
responsibility. In British foreign policy, such a call from the other has been represented 
as the outrageous suffering and death of Kosovan refugees, Sierra Leonians, the 
oppressed people of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the victims of state failure (especially in 
Africa). 
This call demands that there be an artificial halt to the substituting chain of signifiers 
which constitutes subjectivity. A subject, or several subjects, must be constituted as 
capable of taking responsibility, and the myth of this coherent capacity for responsibility 
9" Maja Zehfuss makes a similar argument to this from a different angle in, "Forget September I I" Third 
World Quarterly: Journal of Emerging Areas Vol. 24, No. 3 (2003), pp. 513-528. 
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must be affirmed in certain circumstances. Negotiation is about determining these 
circumstances, and the particular subjectivity that will be authorized in a specific 
context. The temporary affirmation of a subject does not mean that in each circumstance 
the same responsibility is required. This will be discussed below. 
The decision of which mythical subjectivity to assert cannot help but close; however, it 
must remain as open as possible through a constant questioning. Who, or what, is 
excluded by the affirmation of 'Britain' in relation to Sierra Leone? By not involving the 
United Nations, the African Union, or other individual nations, are others being 
illegitimately excluded from this subjectivity? These questions and imperatives have to 
be negotiated against the need to respond to the call of the other with urgency. What 
about the 'international community' in Kosovo? Are we closing towards those 
considered outside the definition of the 'international community"? If so, perhaps it is the 
representation of the international community as subject which requires negotiation. 
At all times one must be aware of the power relations which are being instituted by a 
claim to subjectivity. To take these into account, the subject must be literally reinvented 
each time. 'Britain', the 'international community', the 'international coalition', must be 
re-justified and recreated each time they are declared, such that the 'Britain' which takes 
responsibility by intervening in Sierra Leone cannot be the same 'Britain' which takes 
responsibility by instituting the CA. 
Any assertion of a responsible subject must remain without assurance. We will never 
know if the 'better' subject has been negotiated in a given situation. Therefore, even 
when the decision has been taken, the questioning must not stop. It must remain political 
and undecdiable. There must be ceaseless interrogation both before and after a subject's 
affirmation. Such an interrogation will also help maintain the temporary character of the 
claim. If 'Britain' is declared as the subject to take responsibility in relation to Sierra 
Leone, this must not then become a 'policy', a dogmatic assertion of 'Britain' whenever 
there is a call from 'Africa'. Similarly, the assertion of the 'international community' in 
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Kosovo, or the 'international coalition' in Afghanistan, should not stop us negotiating 
and questioning the inclusiveness of these subjectivities. 
Negotiating the subject of ethics and foreign policy may well mean that 'Britain' as a 
subject falls into disuse. Perhaps the nation-state subject will be deemed never open 
enough towards the future-to-come, towards the absolute other, to be affirmed as that 
which takes responsibility. If so, what we may be negotiating here is the end of 'foreign 
policy' as traditionally conceived. The fact that 'Britain' appeared to be taking less 
responsibility and the 'international community' so much more (the fact that one 
signifier supplemented the other) led Hain to speculate in 2001 about "the end of foreign 
policy" altogether. 934 This may be a healthy questioning of 'British' subjectivity. 
However, its temporary character is shown a year later when a new Junior Minister, 
Denis MacShane, gave what appeared to be a direct response in a speech entitled, "The 
Return of Foreign Policy". 935 
There can be no conclusions drawn from this discussion of negotiating the possibility of 
a subject which can take responsibility in world politics. The subject is always already 
split, differs from itself and defers back to other signifiers. What has been drawn out is 
the importance of halting this slide of signifiers in response to a call. Yet this temporary 
affirmation of a subject must be negotiated against the importance of openness towards 
the other, always questioned, never assured or allowed to solidify into a reffled policy. 
This subjectivity must also negotiate its aporetic, ever-failing character against the need 
to protect its citizens without violent closure towards the other - internally and 
externally. Policies which affirm a subject of ethics and foreign policy can only then be 
context-bound decisions, always open to renegotiation and reinvention. Thus, the 
negotiating of a subject of ethics and foreign policy enacts a perpetual ethico-political 
foreign policy. 
934 Peter Hain, "The End of Foreign Policy? ", 22 January 200 1. 
935 Denis MacShane, "The Return of Foreign Policy", 13 February 2002. 
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Negotiating Responsibility 
Chapter IV examined the way the enactment of responsibility was represented in British 
foreign policy. In other words, how responsibility itself was represented in the British 
text where it was the dominant signifier for ethics in foreign policy. What emerged was 
two primary responsibilities, to protect and to save, both based upon an unexamined 
responsibility to avert outrageous and preventable human death and suffering. This 
assumption also requires unlimited questioning and will be returned to at the end of the 
discussion. 
The 'responsibility to protect' the human rights of others through humanitarian 
intervention in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan worked by effacing the "eternal 
moral dilemma" first noted in Iraq by Straw. 936 This was caused by there always being 
morality, or 'responsibility to protect', on both sides of the argument: both to those who 
suffer and die under a tyrannical regime, but also to those who will suffer and die as a 
result of an invasion. This impossible responsibility must be negotiated by 
acknowledging the ethical aporia in all these situations. Interventions in Kosovo, Sierra 
Leone and Afghanistan should be questioned along the same lines as Iraq. However, 
rather than allowing this dilemma a simple resolution ("[r]idding the world of Saddam 
would be an act of humanity. It is leaving him there that is in truth inhumane")937 it 
should be allowed to stand, with all the uncomfortable consequences that flow from it. 
This means, above all, no longer representing the enactment of the 'responsibility to 
protect' with "a clear conscience and a strong heart". 938 A clear conscience afterwards 
does not, of necessity, mean Blair acted irresponsibly in the decision, though it certainly 
suggests that Blair is ignoring his responsibility to other others. If this responsibility is 
not being ignored, it is difficult to see how a clear conscience and a strong heart could be 
achieved. Thus, we can argue that such a simplistic representation of the decision seeks 
to close the space for deconstructive questioning both before and after it. Negotiation 
936 Straw, "Iraq: A Challenge We Must Confront". 
937 Blair, "Let the United Nations mean what it says and do what it means". 
93 8Blair, Statement to House of Commons opening Iraq debate. 
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demands that the dilemma of ethics and responsibility remain political. The oscillation 
between imperatives (responsibility towards both sets of others) must continue to allow 
the closure - the closure that calculates which responsibility to enact - to remain as open 
as possible. 
Such a calculation, however, cannot mean that the decision is given on the simple basis 
of knowledge. Again, the way the decision to invade Iraq was justified, the way the 
moral dilemma was resolved, was often represented as being because of what was 
'known' about Saddam's regime. 939 Straw argues that, "[fln the circumstances, deciding 
,, 940 to give Saddam the benefit of the doubt would have required a huge leap of faith . Yet 
such a leap is precisely what negotiation requires: a leap beyond knowledge, beyond 
knowledge giving the decision. The aporetic structure of the decision itself requires that 
it cannot be ultimately justified by knowledge. Neither can it be justified by the 
application of an ethical norm, rule or policy, such as the 'responsibility to protect'. A 
doctrinal rule cannot give the decision. Rather, negotiation requires a leap beyond both 
rules and knowledge, such that if the rule ends up being affirmed, it is reinvented there 
and then in each decision. Each time, in each context, in each moment, the 'responsibility 
to protect' which flows from the DIC must be re-invented, rather than simply applied. 
Keeping the decision open for as long as possible, maintaining the political nature of the 
'responsibility to protect', while recognising that the decision is demanded in urgency, 
allows space for the inventive play of negotiation. Too often questions of humanitarian 
intervention are represented as a choice between invasion or economic sanctions/ 
diplomatic pressure (often themselves represented as doing nothing) . 
94 1 Negotiation 
raises the possibility of policies that remain unthought in this binary distinction; policies 
which necessarily close towards the other, but also open. As Christoph Bluth notes, 
9'9 See especially the 'facts' that were known about Iraq that became the basis of policy: Blair, Speech to 
the Welsh Assembly, 30 October 2001. 
940 Straw, Iraq Statement. 
94 ' Before the war in Iraq Blair claims that the international community "will talk but not act; will use 
diplomacy but not force" (Tony Blair, "Iraq Statement to Parliament, " 24 September 2002). After the war, 
justifying humanitarian interventions in general, Blair claims that it is a problem if under international law, 
"there is nothing anyone can do, when dialogue, diplomacy and even sanctions fail" - Blair, Speech on the 
threat of global terrorism. 
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critics of the invasion of Iraq failed to offer alternatives to deal with human rights abuses 
in Iraq. 942 We must ask whether possibilities were ruled out by characterising the 
decision in such a way (invasion versus sanctions), whether effacing our responsibility to 
those who died as a result of 'humanitarian intervention' closes down the space for 
negotiation too soon. 
It may be that in situations such as Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan or Iraq there were 
no other possibilities. But this is both unlikely and cannot excuse closing towards a 
'better' intermediate schema, the closure which opens more. Once again, we cannot 
know, or judge, whether British foreign policy negotiated a responsible decision. We 
cannot even know, or judge, whether a 'decision' was made at all, or if a program (as 
knowledge or rule) was enacted. Nonetheless, the representation of decisions as a 
'responsibility to protect' in the British foreign policy text have had dangerous 
implications in terms of de-politicizing ethical questions of responsibility. This 
representation was irresponsible in closing debate, closing space for a negotiation, and 
thus closing towards greater openness to the other. 
It is also crucial to bear in mind that responsibility cannot be considered separately from 
subjectivity. Who is constructed as taking responsibility in a specific context will have a 
large impact upon how such a responsibility is taken. Therefore, part of any negotiation 
of the 'responsibility to protect' is the negotiation of the openness of the subject which 
takes the responsibility. 'Openness' here means the degree to which the subject of ethics 
and foreign policy is open to contestation. The de-essenti al i sing and de-reifying of the 
subject which takes responsibility will also, perhaps, contribute to the openness of 
political debate about which 'others' we are responsible for protecting. This will be 
examined in terms of the EU and hospitality below. 
This link between subjectivity and responsibility is fundamental to the second of the 
responsibilities discussed: the 'responsibility to save'. Chapter IV demonstrated that the 
942 Christoph Bluth, "The British Road to War: Blair, Bush and the decision to invade Iraq, " International 
Affairs Vol. 80, No. 5 (2004), pp. 884-885. 
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genuinely moral conception of Britain's 'responsibility to save' Africans was 
undermined by its necessary corollary: the contempt for, and patronisation of, 'Africa' as 
an 'object', incapable of taking responsibility for 'its' own people. This was shown by 
the supplementation of the African led NEPAD by the British inspired CA. The 'saving' 
of Africa and Africans is represented as an attempt to save human life by helping, 
'Africa' to become a subject as conceived in British foreign policy. Rather than a 
hyperbolic respect for the other as other, the 'responsibility to save' involves an 
(ir)responsible conditional respect for the other as becoming same. 
These are the two poles that must be negotiated between. To opt for a responsibility 
involving an unconditional respect for the other as other would be open to the other but 
also to the coming of the worst: a genocidal conflict such as that in Rwanda. And the 
impact of this figure of the worst should not be underestimated; as Straw says, the 
international community's failure in Rwanda "still haunts us today". 943 Thus restrictions 
are necessary upon openness. Yet the opposite pole of contemptuous pity for the African 
other as other until they become the same is another version of the 'worst'. There must 
be a negotiation between the poles of an unconditional responsibility of saving the other 
as other, and a conditional responsibility of saving the other by becoming same. 944 
Campbell sums up the problem in Bosnia as a similar matter of how to "reclaim politics 
from pity and enable the exercise of responsibility while at the same time paying respect 
to those small steps that have already been taken". 945 
A negotiation of responsibility requires an initial recognition and acknowledgement of 
its aporetic structure. Just as there is no simple resolution of the 'responsibility to 
protect', there can be no solution to the 'responsibility to save'. This must be followed 
by ceaseless questioning of British foreign policy's conception of subjectivity. If, as 
shown in Chapter 111, there is no way 'Britain' can be conceived as a 'successful' subject 
943 Straw, "Shaping a Stronger United Nations". 
944 The discussion of this negotiation will have obvious resonance for the EU's conditional hospitality 
granted to Central and Eastern European countries and the Balkans (see Chapter V). The conditions upon 
this hospitality were such that, before entry into the European home was granted to the other, this other 
had to demonstrate that it had become the same: part of the European family of nations. 
945 Campbell, "Violence, Justice, and Identity in the Bosnian Conflict", p. 23. 
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of ethics in its own terms, how can 'Africa', or 'African nations' be required to achieve 
this impossibly coherent and transcendental subjectivity? A more open conception of 
what subjectivity 'is, ' or is capable of being, must be part of negotiating the 
'responsibility to save'. This also involves questioning the 'international community' as 
subject: perhaps its current representation is insufficiently open if it excludes 'Africa', 
which can only "be standing proud in its own right in the international community"946 if 
it becomes same. 
A negotiation would also ask whether any "comprehensive" plan to save Africa pays 
sufficient attention to the specific context of each individual policy, at every moment, 
examining its openness to the other as other. Rather than 'comprehensiveness' being the 
goal of all plans for Africa, perhaps individually tailored plans would show more respect 
for the otherness of 'Africa'. Certainly, the application of rules on such wide ranging 
issues as democratic rights, corruption, the rule of law, democracy, good governance, 
commercial systems, education, infrastructure and so on, must be questioned as to the 
extent it allows Africans to develop their own conception of ethical subjectivity. 
Leaving these issues open to individual context-bound negotiation of policies, or at least 
their re-invention, may be considered too risky. This risk must be acknowledged and 
warily embraced. Remaining open and enacting a responsibility to save 'Africa', 
'African nations' or even the African Union, by encouraging a negotiation of their own 
subjectivity (which remains other) will give no assurance against the return of 'Rwanda' 
(as symbol of the worst). But neither is treating every African state as an objectified 
future-Rwanda an ethical or responsible policy. It risks becoming a pitying, 
contemptuous version of the 'worst', even if it comes with a good conscience. 
Remaining open towards the 'responsibility to save' the other as other, while retaining 
risk, also gives the possibility of invention. Such an intermediate schema could take 
many forms. It could, perhaps, be as simple as the supporting of NEPAD without its 
supplementation by the CA. It could mean a new version of the CA which makes no 
946 Blair, "Speech on Africa". 
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claims to being "comprehensive" and perhaps demands less, if not nothing, in return for 
Britain's responsibility to save. It could even mean a withdrawal of such grand plans for 
Africa and a negotiation of each responsibility in its specific context. Even at a basic 
level, an openness to negotiation could at least prevent us simply speaking of 'Africa' 
and 'its' problems as a first step to no longer treating 'it' as a homogeneous, 
undifferentiated object. Even if the 'responsibility to save' were to remain in its current 
form after all negotiation, a "comprehensive" policy must at least maintain a space for 
ethico-political questioning. 
Finally, the unquestioned foundation of British and EU foreign policy's claim to 
responsibility also needs to be opened to ethico-political enquiry: a responsibility to end 
preventable and outrageous suffering and loss of human life. What is excluded by their 
construction of 'preventable' and outrageous loss and suffering? What 'human life' is 
not considered to matter here? Regarding the EU, the question arises as to its privileging 
of 'life' which is proximate to its 'self. If every other (one) is every (bit) other, then 
what moral difference can geographical proximity make? This is considered in the next 
section. 
In British foreign policy, we must ask which lives are considered expendable, and what 
is considered acceptable (as opposed to outrageous) suffering. Too often our 
responsibility towards combatants is ignored and effaced. There was little or no 
discussion of Serbian soldiers, Sierra Leonian gangsters (or even Sierra Leonian civilians 
in fact), Taliban fighters or Iraqi soldiers who died as a result of our 'responsibility to 
protect'. Does this omission close too precipitously towards the other? There can be no 
justification for excluding these lives from the negotiation of a 'responsibility to protect' 
human life. 
In the 'responsibility to save', by concentrating on the outrageous, there is a risk of 
closing towards those others who suffer as a result of natural disasters. Blair justified the 
greater attention given to victims in Africa, as opposed to those of the Asian Tsunami, as 
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a matter of Africa being "a preventable disaster". 947 Yet surely such natural disasters as 
Tsunamis and earthquakes (in Pakistan, Indonesia and Iran) produce equally preventable 
death and suffering as AIDS in Africa? Even if the disaster itself is not preventable, 
subsequent deaths as a result of damage to infrastructure, lack of medicine, food and 
shelter could be both outrageous and preventable. 
No consideration is given to the implications of how foreign policy constructs those lives 
which do matter. Howells, for example, represents these as "non -combatants, " primarily 
,, 948 "women and children. Kim Hutchings observes that concentrating on 'women and 
children' as illegitimate subjects of political violence is a common way of constructing a 
gendered shorthand for the discussion of ethics in world politics: killing men (soldiers 
especially, who are always represented as men) is acceptable; killing women is 
outrageous and preventable. 949 What must be negotiated then, is precisely what foreign 
policy constructs as outrageous and acceptable, preventable and unpreventable death and 
suffering. To remain open towards the other, and the future-to-come, there must be a 
questioning of the assumptions contained in all moral norms that may be re-invented 
through negotiation. 
Negotiating Hospitality 
Chapter V drew out the way in which the EU represented the ethical dimension of its 
foreign policy (1999-2004) primarily as a responsibility to its proximate regions. This 
policy is closely tied to the EU's conception of its own subjectivity as a 'home', 
concentrating its responsibility upon its 'family' and its 'neighbourhood' or 'backyard'. 
As such, the EU largely exercises its responsibility through hospitality in more or less 
conditional, and more or less extensive ways. This discourse of hospitality, however, 
deconstructs in two ways: firstly, through the aporetic structure of hospitality (as 
947 Tony Blair, PM Press Conference, 6 January 2005. 
948 Howells, "Why the UN Millennium Review Summit matters to the UK". 
949 Kim Hutchings, "Feminist Ethics and Political Violence", in Brassett and Bulley (eds. ), "Ethics in 
World Politics" (forthcoming). 
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unconditional and conditional); and, secondly, through the concept of hospitality 
deconstructing the very subjectivity of the EU as a 'home'. Thus, in illustrating the 
negotiation of hospitality in EU foreign policy, we return to the negotiation of the subject 
of responsibility. 
The first deconstruction occurs because the hospitality offered by the EU through the 
policies of enlargement (to Central and Eastern Europe, and subsequently the Balkans) 
and the ENP is both highly conditional and differential. It does not, and cannot, open to 
the other as much as is demanded by unconditional hospitality. As such, the EU's 
foreign policy is always both hospitable and hostile, ethical and unethical. Negotiation 
must be enjoined between the heterogeneous and indissociable poles of unconditional 
and conditional hospitality. An unconditional hospitality, which asks no questions and 
sets no conditions upon entry, would be a great openness but also risk the worst: 
destroying the very home which makes hospitality possible in the first place. But 
equally, a highly conditional hospitality closes the EU home to the other, and ushers in 
the worst as an unethical, dogmatic exclusion. 
A negotiation between these poles involves a constant questioning of the conditions set 
upon entry to the EU. Each decision on an application to join the European 'home' 
would be both individual and context-bound. As such, a negotiation of hospitality must 
question the policy of placing Balkan countries on a unilinear 'road' to EU 
membership. 950 The representation of this 'road' as a single track, the same for Bosnia 
Herzegovina as it is for Croatia, FYROM and Serbia and Montenegro, suggests that 
'hospitality' may have ossified into dogmatic conditions applied to each applicant, 
regardless of specific characteristics, history and needs. The 'Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements' which place them on this 'road' are certainly represented as 
similar "commitments" to "thoroughgoing reform. 5195 1 This apparently undifferentiated 
approach disallows the negotiation of an ethico-political decision which remains as open 
as possible to the other, taking each particular 'case' as a singularity. The conditions 
950 Patten, Speech to the Peace Implementation Council. 
951 Patten, Speech to the OSCE Permanent Council. 
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could prove too closed to allow for others arriving and travelling on differentpaths to the 
European home, or knocking at different doors, dependent upon their needs. 
A negotiation of hospitality also challenges the intense questioning of applicant 
countries. Prodi describes the "questionnaire" handed to Croatian and FYROM upon 
their applications as "over 2,500 questions on the political, economic, and administrative 
situation in the country", the answers to which "will form the basis for the Commission's 
opinion on the starting of accession negotiations". 952 The emphasis on the number of 
questions suggests the EU is seeking assurance based on comprehensive knowledge that 
would give the decision (or at least the Commission's opinion) as a pre-programmed 
response. This risks a closure towards the other in the name of an impossible assurance 
against the worst. These questions and conditions, at a minimum, must be kept under 
constant review. They must be interrogated each time to see if, for example, the specific 
history and characteristics of the FYROM demands less restrictive conditionality. 
Perhaps the FYROM is in more urgent need of the EU's hospitality than Croatia (for 
reasons of security, prosperity or stability for example). 
The aim of these questions and conditions upon hospitality must also be challenged. Just 
as there was a concern that the 'responsibility to save' contemptuously objectified 
'Africa' and required 'its' becoming same to gain respect, the 'road' to Europe placed 
the responsibility for the EU's hospitality on the Balkans becoming same. Applicant 
countries must prove that they are part of the European 'family' before they can be 
allowed into the 'home', following the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and 
answering their questions correctly. It seems that rather than hospitality granting entry of 
the other as other, this requires that the other become same before entry. 
The oscillation between unconditional hospitality and conditional hospitality must be 
precisely this negotiation between hospitality to the other as other and the other as same. 
This difficulty is tied to the sub ectivity of the EU as 'home'. The 'home' necessarily j 
excludes and closes to the other, but this closure is also the condition of openness, the 
912 Prodi, "Croatia's joumey towards EU membership". 
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condition of its granting hospitality. This is the second aporia of hospitality: 
unconditional hospitality granted to the other as other, no questions asked or conditions 
set, would mean the European 'home' could no longer simply be the EU's. The 
European 'home' would also be the 'home' of the other and the place where the EU's 
subjectivity is held hostage and questioned by the other. Hospitality deconstructs that 
which makes it possible: the 'home'. 
Therefore we return to a negotiation of subjectivity; the negotiation of hospitality in EU 
foreign policy is a negotiation of how the EU conceives its 'self. The demand for this 
negotiation is even greater because, as shown in relation to the Ukraine, the other is 
already within: the EU is a stranger to itself, its subjectivity is already not what it claims 
to be. Above all, an acknowledgement of the aporia is required, a recognition that the 
other is already within and it has not of necessity destroyed the EU's feeling of being at 
home with itself. As Shapiro notes, "cosmopolitanism must begin at home", through an 
"ethic of hospitality... to one's collective self '. 953 This is a first step to what negotiation 
seeks to achieve: a de-reffication, a de-essentialising, of the European 'home', or what 
Shapiro calls, "a degree of unreading, unmapping, and re-writing". 954 
Such a de-essentiali sing of the European 'home' means questioning the predicates that 
the EU uses to represent itself. As discussed in Chapter V, this 'home' contains both 
geographical and moral elements. Firstly, those granted hospitality must be considered 
geographically European, hence the responsibility towards the proximate 'family. ' 
Secondly, the EU represents its 'home' as based on "political and ethical" values such as 
justice, transparency, democratic accountability, 955 tolerance, inclusiveness and respect 
for others. 956 There is, perhaps, a third stipulation that is silently assumed: that 
hospitality can only be offered to a nation-state. 
953 Shapiro, "The Events of Discourse", p. 713. 
954 Shapiro, "The Ethics of Encounter", p. 77. 
955 Prodi, "Europe and Global Governance". 
956 Prodi, Inauguration of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. 
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An im-possible negotiated invention of the ethical in EU foreign policy would be 
something which was not possible based on these predicates; a hospitality that the EU as 
it defines itself could not offer. In territorial terms this could involve moving away from 
the ENP and the question of Ukraine. What about countries which are not territorially 
adjacent to the EU and yet share their ethical and political heritage? Could hospitality be 
extended to Canada, Australia or even, perhaps, Brazil? Negotiating the political and 
ethical values of the European 'home', a degree of unreading could permit a relaxation 
of demands upon Turkey. But could an invitation be extended to those nearby who may 
be in need of such hospitality (for reasons of security, prosperity, stability and so on), 
without achieving the strict requirement of values? Could Lebanon, Morocco, or even, 
perhaps, Jordan be extended such hospitality? Finally, we could adapt Shapiro's critique 
of Kant's hospitality: because of the EU's attachment to state sovereignty it "lack[s] a 
957 sensitivity to peoples and nations that [are] not organised in the form of states" . Could 
the EU consider advancing hospitality to peoples who are not states, such as the Kurds? 
These are, of course, highly unlikely speculations. But they are precisely the possibilities 
of the impossible that remain to be thought, through a negotiation of hospitality and 
subjectivity in foreign policy. A de-essential i sing of the European 'home' will always, 
and must, remain a dangerous and calculated policy. While ethical subjectivity is 
shifting, fragmented and impossible to fix, it must still be affirmed in response to the call 
of the other. This remains the case with the European 'home'. Too great an 'unreading' 
of the EU sub ect would lead to the 'worst': the destruction of the very 'home' which 
permits hospitality. Yet, especially in territorial terms, there appears much room for 
negotiation. The territorial boundaries of the EU have never been fully reified; as 
Romano Prodi himself notes, to the East and South "it is very difficult to make out the 
new frontiers of Europe. This, of course, is nothing new: it has been hard to decide 
058 
where Europe ends in these two compass directions for thousands of years. 
9" Shapiro, "The Events of Discourse", p. 697. 
958 Prodi, "Europe and the Mediterranean: time for action". 
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The importance of negotiation lies in preventing an entrenchment of EU sub ectivity 
such that the 'home' becomes a closure without opening. This negotiation of the home is 
also a negotiation of the conditions placed upon hospitality. At minimum, negotiation 
could be a space for questioning the ENP's overt hostility (being "for those neighbours 
for which accession is not on the agenda")959 which still retains a reference, if small, to 
hospitality. This must be a questioning of the EU's claims to subjectivity. There is 
evidence that this questioning is being performed in the EU's hospitality discourse. 
Patten observes in his memoirs that "the question of the further enlargement of the EU 
arrives as the most important question of Europe's identity, of what Europe is to 
become". 960 Enlargement, or hospitality, is not just about what it is to become, it is also a 
question of whether 'Europe' has a to come. "Certainly, " says Patten, "we cannot 
,, 961 enlarge forever. But I do not believe we can stop yet... This questioning is a 
minimum requirement of negotiating ethics in EU foreign policy. 
Conclusion 
This chapter began by asking, given the aporetic undecidability of the concepts of ethics 
and foreign policy outlined in Chapters 111, IV and V, 'where do we go from hereT 
Rejecting the appeals of two non-deconstructive options (abandoning ethics and foreign 
policy or ignoring the aporia and attempting to move forwards with an irresponsible 
thematisation), the chapter suggested that we turn to Derrida's concept of 'negotiation' 
as a possible movement through undecidability. The aim of such negotiation is not an 
ethical foreign policy, which can only remain to come, but rather an ethico-political 
foreign policy. 
The first section examined the main critique of a Derridean 'ethics': that the rigorous 
undecidability of his concepts allows us no way of making the ethical/political decision. 
Through a reading of 'Force of Law' it was established that Derrida tackles precisely this 
959 Prodi, Speech on visit to Bogazici University. 
960 Patten, Not Quite the Diplomat, p. 143. 
961 ibid. 
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issue, observing that the incalculability of justice demands that we calculate in order to 
avoid the 'worst'. Negotiation enters here as the oscillating movement between the 
calculable and the incalculable, the conditional and the unconditional, obeying the dual 
duty of deconstruction: staying open to the future-to-come and closing through decision 
to avoid the 'worst'. A negotiated calculation of this closure, therefore, is required to 
have the character of an opening by only closing to others, ideologies, events and 
calculations which seek to prevent the future, the other, justice and ethics from coming. 
The second section introduced and outlined four implications of 'negotiation' as a 
movement through the undecidability of ethics and foreign policy. While the job of 
negotiation is to oscillate between imperatives (calculation and the incalculable, 
conditional and unconditional and so on), it must also decide and close by creating 
'intermediate schemas'. Such a negotiated closure is possible neither as a policy 
following a moral norm or rule, nor as a simple consequence of the knowledge gained 
about the situation. Rather, as a matter of urgency, a decision must break with moral 
norms and knowledge. While negotiation gives no assurance against the 'worst', it 
allows space for invention of the unthought, even im-possible, enactment of ethics and 
foreign policy. As such negotiation is both a threat and an opportunity. 
Finally, the third section examined the possibility of negotiating the subjectivities, 
responsibilities and hosPitalities of the British and EU foreign policy text. This must not 
be seen as the simple application of negotiation (as a set of ethical rules) to foreign 
policy. Rather, as a context bound rule without rule, negotiation and foreign policy both 
transform each other. The illustrations of such negotiations were thus merely suggestive, 
revealing possibilities (abandonment of a comprehensive plan for 'Africa') and im- 
possibilities (the EU inviting Lebanon and the Kurds into the European 'home') for 
ethico-political foreign policy decisions. 
This has been a highly circumspect answer to the question: 'where do we go from hereT 
Perhaps, in conclusion, we should challenge the 'where' of this question. It implies the 
search for a place where ethics and foreign policy is possible, where the aporetic 
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undecidability of subjectivity, responsibility and hospitality will be resolved or 
resolvable. Given the interminability of this undecidability, however, the 'where' must 
always remain the impossible to come. Instead, perhaps it would be more fruitful to ask 
'how do we go from here? ' This how suggests the possibility of a movement through 
aporia and undecidability rather than a movement beyond to a 'where'. This how can 
perhaps best be conceived as a negotiation. Rather than an ethical foreign policy, it seeks 
an ethico-political foreign policy; it keeps the political undecidability of ethics from 
becoming de-politicised and decidable. 'How do we go from here? ' We move through 
aporetic undecidability by retaining a space for the negotiation of ethics and foreign 
policy. 
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Conclusion 
"I'm an optimistic Sisyphean when it comes to ethics andforeign policy. I hope to end up with the 
stone a bit higher up the mountain than when I started " Lord Howe of Aberavon. 962 
This thesis has offered an answer to the question of to what extent an ethical foreign 
policy be considered possible. In terms of the foreign policy texts examined, it has 
investigated whether a truly ethical, responsible relation to otherness as foreign policy is 
a possibility. This has produced a reconceptualisation of the dichotomy of possibility and 
impossibility in terms of undecidability, and sought a movement through such 
undecidability via the Derridean concept of negotiation. Despite never speaking of ethics 
in the section of his autobiography devoted to his time as British Foreign Secretary 
(1983-198 9), 963 Lord Howe's description of ethics and foreign policy is evocative of this 
argument. 
Sisyphus, a King in Greek mythology, was condemned by the Gods to endlessly roll a 
large stone up a mountain. However, each time Sisyphus neared the top, the stone would 
roll back down the hill and he would have to start all over again. 964 Like the Sisyphean 
goal of reaching the top of the mountain, an ethical foreign policy is ultimately 
unachievable. Thus, negotiation seeks a movement through the undecidability of ethics 
and foreign policy, rather than a movement towards its decidability; it concentrates on 
how the stone could be rolled rather than where it will end up. Nonetheless, this thesis 
remains, like Lord Howe, optimistically Sisyphean; the unrealisable goal of an ethical 
foreign policy persists as the animating concern of the deconstruction and negotiation in 
Chapters III to VI. 
962 Lord Howe of Aberavon, Interviewed by Dan Bulley, the House of Lords, Westminster, London, 5 
April 2005. 
963 Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (London and Basingstoke: Pan Books, 1995), pp. 301-598. 
964 Homer, The Odyssey, translated by Walter Shewring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), see 
Book XI, pp. 128-142. 
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As the Introduction stated, the deconstruction of ethics and foreign policy is not opposed 
to the possibility of an ethical foreign policy, but inspired by a desire for an ethical, 
responsible relation to otherness. This Conclusion surnmarises the main arguments of the 
thesis and draws out its central contributions by reasoning them through the possibility 
of an 'ethical foreign policy to come'. Such an openness to the future-to-come of ethics 
and foreign policy is important in the study of foreign policy (FPA) as well as in the 
British and EU foreign policy texts. But what is meant by the inelegant phrase 'ethical 
foreign policy to come"? To answer this question, an outline of Derrida's use of the term 
'democracy to come' is necessary. 
Promise and Perfectibility of the To Come 
An introduction to the 'future-to-come, ' as that which is impossible to anticipate but may 
come, perhaps, was given in Chapter VI. But what does it mean to speak of a concept, or 
a practice, as having a 'to come"? Derrida describes various concepts and institutions as 
containing such a to come; these include justice, 965 the gift, 966 reason '967 communiSM, 
968 
international law and international institutions. 969 However, the dominant description 
comes in relation to democracy. In The Other Heading, Derrida observes that to speak of 
its "to come" means democracy is "never simply given... but rather something that 
remains to be thought... that must have the structure of a promise. , 970 Prefixing 
'democracy' with a 'to come' does not therefore mean what we may currently 
understand as a representative, generally liberal, form of parliamentary government. It is 
not pointing to "the future of a democracy that is going to come or that must come or 
even a democracy that is the future. " To speak of the "very concept of democracy as a 
concept of promise" means it will not be present in the future. 
971 
96' Derrida, "Force of Law", p. 27. 
966 Derrida, Politics ofFriendship, p. 39. 
967 Derrida, Rogues, p. xv. 
96' Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. 99. 
969 Derrida, Echographies of Television, p. 75. 
970 Derrida, The Other Heading, p. 78. 
971 Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. 64. 
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Derrida thus conceives the promise of the to come as messianic. 972 The experience of the 
promise, the experience of waiting for democracy to come, is likened to that of a religion 
which awaits the coming of the messiah. 973 However, the crucial difference between the 
promise of the to come and religion is the lack of a messiah. The to come is an 
experience of "messianicity without messianism", 974 without a messiah. A concept of the 
future to come, as observed in Chapter VI, is beyond anticipation, apprehension and 
fore-knowledge. Thus, unlike religion, experiencing the promise of a concept which is to 
come is about "a waiting without horizon of expectation", 975 without any expectation of 
when, who or what will come. It is less like waiting for God than Waitingfor Godot. 976 
Nonetheless, despite the lack of a messiah as the future-present of democracy, or rather 
because of this lack, the promise of the messianic without messianism still remains 
"affirmative" and "empancipatory". 977 Instead of being simply achievable and possible, 
the promise of democracy to come is beyond apprehension, knowledge and 
programming, beyond all our current designations of democracy as liberal or 
representative. This promise gives an affirmative injunction to strivefor its achievement, 
for its avenir, despite the im-possibility of this accomplishment. As Derrida puts it, the 
"expression 'democracy to come' does indeed translate or call for a militant and 
interminable political critique. , 978 The experience of democracy to come then is both 
like, and unlike, that of Vladimir and Estragon, who simply wait for Godot without 
leaving their spot. The "to of the 'to come' wavers between imperative injunction (call or 
performative) and the patient perhaps of messianicity (nonperformative exposure to 
979 what comes, to what can always not come or has already corne)" . 
Thus, current affirmations of today's 'democracy' are far from enough; the performative 
to calls for an indefinite contestation of democracy's contemporary forms in the name of 
972 Derrida, Negotiations, p. 180. 
973 Derrida, Specters ofMarx, P. 167-168. 
974 Derrida, Echographies of Television, p. 13. 
975 Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. 168. 
976 Samuel Beckett, Waitingfor Godot (London: Faber and Faber, 1965). 
977 Derrida, Specters ofMarx, p. 75. 
978 Derrida, Rogues, p. 86. 
979 bid, P. 91. 
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'democracy to come'. This is what Derrida enacts in affirming international institutions 
and international law while pointing out their significant failures and inadequacies. 980 All 
the out-dated concepts on which institutions such as the UN are based, such as state 
sovereignty, require rethinking through an interminable political critique: 
Which does not mean that international institutions are to be condemned. We ought to be glad 
they exist, imperfect as they may be, and their perfectibility attests to their future, their still-to- 
come. Their current existence, even when it leaves something to be desired, represents an 
immense step forward. 9" 
The promise of concepts and institutions with a to come, their messianicity without 
messianism, is demonstrated by their perfectibility, by their capacity for improvement 
and even "progress .,, 
982 As Thomson argues, with the concept of 'democracy-to-come', 
Derrida "does confirm the possibility of there being more democracy rather than less". 983 
Yet this progress, this "step forward", 984 is only possible as a heavily circumscribed 
movement of contestation and negotiation which seeks, but cannot achieve, perfection. 
The perfectibility of democracy to come should not, however, blind us to its corollary: an 
equally necessary pervertibility. As was observed in Chapter VI, remaining open to the 
future-to-come is hazardous: "[t]he future can only be anticipated in the form of an 
absolute danger". 985 Because we cannot apprehend what may come it "can only be 
proclaimed, presented, as a sort of monstrosity". 986 This is what Penelope Deutscher is 
observing when she implies that the perfectibility and pervertibility are equally potential 
corollaries of the to come: in the process of perfecting and improving, "this improvement 
itself containing the risks of perversion". 987 As Chapter III argued, democracy is always 
autoimmune; its suicide is a threat that is necessarily contained in the promise of 
980 See, for instance, Derrida, Specters of Marx, pp. 83-84. 
98 ' Derrida, Echographies of Television, p. 75. 
982 Derrida, Deconstruction Engaged, p. 100. 
983 Thomson, Deconstruction and Democracy, p. 29. 
984 Derrida, Echographies of Television, p. 75. 
985 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 5. 
986 ibid. 
987 Penelope Deutscher, in Derrida, Deconstruction Engaged, p. 97. 
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democracy. Thus the promise of the to come must be "a promise that risks and must 
always risk being perverted into a threat". 988 
Talking of democracy to come then is a matter of obeying the dual injunction of a 
deconstruction: to gesture in opposite directions at the same time. 989 On the one hand, 
perfection can only be treated as a potential which cannot be achieved and which could 
be dangerous, but on the other, it must be positively affirmed through its perfectibility 
and pervertibility. Derrida reveals how the two are tied together in the struggle to bring 
democracy to presence, to make it come, by playing on the Spanish and Italian double 
meaning of si - both positive as a 'yes, ' and potential as an 'if. ' 
If [si] democracy does not exist and if [si] it is true that, amorphous or polymorphous, it never 
will exist, is it not necessary to continue, and with all one's heart, to force onself to achieve it? 
Well, yes [sil, it is necessary; one must, one ought, one cannot not strive towards it with all one's 
force. 990 
The apparently tentative nature of this quasi-positive, quasi -affirmative, iflyes is the 
indispensable structure of the promise, and thus of any concept which is to come. It 
gestures at once towards democracy to come's requisite potential nature, its lack of 
messianism, but also to the affirmative perfectibility of its messianic promise. And 
it is 
this perfectibility which institutes continual dissatisfaction and incessant critique of 
today's 'democracy'. 
9" Derrida, "Autoimm unity", p. 120. 
989 Derrida, "Dialogue with Jacques Derrida", p. 120. 
990 Derrida, Rogues, p. 74. 
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Ethical Foreign Policy To Come? 
The suggestion of an ethical foreign policy to come is made precisely as a si, both an if 
and a yes. It encapsulates the yes, the desire, the affirmation and 
perfectibility/pervertibility, the strivingfor an ethical foreign policy; but also captures 
the if, its necessary potentiality, its undecidability and never ultimately achievable 
possibility. Indeed, because this undecidable potentiality is the necessary condition of 
their being politics and ethics, 991 the if is an inseparable condition of the yes. The 
Introduction to this thesis noted the co-constitution of the apparently separate issues of 
ethics and foreign policy; both concern the construction of, and relation to, otherness. If 
ethics and foreign policy, as it has been understood in the British and EU foreign policy 
texts, has a to come, a promise and perfectibility, then it is in this im-possibly 
responsible relation to otherness. 
However, the affirmation of 'ethics' and the 'ethical' is not only controversial in IR and 
FPA, it is also problematic in relation to Derridean scholarship. Geoffrey Bennington 
argues, quite correctly, that "[d]econstruction cannot propose an ethics" because ethics is 
"metaphysical through and through and can therefore never simply be assumed or 
affirmed in deconstruction. The demand or desire for a 'deconstructive ethics' is in this 
sense doomed to disappointment. , 992 John Caputo, in more provocative terms, uses 
deconstructive thinking to declare himself against ethics, because this position best 
acknowledges "the lack of safety by which judging is everywhere beset". 
993 He argues 
that Derrida's declining the idea of an ethics of deconstruction, 994 is aimed at 
"appreciating" the "tenuous delicacy" of undecidability. 995 
991 Derrida, Limited Inc, p. 116. 
992 Geoffrey Bennington, Interrupting Derrida (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 34. 
993 John D. Caputo, Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference to 
Deconstruction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 4. 
994 As he does in Derrida, "Passions: 'An Oblique Offering"', p. 14. 
995 Caputo, Against Ethics, p. 3. 
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Bennington and Caputo are right to warn against any easy use of ethics. Derrida himself 
observes that he has "too much reticence to use the word [ethics] easily". 996 However, 
this should not prevent us from an uneasy, unsafe use of the word. Far from simply 
assuming or affirming an ethics, this thesis has appealed to ethics as an "ongoing 
historical practice", 997 stressing its ongoingness, its openness, its to come. There is only 
disappointment if a closed, decidable ethics is sought. The deconstruction and 
negotiation of a responsible relation to otherness in this thesis is, in contrast, a self- 
consciously risky affirmation of the undecidability of ethics, an affirmation of its 
perfectibility and pervertibility. 
In Derrida's later work, there is a suggestion that he was rethinking what ethics might 
mean, and gesturing towards its perfectibility. 
I tried to argue in my seminar this year that pure ethics, if there is any, begins with the respectable 
dignity of the other as the absolute unlike, recognized as nonrecognizable, indeed as 
unrecognizable, beyond all knowledge, all cognition and all recognition: far from being the 
beginning of pure ethics, the neighbour as like or as resembling, as looking like, spells the end or 
the ruin of such an ethics, if there is any. 99' 
Negotiating ethics, this pure relation to the absolute unlike, is what Derrida explicitly 
calls for in a "thinking of responsibility which does not stop" at the "dominant schema" 
of "determin[ing] the neighbour" as like our selves. 999 This would be a pure ethics as an 
purely ethical foreign policy - an absolutely ethical and responsible relation to otherness, 
to the unlike, the 'foreign'. However, the thinking of this "unthought" relation "is still to 
come". 1000 But the careful negotiation of the possibility and impossibility of this 
association, one of taking "in without being able to lodge the other chez soi [at home in 
the self]", motivates much of Derrida's most provocative thought. 
1001 
996 Jacques Derrida, Altiritis, cited in and translated by Thomson, Deconstruction and Democracy, p. 127. 
997 Walker, InsidelOutside, p. 5 1. 
998 Derrida, Rogues, p. 60. 
999 Derrida, "'Eating Well' or the Calculation of the Subject", p. 116. 
1000 Ibid. 
1001 Derrida, Without Alibi, p. xxxiii. 
263 
This ethical relation to the other and otherness which Derrida seeks to provoke was also 
sought in Chapter VI of this thesis through illustrating a potential negotiation of British 
and EU foreign policy: a responsible and hospitable saving and welcoming of the other 
while retaining its otherness, and without making it the same. The promise, the iflyes of 
such an im-possible ethical foreign policy is what Chapter VI aimed to institute through 
negotiation while acknowledging its necessary potentiality, which resists final 
constitution. This is why negotiation remains the place of the ethico-political, rather than 
the ethical itself. 
As with the concept of democracy to come, invoking a to come of ethics and foreign 
policy calls for incessant critique of the current claims to its enaction, as well as a 
consideration of all foreign policy text as ethics. This consists of an endless challenging, 
such as that in Chapters III to V, of the closure towards the future that these texts enact, 
the future of an ethical, responsible relation to otherness opened up by claims to an 
ethical dimension of foreign policy. Campbell suggests that a potential openness is also 
demonstrated by FPA literature, especially in Rosenau's description of FPA as a 
discipline. 1002 Those who study foreign policy, says Rosenau, 
... must concern themselves with politics at every 
level... It is in some profound sense a 
discipline with limitless boundaries... [Students of FPA must] expand their horizons, enlarge 
their kit of analytical tools, and probe for meaning in heretofore unexplored areas of social, 
economic and political life... With the passage of time, in short, foreign policy has come to 
encompass nothing less than the full range of individual and collective processes whereby people 
seek to give meaning and hope to their lives. 100' 
Campbell claims that this signals "the existence of a potential if undeveloped open- 
endedness" in FPA that could suggest an "alternative theorization" of foreign 
poliCy. 
1004 
Such open-endedness is also, perhaps, denoted in unconventional FPA by Kowert's 
1002 Campbell, Writing Security, p. 39. 
1003 Rosenau, "New Directions and Recurrent Questions... ", pp. 1-3. 
1004 Campbell, Writing Security, p. 39. 
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acknowledgement that ethics constitutes a "lacuna" for "the untested promise of 
constructivism". 
1005 
However, any potential openness has not been developed, and paths to a possible 
rethinking of foreign policy connected to otherness, politics and ethics, are continually 
closed. Chapter I revealed how both FPA's conventional and unconventional forms 
marginalise questions of politics and ethics in the study of foreign policy. This closure 
arises from the often unstated, and always unquestioned, assumptions by which FPA 
constructs the world of foreign policy. Such presuppositions lead 'conventional' analyses 
to ask only a narrow range of questions ('why' questions), to rely on a problematic but 
foundational separation between the state's inside and outside, and to favour 'scientific' 
methodologies purged of moral questioning. For 'unconventional, ' or constructivist, 
FPA this closure emerges from constructivism's fetishist concern to maintain its 
'middle-ground' acceptability to conventional FPA and IR. The concern demonstrates 
itself in the limiting reference to a non-discursive reality, a continued reliance on the 
inside/outside dichotomy, and the desire to achieve an impossible 'better' account of 
foreign policy decisions. 
The dichotornising assumptions which mark FPA literature must be questioned and 
deconstructed, in the terms outlined in Chapter 11, for there to be any development in its 
open-endedness. This thesis has been, in part, a contribution to such a development, to a 
more open, ethico-political retheorisation of foreign policy as text. This has meant a 
thinking of ethics and foreign policy together - one as a function and constitution of the 
other in the way they relate to otherness. It also suggests the possibility for future 
research in FPA, research which examines the politics of foreign policy and develops 
upon the potential open-endedness which Campbell identifies. 
There is a much clearer openness to the promise and perfectibility of an ethical relation 
to otherness in the "ethical dimension" instantiated by both British and EU foreign 
policy. Mervyn Frost announced himself "delighted" at the announcement of an ethical 
1005 Kowert, "Towards a Constructivist Theory of Foreign Policy", p. 268. 
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dimension in the British case "because by stressing ethics he [Cook] was merely making 
explicit what is implicit in all foreign policies". 1006 While this thesis has made a similar 
case for the co-constitution of ethics and foreign policy, its reasons for valuing 
explicitness is very different. For Frost, the appeal of an overt position-taking regarding 
ethics is that it allows others to "judge foreign policy by the standards which the 
government has set for itself'. 1007 
In a reply to Frost's article, Eric Herring lambasts British foreign policy for its "vigorous 
and systematic violat[ion] of the ethics professed in its Mission Statement". ' 008 Herring 
does not share Frost's delight at the explicit statement of an ethical dimension, accusing 
Cook and Blair of "dishonesty and hypocrisy". 1009 Ironically however, Frost and Herring 
appear to agree upon the reason for Frost's delight: the possibility of judging the ethics 
of British foreign policy based on the standards it has set for itself Hence, Herring's 
critique is precisely a damning ethical judgement of British foreign policy. However, to 
value the affirmation of an ethical dimension only in terms of allowing judgement is 
severely restricted and restricting. It ignores the openness such a statement institutes, an 
openness to the promise and perfectibility of ethics and foreign policy, an openness to its 
deconstruction and negotiation, an openness to its to come. 
The importance of Herring's critique, and others like him who condemn the ethics of 
Britain's foreign policy, 1010 should not be underestimated. After all, the potentiality of 
1006 Frost, "Putting the World to Rights", p. 8 1. For a more in-depth exposition of Frost's position on 
ethics and foreign policy, see Mervyn Frost, "The ethics of humanitarian intervention: protecting civilians 
to make democratic citizenship possible", in Smith and Light (eds. ), Ethics and Foreign Policy, pp. 3 3-54. 
1007 Frost, "Putting the World to Rights", p. 88. 
1008 Eric Herring, "Response to Mervyn Frost: The Systematic Violation of Ethical Norms in British 
Foreign Policy" Cambridge Review ofInternational Affairs Vol. 12, No. 2 (1999), p. 9 1. 
1009 Ibid., p. 92. 
'0'0 See for example: Neil Cooper, who argues that British foreign policy has failed to make the arms 
agenda more ethical - "The pariah agenda and New Labour's ethical arms sales policy" in Little and 
Wickham-Jones (eds. ), New Labour'sforeign policy, p. 163; Davina Millier, who claims that "ethical 
considerations, including human rights, have been sacrificed in order to effect engagement" with countries 
such as Iran - "British foreign policy, human rights and Iran" in Little and Wickham-Jones (eds. ), New 
Labour'sforeign policy, p. 189; Mark Curtis's suggestion that Britain "clearly has a generally unethical 
foreign policy" - Curtis, Web of Deceit, p. 362. For more sympathetic critiques, see the articles of Wheeler 
and Dunne: Wheeler and Dunne, "Good international citizenship", pp. 847-870; Tim Dunne and Nicholas 
J. Wheeler, "The Blair doctrine: advancing the Third Way in the world", in Little and Wickham-Jones 
(eds. ), New Labour's Foreign Policy, pp. 61-76 ; and Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Moral 
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the to come calls for interminable critique. But this is not all it calls for. The promise of 
an ethical foreign policy to come lies in its perfectibility, the perfectibility of an 
undecidably im-possible relation of responsibility to otherness through negotiation and 
critique. However, to initiate this perfectibility requires a more fundamental criticism 
and an unlimited questioning of the possibility of ethics and foreign policy. Too often 
arguments such as Herring's are made regarding how states ought to conduct their 
foreign policies without questioning what makes both ethics andlas foreign policy 
possible in the first place. This thesis provides a sustained deconstructive analysis of the 
ultimately unfounded foundations upon which this possibility is built. 
The undecidable possibility of a responsible relation to otherness depends, first and 
foremost, upon there being a subject of ethics and foreign policy which can relate to 
otherness. There must be some understanding of what 'we' - and others like ourselves - 
are which makes 'us' capable of acting ethically in international affairs. British and EU 
foreign policy constructs this subject as that which is capable of taking responsibility for 
the lives and suffering of others. However, as the deconstruction undertaken in Chapter 
III revealed, such a notion of subjectivity cannot be achieved but always remains 
undecidable as to its possibility. Its reliance on the im-possible ability to accept 
responsibility comes undone through the internally inconsistent logic of state failure and 
a constant shifting in the discourse between different signifiers of subjectivity (Tritain', 
the 'International Community', the 'International Coalition', and so on). 
A negotiation of subjectivity, as illustrated in Chapter VI, reveals the possibility of an 
ethico-political decision to affirm a subject in response to a call from the other. This 
negotiation strives for an openness to a future-to-come of ethics and foreign policy, 
while closing to its 'worst' calculation, its perversion. The perpetual challenging and 
critique of any claim to a 'we' who can act responsibly opens up new possibilities, 
potentially ending the dominant narrative of a 'state' subject in foreign policy. As such, 
Chapters III and VI are considered to supplement the debate on what Jabri calls the 
Britannia? Evaluating the Ethical Dimension in Labour's Foreign Policy" Foreign Policy Centre (2004), 
http: //fpc. org. uk/fsblob/233. pd (accessed 2 June 2004). 
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"restyling" of the subject of responsibility in international relations. 1011 There is certainly 
a need for Jabri's restyling of the individual subject, taking it beyond a stale debate 
between cosmopolitans and communitarians. But this thesis offers different possibilities 
for affirming collective subjects in response to a call from the other. 
Despite the undecidability of the subjectivity inscribed in the British and EU texts, it is 
also important to examine how both represent the possibility of enacting ethics and 
foreign policy. In British foreign policy (1997-2006), this possibility was described as a 
responsibility for both 'protecting' and 'saving' others. However, like subjectivity, 
Chapter IV demonstrated this enactment of responsibility to be undecidably im-possible. 
Britain's apparently responsible interventions in other countries in order to 'protect' 
human life were also, by their own logic, an unethical and irresponsible 'attack' upon 
other human lives. Equally, the responsibility to 'save' undermined the logic of its own 
ethicality. The responsible compassion of 'saving' those suffering from poverty and 
disease, as well as for 'saving' the failing states in Africa who produce such suffering, 
was also an irresponsible contempt for the other as other. 
Nonetheless, the unachievable desire for a responsible relation to protect and save the 
other as an other, which cannot be lodged chez soi, "" must not be renounced. The 
optimism of this thesis lies in the promise of such a relation, its perfectibility, and the 
possibility that it can be negotiated through individual ethico-political decisions. An 
indicative sketch illustrating the potential for such a negotiation was given in Chapter 
VI. This retains an openness to inaugurations and inventions of new opportunities for 
enacting responsibility towards the other, possibilities that are, perhaps, less violent, less 
contemptuous and less determined in advance. This relation must remain a perhaps, a 
may be, to come, but negotiation and invention allows that there could be more 
responsibility rather than less. 
1011 See Jabri, "Restyling the Subject of Responsibility in International Relations". 
1012 Derrida, Without Alibi, p. xxxiii. 
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The EU foreign policy text contrasted well with that of the British. The enactment of the 
responsibility espoused was more circumspect and yet increasingly assured. The research 
conducted on the text of EU foreign policy, and reflected in Chapter V, found that 
responsibility was enacted through a hospitable welcoming of neighbouring countries 
and regions into the EU. This can be considered a major contribution to the 
understanding of EU foreign policy, which has not thus far been read as a discourse of 
hospitality. Far from an imposed interpretation, this understanding arises from the 
discourse of key figures who spoke, and where spoken by, the EU text. It also 
contributes to an increased awareness of hospitality as an important concept in IR. While 
largely ignored due to its liminality - what Dillon calls the 'inter' of international 
relations regarding the refugee' 013 _ this thesis makes a case for hospitality's increased 
centrality for the possibility of ethics in world politics. 
A deconstruction of the EU's discourse finds that the hospitality granted through the 
EU's policy of enlargement, its policies towards the Balkans, and the ENP, is also an 
unethical, irresponsible hostility due to the conditions it places on those who seek entry. 
An unconditional hospitality also includes a hostility by endangering the home which 
makes hospitality possible. Yet this undecidable hostipitality is the condition of 
hospitality having a to come. As Deutscher observes, "there is no model hospitality, only 
processes always in the course of perverting and improving, this improvement itself 
containing the risks of perversion". 1014 The indicative negotiation of the promise of 
hospitality in Chapter VI produced precisely such a dangerous rethinking of its im- 
possible undecidability. It opened new im-possibilities for EU foreign policy, 
possibilities of a hospitable welcoming to otherness which remain impossible for the EU 
as it understands itself - both as a geographically and ethically defined 'home'. 
To return to Lord Howe's evocative analogy, the deconstruction and negotiation of the 
undecidable im-possibility of ethics and foreign policy in this thesis offers a way of 
leaving the stone slightly higher up the mountain. The focus of Chapter VI has been on 
1013 Dillon, "The Scandal of the Refugee". 
1014 Deutscher, in Derrida, Deconstruction Engaged, p. 97. 
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how this can be done, not where the stone will necessarily end up. Nonetheless, an 
ethico-political foreign policy of negotiating individual decisions must always retain the 
hope of rolling the stone higher, improving the ethicality of foreign policy and realising 
more responsibility in the relation to otherness. This is only possible through retaining a 
reference in negotiation to the perfectibility and promise of an ethical foreign policy to 
come. 
The fulfilment of this promise must remain something beyond our expectation, a 
messianic without messianism. But the messianic promise remains. The appeal of a 
deconstruction and negotiation of ethics and foreign policy is that it provides a way of 
rolling the Sisyphean stone. Conceived as a movement through undecidability, 
negotiation does not, and cannot, produce an ethical foreign policy and reach the top of 
the mountain. In addition, negotiation always risks the stone rolling further down the 
mountain, producing the worst, most damaging policy which closes towards otherness. 
But because ethics and foreign policy are co-constituted as attempts to differentiate the 
self from the other and relate to this otherness, any foreign policy has little option but to 
roll the stone. Ethics is inherent to foreign policy, but there can be more or less ethical 
ethics. And moving a stone, however ethical, up a mountain is inherently risky. 
Negotiation, nevertheless, provides the possibility of a movement that can be taken as a 
chance as well as a risk. It allows an optimism that the stone can be left higher up the 
mountain than where it was found. 
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